Rodriguez et al v. FDIC as Receiver of RG Premier Bank of Puerto Rico et al
Filing
24
OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 motion for summary judgment; granting 14 Motion to Dismiss. the Court will enter a separate Final Judgment dismissing the claims against FDIC and R&G Mortgage with prejudice and the claims against R&G Financial without prejudice. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 09/27/2011. (dv)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JOCELYN RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Before
the
Court
are:
(1)
Defendant
R&G
Mortgage
Corp.’s
(“R&G Mortgage”) motion for summary judgment (No. 13); and (2) a
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
filed by Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),
as Receiver of R-G Premier Bank of Puerto Rico (“R-G”) (No. 14). Said
motions are unopposed (No. 23). For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants’ motions are hereby GRANTED.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Jocelyn
Rodriguez
(“Rodriguez”)
allegedly
was
dismissed from her employment in November 2009. On December 29, 2009,
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of First
Instance alleging unjust dismissal and pregnancy discrimination under
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
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Puerto Rico law. Plaintiff brought her claims against R-G, R&G
Mortgage and R&G Financial Corporation (“R&G Financial”).
On April 30, 2010, the Office of the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico closed R-G and caused
the FDIC to be appointed as receiver. As such, on June 16, 2010, the
Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico entered an order substituting
FDIC as the Defendant and real party in interest in place of R-G.
This case was then removed to the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico on July 14, 2010 (No. 1).
The FDIC published a notice to the creditors of R-G advising
them that their claim had to be filed on or before August 4, 2010,
the claims bar date. Even though the claims bar date had passed, the
FDIC sent Plaintiff a discovered creditor notice, dated October 13,
2010, setting forth the requirements under which Plaintiff might be
able
to
participate
in
the
administrative
claims
process
by
submitting a proof of claim on or before January 11, 2011. The letter
also clarified that it was not an extension of the claims bar date
and that Plaintiff had to submit supporting documentation, such as
evidence that Plaintiff lacked knowledge of the appointment of the
receiver, along with the proof of claim.
Plaintiff’s proof of claim was not received until January 18,
2011, one week after the deadline set out in the discovered creditor
notice. Also, Plaintiff failed to submit any supporting documentation
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
-3-
that she lacked knowledge about the appointment of the receiver.
Since Plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of the notice
to discovered creditors, her claim was disallowed by the FDIC on
January 28, 2011.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Motion For Summary Judgment
Summary judgment serves to assess the proof to determine if
there is a genuine need for trial.
895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990).
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate
when “the record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
56(c);
see
also
Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating that summary judgment is appropriate when, after evaluating
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
evidence “fails to yield a trial worthy issue as to some material
fact”); Goldman v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116
(1st
Cir.
1993);
(1st Cir. 1992).
Canal
Ins.
Co.
v.
Benner,
980
F.2d
23,
25
The Supreme Court has stated that “only disputes
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
-4-
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In this way, a fact is material if, based on the substantive law at
issue, it might affect the outcome of the case.
See Mack v. Great
Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989).
On a summary judgment motion, the movant bears the burden of
“informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying
those
portions
of
the
[record]
which
it
believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the movant
meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party who may
not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must
affirmatively show, through the filing of supporting affidavits or
otherwise, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Goldman,
985 F.2d at 1116.
B.
Motion To Dismiss
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Destek Group
v.
State
of
New
Hampshire
318 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).
Public
Utilities
Commission,
The party claiming there is
jurisdiction carries the burden of showing that the court has
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
jurisdiction.
Murphy
-5-
v.
United
States,
45
F.3d
520,
522
(1st Cir. 1995).
Motions
brought
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
(“FRCP”) 12(b)(1) are subject to a similar standard as FRCP 12(b)(6)
motions.
Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, S.E., 229 F. Supp. 2d 105,
107 (D.P.R. 2002).
A court must “treat all allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in
favor of the plaintiff.”
Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East
Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Torres
Maysonet, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
III.
ANALYSIS
Defendant R&G Mortgage argues that summary judgment should be
granted in its favor because Plaintiff was not an employee of R&G
Mortgage at the time of her dismissal. Defendant FDIC argues that its
motion to dismiss should be granted because Plaintiff failed to
comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”).
The Court will now consider Defendants’ unopposed arguments.
A.
Claims Against R&G Mortgage
R&G Mortgage argues that the claims against it should be
dismissed because it was not Plaintiff’s employer at the time of her
dismissal.
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
-6-
After considering the argument, the Court determines that
summary
judgment
should
be
granted
in
favor
of
Defendant
R&G
Mortgage. Plaintiff brought causes of action against R&G Mortgage
alleging unjust dismissal under Puerto Rico Law 80, P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 29, §§ 185a et seq. (“Law 80”), and pregnancy discrimination
under Puerto Rico Law 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq.
(“Law 100”). However, Law 80 and Law 100 create causes of action
between an employee and his or her employer. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
29, § 185a (prohibiting employers from dismissing employees without
just cause); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (“[a]ny employer who
discharges, lays off or discriminates against an employee” based on
any of the protected categories can incur civil and/or criminal
penalties).
Here,
Plaintiff
Defendant
was
R&G
employed
Mortgage
with
it
has
until
presented
February
evidence
2009
and
that
that,
thereafter, Plaintiff became an employee of R-G. Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence or arguments to contradict this. Plaintiff was
therefore not an employee of R&G Mortgage at the time of her
dismissal in November 2009. As such, Plaintiff cannot succeed on her
Law 80 and Law 100 claims against R&G Mortgage since R&G Mortgage was
not her employer at the time of dismissal.
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
B.
-7-
Claims Against FDIC As Receiver For R-G
The FDIC, as receiver, must conserve and preserve a failed
institution’s assets, liquidate those assets when appropriate, and
use the proceeds of liquidation to make distributions among the
failed
institution’s
valid
creditors.
See
12
U.S.C.
§§
1821(d)(2)(A)(ii); 1821(d)(2)(B) and (E). As part of the scheme for
winding
up
failed
financial
institutions,
Congress
created
a
statutory procedure for the orderly and efficient processing of
claims. The administrative claims process, set forth in 12 U.S.C. §§
1821(d)(3)-(13), requires that all claims be submitted to the FDIC
by a date established by the receiver. Said deadline is the claims
bar date. After receiving those claims, the FDIC has up to 180 days
to review said claims and either allow or disallow the timely claims.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).
Untimely claims must be disallowed unless “the claimant did not
receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file
such claim before such date[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C). In that
case, an untimely claim “may be considered by the receiver” provided
the claim is “filed in time to permit payment[.]” Id. Failure to
comply with the mandatory administrative claims process deprives
courts of jurisdiction. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); Simon v.
F.D.I.C., 48 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Section 1821(d)(13)(D)(i)
bars all claims against the assets of a failed financial institution
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
-8-
which have not been presented under the administrative claims review
process”).
In the instant case, the claims bar date was August 4, 2010.
Plaintiff failed to submit her proof of claim by the August 4, 2010
claims bar date. She also failed to submit her proof of claim by the
January 11, 2011 deadline established by the discovered creditor
notice. When Plaintiff sent her untimely proof of claim, she failed
to provide supporting documentation showing that she lacked knowledge
of the appointment of the receiver. Under these circumstances, the
Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to meet the mandatory
administrative claims process requirements and therefore Plaintiff
cannot meet the jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining this
action. As such, the FDIC is entitled to dismissal of the action with
prejudice.
C.
Claims Against R&G Financial
In addition to her claims against the FDIC and R&G Mortgage,
Plaintiff brought Puerto Rico law claims against Defendant R&G
Financial. However, with the dismissal of the claims against the
FDIC,
there
are
no
pending
claims
giving
rise
to
federal
jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A); Laureano-Vega v. F.D.I.C.,
2011 WL 3475313 at *3 (D.P.R. Aug. 8, 2011) (Fuste, J.).
As such, dismissal of the pending state law claims is proper
because an independent jurisdictional basis is lacking.
Exercising
CIVIL NO. 10-1656 (JAF/JP)
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jurisdiction over pendent state law claims once the federal law
claims are no longer present in the lawsuit is discretionary.
See
Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, the Court
chooses not to hear the state law claims brought by Plaintiff against
Defendant R&G Financial. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment
dismissing the claims against R&G Financial without prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the Court grants Defendant FDIC’s motion to dismiss and
Defendant R&G Mortgage’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly,
the Court will enter a separate Final Judgment dismissing the claims
against FDIC and R&G Mortgage with prejudice and the claims against
R&G Financial without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 27th day of September, 2011.
S/JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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