Batista v. Cooperativa De Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio et al
Filing
136
OPINION AND ORDER - Denied 118 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim as to Retaliation filed by Candido Cotto-Hernandez, Cristina Diaz-Atienzo, Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio, Maria Ramirez-Lopez, Carmen Couvertier -Marquez, Carlos Roman-Espada, Santos Colon, Rosa Maldonado-Gonzalez, Catherine Rivera-Calderon; Denied 119 MOTION for Summary Judgment regarding the retaliation claim and memorandum in support thereof filed by Candido Cotto-Hernandez, Cristin a Diaz-Atienzo, Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio, Maria Ramirez-Lopez, Carmen Couvertier-Marquez, Carlos Roman-Espada, Santos Colon, Rosa Maldonado-Gonzalez, Catherine Rivera-Calderon. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on 9/17/15.(ljt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PRISCILLA BATISTA,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 10-1953 (CVR)
v.
COOPERATIVA DE VIVIENDA
JARDINES DE SAN IGNACIO, ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Priscilla Batista (“Plaintiff”) brought this suit alleging violations to the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., and state law claims of tort under 31 P.R.
Laws Ann., § 5141, et. seq., and local antitrust violations under 10 P.R. Laws Ann., § 257 et.
seq. Defendant Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio (“Cooperativa”) is a
housing cooperative that owns and administers a cooperative project where members, like
Plaintiff, reside. Individual Defendants Carmen Couvertier Márquez, Carlos Román
Espada, Cándida Cotto Hernández, Cristina Díaz Atienza, María Ramírez Lopez, Katherine
Rivera Calderón, Rosa Maldonado González, and Santos Colón, are all members of
Cooperativa’s Board of Directors (collectively “Defendants”).
Plaintiff’s complaint was originally comprised of several causes of action, all of which
were dismissed by the District Court on summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 88 and 89).
Plaintiff appealed that judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and
remanded on the sole issue of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. (Docket No. 101).
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
Opinion & Order
Page 2
Before the Court now is Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss the Retaliation Claim
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Incorporated Memorandum of Law”
(Docket No. 118), Defendants’ “Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding the Retaliation
Claim and Memorandum in Support Thereof” (Docket No. 119) and Plaintiff’s Opposition
to both documents. (Docket Nos. 127 and 129).
Defendants filed two separate motions (a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for
Summary Judgment) moving the court to grant the same remedy, to wit, the dismissal of
the retaliation claims. In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants aver the Complaint fails to
meet the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), insofar as it fails to identify a
protected activity and because it is conclusory and devoid of specific instances of retaliatory
conduct. In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants posit Plaintiff failed to meet
the standard for a prima facie retaliation claim.
Plaintiff counters arguing summary disposition is unwarranted, as the Amended
Complaint contained specific instances of retaliation, and because issues of fact remain as
to the date the retaliatory conduct began. The issue of the dates, in turn, serves to establish
that Defendants’ proffered reasons for their actions were a mere pretext to retaliate against
Plaintiff and evict her from her home.
For the reasons explained herein below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motion to Dismiss are both DENIED.
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
Opinion & Order
Page 3
ANALYSIS
A.
The Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the moving
party bears the two-fold burden of showing that there is “no genuine issue as to any
material facts,” and that he is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vega-Rodríguez v.
Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997).
After the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party
to show that there still exists “a trial worthy issue as to some material fact.” Cortés-Irizarry
v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997). A fact is deemed “material” if it
potentially could affect the outcome of the suit. Id. Moreover, there will only be a
“genuine” or “trial worthy” issue as to such a “material fact,” “if a reasonable fact-finder,
examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting
summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party’s favor.” Id. At all times during
the consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the entire
record “in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulge all reasonable inferences
in the party’s favor.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.
1994).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “emphasized the importance of local rules
similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico].” Hernández v. Philip Morris USA,
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
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Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); see also, Colón v. Infotech Aerospace Servs., Inc., 869
F.Supp.2d 220, 225-226 (D.P.R. 2012). Rules such as Local Rule 56 “are designed to
function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is -and what is notgenuinely controverted.’ ” Hernández, 869 F.Supp.2d at 7 (quoting Calvi v. Knox County,
470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)).
In particular, Local Rule 56 imposes guidelines for both the movant and the party
opposing summary judgment. A party moving for summary judgment must submit factual
assertions in “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in
numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of
material fact to be tried. Each fact asserted in the statement shall be supported by a record
citation as required under subsection (e) of this rule”. Loc. Rule 56(b). Subsection (e), on
the other hand, states that “facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of
material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed
admitted unless properly controverted”. Loc. Rule 56(e).
The Court gives short shrift to the Motion for Summary Judgment, as it finds that
Defendants’ Statement of Facts is procedurally non-compliant with the Local Rules. As
previously mentioned, Loc. R. Civ. P. 56 (b) specifically requires the movant to supply a
record citation as to each fact proffered for the Court’s consideration. None of the
uncontested facts supplied by Defendants contains a citation to the record. Even worse,
Defendants failed to supply for the Court’s review several of the very documents their
analysis and facts rely upon. (See Defendants’ Statement of Facts Nos. 9 and 10, where
Defendants refer to certain documents, and Plaintiff’s opposition thereto, where Plaintiff
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
Opinion & Order
Page 5
states that “Mrs. Priscilla Batista denies as drafted because Defendants did not include said
documents as an exhibit in support of defendants request for summary judgment”. See
Docket No. 127-1, p. 5, ¶¶ 9 and 10). Clearly, the Court cannot resolve motions in a vacuum
and without the necessary evidence.
Over three decades ago, the Court of Appeals expressed its increasing “frustration
[with] the more and more typical phenomenon ... of a district court having to decide a
motion for summary judgment without the assistance the court should expect from
counsel.” Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir.
1983). Since the adoption of the local anti-ferreting rules, the Court of Appeals has been
very vocal in its strong and consistent admonition that “parties ignore [said rule] at their
own peril ...” Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000)(citing prior cases). The
Court of Appeals has also been quite clear in holding that “a party’s failure to comply [with
the rules] would, where appropriate, be grounds for judgment against that party.” Morales
v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (affirming this District Court’s grant
of summary judgment where the Court refused to consider facts which were not presented
in compliance with the precursor to the current anti-ferreting rule).
It is not the Court’s responsibility to do counsel’s work and comb the record for the
missing citations and documents. Therefore, on this procedural ground, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (Docket No. 119)
B.
The Motion to Dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
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A “short and plain” statement needs only enough detail to provide a defendant with “ ‘fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007) (“Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement....’ Specific facts are not
necessary.”). Yet, in order to “show” an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain
enough factual material “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” See,
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
When addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, the court must “accept as true
all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiffs.” Gargano v. Liberty Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009).
Under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, however, a plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his
entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions.” See also, Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). Thus, a plaintiff is now required to present
allegations that “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in order
to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see, e.g. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court’s inquiry occurs in a two-step
process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly
and Iqbal. First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Yet, the court “need not
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
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accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009).
Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon
all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint
“states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This second step is “contextspecific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common
sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted or
whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.
Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state the actual retaliatory acts and their effects,
and that she fails to sufficiently identify the protected activity which forms the basis for her
retaliation claim. The Court cannot agree.
It is important to remember that, for purposes of this pleading, and contrary to its
analysis at the summary judgment stage, the Court must take as true the allegations in the
complaint, unless they are conclusory and devoid of factual underpinnings. A cursory
reading of the Amended Complaint shows this is not the case here.
The FHA protects against discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling ... because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), and renders it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [§ 3604],” Id. § 3617.
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
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In paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff avers that, after she emerged
victorious from her Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) claim, “the
retaliation by the San Ignacio Cooperative and its Board of Directors against Mrs. Batista
was swift and immediately (sic). Defendants engaged in a definite pattern of discriminatory
actions against Mrs. Batista in a concerted effort to evict her from the housing cooperative.
This pattern of retaliatory and discriminatory conduct manifested itself in two-fold fashion:
First, by initiating collection proceedings against Mrs. Batista for amounts she allegedly
owed since 1998, when in fact Mrs. Batista did not owe said amounts or had paid the same;
and second, by demanding that Mrs. Batista move to a two bedroom apartment, denying
her request for reasonable accommodations and ignoring her need to remain in her present
three bedroom apartment due to her multiple health conditions.” Docket No. 21, ¶ 24.
Buttressing this allegation, Plaintiff proffered the following:
a.
Immediately after the administrative process with HUD culminated, on or
about February 2009, Cooperativa requested that Plaintiff move to a two
bedroom unit, or if she elected to remain in the three bedroom unit she
occupied since 1983, to forego her Section 8 benefits and pay market rent
thereafter. Id. at ¶ 25.
b.
Plaintiff was summoned to a hearing wherein Cooperativa attempted to
illegally collect $129.50 allegedly owed by her since 1998, charges which she
disputes. Id. at ¶ 27.
c.
Cooperativa held two hearings on March 25 and July 29, 2009, where
Plaintiff was declared a non-member of the cooperative and was granted
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thirty days to abandon her apartment and ordered to pay the $132.50 she
owed. Id. at ¶ 29.
d.
Plaintiff was denied her rights and privileges during member’s meetings,
including her right to vote. Id.
e.
On January 3, 2011, Cooperativa sent another notice to Plaintiff insisting she
vacate her apartment and move to a smaller unit, and informing her that
Cooperativa would not recognize her benefits under Section 8 and would
charge her a monthly “market rent” of $359.00. Id. at ¶ 32.
f.
On February 11, 2011, Cooperativa again summoned Plaintiff to a hearing in
order to collect the alleged market rent unilaterally imposed on January 2011.
Id. at ¶ 33.
These facts, if taken as true, make a colorable claim for retaliation under the motion
to dismiss standard. That is all the Court needs to consider under this more relaxed
standard to deny this motion, as the facts have served to nudge Plaintiff’s claims across the
line from “conceivable to plausible” under Twombly and Iqbal. Whether the facts actually
evidence retaliatory conduct is a factual issue that is only proper for the jury to resolve at
the trial, after hearing the relevant testimony and giving it the weight they deem
appropriate.
In view of the above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Priscilla Batista v. Cooperativa de Vievienda Jardines de San Ignacio, et al
Civil No. 10-1953 (GAG)
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Dismiss are both DENIED (Docket Nos. 119 and 118).1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 17th day of September of 2015.
S/CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE
CAMILLE L. VELEZ RIVE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1
The instant case has taken an inordinate amount of time and resources for the parties and the Court. In light
of this Opinion and Order, the parties are STRONGLY encouraged to resume the settlement negotiations to attempt to
reach a good faith settlement agreement in the best interest of all. The parties are granted thirty (30) days to conduct
further settlement negotiations and jointly inform the Court of the outcome. If no settlement is reached, the PreTrial/Settlement Conference and the Jury Trial will be promptly scheduled.
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