Rivera-Valentin et al v. Toledo-Davila et al
Filing
16
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Juan M Perez-Gimenez on 11/21/2011. (JG)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
FERNANDO VILLAFAÑA-RIVERA,
NARSISA RIVERA-VALENTÍN,
Plaintiffs
CIV. NO. 10-2079 (PG)
v.
PEDRO TOLEDO-DÁVILA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Fernando Iván Villafaña-Rivera (hereinafter “Villafaña”
or
“Plaintiff”)
and
“Rivera-Valentín”)
his
mother
brought
this
Narsisa
action
Rivera-Valentín
pursuant
to
42
(hereinafter
U.S.C.
§
1983
(“Section 1983") for violations of their civil rights as guaranteed by
the
Fourth,
Fifth,
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
to
the
United
States
Constitution.1 The violations allegedly stem from the use of excessive
force by officers of the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) on the
evening of November 4, 2008, while Villafaña was being arrested. Codefendants
and
PRPD
officers
Ruben
Echevarría-Torres,
Felix
Campos-
Santiago, Julio A. Quintana-Serrano, and former PRPD Superintendent Pedro
Toledo-Dávila (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”) have
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) seeking the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Docket No.
11. Plaintiffs have filed a timely opposition. Docket No. 15. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
1
Plaintiffs also advance claims under Article II, §§ 7, 9, 10, 11 and 19
of the Puerto Rico Constitution, as well as article 1802 of the Puerto Rico
Civil Code, thus invoking the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1367.
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
On
November
3,
Page 2
2010,
Villafaña
filed
the
above-captioned
claim
against Defendants pursuant to Section 1983. Docket No. 1. Villafaña seeks
redress for the injuries allegedly suffered by him at the hands of PRPD
officers
Ruben
Echevarría-Torres,
Felix
Campos-Santiago,
Julio
A.
Quintana-Serrano, and John Does 1 through 7 (collectively referred to as
“The Officers”) which resulted from their use of excessive force and/or
their failure to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force, in
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States
Constitution.
Villafaña
also
seeks
redress
against
the
former
Superintendent of the PRPD, Pedro Toledo-Dávila, and Supervisors John Does
7 through 14 (collectively referred to as “The Supervisors”) due to their
failure to train, instruct, supervise, control and discipline officers
under their command and establish policies to review the use of deadly
force by PRPD officers. Lastly, Villafaña alleges that Defendants’ acts
violated his rights under Article II, Sections 7, 9, 10, 11 and 19 of the
Constitution
of
the
Commonwealth
of
Puerto
Rico,
and
constituted
negligence under Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 5141.2
Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Docket No. 11, and Plaintiff filed an
opposition thereto, Docket No. 15.
B. Factual Background
The Court draws the following facts from Plaintiff’s complaint and
takes them as true for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
On
November
4,
2008,
Villafaña
claims
that
he
was
erroneously
arrested in the backyard of his residence by PRPD officers of the Special
Operations Unit. At around 9:00 pm, while at his home, he heard noises in
the street in front of his residence and decided to get closer to see what
2
All defendants are sued in their individual capacity.
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 3
was going on. Compl. ¶ 8. Villafaña stood next to a yellow truck that was
parked on his neighbor’s yard and saw motorcycles, four-tracks and people
running on the street in front of his residence. He then saw a group of
men dressed in black walking towards him and, under the impression they
were thugs, decided to hide underneath the yellow truck. These men, who
turned out to be The Officers and present defendants from the Special
Operations Unit, proceeded to pull him out from underneath the yellow
truck.
One of The Officers hit him with his nightstick on his left leg and
head. Another officer punched, kicked and choked him, and while on the
ground,
other
officers
assaulted
and
battered
him
using
nightsticks,
boots, and their hands. Id. Villafaña states that as the beating did not
stop, he tried to explain to the officers that he had not done anything
wrong and that he had just been washing clothes at his residence. The
Officers then proceeded to beat him again with their nightsticks at least
five to eight times, leaving marks on his legs and other parts of his
body. At some point the beating stopped and he was taken to a police
station where The Officers filed false accusations against him. As a
result of the thrashing, Villafaña claims he suffered serious trauma
requiring medical attention, and in addition, economic losses stemming
from related medical expenses and loss of earnings due to missing work.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Furthermore, Villafaña states that The Officers joined to conspire
in the cover up and concealment of the events that occurred that night.
Id. The officers failed to report, on their own volition, the abusive
conduct of their peers, and conspired to lie about the events described in
the complaint. As a result, he claims no charges have been filed against
any of the officers due to the incident. Id. at ¶ 10.
As
to
his
claims
against
The
Supervisors,
Villafaña
avers
that
within the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) there exist policies or
customs, practices and usages that are so pervasive that they constitute
the policy of the PRPD. Namely, these practices include: (1) assaulting
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 4
and battering citizens without regard for the need to use force or the
legality
of
its
use;
(2)
a
code
of
silence
consisting
of
acting
individually and conspiring amongst the officers to prevent disclosing the
truth
by
lying
or
failing
to
report
transgressions;
(3)
failing
to
adequately and properly receive and investigate citizen complaints, as
well as discipline, re-train, or otherwise sanction and/or remedy the
transgressions of the officers in question (a failure that plaintiff
alleges has been ratified by The Supervisors); (4) failing to adopt and
maintain an effective early warning system designed to identify repeatedly
deviant officers and then failing to address and correct deviance; (5)
failing
to
adopt
complaints,
independent
relying
instead
investigations
on
police
and
officers
review
employed
of
by
citizen
the
same
Commonwealth, when The Supervisors knew or should have known that relying
on these officers to investigate allegations of misconduct against their
fellow police officers is and has been ineffective at preventing and
correcting
police
misconduct;
and
(6)
failure
to
institute
an
anti-
nepotism policy. Id. at ¶ 26.
All of The Officers, as well as former Superintendent Toledo, have
filed a Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docket No. 11. Mainly, the
defendants argue that Villafaña failed to meet
the pleading standard
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In particular,
they claim that plaintiff Rivera-Valentín, who is Villafaña’s mother,
failed to plead any federal cause of action at all in the complaint.
Defendants
Amendment
also
are
unreasonable
posit
that
preempted,
seizure
and
as
Villafaña’s
they
use
of
are
claims
really
excessive
under
claims
force
the
Fourteenth
arising
under
the
from
an
Fourth
Amendment. As to his conspiracy claim under Section 1983, Defendants
maintain that Villafaña has only set forth conclusory allegations and
hence has failed to state a claim of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983.
Seeking
to
dismiss
the
suit
against
The
Supervisors,
Defendants
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 5
argue that under the case law, The Supervisors cannot be held liable
simply under a theory of respondeat superior. Rather, they may only be
held liable for their own acts or omissions if these are affirmatively
linked to the subordinate’s unconstitutional behavior. Defendants advance
that
Villafaña
has
only
pleaded
conclusory
allegations
that
The
Supervisors failed to train and supervise their subordinates, thereby
failing to surpass the threshold set by Iqbal.
Before proceeding to discuss these issues, the Court outlines the
relevant standard of review below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions to dismiss brought under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
are subject to the same standard of review. See Negrón-Gaztambide v.
Hernández-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1994). Firstly, when ruling on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court “must
accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw
all
reasonable
determine
inferences
whether
the
therefrom
complaint,
so
in
the
read,
plaintiff’s
limns
facts
favor,
sufficient
and
to
justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Médico de
Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing LaChapelle v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998)). Additionally,
courts
“may
augment
the
facts
in
the
complaint
by
reference
to
(i)
documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and
(ii) matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513
F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In
determining
whether
dismissal
of
a
complaint
is
appropriate
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the court must keep in mind that
“[t]he general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.... this short
and plain statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the …
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern.
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 6
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
Nevertheless,
“even
under
the
liberal
pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court
has ... held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege
‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe,
Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact)….” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and
quotation
marks
omitted).
“Determining
whether
a
complaint
states
a
plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a twopronged
approach.
It
should
begin
by
identifying
and
disregarding
statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as
fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” OcasioHernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a
complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “does not need detailed factual allegations, ...
a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a
formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do ... .”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
That is, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions from the
complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 7
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1960). “Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must
then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio-Hernández,
640 F.3d at 9 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951).
When evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not
“attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote
and unlikely.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness
of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to
draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d
at 13.
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 creates “no independent substantive right, but rather,
provides a cause of action by which individuals may seek money damages for
governmental violations of rights protected by federal law.” Cruz-Erazo v.
Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 2000). Section 1983 “provides a
remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any
statute,
ordinance,
regulation,
custom,
or
usage,
of
any
State
or
Territory.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Liability under Section 1983 requires
that the conduct complained of (1) be “committed by a person acting under
color of state law” and (2) “deprived a person of rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” See Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). “To satisfy the second element,
plaintiffs must show that the defendants’ conduct was the cause in fact of
the alleged deprivation.” Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st
Cir. 1997). Moreover, there must be a direct causal connection between the
defendants
and
the
alleged
constitutional
violation.
See
Gutiérrez-
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 8
Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989).
In addition to the foregoing, a plaintiff must also show that each
individual
defendant
constitutional
rights
was
involved
because
no
personally
respondeat
in
the
deprivation
superior
liability
of
exists
under Section 1983. See Colón-Andino v. Toledo-Dávila, 634 F.Supp.2d 220,
232 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Pinto v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d 130, 132 (1st Cir.
1984)).
A. Fourth Amendment - Excessive force
In the instant case, Plaintiffs bring an excessive force claim
under
the
Fourth
Amendment,
alleging
that
Villafaña
was
beaten
and
assaulted unlawfully in furtherance of his arrest. Defendants assert that
said claim should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim
upon which relief can be granted. In addition, they claim that plaintiff
Rivera-Valentín’s claims should be dismissed because she has not brought
forth any well pleaded factual allegations that would entitle her to
relief or any other allegations demonstrating a constitutional violation.
Docket No. 11, at 5-6
The
Fourth
Amendment
to
the
Constitution
of
the
United
States
protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures from the
government.
U.S. CONST.
amend.
IV.
“To
establish
a
Fourth
Amendment
excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant employed
force that was unreasonable under all the circumstances.” Morelli v.
Webster,
552
F.3d
12,
23
(1st
Cir.
2009).
When
analyzing
the
reasonableness factor in an excessive force claim, the assessment should
be objective, asking whether the officers' actions were “objectively
reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”
Napier v. Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 182-83 (1st Cir. 1999)(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). To determine whether the force
used
to
effect
a
particular
arrest
is
reasonable
under
the
Fourth
Amendment requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, including (1) the severity of the crime at issue,
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 9
(2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The reasonableness of a particular use of force
“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene.” Id.
In the complaint, Villafaña specifies how the arrest, beating, and
seizure
were
made.
Villafaña
asserts
that
as
a
result
he
suffered
multiple body trauma and required medical attention. When the facts in
this case are examined in the light most favorable to him, it seems that
The
Officers
did
not
confront
such
tense,
uncertain
or
dangerous
circumstances that would justify the use of excessive force during the
arrest. There is nothing in the record that suggests that Villafaña
presented an immediate threat to The Officers or others. As Villafaña
recites in his complaint, he was merely hiding underneath a truck when
the officers seized and proceeded to assault him. Beforehand, he claims
he
was
only
in
his
residence
performing
household
chores
and
had
committed no crime. Thus, the Court concludes that Villafaña has raised
sufficient allegations at this stage of the pleadings to demonstrate that
The Officers’ actions were unreasonable under the circumstances.
Notwithstanding,
Valentín
has
failed
the
to
Court
plead
agrees
any
with
cause
of
Defendants
action
that
under
the
RiveraFourth
Amendment. Defendants point out that the only instance in which RiveraValentín is mentioned in the complaint as having suffered damages is
under the state law claims section (Compl. ¶ 35). Plaintiffs in their
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss seem to concede the point, but argue
that
Rivera-Valentín’s
state
law
claims
survive
under
the
Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction, “even though no federal cause of action is
pled [by her].” Docket No. 15 at 10. Accordingly, the Court sees fit to
dismiss Rivera-Valentín’s claims under the Fourth Amendment. See also
Colón-Andino, 634 F.Supp.2d at 229 (Arrestee's wife, mother, and father
lacked Article III standing to bring Section 1983 action against police
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 10
officers involved in alleged harassment and arrest of arrestee, absent
allegation
that
they
personally
suffered
injuries
due
to
officers'
actions).
As a result of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and hereby dismisses plaintiff
Rivera-Valentín’s Fourth Amendment claim. Remaining before this Court are
thus plaintiff Villafaña’s Fourth Amendment claims.
B. Fifth Amendment
Plaintiffs’
complaint
asserts
liability
pursuant
to
the
Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants contend that such
liability is inapposite because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
only applies to actions taken by the federal government and not those of
state or local governments. Docket No. 11 at 6-7.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment states that: “No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law...” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment only applies
to actions of the federal government not those of private individuals or
state governments. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
461, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952); see also Martínez-Rivera v.
Sánchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).
In the case at bar, only state officials are named as defendants.
Thus, there is no federal government action and the Fifth Amendment is
inapplicable to Defendants. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
Fifth Amendment claim must be dismissed.
As a result of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss as to the Fifth Amendment claim.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants’ actions violated their
rights
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
Defendants’
respond
in
their
Motion to Dismiss that Villafaña’s claim is really a Fourth Amendment
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 11
claim as he alleges that he was the subject of a seizure, thus preempting
his
Fourteenth
Amendment
claim.
Defendants’
further
contend
that
plaintiff Rivera-Valentín’s Fourteenth Amendment claim should also be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a substantive component that provides
protection against “government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
331 (1986).
The Supreme Court has held that “all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force, deadly or not, in the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard,
rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham, 490 U.S.
at 395; see also Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
2008). In other words, the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment
may preempt the substantive due process protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the use of force constituted a seizure within
the context of the Fourth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed only
under that Amendment’s reasonableness standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
In contrast, if the plaintiff was not seized, then the Fourth Amendment
would
not
apply
and
the
use-of-force
claim
would
proceed
under
the
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A “seizure” which entitles a plaintiff to the Fourth Amendment’s
protection,
occurs
only
when
government
actors
have,
“by
means
of
physical force or a show of authority, ... in some way restrained the
liberty
of
a
citizen
...”
U.S.
v.
Sealey,
30
F.3d
7,
9
(1st
Cir.
1994)(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968)). “Because the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection
against
this
sort
of
physically
intrusive
governmental
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
conduct,
that
Page 12
Amendment,
not
the
more
generalized
‘substantive
due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham, 490 U.S.
at 395. Furthermore, the First Circuit has held that “in an excessive
force case, the threshold constitutional question is analyzed under the
Fourth
Amendment’s
objective
reasonableness
standard.”
Whitfield
v.
Meléndez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005).
The Court concludes that Villafaña’s claim is a Fourth Amendment
claim as he was the subject of a seizure. It is evident from the face of
the complaint that defendants used physical force against Villafaña while
proceeding
to
arrest
him
and
thus
restrained
his
freedom.
Thus,
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim cannot prevail.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ petition that Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment claim be dismissed.
D. Conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Villafaña also alleges that Defendants entered into a conspiracy to
engage
in
Defendants
the
course
contend
that
of
conduct
Villafaña’s
that
violated
allegations
his
in
civil
this
rights.
regard
are
conclusory and hence fail to state a claim of conspiracy pursuant to
Section 1983.
A civil rights conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons
acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by
unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between
the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,’ and ‘an
overt act that results in damages.” Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844
(1st Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). “To establish a conspiracy
claim
under
[Section]
1983,
plaintiff
must
‘prove
not
only
a
conspiratorial agreement but also an actual abridgment of some federallysecured right.’” Rivera-Carrero v. Rey-Hernández, Civil No. 04-1925, 2006
WL 572349, at *2 (D.P.R. 2009)(citing Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,
53 (1st Cir. 2001)). In order to state a conspiracy claim, the plaintiff
must allege “specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 13
amongst the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the alleged
chain
of
events
in
order
to
deprive
the
plaintiff
of
a
federally
protected right.” Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533
(10th Cir. 1998)(citing Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.
1994)(“Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a
valid section 1983 claim.”).
At
the
outset,
the
Court
notes
that
many
of
the
allegations
advanced by Plaintiffs in this respect are conclusory. Statements such as
The Officers “conspired together and with others, and reached a mutual
understanding
to
undertake
a
course
of
conduct
that
violated
[Villafaña’s] civil rights in further of the conspiracy” and that they
“shared the general conspiratorial objective which was to assault and
batter [Villafaña]” can both be classified as generic and conclusory.
However, Villafaña also maintains that the Defendants adhere to a code of
silence, “whereby if asked about the incidents the defendants will lie
about what occurred” and that the defendants refused to intercede in the
beatings or otherwise report the incident to their supervisors. The code
of silence alleged by Villafaña comes closer to the mark of showing a
conspiracy. Oquendo-Rivera v. Toledo, 736 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 (D.P.R.
2010)(Dismissing similar conspiracy claims, but at the summary judgment
stage).
The question confronting a court on a motion to dismiss is whether
all the facts alleged, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs,
render
Ocasio-Hernández,
the
640
plaintiff's
F.3d
at
14.
entitlement
Although
to
relief
Villafaña’s
plausible.
allegations
regarding the code of silence and the failure to intercede and report are
thin, the Court concludes that when they are read in tandem with the rest
of the allegations in the complaint, they make Villafaña’s entitlement to
relief plausible.
Accordingly,
the
Court
chooses
not
to
dismiss
Villafaña’s
conspiracy claim at this early stage of the proceedings. Thus Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy claim is DENIED.
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 14
E. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiffs
customs,
allege
practices
and
that
within
usages
which
the
PRPD
have
there
led
to
are
the
policies
or
constitutional
violations claimed by them. Said practices and customs include assaulting
and battering citizens without regard for the need to use force, a code
of silence, and a failure by the PRPD Internal Affairs Division to
welcome complaints by citizens against officers. Hence, they have brought
supervisory liability claims against The Supervisors, professing that
they have ratified the purported shortcomings of the Internal Affairs
Division, and that they have consequently “abrogated the power to so
train, supervise, discipline and control the officers.” Compl. ¶¶ 25-30.
In
an
action
brought
under
Section
1983,
“supervisors
are
not
automatically liable for the misconduct of those under their command.”
Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, a
superior officer may be held liable under Section 1983 for their own acts
or omissions. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581
(1st Cir. 1994). Consequently for a plaintiff to establish a cause of
action under the supervisory liability doctrine, it must establish that:
“(1)
the
behavior
of
the
subordinates
results
in
a
constitutional
violation and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was ‘affirmatively
linked’ to the behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as
‘supervisory
negligence
encouragement,
of
the
condonation
supervisor
amounting
or
to
acquiescence’
deliberate
or
‘gross
indifference.’”
Whitfield, 431 F.3d at 14 (citing Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d
1367, 1379-80 (1st Cir. 1995)).
A careful review of Plaintiffs’ complaint reveals that they have
not set forth sufficient specific facts in order to overcome the hurdle
of
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss.
In
the
complaint,
Plaintiffs’
allegations do not demonstrate that The Supervisors failed to evaluate,
train and supervise their subordinates with the required specificity,
much less that they intentionally disregarded known facts or that they
Civil No. 10-2079 (PG)
Page 15
were deliberately indifferent to the risk of constitutional violations.
In fact, in this regard Plaintiffs’ statements are conclusory as they
merely recite the prevailing standards governing supervisory liability
under Section 1983. See Sánchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st
Cir.
2009)(disregarding
as
conclusory,
under
Iqbal’s
first
prong,
a
factual allegation that merely “[p]arrot[ed] our standard for supervisory
liability in the context of Section 1983” in alleging that defendants
failed
to
[supervise]
with
deliberate
indifference
and/or
reckless
disregard of Plaintiff’s federally protected rights”).
Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’
supervisory
liability
claim
is
hereby
DISMISSED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
above,
Defendants’
request
for
dismissal
(Docket No. 11) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff
Villafaña’s claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
his claim of supervisory liability, are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Defendants’
hereby
request
GRANTED
as
for
to
dismissal
all
of
as
her
to
Plaintiff
federal
Rivera-Valentín
claims.
The
Court
is
will
nevertheless exercise its discretion and entertain Rivera-Valentín’s state
law claim under article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. Remaining
before the Court are thus Villafaña’s claims under the Fourth Amendment,
including
his
conspiracy
claim,
as
well
as
his
claims
under
the
Constitution of Puerto Rico, and his and Rivera-Valentín’s article 1802
claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, November 21, 2011.
s/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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