Vega-Maldonado v. USA

Filing 13

OPINION & ORDER DENYING 1 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 10/11/2012. (IL) (Main Document 13 replaced on 10/12/2012 to add judge's signature) (ab).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

ANDY VEGA-MALDONADO,
Petitioner,

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v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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CIVIL NO. 10-1302(JAG)
RELATED CRIM. 99-044(JAG)

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OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255
Habeas Corpus Petition (D.E.1)1, as well as the Government’s
Response (D.E. 11), and Petitioner’s Reply (D.E. 12). For
the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the Petition
shall be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2003, Petitioner Andy Vega-Maldonado
(hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Vega-Maldonado”)was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of two hundred and twenty eight
(228) months. Petitioner had previously plead guilty to
violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(j)
and 2 - aiding and abetting in using and carrying firearms
during and in relation to a crime of violence, specifically
extortion, which resulted in the death of a person (Crim.
D.E. 751)2.

1

D.E. is an abbreviation of docket entry number.

2

Crim. D.E. is an abbreviation for criminal docket entry.

Civil No. 10-1302(JAG)

Page 2

On September 8, 2003, Judgment was entered (Crim. D.E.
751).

Petitioner never filed an appeal of his conviction;

therefore, Vega-Maldonado’s conviction became final after
ten

(10)

days,

pursuant

to

Rule

4(b)(1)(A)(I)

of

the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On March 15, 2010, Petitioner gave to prison officials
a Motion in Request for Relief from Void Judgment Pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(4); the same was received and filed on March
19, 2010 (Crim. D.E. 836).
On April 9, 2010, the Court, upon review of the Rule
60(b)(4) motion, issued an order directing the Clerk of the
Court to file said motion as a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255
(Crim. D. E. 845).
Motion

for

On April 23, 2010, Petitioner filed a

Reconsideration

of

the

Court’s

Order

re-

classifying and properly filing his motion as a Section
2255 Petition (Crim. D.E. 849)3.

On May 4, 2010, the Court

issued its Order denying the Reconsideration (Crim. D. E.
854).
On May 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal as
to the Court’s denial of the Reconsideration (Crim. D. E.
856).

On August 13, 2010, the First Circuit Court of

Appeals issued its Judgment dismissing Petitioner’s appeal
(Appeal No. 10-1771, August 13, 2010).

3

Thus, pending

In his motion petitioner acknowledges the fact that as a
Section 2255 Petition his motion would be time barred.

Civil No. 10-1302(JAG)

Page 3

before this Court is Petitioner’s Section 2255 Petition
(D.E.1).
For the reasons expressed herein, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s

Section

2255

Petition

is

time

barred;

therefore, the petition is dismissed with prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA),went into effect on April 24, 1996.

AEDPA

established a limitations period of one (1) year from the
date on which a prisoner’s conviction becomes “final”
within which to seek federal habeas relief.
intended

that

AEDPA

be

applied

to

all

Congress

section

2255

petitions filed after its effective date, Pratt v. United
States, 129 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1997).
In the present case, taking the dates of entry of
Judgment

and

reviewing

the

tolling

of

the

applicable

statute of limitations in the light most favorable to
Petitioner, it is clear that his judgment of conviction
became final ten days following entry of judgment. This
would have been the allotted time limit for Petitioner to
file his Notice of Appeal, Kapral v. United States, 166
F.3d 5665 (3d Cir. 1999).
Petitioner’s Judgment was entered September 8, 2003,
which means than on September 18, 2003, his conviction
became final and the one (1) year statute of limitation
began to accrue.

T h e r e fore, Petit i o n e r h a d u n t i l

Civil No. 10-1302(JAG)

September

18,

petition.

2004,

Page 4

to

timely

file

his

section

2255

However, Vega-Maldonado did not provide his

petition to prison guard until March 15, 2010,

over five

(5) years after the one (1) year statute of limitations had
expired.

Hence, the same is time barred.

Petitioner would like this Court to follow his argument
in his Reply, that this Court could not sua sponte reclassify his original Rule 60 motion as a Section 2255
Petition.

Petitioner alleges that the Court had to first

provide him with notice of the adverse effect this would
have.

Vega-Maldonado

is

well

aware

that

as

a

Petition, his request for relief would be time barred.

2255
The

Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument.
The re-classification of motions in order for them to
be properly filed as Section 2255 Petitions is a matter
already settled by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

The

Circuit Court has made it clear that it is essential for
courts to plot, and then patrol, the boundaries between
section 2255 and the universe of writs.

Otherwise, artful

pleaders will tiptoe around those boundaries and frustrate
Congress’s discernible intent, Trenkler v. United States,
536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008).

In carrying out this duty,

courts must be guided by the principle that substance
trumps form.

“Thus, any motion filed in the district court

that imposed the sentence, and substantively within the
scope of Section 2255, is a motion under Section 2255, no
matter what title the prisoner plaster on the cover,” Id.

Civil No. 10-1302(JAG)

Page 5

at 97, citing Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857
(7th Cir. 2004).
Following

this

approach,

courts

regularly

re-

characterize imaginatively captioned petitions to reflect
that they derive their essence from Section 2255 and, thus,
must satisfy the section’s gatekeeping provisions.

See

United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200 at 206-208(4th
Cir. 2003) (re-characterizing a self-styled Rule 60 (b)
motion).
An

analysis

of

the

substance

of

Vega-Maldonado’s

petition leaves no doubt that, regardless of its label, the
petition falls clearly within the compass of a section 2255
petition. Petitioner is a federal prisoner challenging his
sentence, as well as the performance of his counsel, and
alleging his sentence was beyond the scope of the statute
of conviction.

The Court’s analysis need not go further.

III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated,

the

Court

concludes

that

Petitioner ANDY VEGA-MALDONADO, is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on the claim presented since the same is time
barred.

Accordingly, it is ordered that Petitioner ANDY

VEGA-MALDONADO’s request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2255(D.E.1) is DENIED, and his Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILTY
For the reasons previously stated, the Court hereby

Civil No. 10-1302(JAG)

Page 6

DENIES Petitioner’s request for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.
C. Section 2255.

It is further ordered that in the event

that Petitioner files a notice of appeal,

no certificate

of appealability should be issued because there is no
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11th of October 2012.

S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE