Rivera-Guzman v. Puig-Morales
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER - GRANTING 6 Defendants' MOTION to dismiss. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 7/13/11.(su)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
AMILCAR RIVERA-GUZMAN,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
JUAN CARLOS PUIG MORALES,
Defendant
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Juan Carlos Puig-Morales’ (“Puig”)
motion to dismiss (No. 6) and Plaintiff Amilcar Rivera-Guzman’s
(“Rivera”) opposition thereto (No. 7).
Plaintiff brought this
lawsuit against Defendant alleging violations of the First Amendment
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Plaintiff also brought
a Puerto Rico law cause of action under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico’s
Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141.
Defendant moves to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For
the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby
GRANTED.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Rivera allegedly was a career employee of the Puerto
Rico Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) for over 23 years. His last
position was that of Director of Field Operations of the Sales Tax
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-2-
Bureau for the District of Ponce. Rivera was also a member of the
Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”).
In 2008, Luis Fortuno (“Governor
Fortuno”), a member of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”), was elected
as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Governor Fortuno
appointed Puig as the head of the Treasury. Puig is a member of the
NPP.
Ever since taking office, Defendant has allegedly intended to
remove all PDP career employees with managerial responsibilities in
order to replace them with NPP members. Plaintiff alleges that
through
trust
personnel
Defendant
investigated
the
political
affiliation of all managerial employees. Through said investigative
process,
Puig
allegedly
became
aware
of
Plaintiff’s
political
affiliation.
In mid to late March 2009, Treasury sent various internal
revenue agents to Ponce in preparation for the Inter-University
Athletic League’s annual competition. On March 29, 2009, Plaintiff
allegedly had an argument with Armando Delgado-Roman (“Delgado”), one
of the internal revenue agents sent to Ponce, over time sheets and
attendance.
Delgado,
an
active
NPP
member,
was
supervised
by
Plaintiff. The confrontation turned violent and a melee ensued.
Plaintiff alleges that the police arrived, but that there were no
charges pressed against either Plaintiff or Delgado. Thereafter,
Treasury commenced an administrative disciplinary action against both
employees. Plaintiff alleges that said action was only a formality
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-3-
because Puig had already determined that he was going to dismiss
Plaintiff for political reasons regardless of the results of the
investigation.
Defendant
was
allegedly
fully
of
aware
of
Plaintiff’s
administrative case because he publicly discussed it in a speech,
given on May 28, 2009, where he referred to the incident as an “act
of corruption” which would be remedied. On the same day, Delgado
allegedly spoke with Puig who informed Delgado that he had received
various calls requesting leniency towards Delgado. However, Puig
informed Delgado that he had decided to terminate Delgado. At said
time, the administrative proceedings were still ongoing.
By means of a letter dated July 22, 2009 and served on July 30,
2009, Puig dismissed Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiff was allegedly
replaced by an NPP sympathizer. Plaintiff alleges that Puig also
dismissed Delgado to conceal the discriminatory nature of the action
against
Plaintiff.
Delgado,
unlike
Plaintiff,
was
offered
the
opportunity to resign in order for him to be eligible to apply to
other public service positions.
On February 10, 2010, Delgado filed an action in the Puerto Rico
Court of First Instance against Defendant, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico and Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that, in Delgado’s complaint,
Delgado alleged: (1) that Puig wanted to dismiss Plaintiff for
political reasons; (2) the events of Delgado’s May 28, 2009 encounter
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-4-
with Puig; and (3) the perfunctory nature of the administrative
proceedings. On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
According to the Supreme Court, “once a claim has been stated
adequately,
it
may
be
supported
by
showing
any
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).
set
of
facts
Bell Atl. Corp.
As such, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face, not merely conceivable. Id. at 1974.
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit has interpreted Twombly as
sounding the death knell for the oft-quoted language of Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe,
Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
at 1969).
Still, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non moving party and accept all well-pleaded facts in
the complaint as true. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 36
(1st Cir. 2009).
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-5III.
ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
alleging political discrimination because Plaintiff failed to plead
sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Plaintiff opposes the
motion. The Court will now consider the parties’ arguments.
A.
Political Discrimination
To establish a political discrimination case, Plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts from which a Court can find that Plaintiff
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that Plaintiff’s
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind
the challenged employment action. See Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family
Department, 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2004). A prima facie case of
political discrimination requires that Plaintiff properly plead that:
(1)
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
belong
to
opposing
political
affiliations; (2) Defendant has knowledge of Plaintiff’s political
affiliation; (3) a challenged employment action occurred; and (4)
Plaintiff’s political affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor behind the challenged employment action. Martinez Velez v. Rey
Hernadez, 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007).
Defendant presents no arguments relating to the first and third
elements of a prima facie case of political discrimination. Instead,
Defendant argues that his motion to dismiss should be granted because
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-6-
Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support the second
and
fourth
elements
discrimination.
1.
of
a
prima
facie
case
of
political
Plaintiff opposes the arguments.
Puig’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s PDP affiliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts
to
draw
a
reasonable
inference
that
Puig
was
aware
of
Plaintiff’s political affiliation with the PDP. Said argument fails.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Puig had his trust
personnel
investigate
the
political
affiliation
of
managerial
employees such as Plaintiff (No. 1, ¶ 3.4). Plaintiff also alleged
that from said investigative process Defendant became aware of
Plaintiff’s political affiliation (No. 1, ¶ 3.5). Taking Plaintiff’s
well-pleaded allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
provided sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Puig
was aware of Plaintiff’s political affiliation.
2.
