Martinez v. Eagle Global Logistics

Filing 91

OPINION AND ORDER Granting 88 Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Previous Opinion and Order 84 . Plaintiff's claims under article 5-A of the Puerto Rico Worker's Compensation Act are hereby DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Juan M Perez-Gimenez on 10/21/2011.(JG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
NERY MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff
v.

CIV. NO. 09-2265 (PG)

EAGLE GLOBAL LOGISTICS (CEVA),
Defendant.
AMENDMENT TO OPINION AND ORDER
Pending disposition by this Court is defendant CEVA’s Motion to
Alter Judgment or Amend the Court’s previous Opinion and Order1 under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and plaintiff Martinez’s opposition. Dockets No. 88
and 89. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS CEVA’s Motion
and thus DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Martinez’s claims under article 5-A of
the Puerto Rico Worker’s Compensation Act.
I. Introduction
On August 26, 2011 the Court entered an Opinion and Order (Docket
No. 84) granting in part and denying in part defendant CEVA’s Motion to
Dismiss Claims under Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 41). Therein, the Court
dismissed plaintiff Martinez’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq.; the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; as well as her claims
under the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution.

The

Court

also

dismissed

Martinez’s

sex

discrimination

claim pursuant to Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §
146, et seq. (“Law 100”) and Act No. 69 of July 6, 1985, P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 29, § 1321, et seq. (“Law 69”), as well as her sexual harassment
claim under Act No. 17 of April 22, 1988, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155,
et seq. (“Law 17”). Martinez’s general tort claims under Articles 1802
and 1803 of Puerto Rico Civil Code were also dismissed.

1

Docket No. 84.

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 2

As a result, Martinez’s claims under the following acts remain: (1)
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.;
(2) Article 5-A of the Worker’s Compensation Act, Act No. 45 of April 18,
1935, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 1, et seq. (“Law 45”); (3) Act No. 115 of
December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194, et seq. (“Law 115"); (4)
Act No. 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 501, et seq. (“Law
44"); (5) Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a, et
seq. (“Law 80”); and (6) her age-based discrimination claim pursuant to
Law 100.
CEVA has now filed a Motion under Rule 59(E) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requesting this Court to reconsider its Opinion and
Order and dismiss Martinez’s claims pursuant to Law 45 on the theory that
the same are time-barred. See Docket No. 88. Martinez has opposed said
motion. See Docket No. 89. Upon careful consideration of the parties’
motions,

the

Court

hereby

grants

CEVA’s

Rule

59(E)

Motion

and

thus

dismisses with prejudice Martinez’s claims under Law 45.
The Court outlines the relevant facts below and then proceeds to
discuss the relevant legal issues. For a more detailed background on the
facts, the Court refers the reader to its original Opinion and Order.
Docket No. 84.
II. Relevant Factual Background2
On December 13, 2006 Martinez went to the State Insurance Fund
(SIF) and requested permission to go to work, as she was afraid to lose
her job. On that same date, she informed Rosalyn Noriega, Operations
Manager,

that

she

might

return

to

work

the

next

day.

Noriega

then

informed Martinez that she would be returning to a Customer Service
Specialist position.
The next day, on December 14, 2006, Martinez was allowed to return
to work. She was activated on the computer system at CEVA's headquarters
in Texas so she could clock in and out. On December 19, 2006, Denise

2

The Court draws these facts from the face of plaintiff’s complaint.

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 3

Moore, Regional Human Resources Manager wrote a letter of verification
stating that Martinez had returned to work on December 14, 2006.
After

reporting

to

work

on

the

morning

of

December

14,

2006,

Noriega informed Martinez that she needed to change her schedule. Noriega
later

informed

Martinez

that

her

position

would

be

Inside

Sales

Representative. Martinez’s former position when she had left on August
15, 2006 was Customer Service Representative.
On December 18, 2006, Noriega contacted Martinez and informed her
that she either had to accept an Inside Sales Representative or an
Operations

Specialist

II

position.

Martinez

claims

that

the

job

description for Operations Specialist II was different from her previous
position as Customer Service Representative.
After

some

back

and

forth

communications

between

Martinez

and

Noriega regarding Martinez’s new duties and responsibilities at CEVA,
Martinez returned to work on January 9, 2007. Nevertheless, she was sent
home by Noriega. On January 11, 2007 Martinez sent an e-mail to Noriega,
where she referenced her repeated requests to go back to her position as
Customer Service Representative, but Noriega informed her that it was too
late, that the positions had been posted and that if Martinez had not
applied then there was nothing she could do.
On

or

around

January

25,

2007,

Emilio

Acosta,

a

new

Station

Manager, called Martinez asking her to return to work to the Insides
Sales

Representative

position.

Martinez

claims

she

finally

accepted

because she thought she had no other choice and was afraid to lose her
job if she did not accept the position.
On

January

25,

2007,

Martinez

filed

a

Disability

and

Age

Discrimination Administrative Complaint before the Anti-Discrimination
Unit of Puerto Rico (ADU) against CEVA. See Docket No. 46-1. Her charges
were based on disability and age discrimination.
Almost three years later, on December 21, 2009, Martinez filed the
instant action.
III. Standard of Review

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 4

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preserves the
district court’s right to alter or amend a judgment after it is issued.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions to alter or amend an order or a judgment
are appropriate where they involve reconsideration of matters properly
encompassed in the decision on the merits. See White v. New Hampshire
Department

of

Employment,

455

U.S.

445,

451

(1982).

The

case

law

acknowledges the following four grounds that justify altering or amending
an order or a judgment: (1) to incorporate an intervening change in law;
(2) to reflect new evidence not available at the time of trial; (3) to
correct a clear legal error; and (4) to prevent a manifest injustice. See
Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F. 3d 607 (1st Cir.
2000); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F. 3d 734 (9th Cir. 2001); and
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F. 3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2000).

Thus,

for example, a Rule 59(e) motion is “appropriate where the court has
misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.”
Id. at 1012; See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Howard, 775 F. 2d 876
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
IV. Discussion
CEVA claims that Martinez’s claims under Law 45 are time-barred
under the applicable three-year statute of limitations as: (1) Martinez
requested reinstatement on December 13, 2006, which is more than three
years prior to the filing of her complaint; and (2) as Martinez’s filing
of an administrative claim before the ADU did not toll the prescriptive
period. The Court agrees.
A. The Reinstatement Date
CEVA claims that Martinez asked reinstatement on December 13, 2006.
This was the date in which Martinez claims that she informed

Noriega of

her possible intention to return to work the next day. Noriega then
allegedly informed Martinez that she would be returning as a Customer
Service

Specialist.

Martinez

then

returned

to

work

the

next

day

on

December 14, 2006, but was told by Noriega that she would instead be

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)
working

as

an

Page 5

Inside

Sales

Representative,

a

position

that

Martinez

herself claims is different from her previous position as a Customer
Service Representative.
It necessarily follows that the date in which Martinez requested
reinstatement from her supervisors was December 13, 2006, and that she
first became aware that she was not being reinstated to her previous
position the next day, on December 14, 2006.3
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held that the applicable statute
of limitations period for claims based on a failure to reinstate pursuant
to article 5-A of Law 45 is three years. Velez Rodriguez v. Pueblo Int’l,
Inc., 1994 P.R.-Eng. 909576; 135 D.P.R. 500 (1994). In Velez Rodriguez
the plaintiff suffered a work-related accident and was treated for his
injuries at the SIF. On February 28, 1989, the plaintiff requested his
employer reinstate him to his prior position. The Supreme Court noted
that

plaintiff

maintained

communication

with

his

employer

under

the

belief that he would be reinstated, albeit that never happened. Two years
and eight months later, on October 18, 1989, plaintiff filed the action
in state court pursuant to article 5-A of Law 45. The Supreme Court on
review established that his claim was not time-barred and held that “the
period of limitations should begin to run on the day the employee seeks
reinstatement and his employer refuses to reinstate him.” Id., at 520.
The Court then held that the three-year statute of limitations started to
run

on

February

28,

1989,

the

date

when

plaintiff

first

sought

reinstatement, despite plaintiff having found out later that he would not
be reinstated.
Applying the holding of Velez Rodriquez to the instant case, the
Court finds that the three-year statute of limitations began to run on
December

13,

2006,

reinstatement to
3

the

date

when

Martinez

effectively

requested

Noriega. Although Martinez in her opposition argues

This, assuming that the position of Customer Service Specialist, which
was the one Martinez was informed she would be taking on December 13, is the
same as the position of Customer Service Representative, which Martinez held on
August 15, 2006, when she went on leave.

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 6

that she was in “a sort of limbo” and that the failure to reinstate
should be counted from January 25, 2007, when she unwillingly accepted
the Inside Sales Representative Position and “finally knew for certain”
that she would not be reinstated to the Customer Service Representative
position, the Court believes the holding of Velez Rodriguez to be quite
clear. Martinez’s subjective mental state as to her belief that she might
be reinstated later is irrelevant, since as early as December 14, 2006,
she had notice that she would not be reinstated to her former position.
Thus the Court holds that the three-year statute of limitations
period began to run on December 13, 2006.
B. The Filing of the ADU Claim
The

Court

must

now

determine

whether

Martinez’s

administrative

complaint before the ADU effectively served as an extrajudical claim
capable

of

tolling

the

applicable

three-year

statute

of

limitations

period for Art. 5-A claims under the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Article

1873

of

the

Puerto

Rico

Civil

Code

states

that

“[p]rescription of actions is interrupted by their institution before the
courts,

by

extrajudicial

claim

of

the

creditor,

and

by

any

act

of

acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5303.
According to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, an extrajudicial claim
tolls the statute of limitations as long as it presents the identical
cause of action as the claim later presented in court. Cintron v. E.L.A.,
127 D.P.R. 582, 592-93 (1990); see also Matos Ortiz v. Com. of Puerto
Rico, 103 F.Supp.2d 59, 62 (D.P.R. 2000). Moreover, the relief requested
in

the

extrajudicial

claim

must

be

the

same

relief

that

is

later

requested in court. See Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina, Co., 959 F.2d
1149, 1154 (1st Cir.1992). In other words, “to toll the statute of
limitations the action must be the case at bar, and not merely a somewhat
related action arising from the same facts.” Ramirez de Arellano v.
Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1978).
In Srio del Trabajo v. Finetex Hosiery Co., 16 P.R. Offic. Trans.
1014, 116 D.P.R. 823 (1986), the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 7

for an administrative charge to toll the statute of limitations for state
law claims, the same must still meet the requirements of extrajudicial
claims. There, the Court found that a charge filed before the Puerto Rico
Department of Labor for discrimination under Law 100 interrupted the
statute of limitations for said claim. The Court later clarified that its
holding “was based on this principle of identity of purposes between the
administrative and the judicial action for effects of tolling the statute
of limitations.” Cintron, supra, at 593.
In Cintron, however, the Supreme Court held that an administrative
action before the Board of Appeals of the Personnel Administration System
(“BAPAS”),

did

not

toll

the

one-year

statute

of

limitations

that

a

wrongly removed employee had to recover for the damages resulting from
said act. To that effect, the Supreme Court determined that the BAPAS is
not

empowered

to

grant

damages,

as

its

remedies

are

limited

to

reinstatement and back pay. In other words, “an action before BAPAS and
an action before the courts do not pursue identical aims,” hence, “in
order to toll the statute of limitation in such cases, the government
employee must go directly to the court with his actions of damages.” Id.
at p. 595.
The Court concludes that Martinez’s charge before the ADU did not
in effect toll the statute of limitations, because it did not qualify as
an extrajudicial claim capable of doing so for purposes of Law 45 claims.
Article 3 of the General Regulation of the Antidiscrimination Unit reads
as follows:
This Regulation will apply to the administrative proceedings before
the Antidiscrimination Unit of the Department of Labor and Human
Resources in the administration, investigation and resolution of
claims under the following statutes: Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959,
as amended; Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985; Law No. 17 of April 22,
1988; Law No. 53 of August 30, 1992. Docket No. 88-1.

In essence, the ADU is not empowered to hear, investigate or solve
claims

under

Law

45--such

unit’s

jurisdiction

is

limited

to

claims

arising under the enumerated state statutes. Martinez’s administrative
charges before the ADU alleged that she was subject to discrimination on

Civil No. 09-2265 (PG)

Page 8

account of her age, as well as her disability. Although, as the Court has
already ruled, such charges did toll the one-year statute of limitations
of her analogous claims under Law 100, they did not do the same as to her
Law 45 claims, as the ADU had no jurisdiction to entertain them. Thus,
there

is

no

identity

of

purposes

between

Martinez’s

administrative

charges and her later Law 45 claims asserted in this judicial action.
Even when legal claims are actually raised in an administrative setting,
they are not preserved for statute of limitations purposes if the agency
in which they are raised is an inappropriate forum. Cintron, supra, at p.
595; see also Sánchez Ramos v. P.R. Police Dep’t, 392 F.Supp.2d 167, 181
(D.P.R. 2005) (“for all practical purposes, a plaintiff that files an
administrative complaint for several causes of action, tolls the statute
of limitations for all the causes of action should the agency be able to
provide him all the remedies sought against the defendants”); and Matos
Ortiz, supra, at 62 (because the EEOC has no jurisdiction over claims
brought pursuant to § 1983, a charge filed with the EEOC or Puerto Rico
ADU cannot serve to toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim).
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

Court

concludes

that

Martinez’s

administrative claim before the ADU did not toll the three-year statute
of limitations period applicable to her Law 45 claims.
V. Conclusion
Given

that

Martinez

requested

reinstatement

under

Law

45

on

December 13, 2006, which is more than three years prior to the filing of
her complaint on December 21, 2009, the Court concludes that her claims
under Law 45 are time-barred. Thus, the Court hereby amends its prior
Opinion and Order dated August 26, 2011 (Docket No. 84) to reflect that
Martinez’s Law 45 claims have been DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 21, 2011.
S/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE