Rivera-Ortiz

Filing 51

OPINION AND ORDER granting 40 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Maria E. Melendez-Rivera, Edwin Zayas-Figueroa, Gloria E Ortiz-Martinez. Judgment shall enter dismissing the present case in its entirety. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 4/18/2011.(mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JUAN M. RIVERA-ORTIZ,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF)

v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

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Plaintiff, Juan M. Rivera-Ortiz, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

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Defendants, Gloria E. Ortiz-Martínez, María Meléndez-Rivera, and Edwin Zayas-Figueroa

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(“Movants”), alleging violations of his constitutional rights arising from an alleged delay in the

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resolution of his parole hearing. (Docket No. 19.) Movants request summary judgment,

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asserting quasi-judicial immunity and Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can

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be granted. (Docket No. 40.) Plaintiff opposes. (Docket No. 50.)

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I.

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Factual and Procedural Summary

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On October 9, 2009, while still an inmate at Puerto Rico’s Ponce Correctional Institute,

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Plaintiff filed the case before us. (Docket No. 19.) Plaintiff alleged that the Junta de Libertad

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Bajo Palabra (“Parole Board”) held his parole hearing on January 30, 2009, but subsequently

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failed to issue a disposition. (Id.) Plaintiff named as defendants the Commonwealth of Puerto

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF)

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Rico, the Parole Board, and the individual members of the Parole Board. He sought both an

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order releasing him from custody and $75,000 in damages. (Id.)

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On April 15, 2010, we issued an opinion and order dismissing, on grounds of sovereign

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immunity, all claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Parole Board, and the

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individual Parole Board members in their official capacities. (Docket No. 25.) Movants now

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seek summary judgment on the remaining claims against them in their personal capacities.

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(Docket No. 40.)

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II.

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Rule 56 Summary Judgment

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We grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

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and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual

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dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party and “material” if it potentially

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affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.

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2004). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we view the record in the light most

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favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

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The movant carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any

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material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “Once the moving party has

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made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must

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‘produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF)

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issue.’” Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Triangle Trading Co.

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v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)). The nonmovant “may not rely merely on

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allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts

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showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

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III.

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Analysis

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Because Plaintiff appears pro se, we construe his filings more favorably than we would

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those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless,

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Plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying with procedural and substantive

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law. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997).

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Plaintiff seeks $75,000 in damages for the alleged violations of his rights. Movants

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assert that they are immune from damages claims brought against them in their personal

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capacities, citing Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Board Members, 815 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1987).

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In Johnson, the First Circuit held that, because of their quasi-judicial role, members of the

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Rhode Island Parole Board were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all actions taken

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within the scope of their official duties. See id. at 6–8. The First Circuit joined the Ninth

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Circuit in qualifying that absolute immunity would be granted only for actions within the scope

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of a parole board member’s official duties, “i.e., in processing parole applications and deciding

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whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole.” Id. at 6.

Civil No. 09-2073 (JAF)

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It is clear from the record that the Movants performed the same quasi-judicial functions

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of processing and deciding parole applications as performed by the Rhode Island Parole Board

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members in Johnson. Furthermore, Plaintiff makes no argument that the alleged delay in

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holding his initial hearing was attributable to an action outside the scope of Movants’ duties.

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(See Docket No. 50.) We find that Movants’ quasi-judicial role confers absolute immunity

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upon them for their actions in this case. Having decided that Movants are immune from suit,

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we need not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claims of violations of his constitutional rights.

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IV.

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Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT Movants’ request for summary judgment
(Docket No. 40). We DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint (Docket No. 19) against Movants.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 18 th day of April, 2011.

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s/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
Chief U.S. District Judge