Acevedo-Concepcion et al v. Irizarry-Mendez et al

Filing 35

OPINION & ORDER denying 30 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 10/16/2012. (RJC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

ACEVEDO-CONCEPCION, et al,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
v.
IRIZARRY-MENDEZ, et al,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.
The

Court’s

prior

decision

granted

in

part

Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims of political
discrimination, conspiracy, as well as their supplemental statelaw claims. The only issue remaining in this case is Plaintiffs’
procedural due process claim for their dismissal – specifically,
stemming
“follow

from
the

the

Commonwealth

procedures

of

contemplated

Puerto
by

Rico’s

Act

7

in

failure

to

dismissing

Plaintiffs.” (Docket No. 26, p. 12). Now before the Court is
Defendants’

second

Motion

to

Dismiss,

this

time

seeking

dismissal on abstention grounds pursuant to Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). For
the reasons that follow, this motion is DENIED.

2 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
ANALYSIS1

Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to
exercise their jurisdiction and resolve matters properly before
them. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. There are exceptions to
this rule, and departure from it is allowed under “exceptional
circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve
an important countervailing interest.” Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). One of these exceptions,
established by the Supreme Court in Colorado River, allows a
federal

court

to

decline

the

exercise

of

jurisdiction

upon

“considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard
to

conservation

disposition

of

of

judicial

litigation.”

resources

Colorado

and

River,

424

comprehensive
U.S.

at

817

(quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342
U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
To determine whether abstention is proper, the Court must
assess whether this case presents exceptional circumstances that
“tip

a

federal

scale

heavily

jurisdiction.”

weighted

in

favor

Nazario-Lugo

v.

of

the

exercise

Caribevision

of

Holdings,

Inc., 670 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2012). Over the years, federal
caselaw has amassed a series of factors that help a district
court make this determination. To wit:

1

The Court refers the reader to the Opinion and Order at Docket
No. 26 for a summary of the relevant facts.

3 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res;
the geographical inconvenience of the federal forum;
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;
the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction;
whether state or federal law controls;
the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties'
interests;
7. the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim;
8. respect for the principles underlying removal jurisdiction.
Nazario-Lugo, 670 F.3d at 115. This list is not exhaustive, and
no single factor is determinative.
The
River

decision

doctrine

“to

must

yield

rest

jurisdiction

on

the

under

clearest

of

the

Colorado

justifications

displayed by exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983);
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818–19). The Court will now examine
whether Defendants’ arguments tip the scale convincingly in the
direction of abstention.
The

Court

will

streamline

this

analysis

by

noting

that

factors 1, 2, 6 and 8 are relatively inconsequential to our
analysis.
over

a

First,

res.

neither

Second,

court

both

here

forums

has

are

assumed

equally

jurisdiction

convenient

in

geographical terms. Third (sixth factor), there is no reason to
believe the state forum is inadequate to protect the parties’
interests. In any event, this factor –if analyzed thoroughlycould only weigh against Defendants’ motion. See United States
v.

Fairway

Capital

Corp.,

483

F.3d

34,

43

(1st

Cir.

2007)

4 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

(holding that the adequacy of the state forum is relevant only
when

it

would

disfavor

abstention).

Fourth

(eighth

factor),

since this case is not before the Court on a removal petition,
nor

does

it

seem

jurisdiction

are

that

the

injured,

principles
the

underlying

eighth

factor

removal
is

also

inconclusive.
Third Factor: Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation
There is a parallel case in the local courts involving the
same

parties

and

substantially

the

same

allegations

as

this

case. For that reason, Defendants argue that this Court should
abstain

under

Colorado

River;

otherwise,

contend

Defendants,

“this court could be exercising jurisdiction over matters that
may later operate as res judicata and/or collateral estoppel by
judgment barring claims that were or could have been litigated
in

the

state

case.”

(Docket

No.

30,

citing

Boateng

v.

Interamerican Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000)).
This argument flies in the face of controlling precedent.
The

First

Circuit

has

clarified

that

in

assessing

this

factor, courts should not focus on the “risk of inexpediency,”
Nazario-Lugo, 670 F.3d at 119, or the “routine inefficiency that
is the inevitable result of parallel proceedings.” Jimenez v.
Rodriguez-Pagan,

597

F.3d

18,

29

(1st

Cir.

2010).

Similarly

immaterial is the fact that both forums could end up deciding

5 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

the same issue. KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318
F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2003). Instead, the Court must center
its

analysis

litigating

“on

suits

the

implications

deriving

from

the

and

practical

same

effects

transaction

in

of
two

separate fora, and weigh in favor of dismissal only if there is
some exceptional basis for dismissing one action in favor of the
other.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
There is no such exceptional basis for dismissal present
here.

The

parallel

cases

filed

by

Plaintiffs,

though

duplicative, do not pose more than the “risk of inexpediency”
nor

the

“routine

inefficiency”

of

parallel

proceedings.

Cf.

Jimenez, 597 F.3d 18 (holding that fragmented and inconsistent
litigation, as opposed to mere duplicative litigation, weighs in
favor of abstention) (citing Sto Corp. v. Lancaster Homes, Inc.,
11 Fed.Appx. 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2001); Federated Rural Elec.
Ins. Corp. v. Ark. Elec. Coops., Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 298 (8th
Cir. 1995); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367,
1373

(9th

Cir.

1991),

overruled

on

other

grounds,

Gov't

Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)). As
such, this factor weighs against abstention.
Fourth Factor: Order in which Jurisdiction Was Obtained
According to Defendants, the local case was filed three
days before the one in this Court. Furthermore, the state court

6 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

has entered judgment on some of Plaintiffs’ claims in that case.
The Court finds that Defendants have not shown enough to make
the scale tip in favor of abstention on this factor.
The question posed by this factor is, contrary to what
common sense would indicate, not settled by looking at which
complaint was filed first. Rather, the Court must look at the
relative progress of each case in their respective fora. See
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. Defendants point to the fact that
the state court has dismissed some of Plaintiffs’ claims. (See
Docket No. 32-1). But so has this Court. (See e.g. Docket No.
26). Furthermore, glossing over the state court opinion, it is
clear that Plaintiffs’ federal due process claim has not been
adjudicated.

(Id.).

Thus,

there

is

no

stark

difference

in

progress made between the state and federal suits. This factor
thus weighs against abstention.
Fifth Factor: Whether State or Federal Law Controls
Defendants ask this Court to abstain in spite of the fact
that the sole matter remaining in this case is a federal due
process

claim.

We

need

weighs against abstention.

not

state

more:

this

factor

clearly

7 

CIVIL NO. 09-2133 (JAG)

Seventh Factor: Vexatious or Contrived Nature of the Federal
Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ “insistence in pursuing
[this

case]”

speaks

to

the

vexatious

nature

of

Plaintiffs’

federal suit, and that this argument does not require “extensive
elaboration.” (Docket No. 30, p. 12). Not so; there is nothing
on the record that would establish that Plaintiffs’ reason for
suing in federal court is contrived or vexatious. Plaintiffs
have a valid federal claim, (see Docket No. 26), and they are
entitled to bring it in federal court. Accordingly, this factor
weighs against abstention.
CONCLUSION

Defendants have not shown any sound basis upon which this
Court could surrender its “unflagging obligation” to exercise
federal jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of October, 2012.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge