De Jesus-Rivera v. Abbott Laboratories et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 15 MOTION to dismiss on the Pleadings as to Abbott Laboratories PR Inc., filed by Abbott Laboratories PR Inc. Signed by Chief Judge Jose A Fuste on 7/9/2010.(mrj)

De Jesus-Rivera v. Abbott Laboratories et al

Doc. 18

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT D IS T R IC T OF PUERTO RICO G L O R IA DE-JESÚS-RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. A B B O T T LABORATORIES; ABBOTT L A B O R A T O R IE S PUERTO RICO, INC., Defendants.

C iv il No. 10-1144 (JAF)

O P I N I O N AND ORDER P la in tif f sues under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation for her opposition to that d i s c rim in a tio n . (Docket No. 1.) She also claims relief for the same conduct under various P u e rto Rico laws, including Law 69, of July 6, 1985 ("Law 69"), 29 L.P.R.A. §§ 1321, 1341, w h ic h prohibits retaliation for opposition to unlawful discrimination. (Id.) Defendant Abbott L a b o ra to rie s Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Movant") moves for partial dismissal under Federal Rule of C iv il Procedure 12(c) for failure to state a claim of gender discrimination, retaliation or v io la tio n s of general laws of the United States or Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 15.) Plaintiff does n o t oppose.

Dockets.Justia.com

Civil No. 10-1144 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 I. F a c tu a l Summary

-2 -

W e derive the following facts from the complaint (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff worked for M o v a n t in various capacities beginning in 1998, consistently receiving excellent performance re v ie w s . But in 2007, she began experiencing harassment and discrimination. Specifically, M o v a n t's officers made comments about and "constantly touch[ed]" Plaintiff's body. The o f f ic e rs also made sexual jokes and commented on Plaintiff's sex life. They "threatened her w ith disciplinary actions, due to her rejection to their sexually-charged conduct and comments a g a in st her." Such conduct occurred in the "presence of several of [Movant's] top officers." T h e officers also stripped Plaintiff of duties, telling her that was a "consequence of her rejection to their sexual advances." In addition, they assigned her new, unfavorable duties and began to c ritic iz e her performance. Plaintiff complained to Movant's top officers about the harassment a n d discrimination, but Movant "never conducted any type of investigation, nor ever took any typ e of remedial nor corrective action." Retaliating, the harassing officers informed her she w o u ld be discharged "due to her complaints." On July 14, 2008, Movant fired Plaintiff and re p la c e d her with a "younger male, with less seniority and experience than her." P la in tif f filed a charge of discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity C o m m iss io n , which issued her a right-to-sue letter. She filed the instant suit within ninety days o f receiving that letter.

Civil No. 10-1144 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 II. S ta n d a r d Under Rule 12(c)

-3 -

W e grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings only when the uncontested facts in the p le a d in g s conclusively establish the movant's entitlement to judgment. Aponte-Torres v. Univ. o f P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006). Dismissal is proper at this stage where a plaintiff " f a il[ e d ] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(c) for failure to state a claim, "[w]e view the facts c o n ta in e d in the pleadings in the light most flattering to the nonmovants . . . and draw all re a s o n a b le inferences therefrom in their favor." Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 54 (applying s ta n d a rd for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to a Rule 12(c) motion). But mere legal conclusions "are n o t entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). The c o m p la in t must demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief" by alleging facts that directly or in f e re n tia lly support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 3 0 1 , 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). " S p e c if ic facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what th e . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2 0 0 7 ) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Civil No. 10-1144 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 III. A n a ly s is

-4 -

M o v a n t argues that Plaintiff failed to properly plead a prima-facie case under either f e d e ra l or Puerto Rico law of gender discrimination, retaliation or violations of general laws of th e United States or Puerto Rico.1 (Docket No. 15.) As to the gender discrimination claim, M o v a n t relies on a distinction between a claim of gender discrimination and one of sexual h a ra s s m e n t; Movant does not dispute that Plaintiff stated a claim of sexual harassment. (See id . at 4.) W e find, generally, that Movant would demand of Plaintiff more specific factual re c ita tio n s than the law requires. We also find untenable Movant's distinction between a claim o f discrimination based on gender and one of sexual harassment. Moreover, we find that P la in tif f made no claim of violations of the general laws of the United States or Puerto Rico and th a t Movant's argument against any such claim is, therefore, made in vain. W e begin with the distinction Movant urges between gender discrimination and sexual h a ra ss m e n t. The U.S. Supreme Court foreclosed any such distinction in discussing Title VII's p ro h ib itio n of sexual harassment as discrimination on the basis of gender: S e x u a l harassment which creates a hostile or offensive e n v iro n m e n t for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary b a rrie r to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is

Movant also argues that Plaintiff insufficiently pleaded her exhaustion of administrative remedies, though it does not discuss how this should affect the disposition of her claims, particularly that of sexual harassment. (See Docket No. 15 at 18-20.) In any case, we find that Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded exhaustion of administrative remedies when she stated that she had so exhausted and was filing within ninety days of receiving her right-to-sue letter (Docket No. 1 at 2).

1

Civil No. 10-1144 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being a llo w e d to work and make a living can be as demeaning and d is c o n c e rtin g as the harshest of racial epithets.

-5 -

M e rito r Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of D u n d e e , 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). We, therefore, reject Movant's argument that P la in tif f failed to state a claim of gender discrimination, since Movant does not dispute that P la in tif f stated a claim of sexual harassment.2 A s to retaliation, we find that the complaint contains sufficient facts to support Plaintiff's c la im under both Title VII and Law 69.3 As Movant recites (Docket No. 15 at 14-15), Plaintiff n e e d only have stated facts sufficient to show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she e x p e r i e n c e d an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the p ro te c te d activity and the employment action. See, e.g., Mariani-Colón v. Dep't of Homeland S e c ., 511 F.3d 216, 223 (1st Cir. 2007). Given the facts stated above in Part I, we find that P la in tif f clearly stated a prima-facie case of retaliation.4

Movant argues that no distinction should be made between federal and Puerto Rico law as to the pleading required to state a claim of gender discrimination. (See Docket No. 15 at 5 n.2.) We, therefore, simultaneously reject Movant's argument of insufficient pleading of gender discrimination under Puerto Rico law. Again, Movant argues that the same analysis applies to a retaliation claim, whether it be made under Title VII or under Law 69. (Docket No. 15 at 14.) We note that Movant's motion suffers generally from its failure to analyze Plaintiff's satisfaction of the recited elements of the prima-facie cases. (See Docket No. 15.) Movant, instead, lists various omissions from the complaint that are not required by the rules Movant itself recites. (See id.) For example, Movant would have Plaintiff anticipate in her complaint the nondiscriminatory reason Movant will set forth explaining the allegedly discriminatory behavior. (See Docket No. 15 at 11.) To the extent Movant alleges omissions from the complaint that actually touch on a relevant element of a prima-facie case, we find Movant's articulation of the omissions misleading and frivolous. (See, e.g., Docket No. 16 at 22 ("Plaintiff also fails to plead sufficient
4 3

2

Civil No. 10-1144 (JAF) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

-6 -

F in a lly, in reviewing the complaint, we detect no attempt to claim violations of general la w s of the United States or Puerto Rico. (See Docket No. 1.) And we find baffling Movant's a s se rtio n that Plaintiff "fail[ed] to specify which laws [Movant violated]--other than the ones s ta te d in the complaint." (Docket No. 15 at 20.) As Movant's argument pertains to no claim a c tu a lly made in the complaint, we disregard it. IV . C o n c lu s io n F o r the foregoing reasons, we hereby DENY Movant's motion for partial dismissal (D o c k e t No. 15). I T IS SO ORDERED. S a n Juan, Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of July, 2010. s/J o s é Antonio Fusté JO S E ANTONIO FUSTE C h ie f U.S. District Judge

facts which could lead to a plausible conclusion that she suffered an actual adverse employment decision (other than her termination).").)