Roman-Samot
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 14 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 10/21/2011. (AVB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
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WILKINS ROMAN-SAMOT
Plaintiff.
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v.
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Civil No. 10-1879 (SEC)
PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
OF PUERTO RICO
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Defendant,
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OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before this Court are defendant Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico’s
(the “University”) motion to dismiss (Docket # 14), plaintiff Wilkins Roman-Samot’s
(“Roman”) opposition thereto (Docket # 24), the University’s reply (Docket # 27), and Roman’s
sur-reply (Docket # 36). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, the University’s
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 13, 2010, Roman, a former non-tenured professor of the University, filed
this diversity and federal question suit against his former employer, alleging sex-based
discrimination consisting of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and Puerto Rico’s
general tort statutes. Docket # 1.1 Additionally, Roman alleges that the University retaliated
against him in contravention of the Puerto Rico Whistle-Blower Act (“Law 115”). In essence,
Roman argues that, while working as a professor, a colleague subjected him to several unwanted
homosexual advances. He further alleges that, even though he complained to the University’s
administration, they did nothing to rectify the situation as they failed to investigate his
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This case was originally filed on July 30, 2009. See Civil Case No. 09-1734. The Clerk,
however, dismissed it without prejudice because Roman had failed to pay the required filing fee. See
Local Rule 3(a).
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allegations. Instead, he asserts that the University retaliated against him by not renewing his
contract.
The facts as alleged by Roman in his amended complaint are as follows.
Roman worked for the University as a professor of social sciences from January 2007
to July 31, 2008, the effective date of his termination. Docket # 11 at ¶¶ 3-5. In that time frame,
Roman shared offices with Professor Otto Sievens (“Sievens”), the Chairman of the Evaluations
Committee (the “Committee”) for Roman’s department. Roman affirms that, ever since he
started teaching in 2007, Sievens constantly discussed with him the graduate students’ sexual
conduct in the University’s restrooms. Id. ¶ 9. Allegedly, every time Sievens engaged in such
salacious conversations, Roman would ask him to either change the subject or simply halt the
discussion. Id. ¶ 10.
On April 26, 2007, Sievens allegedly invited Roman to go to the men’s bathroom and
masturbate in front of him. Id. ¶ 11. Upon refusing such invitation, Sievens allegedly told
Roman that his rejection would have “consequences.”Id. ¶ 12. A couple of days later, Roman
filed an oral complaint with the Dean of the Social Sciences Department, Professor Alfonso
Santiago (“Santiago”) in connection with the events described above. Id. ¶ 12. According to the
complaint, Roman told Santiago that if the University failed to take immediate remedial actions,
he would sue. Id. Roman alleges that he and Santiago reached a verbal agreement to put an end
to the alleged harassment. Id. ¶¶ 14-18. Once the fall semester began, however, Roman posits
Sievens remained at the helm the Committee, and that the University failed to investigate
Roman’s grievances regarding Sievens’ conduct, thereby violating the terms of the verbal
agreement. Id. ¶ 19.
According to the complaint, between August 2007 and March 2008, Siemens told Roman
that he was “untouchable” because the University had a history of disregarding the rules
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pertaining to its employees’ conduct. Id. ¶ 22. Things unraveled and, on March 14, 2008, the
University informed Roman that he would be evaluated by the Committee Sievens presided. Id.
¶ 27.
On May 8, 2008, Roman received a letter from the University informing him of his
termination effective July 31, 2008. According to the complaint, Roman was told that his
dismissal was based upon the Committee’s negative evaluation. Allegedly, the Committee
justified Roman’s dismissal on the fact that his Juris Doctor was insufficient to teach at the
University. Id. ¶ 31.
Against this factual backdrop, Roman filed the instant action.
On March 25, 2011, the University filed the present motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, arguing that Roman has failed to state any actionable claims. See Docket # 14, p. 2.
Specifically, the University contends that because Roman failed to exhaust the administrative
proceedings, a condition precedent to a Title VII suit, this Court is now unable to entertain such
claims. See id. at 5. With respect to Roman’s Law 115 claims, the University alleges that
because he failed to appear, or otherwise demonstrate that he has made expressions before a
legislative, administrative, or judicial forum in Puerto Rico, these claims fail on its face. See
id. at 6. Finally, the University avers that Roman’s tort claims are time-barred. Id. at 7. In the
alternative, the University requests that this Court strike certain pleadings because of their
slanderous nature. Id.
In opposition, Roman readily concedes that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Puzzlingly, he proclaims that “[he] will amend the pleadings [to] remov[e] the Title VII
allegations and exchang[e] them for a Law 100 . . . cause of action.” Docket # 25, p. 4.
Responding to the University’s Law 115 defense, Roman avers that because he threatened to
file a complaint against the University before the pertinent forums, his claims fall under the
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purview of Law 115. Regarding his general tort claims, he posits that they are not time-barred.
Id.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ “well-pleaded facts must
possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief.” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F. 3d 107,
112 (1st Cir. 2008).2 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept
as true all “well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences” in plaintiffs’ favor.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The First Circuit has held that “dismissal for
failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual allegations, either
direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some
actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F. 3d 301, 305(1st Cir. 2008). Courts “may
augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly
incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Id. at 305-306. Nevertheless, in
judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must “differentiate between well-pleaded facts,
on the one hand, and ‘bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution,
and the like,’ on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be
ignored.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard,
83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F. 3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2007);
see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus, Plaintiffs must rely on more
than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be rejected. Berner v.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to allow the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (emphasis
added).
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Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515
(1st Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, “even under the liberal pleading standards of Fed R. Civ. P. 8, the Supreme
Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a plausible
entitlement to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. Although complaints do not require detailed
factual allegations, the plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. at 556.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide a court's
assessment of the adequacy of pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. First, the court must identify any
conclusory allegations in the complaint as such allegations are not entitled to an assumption of
truth. Id. at 1949. Specifically, the court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions set forth as
factual allegations in the complaint. Id.
Moreover, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also
Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[S]ome allegations, while
not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail
to cross the line between the conclusory to the factual.”). In other words, “[a] plaintiff is not
entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the
cause of action.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1,12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Second, a complaint survives only if it states a plausible claim for relief. Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, any nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint,
accepted as true, must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. Id. A claim has facial
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plausibility when the pleaded facts allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable
for the specific misconduct alleged. Id. at 1949, 1952. Such inferences must amount to more
than a sheer possibility and be as plausible as any obvious alternative explanation. Id. at 1949,
1951. Plausibility is a context-specific determination that requires the court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 1950.
Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that “the facts establishing
the defense [are] clear ‘on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings.’” Blackstone Realty LLC v.
FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Aldahonda-Rivera v. Parke Davis & Co., 882
F.2d 590, 591 (1st Cir.1989)).
Applicable Law and Analysis
Title VII claims
The University moves to dismiss Roman’s Title VII claims on the grounds that he filed
a charge neither before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) nor with
the Puerto Rico Department of Labor’s Anti-Discrimination Unit. Such omissions entail that
Roman failed to exhaust the administrative remedies, a requisite prior to filing a Title VII claim
in this Court. See e.g., Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114, 119 (1st
Cir. 2009).
As noted above, Roman concedes to this noncompliance. Docket # 25, p. 4. Given
Roman’s unequivocal admission, the Court GRANTS the University’s motion to dismiss on this
front. Consequently, Roman’s Title VII claims are dismissed.
Roman, however, says that “[he] will amend the pleadings [to] remov[e] the Title VII
allegations and exchang[e] them for a Law 100 . . . cause of action.” Id. While Roman’s course
of action is understandable— the Puerto Rico Anti–Discrimination Act (“Law 100"), P.R. Laws
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Ann. tit. 29, § 146 does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies—the vessel he
chose to “exchange” these claims runs afoul of basic notions of federal procedure. As the
University correctly points out, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate the
‘exchanging’ of claims via motion.” Docket # 27, p. 2.
The “exchange” of claims; Law 100 and Tort claims
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with the University that if Roman wishes to include
a Law 100 claim for sexual harassment, he should have filed a motion requesting leave to do
so and tender a second amended complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, parties
must obtain leave to amend from either the opposing party or the court in order to amend their
complaint after a responsive pleading has been filed.3 The University filed and served its
motion to dismiss on March, 23, 2011. Roman, however, failed to amend his complaint in the
prescribed time frame as a matter of course; that is, more than 21 days after the University filed
its motion under Rule 12(b). Overlooking this procedural defect, the Court will treat Roman’s
opposition—filed on May 10, 2011—as a leave to amend his complaint.
In any event, the University alleges that the addition of a Law 100 claim would be futile
because such claim would be time-barred. Docket # 27, p. 2. It predicates this contention on the
fact that Law 100 has a one-year statute of limitation, counted from the date of Roman’s
termination letter. According to the complaint, on May 8, 2008, Roman received the termination
letter, effective July 31, 2008. See Docket # 11 at ¶ 31. Hence, the University argues, Roman
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(i) states:
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to
which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b),(e), or (f),
whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the courts’ leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. . . .
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had until May 8, 2008, the date that he received the letter, to file a complaint. But Roman’s first
complaint—which, again, was dismissed for failure to tender the filing fee—was filed on July
30, 2009. To cinch matters, that Clerk of Court dismissed that complaint on August 4, 2009,
but it was not until September 13, 2010 that Roman filed the instant action.
It should go without saying that courts should freely grant leave to amend the pleadings.
However, there are “[l]imited reasons for denying a pre-judgment motion to amend include
‘undue delay, bad faith, futility and the absence of due diligence on the movant’s
part.’”Gonzalez v. Hurley Intern., Inc., Civil No. 10–1919, 2011 WL 1404916 at *1 (D.P.R. Apr
12, 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Torres–Alamo v. Puerto Rico, 502 F.3d 20, 25–26 (1st Cir.
2007)); see also Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
that “‘[f]utility’ means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.”). In fact, the First Circuit has held that courts should not allow grant
leave to amend a complaint to include claims that would be time-barred. See e.g., Abraham v.
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 2009).
Roman alleges that he timely filed the first complaint. This, based on the equivocated
notion that the statute of limitations was triggered when his termination became effective, i.e.,
July 31, 2008, as opposed to the date of his termination letter. The statute of limitations
governing an action filed under Law 100 is one year. E.g., Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular
De Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 615 (1st Cir. 2000); Lopez-Machin v. Indupro, 668 F.Supp.2d
320, 324 (D.P.R. 2009) (“[I]f a Law 100 . . . claim is not made, or properly notified to a
defendant, within a one year statute of limitations from knowledge of the injury, this claim is
lost.”) (citation omitted).
In line with the foregoing, well-settled Puerto Rican law dictates that “[w]hat determines
when the statute of limitations begins to run [is] the moment when the aggrieved party becomes
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aware of [the damage].” Delgado Rodriguez v. Nazario de Ferrer, 121 P.R. Dec. 347, 261, 21
P.R. Offic. Trans. 342 (1988) (citing Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 P.R. Dec. 232, 243-247
(1984)). In Delgado Rodriguez, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the statute of
limitations had began to run when the employee received his termination letter, and thus was
“[n]otified of his removal.” Id.
Even accepting Roman’s unavailing invitation that he timely filed the first complaint, his
second complaint, i.e., the instant action, is nevertheless time-barred because Roman filed it in
excess of a year from the date of dismissal of the first complaint. See Rodriguez v. Suzuki
Motor Corp., 570 F.3d 402, 407 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that “[w]hen a plaintiff tolls the statute
of limitations by bringing an action before the courts, the mere filing of the complaint has a
tolling effect. . . . .”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Velazquez Rodriguez v.
Municipality of San Juan, ––– F.3d ––––, –––– (1st Cir. 2011) [No. 09-1769, slip op. at 7]
(same). Said differently, Roman’s first complaint was dismissed on August 4, 2009; he had until
August 4, 2010 to re-file it. But it was not until September 13, 2010 that Roman filed the instant
action. Because Roman failed to re-file his complaint before August 4, 2010, his Law 100
claims are time-barred. See Rodriguez-Garcia v. Mun. of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir.
2004) (ruling that once an action [is dismissed without prejudice] the statute of limitations is
reset and “begins to run anew from th[at] date.”).
In sum, as the University succinctly puts it “[Roman] twice allowed more than one year
to go by before seeking judicial redress.” Docket # 27, p. 3. Accordingly, the Court denies
Roman leave to amend his complaint since adding an evidently time-barred Law 100 claim
constitutes an exercise in futility.
By like token, because under Articles 1802 and 1803 Roman’s tort claims are subject to
a one-year statute of limitations, such claims cannot prosper as they are also time-barred. See
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Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Intern., Inc., 232 F.3d 245, 254 (1st Cir. 2000); P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
31, § 5298 (providing that the one-year statute of limitations starts to “[r]un from the time the
aggrieved person had knowledge thereof.”).
In consequence, the University’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; Roman’s tort claims
are dismissed as they are irrefragably time-barred.
Law 115 claims
As previously noted, the University posits that because the complaint lacks any allegation
that Roman, prior to his termination, appeared before any state or federal administrative agency,
before the Puerto Rico Legislature or before state or federal court, his Law 115 claims cannot
prosper. See Docket # 14, p. 6. Opposing, Roman essentially contends that because the
complaint alleges that he threatened to sue the University, such threats should suffice to survive
the motion to dismiss. See Docket # 36, p. 4.
The Puerto Rico Whistle-Blower Act, commonly known as Law 115, P.R. Laws Ann tit
29, § 194 et seq, provides in pertinent part:
(a) No employer may discharge, threaten, or discriminate against an
employee regarding the terms, conditions, compensation, location, benefits
or privileges of the employment should the employee offer or attempt to
offer, verbally or in writing, any testimony, expression or information
before a legislative, administrative or judicial forum in Puerto Rico, when
such expressions are not of a defamatory character nor constitute disclosure
of privileged information established by law.
Id. § 194a. (emphasis added). Furthermore, Law 115 “[r]equires the employee to establish, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, a prima facie case that he or she (1) participated in an activity
protected by [Law 115] and (2) was subsequently discharged or otherwise discriminated
against.” Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2010) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, the complaint contains no allegations demonstrating that Roman “offered” any
information “before a legislative, administrative or judicial forum in Puerto Rico.” P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29, § 194a(a); Collazo, 617.F.3d at 45. Roman, however, insists that paragraphs 13 and
14 of the complaint allege that he threatened to take legal action against the University and that,
under Lupu v. Wyndham El Conquistador Resort & Golden Door Spa, 524 F.3d 312, 313 (1st
Cir. 2008), such actions fall under the purview of Law 115.4 In other words, Roman equates
threatening to file a lawsuit with “attempting to offer” information before a judicial forum.
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In Lupu, the First Circuit held that an employee did not offer or attempt to offer
testimony under § 194a(a) where he discussed concerns with his supervisor in connection with
the employer’s noncompliance with government regulations, “[b]ut [the] employee did not
report or threaten to report the perceived irregularities to authorities.” Collazo, 617.F.3d at 45
(emphasis added) (quoting Lupu, 524 F.3d at 313). Noting that “[t]here is a marked difference
between attempting to offer testimony and threatening to do so,” the University attempts to
minimize the effect of Lupu. Docket # 27, p. 4. Moreover, the University correctly adds that
“threatening” to offer testimony is not included in § 194a(a). Id.
Arguing that the Lupu Court allowed the possibility that an employee’s threat of filing
a lawsuit could trigger Law 115 if his unlawful termination occurs prior to the filing of a
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In pertinent part, the complaint states:
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13. [P]laintiff filed an oral complaint . . .with [Santiago]. . . . At this time, Plaintiff
advised [Santiago] that if the university did not take remedial actions immediately,
he would take legal action.
14. [Santiago’s] relief to Plaintiff’s complaint was an agreement to getting a key
to the men’s bathroom, and removing [Sievens] from the evaluations board
effective the following semester, in order to prevent retaliatory action by
[Sievens]. . . .
Docket # 11 at ¶¶ 13-14.
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complaint, Roman contends that the University led him to believe that his protestations would
be resolved. And that such reassurances explain why he abstained from going forward with the
complaint. See Docket # 36 p. 4.
The University’s statutory argument is sound; nowhere in § 194a(a) is the word “threat”
included. The threshold question, however, is whether Roman’s threat of filing a lawsuit
because of Sieven’s alleged sexual harassment can be considered an “attempt” to sue for Law
115 purposes. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has yet to address this issue. As a prudential
matter, this Court will decline to rule on this issue of first impression because the parties have
failed to fully brief the topic.
Although this is a close case, the Lupu Court—perhaps inadvertently—opened the door
to the possibility that threatening to file a complaint suffices to activate the Law 115's
safeguards. Thus, deferring this determination for a later stage of the proceedings, the Court will
deny the motion to dismiss on this front.
Besides, on a motion to dismiss, courts shall “accept[] as true all well-pleaded facts,
analyzing those facts in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff's theory, and drawing all
reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.” New York v. Amgen Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir.
2011) (quoting United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383
(1st Cir.2011)). Importantly, “[l]abor laws are of a remedial character, with an eminently social
and curative purpose. They are instruments for protecting the working class [from] sexual
harassment and discriminatory acts . . . . Their liberal interpretation, in favor of those whom
they intend to protect, is imperative.” Hernandez v. Raytheon Serv. Co. P.R., Civil No. 05-1937,
2006 WL 1737167 at *2 (D.P.R. Apr 27, 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Irizarry v. J & J Cons.Prods. Co. (P.R.), Inc., 150 P.R. Dec.155, 164 (2000) (holding that courts
should construe any ambiguity in Law 115 in favor of the employee).
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In the present instance, the liberality with which courts should interpret Puerto Rico’s
labor laws, such as Law 115, favors Roman. Hence, his Law 115 claims, which have a threeyear statute of limitations, survive the motion to dismiss.
Request to strike certain pleadings
There is one loose end. The University moves to strike certain allegations from the
pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). It points to Roman’s baseless accusation that a non-party to
this case has an out-of-wedlock son. The University also takes exception to Roman’s allegations
that it violated the Canonic Code and Vatican decrees concerning the Catholic Church’s ban on
homosexuality. Roman failed to oppose this petition.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), provides that “the court may order stricken from any pleading any
... redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Under this rule
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scandalous allegations ... will be stricken from the pleadings in order to
purge the court's files and protect the subject of the allegations. But there
are several limitations on the court's willingness to strike scandalous
allegations. For example, it is not enough that the matter offends the
sensibilities of the objecting party if the challenged allegations describe acts
or events that are relevant to the action. As a result, courts have permitted
allegations to remain in the pleadings when they supported and were
relevant to a claim for punitive damages.
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In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Morell v.
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United States, 185 F.R.D. 116, 118 (D.P.R. 1999) (noting that “[t]he granting of the motion to
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strike is within the discretion of the court.”) (citation omitted).
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Upon consideration, the Court finds these allegations not only wholly irrelevant to the
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disposition of this case, but also scandalous, bordering on unethical. Indeed, the “[i]nstant case
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is not about an inquiry into the Church’s behavior or that of its men of the cloth.” Docket # 14,
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p. 8. Given that the remaining inquiry questions whether the University violated Law 115 by
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dismissing Roman after he threatened to file a lawsuit, the Court will STRIKE the
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aforementioned matters from the pleadings.
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Conclusion
Because Roman’s general tort claims are time-barred, they are hereby dismissed with
prejudice. Likewise, because Roman failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing
the instant action, his Title VII claims are dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, this Court
DENIES Roman’s futile and defective “exchange” to include a new cause of action under Law
100. With respect to Roman’s Law 115 claims, the University’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Finally, the Court GRANTS the University’s request to strike certain pleadings; such matters
are hereby STRICKEN from the record.
For the reasons articulated above, the University’s motion is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 21st day of October, 2011.
S/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge
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