Morales-Santiago v. ARAMARK Cleanroom Services (Puerto Rico), Inc. et al
Filing
20
OPINION AND ORDER - GRANTED 10 MOTION for Partial Dismissal filed by Aramark Cleanroom Services (Puerto Rico), Inc., Aramark Corporation and 11 MOTION to dismiss as to Lourdes Morales-Santiago filed by Efrain Sullivan. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 9/30/11.(su)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LOURDES MORALES-SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402 (JAF/JP)
ARAMARK CLEANROOM SERVICES
(PUERTO RICO), INC., et al.,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Aramark Corporation and Aramark
Cleanroom Services (Puerto Rico), Inc.’s (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “Aramark”) motion for partial dismissal of the
complaint (No. 10), Defendant Efrain Solivan’s1 (“Solivan”) motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against him (No. 11), Plaintiff’s
oppositions
to
Defendant
Aramark’s
motion
(Nos.
12,
13),2
and
Defendants’ replies (Nos. 16, 17). On May 14, 2010, Plaintiff brought
the instant action against Defendants Aramark and Solivan3 alleging
1
Defendant Efrain Solivan states in his motion that Plaintiff misspells his
last name in the complaint as “Sullivan.”
2
Plaintiff filed two nearly identical oppositions to Defendant Aramark’s
motion at docket numbers 12 and 13 without explanation and did not file an
opposition to Defendant Solivan’s motion. As such, the Court deems Defendant
Solivan’s motion unopposed. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s oppositions are
almost completely devoid of any supporting case law and fail to provide developed
argumentation in opposition to Defendants’ motions.
3
Plaintiff also named as Defendants John Ehmann, Aramark Uniform and Career
Apparel, LLC, Aramark Cleanroom Services, Inc., and ABC Insurance Co. The Court
ordered (No. 18) Plaintiff to file proof of service as to these Defendants and
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-2-
gender and national origin discrimination pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, and under Puerto Rico Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
29, §§ 146-151 (“Law 100”), Puerto Rico Law 69, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
29, § 1321-1341 (“Law 69”), Puerto Rico Law 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
29, §185a (“Law 80”), and under Articles 1054, 1059 and 1060, P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 3018, 3023, 3024, and Articles 1802 and 1803,
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 5141 and 5142.4
For the reasons stated
herein, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are hereby GRANTED.
I.
PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Lourdes Morales Santiago (“Morales”) filed the instant
complaint
on
May
14,
2010
against
Defendants
for
damages
and
declaratory relief, alleging that she was discriminated against on
the basis of her gender and national origin.
Plaintiff Morales was an employee of Aramark Cleanroom Services,
Inc. from September 2005 until September 28, 2009.
She started
working at Aramark as a Quality Assurance Manager. She alleges that
warned Plaintiff that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of the
complaint against them without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m). On October 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed proof of service (No. 19) as
to some Defendants but not as to Defendants John Ehmann, Aramark Uniform and
Career Apparel, LLC, Aramark Cleanroom Services, Inc., and ABC Insurance Co. as
ordered by the Court. It appearing from the record that Plaintiff has failed to
serve those Defendants, the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against them
without prejudice.
4
Plaintiff incorrectly cited to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5242.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-3-
her work was well recognized and that she received several awards
during her time with Aramark. She received a Quality Award in 2006,
an “ISO 9001 certification” and also a “Cleanroom Quality Award” in
2006.
She
alleges
that
the
metrics
for
the
Quality
Assurance
Department were always above expected parameters. In October 2007,
she was promoted to Territory Manager. On customer service surveys,
Morales states that her work was graded 9-10 on a 1-10 scale, 10
being excellent.
Plaintiff alleges that her business relations with customers
were excellent and that she never had a bad performance review or
received any complaints from customers. In 2008, however, Defendant
Solivan was appointed to assist the Puerto Rico operations. At that
time, Plaintiff Morales started noticing disparate treatment towards
her and her work. Solivan moved Morales out of the office space that
she had been occupying as a Territory Manager. Morales then had to
work from home with office equipment supplied by herself and without
additional compensation. Aramark gave, as its reason for removing her
from the office, space constraints; however, Plaintiff argues that
the actual reason was that Solivan wanted to pressure her into
resigning from Aramark because he did not want a woman or a Puerto
Rican to have such a high position within Aramark. Plaintiff alleges
that her former office was empty for several months and there were
other unused office spaces at Aramark.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-4-
Plaintiff alleges that John Ehmann (“Ehmann”) and Solivan began
visiting customers and discussing customer issues without including
Morales
on
those
visits
and
conversations
even
though
her
responsibilities included being a customer liaison. When Morales
requested to be included, she was rebuffed. Also, Morales alleges the
she was not awarded a commission on one of her sales.
