Rojas et al v. The Waldorf Astoria Collection
Filing
39
ORDER denying 30 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall advise the Court by next week whether she still wishes to dismiss the present case. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 6/5/2012. (RJC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ROJAS, et al,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
THE WALDORF ASTORIA COLLECTION
d/b/a EL SAN JUAN HOTEL AND
CASINO,
Defendant
OPINION AND ORDER
Garcia-Gregory, D.J.
Pending
before
the
Court
is
defendant
Waldorf
Astoria
Collection’s (“Waldorf”) unopposed Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 30). For the reasons that follow,
the Court DENIES defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs
bring
this
action
alleging
disability
discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Puerto Rico Law 44, P.R. Laws
Ann.
Tit.
plaintiffs’
1,
§
501
amended
(Docket No. 30).
et
seq.
complaint,
Defendants
and
moved
plaintiffs
to
never
dismiss
opposed.
2
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
First EEOC Complaint
Plaintiff Lourdes Rojas (“Rojas”) began working as a maid
for
defendant
housekeeping
in
March
duties,
2004.
which
Rojas
included
performed
sewing
in
the
various
laundry
department and other related tasks. At some point, Rojas was
transferred from the laundry department to the hotel rooms as a
maid. According to Rojas, the duties in the hotel rooms had to
be carried out while standing.
The
varicose
complaint
veins.
states
Rojas
that
provided
Rojas
began
defendant
suffering
with
a
from
medical
certificate to that effect, and requested a transfer to another
department where she “could just sit” and perform her duties.
(Docket No. 29, ¶ 14). However, the director of human resources
told her that no such positions were available.
In January 2008, an ulcer developed in the ankle of Rojas,
where a vein had ruptured. She was hospitalized for a week, and
was subsequently “placed on rest from work” by her doctor for a
period of six months. (Id., ¶ 15). Rojas returned to work in
July of that year, and requested reasonable accommodations from
her
employer.
The
day
after
her
return,
Rojas
met
with
her
employer and her union representative to discuss her request.
Three
days
later,
accommodation by fax.
defendant
sent
Rojas
the
proposed
3
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
The complaint is unclear about what happened with the faxed
accommodation.
Nonetheless,
the
Court
presumes
it
was
not
acceptable because by the end of July, plaintiff filed an EEOC
complaint for failure to provide reasonable accommodation. From
what
the
Court
can
gather,
these
proceedings
were
dismissed
because Rojas accepted her former position as a maid. (Id., ¶
20). Rojas returned to work in May 2009.
Second EEOC Complaint
In June 2009, the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund (PRSIF)
informed defendant that Rojas’s medical condition had worsened.
According to the complaint, she was diagnosed with peripheral
vascular insufficiency in the lower extremities. (Id., ¶ 21).
Rojas also suffered a variety of other accidents and ailments;
she was operated to treat her carpal tunnel condition and she
had a micro-fracture in her ankle which required her to use a
walker. Finally, the complaint avers that Rojas also suffered
two “accidents” at her workplace.1 (Id., ¶ 21-22). In all, the
complaint states that “the plaintiff at this stage is disabled
to carry out te [sic] essential functions of her jog [sic], for
she cannot stand for long periods of time.” (Id., ¶ 21).
1
The complaint does not provide more detail as to these
accidents – what they were, how they affected her health, etc.
4
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
The PRSIF authorized Rojas to return to work on May 2010.
Though
she
requested
reasonable
accommodations
for
her
disabilities, defendant allegedly refused. Rojas then filed a
second
EEOC
complaint.
Plaintiffs
state
that
the
defendant,
instead of affording her accommodations, “have made all efforts
to worsen [Rojas’s] medical condition.” (Id., ¶ 27).
STANDARD OF LAW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
plead
To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must
sufficient
facts
plausible on its face.”
544,
570
(2007);
see
“to
state
a
claim
to
relief
that
is
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
also
Ashcroft
v.
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662
(2009).
In Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2011), the First Circuit distilled from Twombly and Iqbal a twopronged test designed to measure the sufficiency of a complaint.
First,
the
reviewing
court
must
identify
and
disregard
“statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions
couched as fact, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action.”
punctuation
Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (internal
omitted).
In
this
analysis,
the
remaining
non-
conclusory factual allegations must be taken as true, even if
5
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
they are “seemingly incredible,” or that “actual proof of those
facts is improbable.”
Id.
Finally, the court assesses whether
the facts taken as a whole “state a plausible, not merely a
conceivable, case for relief.”
Id.
DISCUSSION
The
ADA
prescribes
that
no
employer
“shall
discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Plaintiffs
claim
that
the
they
failed
to
defendant
provide
discriminated
reasonable
against
Rojas
accommodation
because
for
her
disabilities. Thus, plaintiffs’ theory of liability is limited
to a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA.
To make out this type of claim, plaintiffs must show that
Rojas 1) suffers from a disability as defined by the ADA; 2)
that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job,
with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) that despite
knowing of Rojas’s disability, the defendant did not reasonably
accommodate it. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237
(1st Cir. 2002).
The term “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
6
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
The term “substantially limits” is “construed broadly in favor
of expansive coverage,” and “is not meant to be a demanding
standard.” 29 CFR § 1630.2. Defendants argue that the complaint
fails to show Rojas was disabled as defined by the ADA, because
she fails to show how her illness substantially limits a major
life activity. The Court finds otherwise. The complaint states
that Rojas suffers from several vascular ailments, permanent in
nature, that impede her ability to stand for long periods of
time. This is enough to infer, at least at this stage, that
plaintiff was a disabled individual under the purview of the
ADA.
As to the second prong, defendant argues that plaintiffs
conceded the point in the complaint by stating that: “[Rojas] at
this stage is disabled to carry out te (sic) essential functions
of her jog (sic), for she cannot stand for long periods of
time.” (Id., ¶ 21). The Court finds that while this concession
is inartful and surprising on the part of plaintiffs’ attorney,
it does not support defendant’s position when read in context of
the complaint as a whole.
Neither
party
delineates
with
any
precision
what
the
“essential duties” of plaintiff’s job were. The complaint states
that Rojas “commenced working for the defendant as a maid, from
which
time
she
performed
other
duties
in
the
housekeeping
7
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
department,” which included sewing. (Docket No. 29, ¶ 12). In
contrast, her duties as a maid in the hotel’s rooms had to be
performed while standing up. (Id., ¶ 13). In any event, it is
reasonable to infer that at least some of Rojas’s duties as a
maid or housekeeper could be performed while sitting down. The
complaint also states that Rojas requested that her employer
assign her to a department where she “would not be required to
stand
so
long.”
(Id.,
¶
14).
Thus,
the
Court
interprets
plaintiffs’ statement to mean that Rojas was unable to perform
certain duties of her job standing up. This, however, does not
foreclose the possibility that Rojas could have been assigned to
duties that did not involve long periods of standing, like her
previous sewing assignment.
Defendant does not proffer any argument as to the third
prong
of
the
Carroll
test,
because
defendant
interprets
plaintiffs’ claim as a disparate treatment claim rather than as
a reasonable accommodation claim. The fact that plaintiffs did
not
show
any
“adverse
employment
action”
on
the
part
of
defendant is inapposite to our inquiry. In any event, defendant
could not prevail on this prong, because the complaint flatly
states
that
Rojas
asked
for
accommodations
refused, and instead told Rojas to retire.
but
defendant
8
CIVIL NO. 11-1111 (JAG)
As a final note, the Court also denies defendant’s motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims, inasmuch as it is based
on the same arguments used to seek dismissal on plaintiffs’
federal claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 5th day of June, 2012.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge
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