Plaintiff’s PDP affiliation as a substantial or motivating
factor in Puig’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that he properly pleaded the fourth element of
a prima facie case of political discrimination in paragraphs 3.13
through 3.20 of his complaint (No. 7, p. 3-4).
In said paragraphs
of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Delgado had a conversation
with Puig, on May 28, 2009, in which Puig informed Delgado that he
had already decided to dismiss Delgado (No. 1, ¶ 3.13). On said date,
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-7-
the administrative investigation against Delgado and Plaintiff was
still ongoing (No. 1, ¶ 3.14).
Plaintiff alleges that he was informed of his dismissal on July
30, 2009 and that he was replaced by an NPP member (No. 1, ¶ 3.15).
Also, Plaintiff alleges that Delgado, an NPP member, was also
dismissed
(No.
1,
¶
3.16).
Plaintiff
states
that
Delgado
was
dismissed to seem “evenhanded” and “to conceal the discriminatory
nature of [P]laintiff’s dismissal” (No. 1, ¶ 3.16). However, unlike
with Plaintiff, Delgado was allegedly offered the opportunity to
resign (No. 1, ¶ 3.17). Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that Delgado
filed his own suit against Puig and that Delgado alleged in his
complaint (1) that Puig wanted to dismiss Plaintiff for political
reasons, (2) the events of Delgado’s May 28, 2009 encounter with
Puig,
and
(3)
the
perfunctory
nature
of
the
administrative
proceedings (No. 1, ¶¶ 3.18-3.19). From this, Plaintiff concludes
that he was dismissed by Puig because of his political affiliation
(No. 1, ¶ 3.20).
Taking Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support
a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s political affiliation was a
substantial or motivating factor in Puig’s decision to dismiss
Plaintiff. With regard to the allegations of Delgado’s conversation
with Puig, the Court finds that said allegations in no way support
a finding that Plaintiff’s political affiliation was a factor in the
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-8-
decision to dismiss Plaintiff. In fact, said conversation did not
even address Plaintiff’s situation. Instead, the allegations taken
as true support a finding that Puig intended to dismiss only Delgado.
The circumstances of Plaintiff’s dismissal are also insufficient
to support any reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s dismissal was
related
to
his
political
affiliation.
Both
Plaintiff,
a
PDP
supporter, and Delgado, an NPP member, were dismissed from their
employment after the March 26, 2009 melee. Plaintiff attempts to cure
this
problem
by
pleading
evenhanded
and
to
dismissal.
conceal
However,
said
that
the
Delgado
true
allegations
was
motives
are
dismissed
behind
not
to
seem
Plaintiff’s
entitled
to
any
deference because “while not stating ultimate legal conclusions,
[they] are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail
to
cross
‘the
line
between
the
conclusory
and
the
factual.’”
Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5).
The Court also notes that the conclusory allegation made by
Delgado in his own complaint, that Plaintiff was dismissed based on
his political affiliation, is not entitled to any deference and
therefore cannot support a finding that Defendant was motivated by
Plaintiff’s
political
affiliation.
Ocasio-Hernandez
v.
Fortuno-
Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that courts should
disregard any statements which merely offer legal conclusions couched
as facts).
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-9-
As such, the only allegations that Plaintiff properly pleaded
supporting the fourth element of his political discrimination claim
were that Plaintiff was replaced by an NPP member and that Delgado,
unlike Plaintiff, was offered the opportunity to resign.1 Even taking
said allegations as true, the Court determines that the allegations
that Plaintiff was replaced by an NPP member and that he was not
offered the opportunity to resign do not support a reasonable
inference, in this case, that Defendant’s action of dismissing
Plaintiff was motivated by Plaintiff’s political affiliation.
This
is
the
case
because
Plaintiff’s
other
well-pleaded
allegations make clear that the only reasonable inference permitted
here is that Plaintiff was dismissed for non-discriminatory reasons.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s own allegations that Plaintiff had a
physical altercation with an individual he supervised, Delgado, which
turned into a melee and which even required the police’s presence.
After the melee and the investigation, Puig dismissed Plaintiff and
Delgado, who belonged to the same political party as Puig, even
though he received many calls requesting that he be lenient with
Delgado. Even taking Plaintiff’s other well-pleaded allegations as
true, said allegations make clear that the only reasonable inference
arising from the complaint was that Plaintiff was dismissed because
1
It appears from the allegations in paragraphs 3.16 and 3.17
of the complaint that, while Delgado was offered the opportunity to
resign, Delgado did not take advantage of said opportunity, and Puig
still dismissed Delgado.
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-10-
of the incident with Delgado and not because of his political
affiliation.
As such, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to
allege sufficient facts to nudge his political discrimination claims
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009); see also, Sepulveda-Villarini v.
Department of Education of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.
2010).
B.
Puerto Rico Law Claims
Plaintiff also bring claims arising under Puerto Rico law.
Dismissal
of
pending
state
law
claims
is
proper
because
an
independent jurisdictional basis is lacking. Exercising jurisdiction
over pendent state law claims once the federal law claims are no
longer present in the lawsuit is discretionary.
See Newman v.
Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that “[t]he power
of a federal court to hear and to determine state-law claims in
nondiversity
cases
depends
upon
the
presence
of
at
least
one
‘substantial’ federal claim in the lawsuit . . . [and] the district
court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this
power,
in
light
of
such
considerations
as
judicial
economy,
convenience, fairness to litigants, and comity[]”). Here, the Court
chooses not to hear the state law claims brought by Plaintiff and
will, therefore, dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.
CIVIL NO. 10-1740 (JAF/JP)
-11IV.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. A separate judgment will be entered accordingly dismissing
the federal law claims with prejudice and the state law claims
without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13th day of July, 2011.
S/JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?