Velazquez-Mejias v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R. et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 7/8/2011. (LL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ARIEL VELÁZQUEZ MEJÍAS,
Plaintiff
v.

CIVIL NO. 10-1515 (JAG)

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE
PUERTO RICO, et al.,
Defendant(s)

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY,

D.J.

Pending before the Court is Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint. (Docket No. 13). For the
reasons set forth, the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On

June

10,

2010

Plaintiff

Ariel

Velázquez

Mejías

(“Velázquez”) filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for violation
of

his

Civil

Rights

against

Gladys

Velázquez

Galarza

(“Galarza”), Carlos Rios (“Rios”), Rafael Franco (“Franco”), the
Parole Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Corrections
Administration

(“C.A.”)

and

the

(“Commonwealth”). (Docket No. 3).

Commonwealth

of

Puerto

Rico

Velázquez, a detainee at a

correctional

facility

administered

by

the

C.A.,

seeks

money

damages for injuries suffered as a result of Defendants‟ failure
to correct errors in the computation of Plaintiff‟s Sentence
Liquidation Sheet.
Plaintiff

alleges

that

on

September

18,

2009,

after

receiving a Sentence Liquidation Sheet, he noticed an error in
the computation and brought it to the attention of codefendant
Gladys Velázquez Galarza, Record Technician at the C.A. After
Galarza refused to correct the error, Plaintiff filed various
administrative remedies which were denied by codefendant Carlos
Rios, also Record Technician at the C.A. Plaintiff then sought
review with the Administrative Remedies division of the C.A.,
but was also denied relief.
Plaintiff then filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Puerto
Rico Court of First Instance. Sentencing Judge Rafael Taboas
Dávila ordered the Sentence Liquidation Sheet to be corrected,
and scheduled a hearing on February 23, 2010 with the purpose of
ensuring the correction was made. Rafael Franco, on behalf of
the Administration of Corrections and Rehabilitation, referred
the case to the Parole Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Nonetheless, the record does not reflect whether any action was
taken in the end.

Plaintiff Velázquez alleges he has suffered damages in the
amount of $150,000.00 due to delays in his case and the fact
that

the

error

in

the

Sentence

Liquidation

Sheet

remains.

However, after careful review, this Court finds it is unable to
entertain whatever claim he may have against Defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the
Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement
to relief.” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92,
95-96 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559). While
Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
it

does

require

enough

facts

to

“nudge

[plaintiffs‟]

claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550
U.S.

at

570.

Accordingly,

in

order

to

avoid

dismissal,

the

plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests
through

factual

allegations

sufficient

“to

raise

a

right

to

relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme
Court recently upheld Twombly and clarified that two underlying
principles must guide this Court‟s assessment of the adequacy of
the plaintiff‟s pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint

can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949-50.

First,

allegations

in

the
the

court

must

complaint

as

identify
such

any

conclusory

allegations

are

not

entitled to an assumption of truth. See id. at 1949. “[T]he
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare

recitals

of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950
(citing

Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

556).

Thus,

any

nonconclusory

factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must be
sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility.

See

id. A

claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded facts allow the
court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the
specific

misconduct

alleged.

See

id.

at

1949,

1952.

Such

inferences must be more than a sheer possibility and at least as
plausible as any obvious alternative explanation. See id. at
1949,

1951.

Plausibility

is

a

context-specific

determination

that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. See id. at 1950.

Because

Plaintiff

appears

pro

se,

the

Court

reads

his

complaint generously. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).

This Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are “held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”

Erickson

Nonetheless,

“even

v.
a

Pardus,
pro

se

551

U.S.

complaint

89,

must

94

(2007).

plead

„factual

matter‟ that permits the Court to infer „more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.‟” Atherton v. District of Columbia
office

of

Mayor,

2009

WL

1515373,

at

*6

(D.C.

Cir.

2009)

courts]

from

(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
DISCUSSION
The

Eleventh

Amendment

“prohibit[s

federal

hearing most suits brought against a state by citizens of that
or any other state.” Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir. 1993). “[D]espite the
absence

of

any

express

reference,”

the

Eleventh

Amendment

“pertains to Puerto Rico in the same manner, and to the same
extent,

as

if

Puerto

Rico

were

a

State.”

De

Leon

Lopez

v.

Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.
1991).
“[T]he
operation

of

government
the

enjoys

sovereign

broad

protection

through

immunity

doctrine.”

Muirhead

the
v.

Mecham, 427 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2005). Often, a suit against a

state official is considered a suit against the state, which
triggers

Eleventh

Amendment

immunity.

See

Asociación

De

Subscripción Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio
v. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2007). Consequently,
when

Plaintiff

official

in

brings

his

a

suit

personal

against

capacity

a

Puerto

Rico

than

against

rather

state
the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico itself, the Court must ascertain
whether the suit in reality is a suit against the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. See Muirhead, 427 F.3d at 18.
This

analysis

examines

the

conduct

challenged

and

the

relief sought. See Muirhead, 427 F.3d at 18. When the actions of
an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory
authority, they are considered actions of the sovereign, which
are protected by the Eleventh Amendment.1 See Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949). Furthermore,
when

the

relief

sought

“would

expend

itself

on

the

public

treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,
or

if

the

effect

of

the

judgment

would

be

to

restrain

the

Government from acting, or to compel it to act” the suit will be

1

The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply when an
officer‟s power is limited by statute and his actions go beyond
those limitations. Id. at 689; see also Muirhead, 427 F.3d at
19.

considered one against the sovereign. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment does not apply in a suit against an
officer to recover damages for the agent‟s personal actions,
because

the

judgment

sought

will

not

require

action

by

the

sovereign or disturb the sovereign‟s property. See Larson, 337
U.S. at 687.2 As such, the sovereign immunity doctrine does not
bar personal-capacity suits against state officials because “it
is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her
personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability
upon the governmental entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
167 (1985). Thus, a citizen may seek monetary damages against a
state officer for acts done under color of law, but only if the
officer is sued in his or her individual capacity. See id.
“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability
upon a government official for actions he takes under color of
state law.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165. “[T]o establish personal
liability in a section 1983 action, it is enough to show that
the

official,

acting

under

color

of

state

law,

caused

the

deprivation of a federal right.” Id. at 166.

2

“If the officer purports to act as an individual and not as an
official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit
against the sovereign.” Larson, 337 U.S. at 689.

Given that Velázquez‟s claim against the C.A., the Parole
Board,
itself,

and
he

recovering

the

Commonwealth

is

barred,

money

is

under

damages.

directed

the

See

against

Eleventh

Metcalf,

the

Amendment,

991

F.2d

at

State
from
938.

Plaintiff seeks damages that would require expenditure from the
public

treasury,

which

is

also

prohibited

by

the

Eleventh

Amendment. See Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620.
Moreover,

Velázquez‟s

claim

against

Galarza,

Rios

and

Franco, its validity disregarded, cannot be vindicated by this
Court, for it would also require payment of monies from the
public treasury, and would thus be considered a suit against the
state. See Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620. Whether Plaintiff brings suit
against

the

aforementioned

in

their

individual

or

official

capacity has not been made clear; more importantly, Plaintiff
fails to assert how Galarza, Rios and Franco‟s specific acts or
omissions,

while

acting

under

color

of

state

law,

have

conflicted with their duties as officials and violated his civil
rights. See Larson, 337 U.S. at 695.
Despite

the

fact

that

Velázquez‟s

allegations

are

interpreted liberally in accordance with Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (1972), this Court finds Plaintiff has not met the
pleading standard and, therefore, cannot be awarded the damages
sought.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated

Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss.

above,

the

Court

hereby

GRANTS

Plaintiff‟s claims are dismissed

without prejudice.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th of July, 2011.
S/Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge

1

This Court does not address Defendants‟ claim regarding Plaintiff‟s failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies according to the Prison Reform
Litigation Act of 1995, 110 Stat. 1321, because even if Plaintiff had done
so, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and cannot be entertained
due to the reasons stated in this opinion. Should Plaintiff amend or refile
his complaint, he must satisfy these exhaustion requirements and show the
Court that they have been satisfied. Failure to do so may result in dismissal
of his claims.