Acevedo-Concepcion et al v. Irizarry-Mendez et al

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 17 Motion to Dismiss. Partial Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 12/29/2011. (RJC) Modified on 12/30/2011 to correct title(ab).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

ACEVEDO-CONCEPCION, et al,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
v.
IRIZARRY-MENDEZ, et al,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 17). For the reasons stated below,
the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs state that they were all hired and appointed to
career positions within the Puerto Rico Department of Family
Services

(the

“Department”)

between

July

and

September

2008.

(Docket No. 1, p.5). Shortly thereafter, Luis Fortuño-Burset was
elected

Governor

January

2009.

of

Id.

Puerto

Rico,

Governor

and

Fortuño

entered

then

in

appointed

office

on

Yanitzia

Irizarry-Mendez as Secretary of the Department. Id. As part of
an

effort

to

address

the

Puerto

Rico

government’s

financial

situation, Governor Fortuño signed into law Act No. 7 of March

2 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

9, 2009 (“Act 7”). The enforcement of this law resulted in the
dismissal of thousands of government employees. In May 2009, CoDefendant Irizarry handed Plaintiffs a letter that notified them
of their dismissal pursuant to Law 7. (Id. p.6).
In essence, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants discriminated
against Plaintiffs on the basis of their political affiliation
and that they were deprived of their jobs without due process of
law. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 22). Plaintiffs contend that, although
dismissals authorized by Act 7 were to be made on the basis of
seniority, the government did not “make a scientific study of
the seniority status of the employees before determining who
would be dismissed.” (Id., ¶¶ 24-25). Furthermore, at no point
did the government make this data available to the employees.
(Id., ¶ 26). Finally, the government did not afford Plaintiffs a
meaningful

opportunity

to

question

the

decision

to

terminate

them from employment. (Id., ¶ 27).
On November 5, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed the complaint at
bar.

Named

as

co-defendants

were

Yanitsia

Irizarry-Mendez

(“Irizarry”), in her personal and official capacity as Secretary
of the Department; and Esteban Pérez Ubieta (“Pérez”), in his
personal

and

official

capacity

as

Administrator

of

the

Department. The complaint was also directed against Irizarry and
Perez’s respective conjugal partnerships. Plaintiffs allege that
their civil rights were violated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

3 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

1983, 1985 and 2000(d); and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

to

the

Constitution

of

the

United

States.

Additionally, Plaintiffs invoke supplemental jurisdiction as to
their

claims

damages,

under

along

Puerto

with

an

law.1

Rico

injunction

Plaintiffs
ordering

seek

money

Defendants

to

reinstate Plaintiffs to their jobs. (Docket No. 1). Defendants
now

move

the

Court

to

dismiss

the

above-captioned

complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 17).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v.

Twombly,

550

U.S.

544,

570

(2007);

see

also

Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
In Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2011), the First Circuit distilled from Twombly and Iqbal a two                                                            
1

Plaintiffs bring causes of action under Sections 1, 4, 6 and 7 of Article II

of

the

Constitution

of

the

Commonwealth

of

Puerto

Rico

and

under

the

following Puerto Rico laws, copied verbatim from the complaint: “Law No. 114
of May 7, 1942, 29 L.P.R.A. ' 140 et seq.; Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, 29
L.P.R.A. ' 146 et seq.; Law No. 5 of October, 14, 1975, as amended, 3
L.P.R.A. ' 1331 et seq.; Art. 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31
L.P.R.A. ' 5141.” (Docket No. 1, ¶ 48-49).

4 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

pronged test designed to measure the sufficiency of a complaint.
First,

the

reviewing

court

must

identify

and

disregard

“statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions
couched as fact, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (internal
punctuation

omitted).

In

this

analysis,

the

remaining

non-

conclusory factual allegations must be taken as true, even if
they are “seemingly incredible,” or that “actual proof of those
facts is improbable.” Id. Finally, the court must assess whether
the facts taken as a whole “state a plausible, not merely a
conceivable, case for relief.” Id.
In

conducting

this

test,

a

court

must

not

attempt

to

forecast the likelihood of success even if recovery is remote
and unlikely. Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12. Thus, “[t]he
relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference
of liability that the plaintiff is asking the Court to draw from
the facts alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 13.
ANALYSIS
We start by addressing the core of Plaintiffs’ complaint:
their

claims

of

political

discrimination

under

the

First

Amendment, and of violations of due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

5 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
Political Discrimination

A prima facie case of political discrimination under the
First

Amendment

consists

of

four

elements:

“(1)

that

the

plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations,
(2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's affiliation,
(3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for
the adverse employment action.” Lamboy–Ortiz v. Ortiz–Vélez, 630
F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010). The complaint solidly establishes
the

existence

of

elements

one

and

three.

Specifically,

the

complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are “persons identified with
the Popular Democratic Party (PDP),” and that both Co-Defendants
are “members of the NPP, a fact well known in [their] workplace
and

in

[their

unquestioned
action

communities].”

that

because

(Id.

Plaintiffs

they

were

laid

¶¶

suffered
off

in

4,
an

31-32).

It

adverse

2009.

is

also

employment

(Docket

No.

17,

p.14). Thus, prongs two and four of the Lamboy-Ortiz test remain
to

be

determined;

namely,

whether

Co-Defendants

Irizarry

and

Pérez were aware of the Plaintiffs’ political affiliation, and
whether that was the motivating factor in their dismissal. We
find that the complaint fails to satisfy either requirement.
Plaintiff’s only explicit statement as to Co-Defendants’
awareness of their political affiliation is that they are “all

6 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

active members of the PDP, a fact well known in their workplaces
and in their communities.” (Docket No. 1, ¶ 33). We already
noted

that

Lamboy-Ortiz

the

complaint

test

by

satisfied

stating

the

that

first

prong

Plaintiffs

were

of

the

persons

identified with the PDP. Paragraph thirty-three of the complaint
merely adds that this fact was “well known in their workplaces
and

communities.”

(Cf.

Docket

No.

1,

¶¶

4

and

33).

“[S]ome

allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are
nevertheless
cross

the

so

threadbare

line

between

or
the

speculative

that

conclusory

and

they
the

fail

to

factual.”

Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Paragraph thirty-three
is one of those statements.
In Ocasio-Hernández, the First Circuit required plaintiffs
to plead “discrete factual events” to show that defendants were
aware of plaintiffs’ political beliefs. Ocasio-Hernández, 640
F.3d at 14-15. According to the First Circuit, it was sufficient
for plaintiffs to allege that 1) they were asked by defendants
about “the circumstances pertaining to how and when they got to
work at [the Governor’s mansion];” 2) “that the clerical staff
inquired directly into the plaintiffs' political affiliations;”
and 3) “that employees at [the Governor’s mansion] knew, and
commonly

discussed,

the

political

affiliations

of

their

co-

7 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

workers.” Id. at 15. Here, however, the complaint is bare of
“discrete factual events” that lead us to the same conclusion.
Cf.

Ocasio-Hernández,

640

F.3d

at

14-15.

Plaintiffs

do

not

allege, directly or indirectly, that Co-Defendants had personal
knowledge

of

Plaintiffs’

complaint

supply

a

political

factual

affiliation.

basis

on

which

Nor

the

does

the

Court

can

reasonably infer that either Co-Defendant had any awareness of
Plaintiffs’

political

example,

that

the

commonly

shared

leanings.
political

and

Plaintiffs

never

affiliation

discussed,

or

of

that

allege,

for

employees

was

Co-Defendants

ever

questioned Plaintiffs regarding their preferred political party.
In

any

case,

we

are

not

required

to

“conjure

up

unpled

allegations” to support Plaintiffs’ deficient complaint. Gooley
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). In sum,
the complaint at bar fails to show that Defendants were aware of
Plaintiffs’ political affiliation.
The

complaint

requirement

of

is

also

nowhere

Lamboy-Ortiz;

near

that

meeting

is,

that

the

fourth

political

discrimination was a motivating factor in Plaintiffs’ dismissal.
To make out this facet of the prima facie case, Plaintiffs must
do

more

than

merely

juxtapose

“a

protected

characteristic

-

someone else's politics - with the fact that the plaintiff was

8 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

treated unfairly.” Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212
F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
In

this

regard,

the

complaint

is

bursting

with

legal

conclusions and boilerplate language. For example, Plaintiffs
aver

that

after

the

NPP

assumed

power,

“defendants

began

a

pattern of discrimination and harassment against plaintiffs,”
and continued this pattern until they were terminated in July,
“all

because

of

their

political

affiliation

and

beliefs...”

(Docket No. 1, ¶ 5). Further, that the “actions of defendants
were solely motivated by plaintiffs’ political beliefs.” (Docket
No. 1, ¶ 37). The complaint also asserts, without more, that CoDefendants conspired to discriminate against Plaintiffs for the
same reasons. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 22). However, after trimming the
complaint of legal conclusions and threadbare facts, there is
nothing

left

Plaintiffs’

that

would

termination

allow
was

a

plausible

politically

inference
motivated.

that
“[A]

plaintiff may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and
tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was
motivated

by

a

discriminatory

animus.”

Correa-Martínez

v.

Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990).
Again, we turn to Ocasio-Hernández for guidance in this
analysis. There, plaintiffs stated that rumors spread about a
list

of

PDP-affiliated

workers

who

were

to

be

terminated.

9 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 18. Defendants were also accused
of

making

disparaging

administration,

and

of

remarks

about

inquiring

into

the

previous

plaintiffs’

PDP

political

affiliation. Id. Plaintiffs highlighted that they were fired and
replaced

less

than

ten

weeks

after

Governor

Fortuño

assumed

office. Id. That was enough for the First Circuit to find that
the complaint allowed for a plausible inference of political
discrimination. The instant complaint, however, does not state
an

analogous

inference.

set

At

disregarding

of

most,

the

facts

that

Plaintiffs

procedure

would
charge

spelled

out

allow
the
by

for

the

same

government

with

Act

7

prior

to

Plaintiffs' termination. It is conceivable that this failure was
due to political discrimination. However, Iqbal requires that
the claims be plausible, not merely possible.2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1951 (internal punctuation omitted).
The Court is mindful that heightened specificity is not
necessary; “the statements need only give the defendants fair
notice of what the claim … is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”

Erickson

v.

Pardus,

551

U.S.

89

(2007)

(internal

punctuation omitted). However, a complaint does not suffice when

2

We find it important to note that, since Act 7 authorized dismissals based

on seniority, the span of time of a plaintiff’s employment would be highly
relevant

to

stating

a

plausible

claim

of

discrimination.

However,

the

complaint makes absolutely no mention of how long each plaintiff spent in the
employment of the Department.

10 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

it simply “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal
punctuation omitted). The Court finds that the complaint, taken
as

a

whole,

does

not

state

a

plausible

claim

of

political

discrimination.
Procedural Due Process
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state
a cognizable claim for violations of due process.3 To prevail on
this claim, Plaintiffs must “identify a protected liberty or
property interest, and allege that the defendants, acting under
color

of

state

law,

deprived

them

of

that

interest

without

constitutionally adequate process.” Aponte-Torres v. University
Of

Puerto

Rico,

445

F.3d

50,

56

(1st

Cir.

2006)

(internal

punctuations and citations omitted.) Property interests are not
created by the Constitution, but rather by independent sources
such as state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972). Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, career or tenured employees
have a property right in continued employment. See e.g. Marrero-

3

The

complaint

procedural

or

never

specifies

substantive

in

whether

nature.

the

due

However,

process
the

violations

allegations

in

are
the

complaint outline a violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court will treat them as such.

11 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); Gonzalez v.
Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2004).
From the outset, the complaint states that all Plaintiffs
“occupied career positions within the Family Department,” prior
to

their

Further,

dismissal

Co-Defendants.4

by

Co-Defendants

ostensibly

(Docket

acted

under

No.

1,

color

¶

of

12).
state

law, because the termination letters given to Plaintiffs were
“authorized

by

Act

7,”

and

because

they

were

both

state

officials. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 29). Thus, the issue here is whether
Plaintiffs

were

deprived

of

their

“constitutionally

adequate

process” prior to their termination.
Generally, individuals with a property interest in their
employment are entitled to some sort of hearing prior to their
termination.  Board
Defendants

of

invoke

Regents

the

v.

so-called

Roth,

408

U.S.

at

“reorganization

569-70.

exception”

recognized in Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir. 1989),

4

This is a prime example of a legal conclusion. However, in contrast to their

unsubstantiated

political

discrimination

claims,

Plaintiffs

provide

here

specific factual enhancements allowing the Court to infer that they indeed
were

career

positions

employees.

are

not

of

Namely,
trust

the
and

complaint

states

confidence,

and

that:
they

“Plaintiffs’

did

not

have

responsibilities with respect to policy making, nor did they act as advisors,
nor did they formulate plans for the broad goals of the agency, nor did they
occupy any confidential relationship to the policy making process, nor did
they

have

any

access

to

confidential

information

policy making decisions.” (Docket 1, ¶ 41).

[that]

could

influence

12 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

for the proposition that not all employees are entitled to a
pre-termination

hearing.

This

exception

applies

when

a

reorganization or cost-cutting measure results in the dismissal
of employees, as long as those measures are not pretext for
unlawful political discrimination. Id. Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, counter that regardless of the “reorganization exception,”
Defendants did not follow the procedure for layoffs contemplated
by

Act

7.

Specifically,

the

complaint

stresses

that

Act

7

authorizes the dismissal of employees strictly on a seniority
basis

(Docket

provided

to

No.

1,

Plaintiffs

p.

6);

in

that

order

no

to

seniority

ascertain

lists

whether

were
their

seniority status had been properly recognized (Id.); that the
government had failed to make a study of seniority status before
determining

who

would

be

dismissed

(Id.);

and

that

the

government did not afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to question
the decision to terminate them based on their alleged seniority
status. (Id.).
In our view, Defendants’ argument is unavailing. According
to Defendants, Act 7 was a “cost-cutting measure taken as part
of

a

reorganization

plan.”

(Docket

17,

p.16).

However,

the

complaint clearly establishes that the government did not follow
the procedures contemplated by Act 7 in dismissing Plaintiffs.
We fail to see how the Duffy “reorganization exception” allows

13 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

the government to sidestep the procedural safeguards implemented
by the very statute that allows for cost-cutting layoffs in the
first

place.

The

Court

therefore

finds

that

the

complaint

establishes a plausible procedural due process violation claim.
Section 1983 claim against defendants in their personal capacity
Our

analysis

under

due

process

must

continue,

however,

because Plaintiffs also seek damages against defendants Irizarry
and Perez in their personal capacity based on section 1983. This
statute creates “no independent substantive right, but rather,
provides a cause of action by which individuals may seek money
damages

for

governmental

violations

of

rights

protected

by

federal law.” Cruz–Erazo v. Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st
Cir. 2000). Liability attaches where the constitutional injury
“(1) [is] committed by a person acting under color of state law”
and (2) “[deprives] a person of rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States.” See Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled in part on other
grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). We have
already

found

that

acting

under

color

the
of

complaint
state

shows
law,

that
and

Defendants
that

were

Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights to due process were plausibly violated.
However, the second element outlined in Parratt requires
that a direct causal connection be drawn between the defendants

14 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
and

the

alleged

constitutional

violation.

See

Gutiérrez–

Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989); see also
Rodríguez–Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997).
Section

1983

does

not

allow

liability

to

be

imposed

official on the basis of respondeat superior.

on

an

Ayala-Rodriguez

v. Rullan, 511 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 2007). As such, Plaintiffs
must show that each individual defendant was personally involved
in the alleged constitutional violation. Diaz v. Martinez, 112
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997). This last step is where the instant
complaint fails.
To be sure, the issue is whether the complaint plausibly
establishes a causal connection between Co-Defendants’ actions
and the fact that the government did not follow proper Act 7
procedures

in

dismissing

Plaintiffs.

The

only

salient

fact

asserted by the complaint in this regard is that “co-defendant
Irizarry

handed

position

with

Defendants

plaintiffs
the

counter

Family
that

letters

removing

Department.”
this

them

from

their

(Docket
merely

action

1,

¶

28).

reflects

a

ministerial act taken by Irizarry in compliance with Act 7.5 In
our view, even if it were true that Co-Defendants authorized
Plaintiffs’

dismissal,

the

complaint

would

still

fail

to

5

The Court also notes that the complaint does not clarify whether the letters

of dismissal were authorized by either Co-Defendant.

15 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

establish that either Co-Defendant is personally liable for the
government’s failure to follow the process established by Act 7.
For instance, the complaint does not assert that either CoDefendant had a say in the determination of seniority status of
Plaintiffs.

Neither

responsible

for

the

is

it

averred

publication

that
or

Co-Defendants

dissemination

were

of

the

seniority lists to Plaintiffs. Finally, it is not alleged that
either Co-Defendant was in charge of – or had any control over –
giving Plaintiffs an opportunity to review the basis for their
termination.

Simply

put,

all

of

the

alleged

facts

in

the

complaint that allow for an inference of a plausible due process
claim against the state, are not reasonably attributable to CoDefendants

in

their

personal

capacity.

As

such,

the

Court

dismisses Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against the individual
Defendants in their personal capacity.
Conspiracy
We now turn to Plaintiffs’ contention, under 42 U.S.C. §
19856, that the Defendants conspired to discriminate against them
due to their political inclinations. This Court is hard pressed

6

Though Plaintiffs do not specify under which of § 1985’s three subsections

their claim is grounded on, the facts alleged in the complaint clearly point
to § 1985(3). This statute prohibits two or more people from conspiring for
the purpose of depriving any person of the equal protection of the laws. 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3).

16 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

to find that the complaint establishes a plausible claim of
conspiracy. In any event, this claim may be disposed of on other
grounds. The First Circuit has explicitly “decline[d] to extend
§ 1985(3)’s protection to political affiliation.” Perez Sanchez
v. Pub. Bld. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2008). Thus,
Plaintiffs political discrimination conspiracy claim are futile
and hereby dismissed.
Sovereign Immunity, Qualified Immunity, and Insufficient Service
of Process7
Finally,

we

reach

Defendants’

arguments

concerning

sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts
from

entertaining

Seminole

Tribe

v.

actions

against

Florida,

517

U.S.

non-consenting
44

(1996).8

states.
Sovereign

immunity also protects state agents against suits brought in
their official capacity because, after all, the real party in
interest is the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985)(This type of claim is simply “another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). The

7

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Defendants in their

personal capacity on other grounds, we do not find it necessary to reach
their arguments regarding qualified immunity and insufficient service of
process.
8

This protection extends to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Fernandez v.

Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, n.13 (1st Cir. 1982). Further, Plaintiffs have not
alleged that the Commonwealth has waived its immunity in any way.

17 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
scope

of

protection

afforded

to

the

Commonwealth

against

official-capacity claims is broad. First, neither injunctive nor
declaratory relief is available in federal court against the
Commonwealth for violations of its own laws. Díaz-Fonseca, 451
F. 3d 13, 43 (1st Cir. 2006). Simply put, “it is difficult to
think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a
federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their
conduct

to

Halderman,

state
465

law.”

U.S.

89,

Pennhurst
106

State

(1984).

School

Second,

&
the

Hosp.

v.

Eleventh

Amendment prohibits retroactive relief (that is to say, monetary
compensation) against states for violations of state or federal
law. In contrast, sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking
prospective relief – either injunctive or declaratory – against
a state for violations of federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 666-667 (1974).
Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the
claims

seeking

monetary

compensation

should

be

dismissed

as

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree; the Commonwealth is
immune to Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims inasmuch as they
seek retroactive monetary compensation. However, the complaint
also petitions for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief

18 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

on the basis of federal law.9 This is clearly allowable under
Edelman v. Jordan, supra.
In summary, we conclude that sovereign immunity shields the
Commonwealth from all but prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief on the basis of federal law. It is important to note that
the scope of such relief would necessarily be “constrained by
principles of comity and federalism.” Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at n.13.
As a final note, Plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity
does not apply where “the relief sought in the federal suit is
damages to be paid out of the official's own pocket,” regardless
of

whether

the

violations

are

state

or

federal

in

origin.

Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 530 (1st
Cir. 2009). Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, we found above that
the complaint did not state a valid claim against either CoDefendant in their personal capacity. Thus, relief under this
theory is not available.

9

Specifically, Plaintiffs ask that the Court issue an injunction “ordering

the defendants to reinstate plaintiffs to their prior or equivalent position
and/or functions which they held” before they were terminated; and “that
defendants be further enjoined from discriminating against the plaintiffs
because of their political beliefs.” (Docket No. 1, ¶ 7).

19 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
State Law Claims
As

we

mentioned

above,

a

federal

court

may

not

grant

monetary, injunctive or declaratory relief against a state for
violations of its own laws. Thus, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity
suit does not entitle them to any relief under state law. On the
other hand, we dismissed in their entirety the personal-capacity
claims against Co-Defendants. As such, there is no avenue by
which Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under the pendent
state-law claims. Accordingly, those claims shall be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ claims
relating

to

dismissed
claims,

as

political

with
well

discrimination

prejudice.
as

those

Further,
against

and

conspiracy

their

pendent

Co-Defendants

shall

be

state

law

Irizarry

and

Perez in their personal capacity shall also be dismissed with
prejudice.

Plaintiffs’

procedural

due

process

claim

against

Defendants in their official capacity remains.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of December, 2011.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
United States District Judge