Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebron, Corp. et al

Filing 92

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 60 Motion for costs and attorney's fees, filed by Lamex Foods, Inc. We ORDER Defendants to pay $4,329.37 of the total expenses claimed. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 7/8/2010.(mrj)

Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebron, Corp. et al

Doc. 92

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 L A M E X FOODS, INC., Plaintiff, v.

U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO

C iv il No. 09-2275 (JAF)

A U D E L IZ LEBRÓN CORP.; AUDELIZ L E B R Ó N , in his personal capacity, his wife, a n d their conjugal partnership, Defendants.

O P I N I O N AND ORDER O n January 26, 2010, we ordered Defendants to pay "any expense related" to the d e p o s itio n of Audeliz Lebrón ("Lebrón"), due to their noncompliance with discovery o b lig a tio n s . (Docket No. 38.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a listing of said expenses, claiming $ 2 2 ,1 1 5 in attorney's fees and $13,268.22 in costs. (Docket No. 60.) Defendants oppose these c la im s arguing that (1) this sanction is unjust, for various reasons outlined below; and (2) the c la im e d expenses are unreasonable, unrelated or otherwise unrecoverable. (Docket No. 80.) P la in tif f replies. (Docket No. 84.) I. S a n c tio n for Noncompliance with Discovery Obligations T h e parties misconstrue this sanction as one falling under Federal Rule of Civil P ro c e d u re 37(a)(5). (See Docket Nos. 60; 80; 84.) This sanction was not the result of a granted m o tio n to compel, as we did not compel the discovery Plaintiff requested. (See Docket No. 38.) We, therefore, are not obliged to award "expenses incurred in making the motion." See Fed.

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Civil No. 09-2275 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 R . Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Instead, we construct an appropriate sanction given our authority under R u le s 16 and 37 to combat failures to comply with scheduling orders and discovery deadlines. S e e Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (authorizing sanction for failure "to obey a scheduling or other pretrial o rd e r" ); 37(b)(2)© (authorizing sanction for failure to comply with a court order regarding d isc o v e ry).1 Indeed, our sanction here was based on Defendants' obstruction of a court-ordered d e p o s itio n (see Docket No. 13). D e f e n d a n ts argue that a sanction here is unjust because (1) they were "substantially ju stif ie d " in refusing to cooperate during Lebrón's deposition; and (2) each party should bear its own costs--or alternatively, Plaintiff should be sanctioned--given Plaintiff's failure to p ro d u c e its witness for a court-ordered deposition. (Docket No. 80 at 2-6.) First, we disagree th a t Defendants were justified in refusing to cooperate. As we never ordered limited discovery (se e Docket No. 13), Defendants' refusal to discuss issues clearly related to Plaintiff's claims in this case constituted an improper obstruction of discovery. Defendants' misunderstanding a s to our jurisdiction over those claims (see, e.g., Docket No. 80 at 2-4) does not excuse that f a ilu re to cooperate. S e c o n d , we declined to sanction Plaintiff at Defendants' request (Docket No. 22), b e c a u s e we found that Plaintiff's behavior did not warrant sanction--we did not find Plaintiff's f a ilu re to produce its witness a strategic or careless frustration of the litigation process. In

We note that in a diversity case, we may also award attorney's fees as a substantive right under Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1(d), which authorizes such an award to a prevailing party when the defeated party "acted obstinately or frivolously." See, e.g., Renaissance Mktg., Inc. v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81-83 (listing First Circuit authority for this rule and describing application of Rule 44.1(d)).

1

Civil No. 09-2275 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 a d d itio n , Defendants' motion for sanctions was deficient in that it did not include the c e rtif ic a tio n required by Rule 37(d)(1)(B). (See Docket No. 22.) II. A w a r d of Attorney's Fees and Costs W e now consider whether Plaintiff's claimed expenses were related to Lebrón's d e p o s itio n ,2 reasonably incurred, and otherwise recoverable under this sanction. We review re q u e sts for attorney's fees for reasonableness. Cf. Wojkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st C ir. 1984) (requiring review for reasonableness in awarding attorney's fees awarded under 42 U .S .C . § 1988). Fees are presumptively reasonable where the requesting party has multiplied a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably spent on litigation. See Gay O f f ic e rs Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Hensley v. E c k e rh a rt, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). A reasonable hourly rate is the rate prevailing in the re le v a n t community, "taking into account the qualifications, experience, and specialized c o m p e te n c e of the attorneys involved." Id. at 295. And the logged hours are reasonably spent o n litigation unless "duplicative, unproductive, or excessive." Id. A. A tto r n e y 's Fees F irs t, we consider the hourly rates Plaintiff's attorneys charged. The timesheet reflects th e work of five individuals, charging the following rates: Laura Beléndez-Ferrero at $175 per

We note Plaintiff's implicit argument, based on its submission, that the time and expenses related to the canceled deposition of its own witness and to the making of the motion to compel were reasonably related to Lebrón's failure to cooperate at his deposition. (See Docket No. 60.) We reject that argument, however, given our intention to limit the sanction to expenses wasted on Lebrón's deposition itself and given our opinion that Plaintiff's attorneys were not faultless--either in their decision to halt discovery of Plaintiff's own witness or in their inability to clarify, without judicial intervention, Defendants' misunderstanding as to the proper scope of discovery in this case.

2

Civil No. 09-2275 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 h o u r; Fernando Rovira-Rullán at $180 per hour; Cristina Arenas-Solís at $150 per hour; and Y o lisa m a r Vázquez and Yadira Rosario, each at $90 per hour. (See Docket No. 60-2.) P la in tif f 's motion summarizes the education and work experience of Beléndez-Ferrero, ArenasS o lís , and Rovira-Rullán (see Docket No. 60 at 5 n.1), but does not discuss Vázquez or Rosario o r the rates charged by any of the five. Plaintiff also submits an affidavit of Beléndez-Ferrero, w h o lists the rates charged but misstates the rates for paralegal work--the first clue we receive a s to the capacity in which Vázquez and Rosario worked--and for Arenas-Solís. (Docket N o . 60-4.) She does not address the reasonableness of those rates. (Id.) Finally, we receive an a f f id a v it of Rafael E. Aguiló-Vélez, a commercial litigator in Puerto Rico, who opines--based o n his professional experience, his familiarity with Plaintiff's attorneys' firm and credentials, a n d his review of the timesheet--that the fees charged were reasonable for this type of case. (D o c k e t No. 60-5.) He makes reference to the rates for all individuals involved, except V á z q u e z . (Id.) D e f e n d a n ts argue that the rates charged were unreasonable, but they offer neither a u th o rity nor evidence to support that position. (Docket No. 80 at 10-11.) Instead, they argue th a t we should reduce the rate for Plaintiff's failure to supply information as to the attorneys' c re d e n tia ls . (Id.) In short, Defendants point to no evidence undermining the veracity of AguilóV é le z ' statement. Thus, we award Plaintiff attorney's fees at the hourly rates claimed. N o w we consider the time Plaintiff's attorneys logged. Upon review of the timesheet, w e find that only two of the listed tasks were entirely related to the preparation for or taking of L e b ró n 's deposition: those listed as task IDs 166025 and 166410. (Docket No. 60-2.) Only f iv e others--166987, 166400, 166999, 166403, and 166032--were even partially related. (Id.)

Civil No. 09-2275 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 A s to these five, the time appears to be split between tasks related to the deposition and those re la te d to attempted settlement of Plaintiff's claims. (Id.) We, therefore, reduce the time c la im e d in those five entries by half, to account for that split. We find all other tasks logged u n re la te d to the deposition and, therefore, unrecoverable. F in a lly, we find the time logged for the tasks related to the deposition reasonable in all re sp e c ts . In so doing, we reject Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's attorneys improperly logged time for menial tasks in quarter-hour increments and improperly logged time in half-hour o r hour blocks. (See Docket No. 80 at 11.) The timesheet shows tasks grouped into multi-hour b lo c k s, without separation into individual tasks. (Docket No. 60-2.) That being the case, we c a n n o t discern, and decline to speculate as to, the increments Plaintiff's attorneys used for in d iv id u a l tasks. The lengthy task descriptions indicate meticulous timekeeping (id.), and we a c c e p t their record absent evidence to the contrary. B. C o sts A s to the costs claimed, we find that only two clearly relate to Lebrón's deposition: $ 3 9 9 .3 7 for transcription services and $810 for interpreter services (Docket No. 60-3 at 14-15). W h ile the copying costs submitted do not specify their purpose and, therefore, might be related, w e note that two of them postdate the deposition while the rest are dated well in advance of the d a te s on which Plaintiff's attorneys logged deposition preparation. (See id. at 3-4; Docket N o . 60-2.) That being the case, we deem the claimed copying costs unrelated. The remaining c la im e d costs are denied as clearly unrelated.

Civil No. 09-2275 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 III. C o n c lu s io n In accordance with the foregoing, we hereby GRANT IN PART Plaintiff's claim for e x p e n s e s related to Lebrón's deposition (Docket No. 60). We ORDER Defendants to pay $ 4 ,3 2 9 .3 7 of the total expenses claimed. I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8 th day of July, 2010. s /J o s é Antonio Fusté J O S E ANTONIO FUSTE C h ie f U.S. District Judge