Franco-Figueroa et al v. State Insurance Fund et al

Filing 159

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 149 MOTION to Alter Judgment. Signed by Judge Jose A. Fuste on 11/8/2013.(mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MANUEL FRANCO-FIGUEROA, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 11-1025 (JAF)

v.
STATE INSURANCE FUND, et. al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION AND ORDER

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We previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants Zoimé Alvarez-

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Rubio, Saúl Rivera-Rivera, and the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund. The plaintiffs now

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ask us to reconsider this decision. But, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize

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the court to reverse course in this case. We must, therefore, deny their motion to reconsider.
We evaluate motions to alter or amend judgment that are filed within twenty-eight

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days of the entry of judgment under Rule 59(e).

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Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2008). A court can grant a motion to amend

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judgment if there is a manifest error of law or newly-discovered evidence or in certain other

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narrow situations—such as where there is an intervening change in controlling law or a need

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to prevent manifest injustice. Melendez v. Autogermana, Inc., 622 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.

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2010); see also 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §

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2810.1 (2d ed.1995) (noting four grounds for granting such a motion: Manifest errors of law

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or fact, newly-discovered or previously-unavailable evidence, manifest injustice, and an

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intervening change in controlling law).

See, e.g., Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer

Civil No. 11-1025 (JAF)

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The plaintiffs’ motion does not explain why granting summary judgment was a “clear

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error of law” or would otherwise result in a “manifest injustice.” Nor do they point to any

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newly-discovered evidence. Instead, they merely raise the semblance of two errors: First,

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that we erred in crediting the defendants’ argument that they were unaware of the plaintiffs’

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political affiliation; second, that we failed to adequately credit circumstantial evidence

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proving discriminatory intent on the part of the defendants.

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While the plaintiffs are correct that a jury may choose to disbelieve Alvarez–Rubio’s

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statement that she never knew or spoke of the plaintiffs’ political affiliation, that fact does

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not help the plaintiffs. Their burden is to show some evidence from which knowledge can be

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inferred, and they have provided none. The plaintiffs point to the fact that they held office or

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were members of the opposing political party, but those facts go merely to proving that they

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are affiliated with the opposing political party, not that the defendants knew of that fact. As

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circumstantial evidence, what the plaintiffs offer is too attenuated to permit the inference of

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knowledge. Having once held a minor local office or an appointed sinecure years earlier is

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too remote to infer employer knowledge.

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The plaintiffs point to a sequence of events that they say shows the defendants'

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discriminatory motive but, as the opinion discussed, the timing of the audit alone is

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insufficient to permit an inference of discrimination. A gubernatorial administration, and

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each of its component parts, has an obligation to govern lawfully. Here, the sequence of

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events shows only that the administration came into office and reviewed hiring practices to

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determine lawfulness. The administration rescinded unlawful promotions and hirings, which

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affected members of both political parties. No juror could rationally infer discriminatory

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intent from these facts alone, and plaintiffs have provided nothing more.

Civil No. 11-1025 (JAF)

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Additionally, neither of the arguments above are appropriate grounds for granting a

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motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs raised both arguments in their original briefing, and the court

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considered them. Markel American Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir.

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2012) (a party moving to alter or amend judgment may not repeat arguments made during

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summary judgment); Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (employee was not

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entitled to order altering or amending judgment where he pointed to no manifest error of law

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or newly-discovered evidence, but merely restated same arguments he made in his opposition

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to summary judgment.)

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Finally, the plaintiffs criticize our use of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s opinion,

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but their criticism is misplaced. The opinion does not rely on the decision as outcome-

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determinative but, instead, merely as an endorsement of the administration’s conclusion that

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the promotions and hirings in question occurred contrary to law. The Puerto Rico Supreme

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Court has the final say on that issue, as it is a matter of Commonwealth law, so we were right

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to acknowledge their opinion.

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translation that we attach as an appendix here.

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In reviewing that case we relied on a certified English

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend judgment, (Docket
No. 149), is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th day of November, 2013.

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S/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE