Diaz Rosado v. Commonwealth Of Puerto Rico Department Of Correction And Rehabilitation et al

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER- GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN PART 13 MOTION to dismiss the Title VII Claims and the Section 1983 Claims against Defendant DCR. Still pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants Rodriguez and Gonzalez in their personal capacities and the Puerto Rico law claims against all Defendants. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 7/5/11.(su) Modified on 7/5/2011 RULING(su).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MARIA DIAZ-ROSADO,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)
GRIZELLE RODRIGUEZ-CASADO, et
al.,
Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER
Before

the

(“Rodriguez”),

Court
David

is

Defendants

Gonzalez-Cordero

Grizelle

Rodriguez-Casado

(“Gonzalez”),

and

the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico’s (“DCR”) motion to dismiss (No. 13).1 Said motion is
unopposed. Plaintiff brought the instant action alleging violations
of

the

Equal

Protection

Clause

under

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

(“Section 1983”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Plaintiff also brought claims
under Puerto Rico law. Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6).

1

For the reasons

Defendants have included the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
their motion to dismiss as a party in this action even though the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has not been sued by Plaintiff. Since the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not a Defendant, the Court will not
consider the arguments in relation to it.

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-2-

stated herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Maria Diaz-Rosado (“Diaz”) alleges that she works for
DCR as an official of working condition. Specifically, Diaz has
worked for the Ramos & Morales Academy (“Academy”) for the last seven
years. The Academy provides services and training to employees of the
DCR.
Plaintiff alleges that she has been discriminated against and
harassed because of her gender since 2008 while Rodriguez served as
the director of the Academy. Diaz has alleged being humiliated
because of her writing even though she excelled in her studies.
Although Diaz completed a course to be certified as an armory worker
and was recommended for the position, Plaintiff states that Rodriguez
denied her the position as armory worker without justification.
Diaz also alleges that Gonzalez, as a supervisor of Plaintiff
at the Academy, has also taken part in the harassment of Plaintiff
by denying her duties. He allegedly directed Diaz to omit her name
from documents she prepared. On the other hand, male employees are
allowed to sign documents they prepare at work. Also, in December
2009, Diaz was allegedly replaced by a male as instructor of personal
defense and physical training. Plaintiff states that the male who

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-3-

replaced her in said position does not possess all the certifications
and his preparation is inferior to that of Plaintiff. In January
2010, a male was again placed as instructor instead Diaz.
Diaz states that she has been given patrol duties and, as such,
goes up and down stairs for eight (8) hours a day. Plaintiff alleges
that her job performance has always been excellent and that she has
all the necessary qualifications to perform the duties that she has
requested. As such, Plaintiff brought the instant action.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR RULE 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Destek Group
v.

State

of

New

Hampshire

Public

318 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).

Utilities

Commission,

The party claiming there is

jurisdiction carries the burden of showing that the court has
jurisdiction.

Murphy

v.

United

States,

45

F.3d

520,

522

(1st Cir. 1995).
Motions

brought

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

(“FRCP”) 12(b)(1) are subject to a similar standard as FRCP 12(b)(6)
motions.

Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, S.E., 229 F. Supp. 2d 105,

107 (D.P.R. 2002).

A court must “treat all allegations in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in
favor of the plaintiff.”

Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of East

Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Torres
Maysonet, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 107.

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-4III.
ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the motion should be granted because:
(1) Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support her
Title VII claims; (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars any Section
1983 claims against DCR; and (3) Plaintiff’s Puerto Rico law claims
should be dismissed because there are no pending federal law claims.
The Court will now consider Defendants’ arguments.
A.

Title VII
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to discriminate against any individual because of such
individual’s

sex,

among

other

protected

classes.

42

U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
Defendants argue that the Title VII claims fail because: (1)
Title VII does not provide for individual liability; (2) Defendants
Rodriguez and Gonzalez are not an employer for purposes of Title VII;
and

(3)

Plaintiff

administrative
Defendants’

did

remedies.

argument

not
The

relating

allege
Court
to

that

will

she

focus

exhaustion

exhausted
its

of

analysis

her
on

administrative

remedies as it is the dispositive issue in this case.
1.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to Title VII, a Plaintiff is required to exhaust his
or her administrative remedies, such as filing a complaint with the

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-5-

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), prior to suing in
federal court. Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 431 (1st
Cir. 2010). In the complaint, Plaintiff presented no allegations
related to the filing of a complaint with the EEOC. As such,
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims is proper because Plaintiff
has failed to properly state a claim.2 Id.
B.

Section 1983
Section 1983 “provides a remedy for deprivations of rights

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that
deprivation takes place ‘under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . .’”
Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hospital, 26 F.3d 254, 256 (1st Cir. 1994)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982)).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that DCR is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state and therefore the
Section 1983 claims against it should be dismissed. No arguments
regarding the Section 1983 claims against Defendants Rodriguez and
Gonzalez were raised by Defendants.
1.

2

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the
individual Defendants would have also failed as there is no
individual liability under Title VII. Uphoff Figueroa, 597 F.3d at
431 (citing Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 28-31 (1st
Cir. 2009)).

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-6-

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in federal courts for
monetary damages against states, unless the state being sued waives
its immunity or consents to be sued. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Puerto
Rico is considered a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Metcalf
& Eddy v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 n.3
(1st Cir. 1993). Eleventh Amendment immunity does not solely protect
the state, but also protects arms or alter egos of the state.
Ainsworth Aristocrat Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Company of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir. 1987). The
enactment of Section 1983 did not serve to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity. E.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979).
In the instant case, the DCR argues that it is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state. The Court agrees
with Defendants that DCR is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
E.g., Martinez-Machicote v. Ramos-Rodriguez, 553 F. Supp. 2d 45, 51
(D.P.R.

2007)

(finding

that

Department

of

Corrections

and

Rehabilitation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is entitled to
Eleventh

Amendment

Defendants’

motion

immunity).
to

dismiss

Accordingly,
the

Section

the
1983

Courts
claims

GRANTS
against

Defendant DCR.
C.

Puerto Rico Law Claims
Defendants request that the Puerto Rico law claims brought

pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction be dismissed since there are

CIVIL NO. 10-1938 (JP)

-7-

no federal law claims pending. Said argument fails because, contrary
to Defendants’ assertion, there are federal law claims pending.
Specifically, still before the Court are Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against Defendants Gonzalez and Rodriguez in their personal
capacities. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this issue
is DENIED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss: (1) the
Title VII claims; and (2) the Section 1983 claims against Defendant
DCR. The Court will enter a separate partial judgment accordingly.
Still pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
against

Defendants

Rodriguez

and

Gonzalez

in

their

personal

capacities and the Puerto Rico law claims against all Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 5th day of July, 2011.

S/JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
JOSÉ ANTONIO FUSTÉ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE