Guardarrama v. Municipality of Aguas Buenas et al

Filing 66

OPINION & ORDER DENYING 41 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 45 Motion for Joinder Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 11/08/2012. (IL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JOSE GUARDARRAMA,
Plaintiff

CIVIL NO. 10-2254 (JAG)

v.
MUNICIPALITY OF AGUAS BUENAS, et
al.,
Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.
Pending before the Court is co-defendant the Municipality
of

Aguas

Buenas’

(“the

Municipality”)

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment. (Docket No. 41). For the reasons set forth below, this
motion is hereby DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2012, Jose Guardarrama (“Plaintiff”) filed
a complaint pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and Puerto Rico’s Law No. 80 of
May 30, 1976, PR LAWS ANN. tit. 29 §§ 185a et seq. (“Law 80”).
(Docket No. 1). Plaintiff, who allegedly suffers from a mental
disability that impairs his speech and emotional state, claims
he was forced to resign from his position after the Municipality
failed to provide him with reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff
alleges

he

requested

to

be

separated

from

co-worker

Isabel

Civil No. 10-2254

2

Rosario (“Rosario”) during working shifts, because Rosario had
previously

harassed

and

humiliated

him

due

to

his

mental

condition.
On April 18, 2012, the Municipality filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment with its statement of uncontested facts and the
corresponding memorandum of law. (Docket No. 41). Co-defendants
Nelson Ortiz Reyes (“Ortiz”) and Luis Arroyo Chiques {“Arroyo”)
filed a Joinder Motion for Summary Judgment requesting to join
the Municipality’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 45).
Plaintiff

timely

filed

an

opposition

to

the

Municipality’s

motion, (Docket No. 52); the Municipality then filed a response,
(Docket No. 60); and Plaintiff filed a surreply. (Docket No.
65).

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, in pertinent
part,

that

pleadings,

a

court

may

depositions,

grant

summary

answers

to

judgment

only

if

“the

interrogatories,

and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000).

Civil No. 10-2254

3

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
issue

as

to

any

material

fact

and

...

the

moving

party

is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once a properly supported motion has been presented before
the court, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating
that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's
denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the
opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party
cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but
must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the
existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l,
Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2000).
In

order

for

a

factual

controversy

to

prevent

summary

judgment, the contested facts must be “material” and the dispute
must be “genuine”. “Material” means that a contested fact has
the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing
law. The issue is “genuine” when a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is
well

settled

that

“[t]he

mere

existence

of

a

scintilla

of

evidence” is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion

Civil No. 10-2254

4

for summary judgment.” Id. at 252. It is therefore necessary
that “a party opposing summary judgment must present definite,
competent

evidence

to

rebut

the

motion.”

Maldonado-Denis

v.

Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).
In making this assessment, the court “must view the entire
record

in

the

light

most

hospitable

to

the

party

opposing

summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor.” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st
Cir. 1990). The court may safely ignore “conclusory allegations,
improbable

inferences,

and

unsupported

speculation.”

Medina-

Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
1990).

DISCUSSION
Discrimination under ADA
To survive a summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation
claim, Plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) he was able to perform the essential functions of the
job

with

or

without

reasonable

accommodation;

and

(3)

the

employer, despite knowing of his disability, did not reasonably
accommodate him. See Estades- Negroni v. The Associates Corp. of
N.A., 377 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2004).

Civil No. 10-2254

5

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a
qualified

individual

with

a

disability.

According

to

the

statute, employers must provide “reasonable accommodations to
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability.” § 12112(b)(5)A). The Municipality
has moved for summary judgment alleging that Plaintiff did not
comply with the ADA requirements.
First, the Municipality claims that Plaintiff’s condition
was not apparent, as he did not present the typical physical
characteristics of mental retardation and was able to perform
everyday tasks without constant assistance.

However, the reason

why Rosario allegedly poked fun of Plaintiff was because of his
speech disability. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges he complained
specifically

about

Rosario

to

the

Municipality

and,

thus,

defendants had knowledge of his disability. Therefore, there is
sufficient evidence on the record for a reasonable jury to find
that Plaintiff’s condition was in fact apparent.
Defendant
reasonable

also

alleges

accommodation

that

to

the

Plaintiff

did

Municipality

not
that

request
was

in

compliance with the ADA. After citing case law that establishes
that a plaintiff must make a direct and specific request for
accommodation in order for an employer to receive sufficient
notification, the Municipality argues that it was never put in a
position

to

accommodate

Plaintiff

under

the

ADA.

The

Civil No. 10-2254
Municipality

6

claims

that

Plaintiff

never

directly

told

the

Municipality that, due to his disability, he would not be able
to work with Rosario, who had previously humiliated Plaintiff
during working hours and in front of other coworkers. However,
Plaintiff

counters

Plaintiff’s

that

problem

the

with

Municipality

Rosario.

was

Also-as

well-aware

admitted

by

of
both

parties and as reflected on the record-the Municipality verbally
admonished Rosario after the incident. Then, after a meeting
with

Plaintiff,

the

Municipality

did

not

pair

Rosario

and

Plaintiff together for at least 9 months. The Court understands
that a reasonable jury could find that the Municipality’s action
of

separating

Plaintiff

and

Rosario

was

a

reasonable

accommodation, although it was not labeled as such. In other
words,

there

is

a

triable

issue

of

fact

as

to

whether

the

Municipality had been properly notified of Plaintiff’s need for
a

reasonable

action,

accommodation,

taken

after

the

and

whether

incident,

the
was

Municipality’s
a

reasonable

accommodation.
Finally, the Municipality avers that, even if it had been
properly notified, Plaintiff’s request was not valid under the
ADA

because

it

would

impose

an

undue

hardship

on

the

Municipality. The Municipality provides a list of reasons as to
why an undue hardship would be imposed if Plaintiff were never
to be paired again with Rosario- all of them unfounded. The

Civil No. 10-2254

7

Municipality goes as far as to say that one hundred families
would go without water due to Plaintiff’s request. The Court
cannot take this statement alone as true. On the other hand,
Plaintiff

claims

that

since

no

attempts

were

ever

made

to

reasonably accommodate Plaintiff, such a conclusion cannot be
made at this point in the proceedings. The Court agrees. Once
again, the Municipality has not provided the Court with evidence
that indicates that there is not a genuine issue of material
fact as to the difficulty of accommodating Plaintiff due to his
disability. Thus, summary judgment is not proper at this stage.

Law 80 Dismissal
The
granted

Municipality
for

posits

Plaintiff’s

Law

that
80

summary
claims,

judgment
since

should

there

is

be
no

evidence showing that the Municipality compelled Plaintiff to
resign.
because

But

Plaintiff

the

accommodations

claims

Municipality
needed

due

that

he

was

forced

never
to

offered

his

disability.

the
The

to

resign

reasonable
Court

has

already found that there are genuine issues of material facts
regarding these allegations. Therefore, summary judgment is also
denied as to Plaintiff’s Law 80 Claims.

Civil No. 10-2254

8
CONCLUSION

For

the

Municipality’s
Accordingly,

reasons

set

forth

Motion

for

Summary

Arroyo

and

Ortiz’s

above,

the

Judgment.
Joinder

Court

DENIES

(Docket

Motion

for

No.

the
41).

Summary

Judgment is also DENIED. (Docket No. 45).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 8th, 2012.

S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge