Rivera-Ortiz

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 16 MOTION to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Junta de Libertad Bajo Palabra, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico; We DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth and the Parole Board and DISMISS Plainti ff's claims against Defendants Ortiz-Martinez, Zayas-Figueroa, and Melendez-Rivera for compensation in their official capacities, release from penal custody,and compensation in their individual capacities. We RETAIN Plaintiff's § 1983 claims under the Due Process Clause to recover damages from Ortiz-Martinez, Zayas-Figueroa, and Melendez-Rivera in their individual capacities. We NOTE 23 MOTION requesting Order filed by Juan M. Rivera-Ortiz; 18 INFORMATIVE Motion regarding Eve nts Related to the Parole Board filed by Juan M. Rivera-Ortiz; and 24 MOTION Submitting evidence filed by Juan M. Rivera-Ortiz. The parties are ordered to move this case to conclusion expeditiously. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 4/15/2010.(mrj)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO J U A N M. RIVERA-ORTIZ, P la in tif f , v. C O M M O N W E A L T H OF PUERTO RICO, e t al., D e f e n d a n ts .

C i v il No. 09-2073 (JAF)

O P I N IO N AND ORDER P la in tif f , Juan M. Rivera-Ortiz, brings this case against Defendants, the Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth"), the Junta de Libertad Bajo Palabra ("Parole Board"), G lo ria E. Ortiz-Martínez, Edwin Zayas-Figueroa, and María E. Meléndez-Rivera, under 42 U .S .C . § 1983, alleging delay in Plaintiff's parole proceedings. (Docket Nos. 2; 19.) The C o m m o n w e a lth and the Parole Board ("Movants") move to dismiss per Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 16); Plaintiff opposes (Docket Nos. 20; 21; 22). I. F a c t u a l and Procedural Synopsis W e draw the following facts from Plaintiff's complaint (Docket Nos. 2, 19). For the p u rp o se of addressing a motion to dismiss, we take his factual allegations as true and make all re a s o n a b le inferences in his favor. See Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008).

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 A. R u le 12(b)(1)

-2 -

P la in tif f is an inmate in the penal custody of the Commonwealth confined at the Ponce C o rrec tio n a l Complex. On January 30, 2009, Plaintiff appeared before the Parole Board for c o n sid e ra tio n of his early release. As of the date he filed this action, he had not received word f ro m the Parole Board. Plaintiff has not filed an official complaint through the existing g rie v a n ce procedures at prison because of a shortage of legal staff, but has communicated the s u b s ta n c e of his complaint to the warden. O n October 16, 2009, Plaintiff filed the instant case in federal district court, claiming v i o l a t io n of his right to release following a hearing before the Parole Board and demanding d am ag es pursuant to a judgment previously rendered by this court in favor of Efraín MonteroT o r re s and other prison inmates in Civil Case No. 75-0828. (Docket Nos. 2; 19.) Plaintiff sues O rtíz- M a rtín e z , Zayas-Figueroa, and Meléndez-Rivera in both their official and individual c a p ac itie s. (Id.) Movants moved to dismiss on January 19, 2010 (Docket No. 16), and Plaintiff o p p o s e d on March 4 (Docket No. 21). II. S ta n d a r d for Dismissal

U n d e r Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a movant may challenge the court's s u b je c t-m a tte r jurisdiction by raising a "sufficiency challenge." Valentín v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 2 5 4 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001). Under this approach, the court takes the plaintiff's " ju ris d ic tio n a lly-s ig n if ic a n t facts as true" and "assess[es] whether the plaintiff has propounded

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

-3 -

a n adequate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. The party asserting jurisdiction bears the b u rd e n of showing its existence. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003). A federal district court has an independent obligation to review its subject-matter ju ris d ic tio n over all cases "even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). We may order sua-sponte d is m is s a l if it is evident that we lack the power to decide a case. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. B. R u le 12(b)(6) A defendant may also move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the c o m p la in t, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R . Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing this motion, we "accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, and w e draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [plaintiff]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar F o u n d ., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993). However, mere legal conclusions "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). T h e complaint must demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief" by alleging facts that d ire c tly or inferentially support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. S u lliv a n , 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 5 5 9 (2007)). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair n o tic e of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U .S . 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

-4 -

S u a -s p o n te dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate in limited circumstances. C h u te v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 2002). Before ordering dismissal, a federal court u s u a l ly affords the target an opportunity to address the challenge. Id. No prior notice is n e c es s a ry, however, "[i]f it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending th e complaint would be futile." Id. (quoting González-González v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 3 7 (1st Cir. 2001)). III. A n a l y s is B e c a u s e Plaintiff is pro se, we construe his pleadings more favorably than we would p le a d in g s drafted by an attorney. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, Plaintiff's pro-se s ta tu s does not insulate him from the strictures of procedural and substantive law. See Ahmed v . Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). We discuss in turn Movants' arguments for d is m is s a l and additional grounds that we find favoring dismissal of the case against the re m a in in g Defendants. A. E le v e n th Amendment M o v a n ts contend that they are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh A m e n d m e n t . (Docket No. 16.) Under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is im m u n e from federal-court suits brought by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another S tate ." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). A public institution may also benefit f ro m sovereign immunity if it "is to be treated as an arm [or alter ego] of the State partaking of

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

-5 -

th e State's Eleventh Amendment immunity." Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty., Ltd. v. Tourism C o ., 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. D o yle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). The applicability of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional q u e s tio n . Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). " P u e rto Rico, despite the lack of formal statehood, enjoys the shelter of the Eleventh A m e n d m e n t in all respects." Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983). H o w e v e r, the Commonwealth can waive its sovereign immunity by clearly declaring its intent to submit itself to federal judicial power; participating in a federal program that is expressly c o n d itio n e d upon a waiver of immunity, or affirmatively engaging in litigation. Díaz-Fonseca v . Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). Furthermore, even without a state's consent, f e d e ra l courts may grant prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law . Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). A plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh Amendment b a r by suing responsible persons acting in their official state capacities. Id. at 154. A lth o u g h the Commonwealth has waived its immunity for certain actions in tort, this w a iv e r extends only to suits brought in the Commonwealth's own forums. 32 L.P.R.A. § 3077 (2 0 0 4 ). The statute does not make the Commonwealth amenable to lawsuits in federal district c o u rt. Díaz-Fonseca, 451 F.3d at 33. Furthermore, the Commonwealth has not consented to litig a tio n in this case, and the complaint does not implicate any federal programs that in c o rp o ra te waiver of state sovereign immunity (see Docket Nos. 2; 19). As for the Parole

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

-6 -

B o a rd , we have held that it is an arm of the Commonwealth for the purposes of the Eleventh A m e n d m e n t. Maya-Gambino v. Puerto Rico, No. 09-1117, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28484, at * 5 -1 0 (D.P.R. Mar. 25, 2010). Accordingly, we lack the competence to hear Plaintiff's case a g a in st Movants. As we find that Movants are entitled to sovereign immunity, we need not c o n sid e r their other arguments for dismissal.1 W e next consider the application of sovereign immunity to the individual Defendants in th is case. Defendants Ortiz-Martínez, Zayas-Figueroa, and Meléndez-Rivera have not moved to dismiss the claims against them. (See Docket No. 16.) Given the case law on point, h o w e v e r, it is abundantly clear that they may not be held liable in damages in their official c a p a c itie s . See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 154. We, therefore, dismiss, sua sponte, Plaintiff's c la im s for damages against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. B. F a ilu r e to State a Claim W e observe that Plaintiff's claims in equity and at law suffer from additional defects (D o c k e t Nos. 2; 19). First, Plaintiff seeks an order from this court to enjoin Defendants to r e le a s e him from prison. (Id.) "[A] § 1983 action will not lie when a state prisoner challenges `th e fact or duration of his confinement,' . . . and seeks either `immediate release from prison,' o r the `shortening' of his term of confinement." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)

We note that the Commonwealth has, once again, erroneously argued that we should dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (See Docket No. 16.) Although mandatory, exhaustion is an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise and prove, not a jurisdictional bar. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007).

1

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

-7 -

(q u o tin g Preiser v. Rodríguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482, 489 (1973)). We, therefore, find that Plaintiff h a s failed to plead a legally-cognizable claim for release based on the Parole Board's delay; we d is m is s Plaintiff's equitable claim against Defendants. S e c o n d , Plaintiff demands retrospective damages for the Parole Board's delay in n o tifyi n g him of its decision concerning his request for early release. (Docket Nos. 2; 19.) P la in tif f premises this cause of action upon a prior decision rendered by this court regarding an o ther prison inmate, Montero-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, Civil No. 75-0828. (Id.)

H o w e v e r, claims under § 1983 must be premised upon rights created by federal statute or the U .S . Constitution, not decisional law. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 4 9 3 U.S. 103, 105-06 (1989). We, therefore, dismiss Plaintiff's action against Defendants in s o f a r as his complaint invokes Montero-Torres as the basis for his cause of action. N o tw ith s ta n d in g the foregoing, Plaintiff has apparently stated a claim for deprivation of d u e process through Defendants' failure to notify him of the Parole Board's decision. (See D o c k e t Nos. 2; 19.) While Plaintiff may not recover compensation from individual Defendants in their official capacities, see supra, there is no absolute bar against suing Defendants in their in d iv id u a l capacities for retrospective damages under § 1983. Defendants Ortiz-Martínez, Z ayas- F ig u ero a, and Meléndez-Rivera have thus far neither answered the complaint nor in ter p o se d defenses by motion. We, therefore, allow Plaintiff to prosecute his claims against th e s e three Defendants for compensation for depriving him of due process (Docket Nos. 2; 19).

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

-8 -

IV . C o n c lu s io n A c c o rd in g ly, we hereby GRANT Movants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 16). We D I S M I S S Plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth and the Parole Board (Docket Nos. 2; 1 9 ) and DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Ortiz-Martínez, Zayas-Figueroa, and M e lé n d e z-R iv e ra for compensation in their official capacities, release from penal custody,and c o m p en sation in their individual capacities on the basis of Montero-Torres v. Hernández-Colón, C iv il No. 75-0828 (id.). We RETAIN Plaintiff's § 1983 claims under the Due Process Clause to recover damages from Ortiz-Martínez, Zayas-Figueroa, and Meléndez-Rivera in their in d iv id u a l capacities. We NOTE Plaintiff's informative motions (Docket Nos. 18; 23; 24). T h e parties are ordered to move this case to conclusion expeditiously. I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 15 th day of April, 2010. S /J o s é Antonio Fusté J O S E ANTONIO FUSTE Chief U.S. District Judge