Reyes-Reyes et al v. Toledo et al

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 4 MOTION to dismiss pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) as to Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guillermo Somoza, Puerto Rico Police Department. Signed by Judge Salvador E Casellas on 12/10/2010.(LB)

Reyes-Reyes et al v. Toledo et al

Doc. 19

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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

L O U IS REYES-REYES, et als. Plaintiffs v. P E D R O TOLEDO-DAVILA, et als. Defendants C iv il No. 10-1565 (SEC)

OPINION and ORDER P e n d in g before the Court is Co-Defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1 and the P u e rto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") ("Co-Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 4). P la in tif f s ' opposed (Docket # 8), Co-Defendants replied (Docket # 11), and Plaintiffs s u r-re p lie d (Docket # 16). Upon reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Co-Defendants' m o tio n is GRANTED. F a c tu a l Background On June 21, 2010, Plaintiffs Louis Reyes-Reyes and Louis Reyes-Hernandez 2 filed suit u n d e r 42 U.S.C. 1983 et seq. against Félix Benitez-Quiñones, the Attorney General Guillermo A . Somoza-Colombani, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the PRPD, and Pedro Toledo D á v ila , its former Chief. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants violated their constitutional rights a s protected by the Fourth Amendment. Docket # 1.3 Pursuant to the complaint, on October 4th, 2 0 0 7 , members of the PRPD entered Plaintiffs' home with a search warrant based on agent Guillermo A. Somoza-Colombani, the Commonwealth's Attorney General, is named as a representative of the Commonwealth. Co-Plaintiff Reyes-Hernández is Reyes-Reyes' son.
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25 26 Plaintiffs also set forth claims under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, §§ 5141 & 5142.
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Dockets.Justia.com

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B e n ite z 's false testimony regarding alleged illegal acts committed by Reyes-Reyes in his re sid e n c e and through the use of his vehicle. On August 30, 2010, Co-Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 1 2 (b )(6 ), arguing that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Docket # 4. Plaintiffs o p p o s e d (Docket # 8), Co-Defendants replied (Docket # 11), and Plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket # 16). S ta n d a r d of Review U n d e r Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First Med. Health Plan, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS C a rib b e a n , Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113-114 (D.P.R. 2010). When deciding a motion to d ism is s under this rule, the court will construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the p la in tif f , accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2002); Correa Martinez v . Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1990). The court must then decide whether the c o m p la in t alleges enough facts to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 114 (c itin g Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In so doing, the court accepts as true a ll well pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. (citing P a rk e r v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept a s true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. (c itin g Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). The First Circuit has noted that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, s u p p o rte d by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "[W]here the well pleaded facts d o not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has a lle g e d but it has not''show[n]'-`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (citing Iqbal, 129

S . Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). In sum, when passing on a motion to dismiss

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th e court must follow two principles: (1) legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations a re not entitled to the presumption of truth; and (2) plausibility analysis is a context specific task th a t requires courts to use their judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. C t. at 1950). In applying these principles, courts may first separate out merely conclusory p le a d in g s , and then focus upon the remaining well pleaded factual allegations to determine if th e y plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). The First Circuit has held that "dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the c o m p la in t fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each m a te ria l element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory." Gagliardi v . Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008). Courts "may augment the facts in the complaint b y reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters s u s c e p tib le to judicial notice." Id. at 305-306. However, in judging the sufficiency of a c o m p la in t, courts must "differentiate between well pleaded facts, on the one hand, and `bald a s se rtio n s , unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other h a n d ; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle v. Berkshire L if e Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (citing Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. A m e ric a n Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 7 5 , 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus Plaintiffs must rely in more than unsupported conclusions or in te rp re ta tio n s of law, as these will be rejected. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988)). Therefore, "even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 , the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must a lle g e `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1 st Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Although complaints do not need detailed f a c tu a l allegations, the "plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it

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a s k s for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 127 S . Ct. At 1965; see also Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A plaintiff's obligation to "provide the `g ro u n d s ' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a f o rm u la ic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. At 1 9 6 5 . That is, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative le v e l, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true." Parker, 514 F. 3d at 95. A p p lic a b le Law and Analysis E le v e n th Amendment Immunity In their motion, Co-Defendants aver that the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits a g a in st the State without its consent, shields them from the present action. Docket # 4, p. 2. The E le v e n th Amendment precludes suits in Federal Court for money damages against states unless o n e of the following four exceptions applies: (1) where a state consents to suit in the federal f o ru m , (2) where a state waives its own immunity by statute or the like, (3) where Congress a b ro g a te s state immunity (so long as Congress speaks clearly and acts in furtherance of p a rtic u la r powers), or (4) under certain circumstances other constitutional imperatives may take p re c e d e n c e over the Eleventh Amendment's federal-court bar. Metcalf & Eddy v. P.R.

A q u e d u c t & Sewer Authority, 991 F.2d. 935, 938 (1st Cir.1993); Fernandez v. Chardon, 682 F .2 d 42, 59 (1st Cir. 1982). The First Circuit has affirmed that the Commonwealth of Puerto R ic o enjoys the "full benefits" provided by the Eleventh Amendment. Metcalf, 991 F.2d at 938. T h a t is, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is considered a State. Negron Gaztambide v. Hernandez Torres, 145 F.3d 410 (1st Cir. 1998). In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Co-Defendants have waived their immunity by way o f the Lawsuits Against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Act ("LACPRA"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3077 et seq. Co-Defendants argue LACPRA establishes limits on monetary

c o m p e n s a tio n for actions brought forth against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico but does not

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a u th o riz e nor constitute a consent from the Commonwealth to be sued in federal court. Docket # 11, p. 2. Upon reviewing the above cited law, this Court noted that the LACPRA clearly applies to suits filed in the Courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Moreover, the First Circuit has s ta te d that "[a]lthough the Commonwealth has consented to be sued for damages in actions b ro u g h t under the Commonwealth general negligence statute, such consent does not extend to a c tio n s filed in any courts but the Commonwealth's own. Neither Section 1802 or 1803 contains a n explicit waiver of the Commonwealth''s sovereign immunity." Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 4 5 1 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. P.R. 2006). Thus we are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that the C o m m o n w e a lth has consented to be sued in federal court under LACPRA, as there is no p ro v is io n whatsoever in said statute to support such assertion and our case law provides o th e rw is e . Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are D I S M I S S E D with prejudice. T h e Eleventh Amendment's protection also extends to the state's instrumentalities or " a lte r egos." Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d 1034, 1 0 3 6 (1st Cir.1987). Insofar as the the PRPD is an alter ego of the Commonwealth of Puerto R ic o . McLeod-Lopez, 603 F. Supp.2d at 343 (citing Nieves Cruz v. Comm. of P.R., 425 F. S u p p .2 d 188, 192 (D.P.R.2006); Lopez Rosario v. Police Dept., 126 F.Supp.2d 167, 170-171 (D .P .R .2 0 0 0 )), it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. As such, Plaintiffs' claims a g a in st the PRPD are also DISMISSED with prejudice. S u p p le m e n ta l state law claims Having dismissed Plaintiffs' federal law claims against Co-Defendants, their state law

24 c la im s against said parties are DISMISSED without prejudice. See Rodriguez v. Doral 25 M o rtg a g e Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1175-117 (1st Cir.1995) (finding that "the power of a federal 26 c o u rt to hear and to determine state-law claims in non-diversity cases depends upon the presence

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2 o f at least one `substantial' federal claim in the lawsuit."); Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 3 (1 s t Cir.1991). 4 This Court reminds the parties that all representations to the court, submitted to the court

5 th r o u g h pleadings, motions, and any other document, are bound by FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)'s 6 m a n d a te . Therefore, all claims, defenses, and other legal arguments that are unwarranted by 7 e x is tin g law, are, in fact, frivolous, and can be sanctioned by the courts. In the instant case, 8 P la in tif f s have set forth unwarranted legal arguments, insofar as the current case law is extremely 9 c le a r as to the applicable statutes in cases such as this one. This methodic inclusion of allegations 10 a n d defenses is unjustified, and unnecessarily onerous for the courts. Therefore, parties shall take 11 th e foregoing into consideration when appearing before this Court, or face the imposition of 12 s a n c tio n s . 13 14 Conclusion B a s e d on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' federal claims against Co-Defendants are

15 D I S M I S S E D with prejudice, and their supplemental state law claims against said parties are 16 D I S M I S S E D without prejudice. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 10th day of December, 2010. s /S a lv a d o r E. Casellas S a lv a d o r E. Casellas U .S . Senior District Judge