Velez-Rivera et al v. Autos del Caribe et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 13 MOTION to dismiss as to Rafael Esteves, Carlos Rivera filed by Rafael Esteves, Carlos Rivera. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 5/6/2010.(LB) Modified on 5/7/2010 to correct document type (rc).

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO H E C T O R VELEZ-CABRERA ET AL Plaintiff v. A U T O S DEL CARIBE ET AL D e f e n d a n ts C iv il No. 10-1079 (SEC)

OPINION AND ORDER P e n d in g before this Court is Defendants Rafael Esteves, and Carlos Rivera's (collectively " D e f e n d a n ts " ) motion to dismiss (Docket # 13). Plaintiffs did not file an opposition. After re v ie w in g the filings, and the applicable law, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Factual and Procedural Background O n February 4, 2010, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in their official and in d iv id u a l capacity, and against Autos del Caribe, under the Age Discrimination Employment A c t, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq, Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq, Law 80, P.R. Laws A n n . tit. 29, § 185a et al, Article II of the Commonwealth's Constitution, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1 , and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Docket # 1. S h o rtly thereafter, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint (Docket # 14),1 and moved to dismiss the claims against them arguing that there is no individual liability under the ADEA a n d Law 80. Docket # 13. To this date, Plaintiffs have not opposed.

Autos del Caribe also answered the complaint. Docket # 12.

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CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC) S ta n d a r d of Review F e d . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

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T o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiffs' "well-pleaded facts must possess enough h e f t to show that [they are] entitled to relief." Clark v. Boscher, 514 F. 3d 107, 112 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ).2 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all o f their "well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences therefrom" in the plaintiff's f a v o r. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). The First Circuit has held th a t "dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual a lle g a tio n s , either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain re c o v e ry under some actionable legal theory." Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305(1 st Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). Courts "may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to th e complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice." Id. at 3 0 5 -3 0 6 . However, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must "differentiate between w e ll-p le a d e d facts, on the one hand, and `bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, p e rip h ra s tic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other hand; the former must be credited, but th e latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (quoting A u ls o n v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1 st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d 2 9 , 33 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus Plaintiffs m u s t rely in more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be re je c te d . Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 5 1 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)).

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to allow the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).

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CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC)

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T h e re f o re , "even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 , the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must a lle g e `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed factual allegations, the "plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,'but it asks f o r more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. A t 1965; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A plaintiff's obligation to " p ro v id e the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, a n d a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S. C t. At 1965. That is, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the s p e c u la tiv e level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true." Parker v. H u rle y, 514 F. 3d 87, 95 (1 st Cir. 2008). T h e Court "may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice." G a g lia rd i v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305-06 (1 st Cir. 2008). A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis A lth o u g h the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have yet to address whether or not th e re is individual liability under the ADEA or the ADA, this district "has followed the majority o f circuits that have confronted the issue and held that no personal liability can attach to e m p l o ye e s under the ADEA or the ADA." Reyes-Ortiz v. Valdes, No. 09-1333, slip. op. at * 9 -1 0 (D.P.R. Mar. 22, 2010); see also Julia v. Janssen, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28-29 (D.P.R. 2 0 0 0 ) (citing Diaz v. Antilles Conversion & Export, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 (D.P.R. 1 9 9 9 ); Vizcarrondo v. Bd. of Trs., 139 F. Supp. 2d 198, 205 (D.P.R. 2001); Rodriguez v. Puerto R ic o Marine Management, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D.P.R. 1997); Pagan-Maldonado v.

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CIVIL NO. 10-1079 (SEC)

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C e n te n n ia l Puerto Rico Communication Corp., No. 09-1389, slip. op. at 27 (D.P.R. Dec. 8, 2 0 0 9 ). A similar conclusion has been drawn in this district regarding personal liability under P u e rto Rico Law 80. See Flamand v. American Intern. Group, Inc., 876 F.Supp. 356, 364 (D .P .R . 1994); Martinez v. Blanco Velez Store, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.P.R. 2005). A c c o rd in g ly, Plaintiffs' ADEA and Law 80 claims against Defendants must be d ism is s e d . Moreover, having dismissed Plaintiffs' federal law claims against Defendants, their c la im s under Law 100 and Article 1802 against said Defendants are also DISMISSED W I T H O U T PREJUDICE. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1 st Cir. 1991) (holding th a t "[t]he power of a federal court to hear and to determine sate-law claims in non-diversity c a s e s depends upon the presence of at least one `substantial' federal claim in the lawsuit.") C o n c lu s io n B a s e d on the foregoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, P la in tif f s ' ADEA and Law 80 claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH P R E J U D I C E , and their Law 100 and Article 1802 are DISMISSED WITHOUT P R E J U D I C E . Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs' claims against Autos del Caribe remain pending b e f o re this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 6th day of May, 2010. S / Salvador E. Casellas S A L V A D O R E. CASELLAS U n ite d States District Judge