Rodrguez-Miranda v. Coquico, Inc. et al

Filing 92

OPINION AND ORDER denying 82 Motion for Attorney Fees; finding as moot 84 Motion requesting Order. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 11/29/2011. (mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ÁNGEL EDGARDO RODRÍGUEZMIRANDA,
Civil No. 10-1557 (JAF)

Plaintiff,
v.
COQUICO, INC. and MALIK BENIN,
PHILLIPA ASHBY, and the conjugal
partnership between them,
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER

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Before this court is an unopposed motion for attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest

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(Docket No. 82) filed by Plaintiff Ángel Edgardo Rodríguez-Miranda (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s

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diversity action sought damages, claiming personal injury and defamation in violation of 31

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L.P.R.A. § 5141 (2008) and breach of contract. (Docket No. 1.) The jury trial ended on

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July 28, 2011. (Docket No. 80.) The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $348,821.23, in

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favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Coquico (“Coquico”), for unpaid salary and loans.

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(Docket No. 76.) Prior to the beginning of this action, an earlier case in this district found that

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Plaintiff had infringed Coquico’s copyrights and awarded Coquico $15,000. Coquico, Inc. v.

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Rodriguez-Miranda, No. 07-1432, 2010 WL 3372388, at *4 (D.P.R. 2010 Oct. 19, 2011)

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(“Coquico I”).

Civil No. 10-1557 (JAF)

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Plaintiff now brings this motion under Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1(d) and

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44.3(b).1 The relevant section of Rule 44.1(d) reads, “In the event any party or its lawyer has

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acted obstinately or frivolously, the court shall, in its judgment, impose on such person the

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payment of a sum for attorney’s fees which the court decides corresponds to such conduct.”

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P.R. R. Civ. P. 44(1)(d) (2009). Rule 44.3(b) reads, “The court shall also impose on the

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obstinate party the payment of interest at the rate fixed by the Board by virtue of subsection (a)

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of this rule.” P.R. R. Civ. P. 44.3(b) (2009).

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Plaintiff alleges that Coquico engaged in a “pattern of behavior” demonstrating obstinacy

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before and during trial. (Docket No. 82 at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Coquico:

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(1) never offered to settle the case, despite Coquico’s knowledge that it owed Plaintiff money

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(Docket No. 82 at 1–3); (2) filed “baseless” and “frivolous” claims and counterclaims (id. at 1;

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3); and (3) “consistently ignored” discovery deadlines, causing unnecessary delay (id. at 1–3).

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For the reasons set out below, we disagree with Plaintiff’s characterization of the record and

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deny Plaintiff’s motion.

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“A finding of obstinacy requires that the court determine a litigant to have been

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unreasonably adamant or stubbornly litigious, beyond the acceptable demands of the litigation,

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thereby wasting time and causing the court and the other litigants unnecessary expense and

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delay.” De León López v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 126 (1st Cir. 1991).

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In making a determination of obstinacy, courts are instructed to take into account a case’s

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“personality.” See Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 1253–54 (1st Cir. 1994) (“obstinacy . . .

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Plaintiff cites Puerto Rico Rule of Civil Procedure 44.3(b) for his claim for attorney’s fees. We
note that Rule 44.3(b) provides for prejudgment interest; the Rule that addresses attorney’s fees is
44.1(d), to which Plaintiff makes no reference.

Civil No. 10-1557 (JAF)

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[may] be found to characterize a particular form of conduct in one case but not another”).

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Courts will be less likely to find obstinacy in a case that presents tangled issues, protracted

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disputes, and relentless litigants. See id.

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“This is such a case.” Id. at 1254 (reversing district court’s finding of obstinacy, based

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on the difficult personality of the case). By the time the present case was filed, the parties had

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already been litigating their claims against each other for more than three years.2 At the

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beginning of this case, both parties raised claims and counterclaims that were later dismissed.

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Coquico’s counterclaims for copyright infringement and malicious prosecution were dismissed

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(Docket No. 45), as were Plaintiff’s claims for libel and defamation (Docket No. 67).

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Many of these claims and counterclaims were related to the previously-litigated

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copyright claim, which had an appeal pending at the time.3 See Coquico I. At the beginning

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of the present case, it was not clear which claims from Coquico I would be barred by res

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judicata. Until the first day of trial, we expressly reserved judgment on whether the facts

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underlying Coquico’s breach of contract counterclaim were part of the same transaction that

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gave rise to the earlier copyright claim. (Docket Nos. 45; 70.) We find that Coquico’s decision

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to raise these counterclaims was a product not of obstinacy but, rather, a natural outcome of the

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parties’ “difficult and protracted legal battles.” Dopp, 38 F.3d at 1254.

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The complaint in the earlier copyright action was filed in May of 2007. See Docket No. 1, Civil
No. 07-1432.
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Coquico appealed the judgment in the earlier case, seeking higher damages. Appeal No. 11-1318.
Coquico’s appeal was voluntarily dismissed on September 12, 2011, after the conclusion of this trial. See
Docket Document No. 154, Civil No. 07-1432.

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We turn now to Plaintiff’s claim that Coquico “never offered to pay him a penny” to

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settle the case. (Docket No. 82 at 1.) The record has two indications that Coquico did offer to

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settle the case, and that Plaintiff failed to reply. (Docket Nos. 19; 43.) In its response opposing

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Plaintiff’s motion to compel, Coquico notes that it made a comprehensive settlement offer on

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January 28, 2011, and Plaintiff did not respond. (Docket No. 19 at 2.) Then, at a pretrial

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conference in May 2011, “Defendants’ attorney informed that they made an offer to plaintiffs

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but never received a response. Plaintiffs’ attorney informed that the offer made [was] not

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reasonable.” (Docket No. 43.) Coquico and his codefendant later rejected this court’s

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suggestion to settle for $90,000. (Docket No. 57.)

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We do not believe that such conduct constitutes obstinacy on Coquico’s part. First,

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Plaintiff has not shown that Coquico failed to enter into good-faith negotiations. See Correa

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v. Cruisers, a Div. of KCS Int’l, Inc., 298 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The key issue is not

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whether or not the defendant’s proposed settlement amount approaches plaintiff’s claimed

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damages, but whether the parties engaged in good-faith negotiations.”). Nor has Plaintiff

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demonstrated that he would have been amenable to Coquico’s good-faith attempts at settlement.

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See Dopp, 38 F.3d at 1254–55 (“There is nothing to show that [Plaintiff] . . . ever placed a more

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reasonable value on the case, or that a realistic settlement offer by [Defendant] would have

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satisfied [P]laintiff and shortened the proceedings.”). To the contrary, the record shows that

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Plaintiff failed to respond to Coquico’s settlement overtures. (Docket Nos. 19; 43.) We,

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therefore, decline to find obstinacy on this ground.

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Finally, we turn to Plaintiff’s argument that Coquico’s late filings and failure to meet

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discovery deadlines constitute obstinacy. (Docket No. 82 at 1–3.) Again we disagree.

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Although Coquico’s counsel did request several extensions in the case, there was nothing

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unreasonable or unusual about these requests. (Docket Nos. 19; 25; 48.) None of the

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extensions lasted longer than ten days (id.), and Coquico’s motion for leave to file on the first

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day of trial was quickly denied (Docket No. 71), avoiding any “unnecessary expense and delay.”

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De León López, 931 F.2d at 126. In two of his motions requesting extensions, Coquico’s

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counsel explained that the delays were due to health issues and a separate ongoing trial.

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(Docket Nos. 19; 48.) We doubt that Rule 44.1 was meant to address this sort of commonplace

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delay. See Fernandez v. San Juan Cement Co., 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 823, 830 (1987) (holding

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that Rule 44.1 is meant to penalize “a losing party that because of his stubbornness, obstinacy,

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rashness, and insistent frivolous attitude has forced the other party to needlessly assume the

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pains, costs and inconveniences of a litigation”). We, therefore, decline to find obstinacy on

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this third and final ground.

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II.

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Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, we hereby DENY Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees
(Docket No. 82).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of November, 2011.

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s/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U.S. District Judge