Perez-Traverso et al v. Hospital Comunitario Buen Samaritano, Inc. et al

Filing 233

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 230 Motion In Compliance; 231 Motion In Compliance; granting 232 Motion for Joinder. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiffs' state law claims. By April 4, 2014, the parties shall file a joint motion informing the Court of three prompt dates on which they are available to begin trial. The parties should keep in mind that the Court is on duty during the weeks of April 21, May 19, and June 16; the court will not be available for trial during those times.Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 4/1/2014.(NBB)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MONSERRATE PÉREZTRAVERSO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIV. NO.: 10-2263(SCC)

HOSP. COMUNITARIO BUEN
SAMARITANO, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs in this case are Monserrate Pérez-Traverso, who
claims to have been harmed by the actions of the defendant
hospitals and doctors, and her children. See Docket No. 100. As
this case was poised for trial, the defendant hospitals filed,
without leave, a tardy motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiffs’ EMTALA claims. See Docket No. 213. Nonetheless,
we considered the motions and granted both, thus dismissing
Plaintiffs’ only federal causes of action. Perez-Traverso v. Hosp.

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Comunitario Buen Samaritano (hereinafter, “Perez-Traverso I”),
Civ. No. 10-2263(SCC), 2014 WL 1017885, at *4 (D.P.R. March
17, 2014). Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. See Docket No.
227. In addition to arguing that their EMTALA claims were
improperly dismissed, Plaintiffs argued that two of the
plaintiffs were diverse, and, at a minimum, their state-law
claims should be allowed to proceed to trial. See id. at 2–3.
Though we rejected Plaintiffs’ EMTALA arguments, we agreed
that the fairest course was to let the diverse plaintiffs’ claims
proceed to trial. Perez-Traverso v. Hosp. Comunitario Buen
Samaritano (hereinafter, “Perez-Traverso II”), Civ. No. 102263(SCC), 2014 WL 1155346, at *3 (D.P.R. March 21, 2014)
(noting our “power to add and drop parties on [our] own
motion at any time, on just terms,” and holding that the
diverse plaintiffs should be severed from the non-diverse
plaintiffs so as to save federal jurisdiction). Recognizing that
trial was thus inevitable in this case, we also sua sponte raised
the question of reconsidering our previous decision not to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law
claims. Id. (noting that “the diverse plaintiffs’ claims mirror in
nearly all respects the claims of the non-diverse plaintiffs”). We
ordered the parties to brief us on supplemental jurisdiction,

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and after considering their filings we conclude that exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over all of the plaintiffs’ state-law
claims is proper.
The principal jurisdictional hook for this case was Plaintiffs’
EMTALA claims. Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were here under
our supplemental jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1367. As a
general matter, our dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claims would
lead to a dismissal of their state-law claims as well.1 See
Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir.
1995) (“As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of
a plaintiff’s federal claims at the early stages of a suit, well

1.

When we asked the parties to brief us on supplemental jurisdiction, we
did so by direct reference to cases where the court had original federal
question jurisdiction. See Perez-Traverso v. Hosp. Comunitario Buen
Samaritano, Civ. No. 10-2263(SCC), 2014 WL 1155346, at * (D.P.R. March
21, 2014) (citing Cavallaro v. UMass Mem’l Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2012))); see also id. (considering the “reconsider[ation]” of our
previous decision not to extend supplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claims after dismissing the federal hook). This makes sense, as the
supplemental jurisdiction statute severely limits the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction where original jurisdiction is based on
diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1376(b). Nonetheless, Hospital Comunitario
Buen Samaritano chose to limit its brief to the propriety of a court’s
“exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when the basis for federal
jurisdiction is diversity.” Docket No. 231, at 4. While Buen Samaritano’s
arguments in this regard are largely correct, they are not relevant to our
reasoning here.

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before the commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal
without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims.”).
However, in certain cases “a federal court may retain jurisdiction over state-law claims notwithstanding the early demise of
the federal claims.” Id. Indeed, the First Circuit has explained
that the general rule “is not compelled by a lack of judicial
power”; instead, it is a recognition that in the typical case,
concerns of judicial economy, convenience, comity, and
fairness militate in favor of declining jurisdiction.” Id. (citing
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).
Here, a balancing of the equities weighs strongly in favor of
retaining jurisdiction. We begin with the fact that this case is
quite old. The lead plaintiff’s injuries happened more than four
years ago, and this case was itself filed in 2010. To dismiss the
state-law claims now would only further delay Plaintiffs’
chance to have their day in court. Such delay seems especially
unfair given that discovery in this case has been complete for
some time, and a trial could be held just as soon as an appropriate date can be agreed upon. Further, the lead plaintiff has
been diagnosed with cancer, see Docket No. 230, at 7, and a
decision to dismiss her claims and force her to refile in state
court may permanently deprive her of an opportunity for trial.

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We find it of note, too, that the defendant hospitals filed their
motions for summary judgment six months after dispositive
motions were due—without even requesting leave or explaining the motions’ lateness. We would have been justified in
summarily striking the motions, and the hospitals might have
been going to trial on the EMTALA claims now too.
Additionally, concerns about judicial economy and comity
both weigh in favor of our retaining jurisdiction. First, as we
have said, if we declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
we would nonetheless exercise diversity jurisdiction over some
of the plaintiffs’ claims. But because all of the plaintiffs’ claims
are grounded in the same events, a decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction would require an unfortunate
duplication of effort.2 Plus, the resources that have already
been expended here would be for naught. Moreover, we are
familiar with this case, having dealt with it for some time and
in great detail; there is no reason to require another judicial
officer to familiarize herself with this case when we could more
easily retain jurisdiction over it. As for comity, the state-law

2.

Likewise, if we dismissed this whole case, the diverse plaintiffs would
probably refile in federal court, while the non-diverse plaintiffs would
re-file in state court. Duplication of effort would occur in either case.

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claims amount to a straightforward medical malpractice suit of
a sort that this court routinely handles. It presents no complex
or novel issues of state law, and so it need not be left to the
expertise of a local tribunal.
Finally, we reject Hospital la Concepción’s argument that
retaining supplemental jurisdiction here would be unfair.
According to Concepción, Plaintiffs want to be in federal court
because awards are much higher here, where plaintiffs are
entitled to a jury, than in state court, where they are not. See
Docket No. 229, at 18. We have no doubt that Concepción is
accurate in its assessment of Plaintiffs’ motivations, but we see
no unfairness to the defendants in that fact. Indeed, granting
Defendants the relief they seek has the potential to cause at
least as much prejudice to Plaintiffs. Puerto Rico, after all, is the
only jurisdiction in the United States that does not afford a
right to jury trials in civil cases. See Echevarria v. Robinson
Helicopter Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d 275, 283 n. 8 (D.P.R. 2011) (noting
that “Puerto Rico is the only United States jurisdiction in which
its American citizens are not afforded any right to trial by jury
in civil cases before local courts”). The best that can be said for
Concepción’s fairness argument is that it is a wash; in fact, it

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may well militate further in favor of retaining jurisdiction.3
At the end of the day, the First Circuit’s precedents make
clear that whether or not we exercise supplemental jurisdiction

3.

In a somewhat related context, the First Circuit rejected a public policy
challenge to a forum selection clause where the challenge was based on
Puerto Rico’s refusal to allow juries in civil cases. See Rivera v. Centro
Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2009). That opinion,
however, relied largely on Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis,
which refused to incorporate the Seventh Amendment against the states
on the theory that the Bill of Rights was “not concerned with state
action.” Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916), cited by Rivera, 575 F.3d at 23.
Since Rivera, however, the Supreme Court has questioned the
continuing vitality of its early incorporation precedents. In McDonald,
it characterized its later precedents as having “moved in th[e]
direction” of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). It explained that post-Bombolis
precedent “shed any reluctance to hold that rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under the Due
Process Clause,” and it specifically rejected reasoning—employed in
Bombolis—that would permit “different standards ‘depending on
whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.’” Id. at 3035
(quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). Bombolis, then, was
decided long before the current era using discarded legal principles. See
id. at 3035 n.13; cf. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body
is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” (internal quotations
omitted)). Whether Bombolis—and therefore Rivera—remain good law
is up for debate. Nonetheless, because this matter is unsettled, we have
not given it much weight in our analysis.

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is a matter left to our discretion based on our assessment of
case-specific factors. See Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of
Me., 112 F.3d 538, 564 (1st Cir. 1997) (“In a federal question
case, the termination of the foundational federal claim does not
divest the district court of power to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, but, rather, sets the stage for an exercise of the
court’s informed discretion.”). Here, having considered the
merits of each side’s position, we conclude that the best course
is to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Cf. King v. Friends of Kelly Ayotte,
860 F. Supp. 2d 118, 129 (D.N.H. 2012) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims); Ciampi v.
Zuczek, 598 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 n.8 (D.R.I. 2009) (exercising
supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims where
the “litigation had matured well beyond its nascent stages”
and the court was “familiar with the underlying facts” (internal
quotations omitted)); Metlife Capital Corp. v. Water Quality Ins.
Syndicate, 198 F. Supp. 2d 97, 105–06 (D.P.R. 2002) (exercising
supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims where
the court had expended significant resources on the case,
substantial discovery had been conducted, and the case was
very old); Negron-Vazquez v. Colon-Flores, Civ. No. 91-

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1307(DRD), 1996 WL 482961, at *5 (D.P.R. Aug. 14, 1996)
(exercising supplemental jurisdiction, despite the dismissal of
the federal claims, where the case was trial-ready and had been
on the court’s dockets for years); see also Smith v. Jenkins, 732
F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) (approving, without further comment, the trial court’s retention of supplemental jurisdiction
after no federal claims remained); Allstate Interiors & Exteriors,
Inc. v. Stonestreet Const., LLC, 730 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2013)
(finding no error in the district court’s decision to retain
supplemental jurisdiction absent any further federal claims).
In the alternative, however, we would permit the two
diverse plaintiffs to maintain their claims in this court. We have
explained this reasoning previously, see Perez-Traverso II, 2014
WL 1155346, at *2–3, and we reiterate it. Nonetheless, because
we made that ruling without the benefit of Defendants’
opposition, we have carefully reviewed their filings on the
matter and we address their objections now.
First, Concepción argues that diversity jurisdiction is
unavailable because the admittedly diverse plaintiffs have
failed to plead that they meet the jurisdictional amount in
controversy, $75,000. Frankly, we are confused by this argument. The Fourth Amended Complaint clearly pleads damages

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in the amount of $250,000 for each of the diverse plaintiffs,
easily satisfying the jurisdictional threshold. See Docket No.
100, ¶ 68. Second, the defendants argue that, notwithstanding
the sufficient pleading, the diverse plaintiffs cannot hope to
actually meet the jurisdictional threshold. According to the First
Circuit, a plaintiff’s jurisdictional averment controls “as long as
that amount is asserted in good faith.” Barrett v. Lombardi, 239
F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2001). However, there is a latent element of
objective good faith in this equation: when there is a legal
certainty that the plaintiff could not recover at least $75,000,
dismissal is warranted. Esquilin-Mendoza v. Don King Prods.,
Inc., 638 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011). Defendants suggest that it is
a legal certainty that the diverse plaintiffs will not meet the
jurisdictional threshold. To this end, Defendants offer evidence
that, since Pérez’s accident, the diverse plaintiffs have not been
in frequent contact with her. Seeing this, we do find it unlikely
that the diverse plaintiffs will recover more than $75,000, but
we cannot say that this is true to a legal certainty. Indeed, we
have seen relatives awarded substantial recoveries for arguably less serious injuries to their loved ones. Finding that the
jurisdictional averment was made in good faith, then, we reject
this argument. Finally, Concepción argues that “there is no

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scintilla of evidence that has been presented by plaintiff during
discovery and in their opposition for summary judgment . . . to
sustain” Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence actions. Docket No.
229, at 7. To this argument, we need say only that Defendants
had the opportunity to file motions for summary judgment as
to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims and chose not to do so. We thus
find it unremarkable that Plaintiffs have not opposed arguments that were never raised. This argument is rejected, too.
We conclude that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims is warranted, notwithstanding
the dismissal of their only federal claims. In the alternative, we
would sever the claims of the diverse plaintiffs, Ruben and
Roberto Lorenzo, and try them on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction while dismissing the remaining plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1st day of April, 2014.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE