Grajales et al v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority et al

Filing 247

OPINION AND ORDER re 184 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court DENIES defendant PRPA's motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 02/13/2013. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DANIEL GRAJALES,
WANDA GONZALEZ and CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP GRAJALES-GONZALEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL NO. 09-2075 (FAB)

PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, et
al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Puerto Rico Ports Authority’s
motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds.
No. 184.)

(Docket

Having considered the motion and plaintiffs’ response,

(Docket No. 200), the Court DENIES defendant PRPA’s motion.
DISCUSSION
I.

Procedural Background
On October 16, 2009, plaintiff Daniel Grajales (“Grajales”),

his

wife

Wanda

Gonzalez

(“Gonzalez”),

and

their

partnership1 filed a complaint against the defendants.
No. 1.)

conjugal
(Docket

The complaint included a general claim for civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, state claims for

1

Because the claims of Grajales’ wife are wholly derivative,
the Court will refer to Grajales as if he were the only plaintiff.

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

2

damages under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
Puerto Rico Law No. 100 for alleged discrimination. Id. Plaintiff
Grajales filed an amended complaint pursuant to a court order on
February 26, 2010.

(Docket No. 31.)

complaint on September 27, 2010.

He filed a second amended

(Docket No. 66.)

The second

amended complaint included as defendants the Puerto Rico Ports
Authority (“PRPA”), a public corporation, and co-defendants Alvaro
Pilar-Vilagran (“Pilar”), Miguel Alcover-Colon (“Alcover”), Elmer
Emeric-Oliver

(“Emeric”),

Gonzalo

Gonzalez-Santini

(“Gonzalez-

Santini”), Carlos Travieso (“Travieso”), among others, in their
official and personal capacities (collectively, “defendants”).
(Docket

No.

66.)

Plaintiff

Grajales

argues

that

defendants

subjected him to political discrimination through a variety of
occurrences.

Id.

On August 31, 2012, plaintiff Grajales filed a

third amended complaint.

(Docket No. 146.)

In the third amended

complaint, he added a wrongful termination claim against defendant
PRPA and added his minor children, ZGG, DGG, and CGG as plaintiffs
in the suit for damages.

See id.

On November 30, 2012, defendant PRPA filed a motion for
summary judgment.

(Docket No. 184.)

It argues that the doctrines

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

3

of res judicata,2 collateral estoppel, and fragmentation estoppel3
apply

to

dismissed.

this
Id.

case,

and

that

therefore,

the

case

should

be

It also contends that because the federal claims

should be dismissed, all of the supplemental state law claims
should be dismissed as well.

Id.

On December 28, 2012, plaintiff

Grajales responded to defendant PRPA’s motion for summary judgment.
(Docket No. 200.)

He argues that both the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in this case, id. at
pp. 11-17, and requests that the Court deny defendant PRPA’s motion
for summary judgment.

Id. at p. 18.

For the reasons discussed

herein, the Court DENIES defendant PRPA’s motion for summary
judgment because of res judicata.
II.

Factual Background
On May 20, 2011, plaintiff Grajales received a termination

letter which dismissed him from his employment at defendant PRPA.
(Docket No. 184-2.)

At the time, he was a security supervisor at

the Aguadilla airport.

Id.

On March 13, 2012, plaintiff’s

2

Res Judicata is an affirmative defense that must stated when
a party responds to a pleading.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1).
In its
answer to plaintiff’s third amended complaint, defendant PRPA
states that plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata. (Docket No. 173 at pp. 8-9.) It reiterates these claims
in its motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 184.)
3

Defendant PRPA’s “fragmentation estoppel” argument is, in
essence, a restatement of his claim preclusion argument.

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

4

attorney wrote an extrajudicial letter to defendant PRPA, which had
a

tolling

effect

on the

one-year

plaintiff’s cause of action.

statute

of

limitations

for

(See Docket Nos. 142-1, 145, & 184-

2.)
On April 12, 2012, plaintiff Grajales filed a complaint in the
Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Aguadilla Superior Division
against defendant PRPA, claiming that he was wrongfully fired from
his job pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 115, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29,
§ 194 (“Law 115”).
No. 184-3 at p. 5.)

Id. at pp. 5-9.

(“Law 115 case”).

(See Docket

On May 25, 2012, the Secretary of Labor and

Human Resources of Puerto Rico (“Secretary of Labor”) filed a
complaint on behalf of plaintiff Grajales also in the Puerto Rico
Court

of

First

Instance,

Aguadilla

defendant PRPA (“Law 115 case”).

Superior

Division

against

(See Docket No. 184-6 at p. 5.)

In that complaint, the Secretary of Labor contends that plaintiff
Grajales was wrongfully dismissed in violation of Puerto Rico
Law 16, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 361 (“Law 16”).

Id. at pp. 5-8.

In August 2012, within two days of each other, the Secretary
of Labor and plaintiff Grajales submitted motions to dismiss the
Law 16 and the Law 115 cases without prejudice.
at p. 2; 184-7 at p. 2).

(Docket No. 184-4

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

5

III. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A fact is “material” if it has the potential

to “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Id.

A dispute is “genuine” when it “could be resolved in favor of
either party.”

Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d

6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden
of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.”
party

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
must

evidence.

demonstrate

this

through

definite

and

The

competent

See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576,

581 (1st Cir. 1994). It must identify “portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any’” which support its motion.
Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

Once a properly supported motion

has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party “to
demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its]
favor.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d
46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

6

If the non-moving party establishes uncertainty as to the
“true state of any material fact, the movant’s efforts should be
deemed unavailing.”

See Lopez & Medina Corp, v. Marsh USA, Inc.,

694 F. Supp. 2d. 119, 123 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing Suarez v. Pueblo
Int’l., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).

It is well-settled that

“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient
to

defeat

a

properly

supported

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
opposing

summary

evidence

to

for

summary

judgment.

It is therefore necessary that “a party

judgment

rebut

motion

the

must

‘present

motion.’”

definite,

competent

Maldonado-Denis

v.

Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal
citation omitted).
the

non-moving

Otherwise, summary judgment is appropriate if

party’s

case

rests

merely

upon

“conclusory

allegations, improbable references, and unsupported speculation.”
Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayagüez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st
Cir. 2006).
IV.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court denies defendant PRPA’s motion for summary judgment.

Neither the defendant nor the plaintiff has put the Court in a
position to decide the merits of the motion; the filings of both
parties

are

insufficient.

While

defendant

PRPA

provides

a

certified translation of one Supreme Court of Puerto Rico case on
which it relies, (see Docket No. 184-9 at p. 1), it cites to

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

7

several other cases repeatedly and discusses them in detail without
providing the Court with any certified translation, (see Docket
No. 184).

Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion to summary

judgment fares no better:

he also discusses several Puerto Rico

cases in detail but does not provide the Court with any certified
translations.

(See Docket No. 200.)

Instead of citing relevant

authority, plaintiff cites to his own set of material facts as
proof of his arguments in his response to defendant’s motion for
summary judgement.

Id.

Furthermore, plaintiff filed what appears

to be a copy of the court of appeals docket for one of the
Aguadilla Superior Court cases, which is completely in Spanish with
no English translation.

(Docket No. 200-2 at pp. 2-4.)

“All

pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English
language.”

48 U.S.C. § 864. In applying this provision, the First

Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[it] ha[s] enforced the
rule where the Spanish language document or matter is key to the
outcome of the proceedings in the district court.”
F.3d at 67.

Dalmau, 544

Even were the Court to consider those cases and other

documents, it still would not be in a position to reach the merits
of the motion because of the lack of material facts and the paucity
of case law and analysis by both sides.

It is black-letter law

“that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by

Civil No. 09-2075 (FAB)

8

some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

U.S.

A party may not merely

“mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the
Court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument,
and put flesh on its bones.

Id.

“Judges are not mind-readers, so

parties must spell out their issues clearly, highlighting the
relevant facts and analyzing on-point authority.”

Rodriguez v.

Munic. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, the Court DENIES defendant PRPA’s
motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 13, 2013.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE