Grajales et al v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority et al
Filing
145
OPINION AND ORDER re 132 Motion to Amend/Correct. The Court GRANTS plaintiff Grajales' motion to amend the complaint. The plaintiff will file a final version of his third amended complaint devoid of corrections and deletions no later than 8/31/2012. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 08/27/2012. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DANIEL GRAJALES,
WANDA GONZALEZ and CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZALEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL NO. 09-2075 (FAB)
PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, et.
al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Daniel Grajales’ (“Grajales”),
Wanda Gonzalez’s (“Gonzalez”), and their conjugal partnership’s1
motion to amend their complaint once again.
(Docket No. 132.)
Having considered the proposed amended complaint, (Docket No. 1321), the defendants’ opposition, (Docket Nos. 137 & 140), and the
plaintiff’s replies to defendants’ opposition, (Docket Nos. 142 &
144), the Court GRANTS the motion to amend the complaint.
DISCUSSION
I.
Background
On October 16, 2009, plaintiff Grajales filed a complaint
against the defendants.
1
(Docket No. 1.)
The complaint included a
Because the claims of Grajales’ wife are wholly derivative, the
Court will refer to Grajales as if he were the only plaintiff.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
2
general claim for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. sections
1983 and 1985, state claims for damages under the tort statutes of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Puerto Rico Law No. 100 for
alleged discrimination. Id. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
pursuant to a court order on February 26, 2010.
(Docket No. 31.)
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on September 27, 2010.
(Docket
No.
66.)
The
second
amended
complaint
included
as
defendants the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (“PRPA”), a public
corporation, and co-defendants Alvaro Pilar-Vilagran (“Pilar”),
Miguel Alcover-Colon (“Alcover”), Elmer Emeric-Oliver (“Emeric”),
Gonzalo
Gonzalez-Santini
(“Travieso”),
capacities
among
(“Gonzalez-Santini”),
others
(collectively,
in
their
Carlos
official
“defendants”).
and
(Docket
Travieso
personal
No.
66.)
Plaintiff Grajales argued in the second amended complaint that
defendants subjected him to political discrimination through a
variety of occurrences.
On
January
magistrate judge.
13,
Id.
2010,
the
Court
(Docket No. 23.)
referred
the
case
to
a
Among several other motions
that were filed and disposed of, defendants filed a motion for a
judgment on the pleadings on December 9, 2010, and alleged that the
plaintiff’s second amended complaint failed to set forth sufficient
factual content to state a plausible claim for relief.
No. 82.)
(Docket
On January 25, 2011, the magistrate judge recommended
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
3
that the Court grant the motion.
(Docket No. 103.)
On March 3,
2011, the Court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge
and entered judgment.
(Docket Nos. 110 & 112.)
On June 13, 2012,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Court’s opinion on
the plaintiff’s political discrimination claim and remanded for
further proceedings.
(Docket Nos. 126 & 127.)
On August 2, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to amend and
correct his complaint.
(Docket No. 132.)
Plaintiff argues that
while the case was on appeal, the PRPA wrongfully fired him.2
at p. 1.
2
Id.
Therefore, he wants to amend the complaint to add a
Grajales filed two letters from the PRPA - one from March 2011
and one from May 2011 - written wholly in Spanish unaccompanied by
any English translation. (Docket No. 142-1 at pp. 7-11 and pp. 1314.)
The Court, however, will not consider the letters until
plaintiff files English versions pursuant to Local Rule 5(g) (“All
documents not in the English language which are presented or filed,
whether as evidence or otherwise, must be accompanied by a
certified translation into English prepared by an interpreters
certified by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
Certification by a federally-certified interpreter may be waived
upon stipulation by all parties.”); see also 48 U.S.C. § 864 (“All
pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English
language.”) The rule has been enforced in cases, like this one,
where the Spanish language documents are key to the outcome of the
proceedings. Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party v. Dalmau, 544
F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2008).
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
4
wrongful dismissal claim to defendant PRPA3 and add his children as
plaintiffs in the suit for damages.
Id.
On August 15, 2012, defendant PRPA filed an opposition to
plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint.
(Docket No. 137.)
The
Court ordered plaintiffs to respond to the defendants’ opposition
by
August
defendants
17,
2012.
PRPA,
(Docket
Pilar,
No.
Alcover,
138.)
On
Emeric,
August
16,
Vilagran,
2012,
Gonzalez
Santini, and Travieso filed a motion supplementing their response
in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.
(Docket No. 140.)
With that motion, the defendants also filed a
copy of a letter authored by the plaintiff’s counsel.
(Docket No.
140-1.) On August 17, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion in compliance
3
In the third amended complaint, the plaintiff lists the new
plaintiffs in the caption and text of the complaint, (see Docket
No. 132-1 at p. 1 and ¶ 4), but fails to include any new defendants
in the caption and fails to list them in the third amended
complaint along with the other defendants (see Docket No. 132-1 at
pp. 1-3). In his March 13, 2012 letter, plaintiff Grajales states
that “all defendants to be named in said claim to be filed . . .
will be attorney Hilda Rodriguez Manzano of the PRPA legal
department and Mr. Jorge Santiago Marrero (Chago), former Aguadilla
Airport Manager, and the Puerto Rico Port Authority (PRPA).” In
the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendants’ motion supplementing
their response, however, plaintiff indicates that “the proposed
third amended complaint, as it pertains to the wrongful discharge
and all of the allegations addressing said issue are addressed only
to the [PRPA].” (Docket No. 144 at p. 3.) Therefore, the Court
will also only address the wrongful dismissal claim with regards to
defendant PRPA.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
5
with the Court’s order to reply to defendants’ opposition to amend
the complaint.
(Docket No. 142.)
The defendants argue that plaintiff’s third amended complaint,
which plaintiff tendered with their motion, is a working draft with
corrections and deletions, and, therefore, fails to comply with the
Court’s Local Rules of redaction.
(Docket No. 137 at ¶ 3.)
Second, the defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to file his
complaint
within
the
section 1983 claims.
plaintiff
one-year
statute
Id. at ¶¶ 4 & 9.
Grajales
was
fired
from
of
limitations
for
The defendants contend that
his
job
as
the
security
supervisor on May 20, 2011, which was over a year from the date
when plaintiff filed his motion to amend the complaint on August 2,
2012.
Id. at ¶ 4.
The defendants admit that plaintiff sent them
a letter prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations,
which plaintiff argues tolled the statute of limitations.
No. 140 at ¶¶ 3-4.)
(Docket
The defendants claim, however, that the
plaintiff’s letter fails to comply with the Puerto Rico tolling
statute for damages claims, Article 1873 of the Civil Code, P.R.
Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5303.
(Docket No. 140 at ¶¶ 3-4.)
Thus, the
defendants request that the Court deny the plaintiff’s motion to
file a third amended complaint to add the wrongful dismissal claim.
The Court finds the defendants’ arguments unavailing and will
address each argument in turn.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
II.
6
Legal Analysis
A.
Applicable Law Governing Statute of Limitations
A section 1983 claim is a federal claim and “federal law
determines the date on which the claim accrued.” Santana-Castro v.
Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 114 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citation
and quotations omitted).
The statute of limitations period starts
running when a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis for his claim.”
Id. (internal citation and
quotations omitted). The statute of limitations and tolling rules,
however,
are
provisions
drawn
are
from
state
consistent
law,
with
as
long
underlying
as
the
tolling
federal
policy.
Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir.
2011) (internal citations omitted); see also Nieves-Vega v. OrtizQuiñones, 443 F.3d 134, 137-38 (1st Cir. 2006).
Here, Puerto
Rico’s one-year statute of limitations governing tort actions
applies to plaintiff’s claim.
parties do not dispute this.
Rodriguez, 659 F.3d at 173.
The
In Puerto Rico, the applicable
provisions for tolling are located in article 1873 of the Civil
Code.
See P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5303.
Article 1873 provides
three ways that a plaintiff can toll the statute of limitations:
“Prescription of actions is interrupted by
their institution before the courts, by
extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and by
any act of acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.” Id.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
7
Only one method - the sending of an “extrajudicial” letter - is
applicable in this case.
“[A] letter sent by a tort plaintiff to
the tortfeasor, complaining of the tortious conduct and demanding
compensation is an extrajudicial claim that, if timely, interrupts
the prescription of the cause of action in tort.”
Santana-Castro,
579 F.3d at 114 (citing Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Perez y
Cia. de P.R., Inc., 142 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1998)).
an
extrajudicial
letter
only
has
a
tolling
effect
Therefore,
if
it
is
“identical” to a complaint that is then filed. Santana-Castro, 579
F.3d at 114 (internal citations omitted).
An extrajudicial letter
is “identical” to a subsequently filed complaint if it meets three
elements: 1) the extrajudicial letter and complaint seeks the same
kind of relief; 2) “[t]he causes of action asserted [in the
complaint] must be based on the same substantive claims” as those
asserted in the letter; and 3) “provided that other Puerto Rico
tolling statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds, they
must
be
asserted
against
the
same
defendants
capacities; new defendants should not be added.”
in
the
same
Id. (internal
citations omitted).
The
Puerto
Rico
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
when
considering whether the identicality requirements are met, the main
principle to keep in mind is whether the letter gives “fair notice
of the claims that are subsequently raised.”
Santana-Castro, 579
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
8
F.3d at 115 (citing Cintron v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27
P.R. Offic. Trans. 582, 1990 WL 658719 (1990)); see also RodriguezGarcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 97 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“The
identicality
requirement
prevents
plaintiffs
from
circumventing the notice function of the statutes of limitations by
asserting different claims in belated federal court complaints.”).
B.
Plaintiff Grajales’ “Extrajudicial” Letter
The letter sent by Plaintiff Grajales’ counsel on March
13, 2012, meets all three of the identicality requirements, and,
therefore, tolls the one-year statute of limitations against PRPA.
1.
Whether the Same Relief Was Sought
First, plaintiff’s letter and the third amended
complaint seek the same relief.
Defendants contend that the
plaintiff’s letter seeks different relief from the third amended
complaint.
(Docket No. 140 at p. 4.)
They argue that in the March
13, 2012, letter, plaintiff sought “relief” in the form of “a
meeting to discuss the issue of plaintiff Grajales’s termination.”
Id.
They also argue that “[a]t no moment throughout the six page
letter [do plaintiffs ask] for monetary indemnification and for
costs
and
attorney’s
complaint . . .”
Id.
fees
as
they
did
in
the
federal
court
Defendant fails to address, however, all of
the details that plaintiff sets out in his letter.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
9
While the plaintiff did ask to set up a meeting in
the letter, he first specified that the letter’s purpose is to give
“formal notice of a potential judicial claim in connection with the
wrongful termination of Mr. Daniel Grajales on May 20, 2011.”
(Docket No. 140-1 at p. 1.) Contrary to the defendant’s claim that
the plaintiff does not ask for monetary indemnification, the
plaintiff specifies that both he and his children “have suffered
severe damages which include but are not limited to psychological
and emotional damages, expenses, loss of income, medical expenses
and loss of future income.”
a
variety
of
laws
Id.
Furthermore, the plaintiff lists
that covers his
claim,
including specific
articles of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, federal law, and the Puerto
Rico and United States Constitutions.
Id. at pp. 1-2.
While the
defendants could have argued - but they did not do so - that the
request for damages and statement of which laws the claims fall
under might be too general, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated that the plaintiff has some room to vary between the letter
and the complaint as long as the plaintiff puts defendant on notice
of a potential lawsuit for damages. See Rodriguez-Garcia, 354 F.3d
at 98 (holding that the allegation of damages alone is sufficient
to give defendants the required notice that they might have to
defend a damages lawsuit) (internal citation omitted); see also
Santana-Castro,
579
F.3d
at
115
(finding
that
even
though
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
10
plaintiff’s letter states a different amount of damages than the
complaint, plaintiff still meets the first identicality requirement
because the letter put defendant on notice of a potential lawsuit
for damages). Plaintiff’s letter certainly gives defendants notice
that there is a potential lawsuit involving damages because, after
writing several sentences on the aforementioned items, plaintiff
then states “[y]ou are hereby also placed on notice that all
defendants to be named in said claim to be filed in the United
States (sic) District Court will be . . .” and proceeds to list the
names of the possible defendants.
(Docket No. 40-1 at p. 2.)
Defendants do not dispute this; in fact, defendants acknowledge
that plaintiff said he would file a complaint if defendants made no
attempt to discuss the issues in the letter.
¶ 11.)
(Docket No. 140 at
Therefore, the plaintiff meets the first identicality
requirement he seeks the same relief in both the letter and the
subsequent complaint.
2.
Whether the Causes of Actions Are Based on the Same
Substantive Claims
The
Court
finds
that
plaintiff’s
letter
and
subsequent complaint assert the same substantive claims. Plaintiff
explained in sufficient detail
“to put defendant on notice of the
general nature of [his] claims”.
116 (internal citation omitted).
Santana-Castro, 579 F.3d at 115Both claims “rely on the same
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
11
substantive legal ground.” Rodriguez-Garcia, 354 F.3d at 98. Both
the letter and the complaint assert that the PRPA wrongfully
terminated Grajales from his position under the pretense that he
was insubordinate when the real reason for his termination was his
political affiliation.
(Docket Nos. 140-1 at p. 1 and Docket
No. 132-1 at ¶¶ 55-61.)
Although plaintiff’s letter did not
expressly refer to the exact constitutional provisions or federal
laws under which he would file the claim, plaintiff certainly
provided defendants with enough facts to put them on notice about
what kind of claim the plaintiff would file in court. Furthermore,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “the substance
of the claims alleged” is not affected when a plaintiff does not
specifically refer to particular sections of the United States Code
or other procedural vehicles.
Rodriguez-Garcia, 354 F.3d at 99.
The plaintiff clearly stated in his letter that he has a “potential
judicial claim in connection with [his] wrongful termination . . .
[which]
arises
out
discrimination . . .”
of
a
history
of
political
(Docket No. 140-1 at p. 1.)
persecution,
Furthermore, he
provided nearly four pages of facts, most of which are also
included
complaint.
nearly
verbatim,
in
the
subsequent
third
amended
Therefore, plaintiff Grajales’ causes of action in his
letter and complaint were based on the same substantive claims.
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
3.
12
Whether the Claims Are Asserted Against the Same
Defendants in the Same Capacities
Finally, the Court also finds that plaintiff asserts
claims against the same defendants in the same capacities in his
amended
complaint
as
he
did
in
his
March
13,
2012
letter.
Defendants argue that, with regards to this third prong, plaintiff
did not address the letter to “any of the current defendants in the
instant case.
Said letter was sent to three persons none of which
is a party in the instant case.”
(Docket No. 140 at ¶ 9.)
The
requirement, however, is not that plaintiff must make claims
against
the
complaint.
same
defendants
Indeed,
the
that
he
defendants
listed
admit
in
that
the
original
it
is
the
extrajudicial claim - here, the letter - that must assert the
claims against the same defendants in the same capacities as the
subsequent complaint.
Id. at ¶ 6.
The plaintiff, therefore, has
met this third requirement because he listed out three potential
defendants - Hilda Rodriguez Manzano (“Rodriguez”) of the PRPA
legal department;
Jorge
Santiago
Marrero
(“Santiago”),
former
Aguadilla Airport Manager, and the PRPA - and asserts that he would
bring suit for damages against these three defendants in his
March 13, 2012, letter.
(Docket No. 140-1 at pp. 1-2.)
In his
third amended complaint, he adds facts about Rodriguez, Santiago,
and the PRPA, (see Docket No. 132-1), but is only bringing the
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
13
wrongful dismissal claim against defendant PRPA.4
While he is not
bringing claims against all of the listed defendants in the letter,
he
is
not
adding
any
additional
defendants.
Therefore,
the
plaintiff has met the third requirement for identicality in order
to toll the statute of limitations against PRPA.
Because
plaintiff
has
met
the
identicality
requirements to toll the statute of limitations, the Court will
grant plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to include the
factual
allegations
for
a
wrongful
termination
claim
against
defendant PRPA. Plaintiff’s extrajudicial letter, however, has not
identified any claims with regards to any of the other original
defendants in the second amended complaint.
pp. 1-2.)
(Docket No. 140-1 at
Thus, no tolling of the statute of limitations occurs
with regards to any claims against the other defendants listed in
the second amended complaint and plaintiff may not bring a wrongful
termination claim against them.
Only the section 1983 claim for
political discrimination based on plaintiff’s transfer to the
Mercedita
airport in
Ponce,
the
removal
of
his
sidearm,
the
negative performance evaluations, and threats of suspension and
termination remain against the rest of the defendants.
4
Therefore,
As mentioned above, plaintiff has clarified that he is only
bringing the wrongful termination claim against defendant PRPA.
(Docket No. 144 at p. 3.)
Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)
14
the wrongful termination claim will only be brought against the
PRPA and no other defendant listed in the second amended complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
expressed,
the
Court
Grajales’ motion to amend the complaint.
a
final
version
of
his
third
amended
GRANTS
plaintiff
The plaintiff will file
complaint
devoid
corrections and deletions no later than August 31, 2012.
of
Once the
third amended complaint is filed, a scheduling order will issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 27, 2012.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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