On September 28, 2009, Plaintiff Morales was informed through
Amy
Zielenski
(“Zielenski”),
the
Senior
Territory
Manager
and
Plaintiff’s former boss, that Ehmann and Solivan decided to terminate
her because there was no need for a customer service position in
Puerto Rico. Both Ehmann and Solivan would be covering the former
tasks. Plaintiff alleges that she later received information from
Zielenski that Ehmann and Solivan had been looking for a reason to
terminate Morales for several months.
Further, Plaintiff alleges that a corporate email was sent to
Aramark customers without Morales’ consent stating that she was
resigning to pursue a career as a lawyer. Although Morales studied
law, she claims the information was untrue. The email also stated
that Zielinski would be covering the position, which was contrary to
the information previously given to Plaintiff.
Morales was servicing a total of twenty (20) accounts at the
time she was terminated. She alleges that no other Territory Manager
was terminated aside from the one in Puerto Rico, that there were no
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-5-
other female managers or supervisors at Aramark in Puerto Rico at the
time of her termination, and that the last female manager resigned
due to gender discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that several weeks
after her termination and after she presented her claim before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a new position of
“Customer Service Coordinator” was created. She alleges that the
person in this position is doing the same tasks that Plaintiff was
doing. Plaintiff was not offered the position. The position of Puerto
Rico Territory Manager was opened seven months later and offered to
the person in the Customer Service Coordinator position.
Finally, Morales alleges that Aramark attempted to reach a
settlement agreement with illegal clauses and restrictions. She seeks
punitive damages in excess of $1,000,000.00, actual damages of
$250,000.00, costs, and attorney’s fees.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
According to the Supreme Court, “once a claim has been stated
adequately,
it
may
be
supported
by
showing
any
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62 (2007).
set
of
facts
Bell Atl. Corp.
As such, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable.
Id. at 570.
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit has interpreted Twombly as
sounding the death knell for the oft-quoted language of Conley v.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-6-
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe,
Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 561). Still, a court must “treat all allegations in the Complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
plaintiff.”
Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East Providence,
970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment,
Title VII, and state law claims and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive
damages. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
entitling her to relief. The Court will examine each argument in
turn.
A.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
should be dismissed because a cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment can only be brought against state actors and Defendants are
not state actors. In her opposition, Plaintiff consents to the
dismissal of her Fourteenth Amendment claims. (Pl.’s Opp. at 4). As
such,
the
Court
hereby
GRANTS
Defendants’
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
motions
to
dismiss
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
B.
-7-
Title VII Claims
1.
Liability of Aramark Under Title VII
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against
Aramark should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s allegations are
unsupported and conclusory. Title VII protects against discrimination
in the workplace on the basis of certain protected categories,
including sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff alleges Title VII
discrimination claims on the basis of: (1) sex; and (2) national
origin.
a. Discrimination Based on Sex
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a Title VII
claim for discrimination on the basis of sex must be examined
according to the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
framework
consists
of
the
following
three
The McDonnell Douglas
steps.
First,
the
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that: (a) she is a member
of a protected class; (b) her job performance was satisfactory;
(c) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (d) the defendant
continued to have her duties performed by a comparably qualified
person.
Santiago-Ramos
v.
Centennial
217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000).
P.R.
Wireless
Corp.,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit has also phrased the fourth prong of the test
to require a plaintiff to demonstrate that “[the] employer sought a
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
replacement
for
qualifications.”
(1st Cir. 1994).
[the
Smith
-8plaintiff]
v.
Stratus
with
roughly
Computer,
40
equivalent
F.3d
11,
15
The replacement of the plaintiff demonstrates that
the plaintiff was terminated despite the employer’s “continued need
for the same services and skills.”
Mesnick v. General Electric Co.,
950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991).
If
the
plaintiff
establishes
a
prima
facie
case
of
sex
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to state
a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Hillstrom v. Best Western TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003).
If the defendant meets that burden, the burden then shifts once again
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s stated reason
is mere pretext for sex discrimination.
Id.
First, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because she
is female. Secondly, Plaintiff alleges that she performed her job
satisfactorily because she received an award and favorable reviews
and
no
complaints
from
customers.
As
such,
taking
Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, Plaintiff meets the second prong of the test.
As to the third prong, Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action when she was terminated from her employment.
Plaintiff also alleges that being forced to work from home
constitutes
employment
an
adverse
action
must
employment
materially
action.
change
To
the
be
adverse,
an
conditions
of
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
plaintiff’s
employment.
-9Gu
v.
312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
Boston
Police
Department,
Some material changes include
“demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to
promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations, and toleration of
harassment by other employees.” Id.
Plaintiff offers no allegations
regarding whether other employees were also told to work from home,
whether
the
move
was
temporary
or
permanent,
or
whether
her
compensation and/or responsibilities were reduced. Given the lack of
factual allegations regarding her alleged forced move to work from
home, the Court finds that the move does not constitute an adverse
employment action under Title VII. See Wooten v. St. Francis Med.
Ctr., 108 Fed. Appx. 888, 891 (5th Cir. 2004)(finding that employee’s
temporary move to a small office, which was formerly a storage area,
did not constitute an “adverse employment action” and noting that
employee offered “nothing to indicate that the change in her work
area was motivated by racial or gender considerations”).
As to the fourth prong, Plaintiff makes no allegations about the
qualifications of the person who replaced her. Plaintiff claims that
Solivan and Ehmann terminated her position and took over her duties
and that Defendants later stated that Zielenski would take over her
duties. In her complaint, Plaintiff fails to make any factual
allegations as to the qualifications of Solivan, Ehmann and Zielinski
so
as
to
ascertain
whether
they
are
comparably
qualified.
In
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-10-
addition, while she avers that when her position was reopened another
person was offered the position, she fails to allege the gender or
qualifications of this person. Given Plaintiff’s sparse allegations,
the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the fourth prong of
the test. As such, Plaintiff has not met her initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of
sex.
Even assuming that Plaintiff met her prima facie burden, which
is “not onerous” in Title VII cases, if Defendant articulates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision, then the
“presumption of discrimination vanishes, and the burden of production
shifts back to the plaintiff.” See Smith, 40 F.3d at 16. “The
plaintiff must then introduce sufficient evidence to support two
additional findings: (1) that the employer’s articulated reason for
the job action is a pretext, and (2) that the true reason is
discriminatory.” Id. In the instant case, Defendants’ alleged reason
for removing Plaintiff from her office was due to space constraints
and the alleged reason for her termination was because of lack of
need for the position. Plaintiff claims that she was moved from her
office and later terminated because Defendants did not want a woman
or Puerto Rican holding a high position in the company. She avers
that while she was told there was no need for her position, her same
position was reopened approximately seven months later.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-11-
Notwithstanding these averments, Plaintiff fails to provide any
facts to support a finding or inference that Defendants’ reasons were
pretextual and their true reason was discriminatory. Plaintiff makes
conclusory statements that the last female manager resigned due to
discrimination by male managers and that there were no other female
supervisors
or
managers
in
Puerto
Rico
at
the
time
of
her
termination. She provides no further factual allegations to support
these naked assertions or explain the alleged discrimination she or
the other female supervisors suffered. She also offers no allegations
of how other employees or territory managers at the time were treated
in comparison. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “[a]
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009)(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 127). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s
conclusory assertions are inconsistent with her allegation that her
former boss, Amy Zielenski, who was a woman, was at the time of the
events alleged in the complaint, the Senior Territory Manager. Also,
as stated above, Plaintiff does not make any allegations regarding
the gender or qualifications of the person who was selected for the
new Customer Service Coordinator position and who later was offered
her former position.
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-12-
In disparate treatment cases, “the plaintiff has the burden of
showing that she was treated differently from persons situated
similarly in all relevant aspects.” Smith, 40 F.3d at 16 (citing The
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1989)(internal quotation omitted)). In her complaint, Plaintiff
Morales, in a conclusory fashion, alleges that she started noticing
disparate treatment towards her and her work and that she was removed
from her office and forced to work from home. Nevertheless, she does
not make any factual allegations to support that she was treated
differently from similarly situated persons. See
Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (“[I]t is the
plaintiff’s task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees
were not treated equally”).
While Plaintiff alleges that Zielenski told her that Defendants
were looking for a reason to terminate Plaintiff, Plaintiff provides
no further factual enhancement to this statement to support that
Defendants terminated her because of her sex. The First Circuit has
explicitly stated, “Title VII was not designed to transform courts
into ‘super personnel departments, assessing the merits-or even the
rationality of employers’ nondiscriminatory business decisions.”
Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & County Club, 218
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000)(quoting Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825).
Plaintiff’s assertion that she was terminated because of her sex
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-13-
without further factual enhancement “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient for the
Court to find that Defendants acted with a discriminatory animus.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations that she performed satisfactorily and
received awards for her performance as true, the Court finds that
these factual allegations alone are not sufficient to support a
finding of pretext and that Defendants acted with a discriminatory
animus. As the First Circuit states, “Title VII does not grant relief
to a plaintiff who has been discharged unfairly, even by the most
irrational of managers, unless the facts and circumstances indicate
that discriminatory animus was the reason for the decision.” Smith,
40 F.3d at 16.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim against Aramark for a violation of Title VII on the basis of
sex and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.
b. Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
discrimination on the basis of national origin. With regard to her
national
origin
argumentation
in
discrimination
claim,
support
claim
of
her
Plaintiff
in
her
offers
oppositions
no
to
Defendants’ motions. In opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a plaintiff
cannot expect a trial court to do [her] homework for [her].” McCoy
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-14-
v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.
1991). Rather, the plaintiff has an affirmative responsibility to put
her best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that
will support her claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d
at 52; The Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16; Ryan v. Scoggin, 245
F.2d 54, 57 (10th Cir. 1957)). Plaintiff must set forth in her
complaint
“factual
allegations,
either
direct
or
inferential,
regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under
some actionable theory.” Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514
(1st Cir. 1988).
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated
because she was Puerto Rican. Specifically, she alleges that she was
fired
because
Defendant
Solivan
“did
not
want
a
woman,
nor
a
puertorrican [sic] to have such a high position within Aramark.” See
Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff neither offers factual support for this
statement nor offers any argumentation to support her claim in her
oppositions.
Moreover, she does not allege that non Puerto Ricans
were treated differently and does not make any allegations as to the
national origin of Defendant Solivan or of the person who allegedly
replaced her. Plaintiff’s conclusory statements without further
factual enhancement will not suffice. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
As such and given that Plaintiff provided no argumentation in support
of
her
national
origin
discrimination
claim,
the
Court
GRANTS
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-15-
Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim.
2.
Supervisory Liability Under Title VII
Defendant Solivan argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims
against him should be dismissed because Title VII does not permit a
cause of action against individual supervisors. The First Circuit has
determined that the definition of “employer” for Title VII purposes
does not encompass individual supervisors, even if such individuals
are acting as agents of the employer.
Fantini v. Salem State
College, 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).
Therefore, individual
supervisors may not be held liable pursuant to a Title VII claim.
Id.
have
(“[we] take this opportunity to determine as [other circuits]
that
there
is
no
individual
employee
liability
under
Title VII[]”). In the instant case, the First Circuit rule regarding
individual liability dictates that Defendant Solivan may not be held
liable for a cause of action under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendant Solivan’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claim
against him.
C.
Puerto Rico Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts various state law claims against Defendants.
Because Plaintiff no longer has federal claims pending before the
Court, the Court will no longer retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
supplemental claims. See U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Rivera v. Murphy, 979
F.2d
259,
264
(1st
Cir.
1992).
As
such,
the
Court
dismisses
CIVIL NO. 10-1402(JAF/JP)
-16-
Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
herein,
the
Court
hereby
GRANTS
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiff’s federal claims against
Defendants Aramark Corporation, Aramark Cleanroom Services (Puerto
Rico), Inc. and Efrain Solivan are dismissed with prejudice and
Plaintiff’s state law claims against these Defendants are dismissed
without prejudice.
In accordance with this Opinion and Order, the
Court will enter a separate judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 30th day of September, 2011.
s/José Antonio Fusté
JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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