Santiago-Rodriguez v. Sistema San Juan Capestrano, Inc.

Filing 40

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION for 39 Report and Recommendation. The Court detected some grammatical errors and decided to enter an amended opinion and order. Judgment will be entered accordingly. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 4/11/2013.(JAM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MIGDALIA SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff(s),

Civil No. 11-1128 (DRD)

SISTEMA SAN JUAN CAPESTRANO,
Defendant(s).

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are: (a) Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment And
Memorandum Of Law In Support Thereof, Docket No. 11; (b) plaintiff’s response, Docket No. 16;
(c) Defendant’s Reply To Plaintiff’s Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment, Docket No. 23;
(d) Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreño-Coll (hereinafter
“Magistrate Judge”). The Report and Recommendation concluded that the federal claims be
dismissed with prejudice. The state law claims were not dismissed, as the Magistrate Judge
concluded that she did not wish “to undermine any jurisdictional basis for state-law claims.” Docket
No. 33, page 12. The Court interprets that the state claims were to be dismissed without prejudice.
For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted in
toto, as supplement herein.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Migdalia Santiago Rodríguez (hereinafter “Santiago” or “plaintiff”) alleges in the
Complaint several employment violations under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., and the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq., and constructive discharge. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages, lost wages

and benefits, past and future, including loss of Social Security benefits triggered by plaintiff’s
supervisors on the ground of plaintiff’s filing of an administrative claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”), attorneys fees and costs.
Defendant Sistema San Juan Capestrano (“Capestrano” or “hospital” or “defendant”) moved
for summary judgment and the dismissal of the instant action with prejudice based on the fact that
the plaintiff was unable to show a disability under the ADA, and a discrimination case under
the ADEA, Docket No. 11. Plaintiff generally opposed on the grounds that the tests used by the
defendant under the ADA and the ADEA are incorrect, as well as their applicability to the facts of
the instant complaint. For example, plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to apply the prima facie
test showing discrimination under the ADEA as per McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973), which is the applicable test in cases under ADEA. See Docket No. 16, pages 11-15.
Plaintiff further alleges that she is “regarded as disabled” under the ADA “because [of] her condition
of positive cancer nodules on the thyroids.” Id. at page 15. Defendant replied that plaintiff’s
opposition is “proposing new additional facts and claiming that Defendant failed to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s demotion.” See Docket No. 23. “Plaintiff argues that Defendant
did not rebut the presumptions of discrimination and provided ‘blunt and unsupported allegations.’”
Id. “Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition fall flat.” Id.
The instant case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. See
Docket entries No. 31 and 32. The Magistrate Judge entered the Report and Recommendation on
January 14, 2013, Docket No. 33. Pursuant to the Order Referring Case, Docket No. 31, the parties
were granted five business days to file any objections, that is, January 22, 2013. The record shows
that plaintiff opposed the Report and Recommendation on January 28, 2013, Docket No. 34. The
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Court finds that plaintiff’s opposition is tardy and was filed without leave of Court. Defendant filed
a reply on February 7, 2013, Docket No. 35 without leave of Court. See Docket No. 33, pages 12-13.
The Court is cognizant that the Report and Recommendation provides the parties fourteen days to
object, however, this provision is contrary to the Court’s Order, Docket No. 31. In any event, the
Court has reviewed plaintiff’s tardy objection, as well as defendant’s reply, and finds that plaintiff’s
objections are merely a rehash of the arguments raised in the opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. Hence, plaintiff’s tardy objection will not alter the Court’s analysis nor the filing ruling.
Standard of Review
The district court may refer dispositive motions to a United States Magistrate Judge for a
report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”); Local Civil Rule 72(a) of the Local Rules of the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico (“L.Civ.R.”).
“Absent objection, ... [a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party]
agree[s] to the magistrate’s recommendation.” Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F. 2d 245, 247
(1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985). Moreover, “failure to raise objections to the
Report and Recommendation waives that party’s right to review in the district court, and those
claims not preserved by such objections are precluded on appeal.” Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F. 2d
22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1992).
In the instant case, plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation were filed tardy. Hence, the Court will consider the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation as being unopposed. Thus, in order to accept the unopposed Report and
Recommendation, the Court needs only satisfy itself by ascertaining that there is no "plain error" on
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the face of the record. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto, Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.
1996)(en banc)(extending the deferential "plain error" standard of review to the unobjected legal
conclusions of a magistrate judge); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982)(en
banc)(appeal from district court's acceptance of unobjected findings of magistrate judge reviewed
for "plain error"); Nogueras-Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305
(D.P.R. 2001)("Court reviews [unopposed] Magistrate's Report and Recommendation to ascertain
whether or not the Magistrate's recommendation was clearly erroneous")(adopting the Advisory
Committee note regarding Fed.R.Civ.P 72(b)); Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.
1990)("when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error").
After a careful review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court finds
no "plain error" and agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusions, as supplemented herein. As
stated above, the Court’s review of plaintiff’s tardy objections do not change the final ruling of the
Court, as the Court finds that the arguments were properly address by plaintiff prior thereto in a
filing, and the Court address then in this Opinion and Order.
Analysis
A review and in absence of plain error, the Court hereby accepts, adopts and incorporates by
reference, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33.
The Magistrate Judge found that the following facts were uncontested. Plaintiff was hired
by the defendant in June 2006 as a general supervisory nurse. Plaintiff was 45 years old at the time
she was hired by Sistema San Juan Capestrano. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33,
page 2. On November 21, 2009, an incident occurred at San Juan Capestrano, consisting of a
per diem nurse’s administration of flu shots to some of defendant’s employees without authorization.
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Id. at page 3. This incident triggered an investigation by the defendant in early December 2009,
which included plaintiff’s failure to inform the incident to the defendant’s administration. Id.
Plaintiff was interviewed by the defendant’s department of human resources, and confronted with
the question of whether or not she informed the incident to the defendant’s administration. Id., see
also Docket No. 11-2, at pages 34-36. During plaintiff’s meeting with the department of human
resources, plaintiff informed that she had scheduled an emergency surgery to remove her thyroid for
December 21, 2009. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33, page 3.
Plaintiff was later notified through defendant’s letter dated December 15, 2009, that the
investigation has revealed that plaintiff failed to report the November 21, 2009 incident to the
administration. Hence, plaintiff would be released from her current position of general supervisory
registered nurse, and was to be transferred to the position of general registered nurse effective
December 21, 2009.1 Id. at pages 3-4, and Docket No. 11-5, and the certified English translation,
Docket No. 14-3.
Plaintiff proceeded with her surgery as scheduled on December 21, 2009, and never returned
to work, resigning from the hospital through letter of January 7, 2010 effective January 12, 2010, see
Docket No. 11-6, and the certified English translation, Docket No. 4. The Court finds that because
the language of plaintiff’s resignation letter addressed to Mrs. Colón, Clinical Services Director, is
critical for plaintiff’s claims, the same is cited below:
This is to inform you that effective January 12, 2010, I resign my
position as General Nurse, a position to which I was demoted early in
1

The Court notes that this is not the first time that plaintiff has been interviewed by the defendant’s
department of human resources, see defendant’s Employee Corrective Actions Report of July 3, 2009, Docket
No. 14-5, regarding plaintiff’s frequent absences from work without proper and/or timely notice with her supervisors.
No disciplinary action was taken by the defendant at the time.

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December after four years as General Supervisor of the 3-11 shift, the
position for which I was hired.
I wish to reiterate my position that the incident on which you
based your decision to demote me was an isolated case of
involuntary forgetfulness whereby I did not make the entry in the
shift report, in the understanding that, since other supervisors
were involved, the hospital administration was aware of and
approved the vaccination. Also, the person providing the service
was not a stranger to the institution, but rather an employee who, at
the request of several coworkers, during her free time provides
material and equipment to protect other employees, a function she
performs on a daily basis as an employee of the Government of
Puerto Rico.
Having nothing further to say, I thank you for the opportunity you
gave me to work for the hospital. (Emphasis ours).
Docket No. 14-4.
Plaintiff further alleges that her position of general supervisory registered nurse was assigned
to Lisa Rivera, a younger nurse, who was being trained to a supervisory position by plaintiff prior
to her demotion and resignation. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33, pages 4-5.
The American with Disabilities Act
The Court agrees with the legal analysis made by the Magistrate Judge as to the ADA, and
incorporates the same herein:
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) prohibits
employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). To establish an ADA claim, a person must prove: (1) that she was
“disabled within the meaning of the ADA”; (2) that she was “qualified to
perform the essential functions fo the job, either with or without a reasonable
accommodation”; and (3) “that the employer took adverse action against” the
employee “because of the disability.” Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d
1162, 1166 (1st Cir.2002). An ADA plaintiff has several options for showing
that she is disabled under the ADA; here, Plaintiff has opted to argue that she
is disabled under the ADA because she was “regarded as having” an
impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.
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See Ruiz-Rivera v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82–83 (1st Cir.
2008).
“Regarded as” claims under the ADA are meant to protect plaintiffs from
“myths, fears, and stereotypes” that may arise regarding their non-disabling
medical conditions. See id. at 82. To prevail under this test, the plaintiff must
show not only that her employer “perceived h[er] as somehow disabled,” but
that “the employer regarded h[er] as disabled within the meaning of the
ADA.” Id. at 83 (citing Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169). Plaintiff “must
demonstrate not only that the employer thought [she] was impaired in [her]
ability to do the job that [she] held, but also that the employer regarded h[er]
as substantially impaired ‘in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared with the average person having comparable
training, skills, and abilities.’” Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.,
358 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999)).
Almost nothing in the statements of facts addresses how Plaintiff was
perceived by her employer. The following, however, is undisputed: Plaintiff
was never subjected to any comments about any perceived disability, and she
admitted during her deposition that she was not perceived or treated as
disabled. All Plaintiff has to hang her “regarded as” argument on is the fact
that she told the hospital’s human resources department that she was going
to have thyroid surgery, and that this surgery could cause muteness. It is the
muteness that Plaintiff claims led to her being regarded as disabled, but there
are two salient facts that make her argument implausible: first, it is
uncontested that Plaintiff was demoted before the surgery, and she never
returned to work after it was performed; and second, she does not even allege
that she told the hospital that muteness was a possible consequence of the
surgery.
It is our opinion that Plaintiff’s “regarded as” claim under the ADA must fail
because she was at no time working with any condition that could have been
regarded by her employer as a disability under the Act. To the contrary, it is
uncontested that Plaintiff ceased to work at the hospital before undergoing
the surgery that she says led to the perception of disability. We cannot
understand, then, how such a perception might have been formed. Thus, we
recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to
her ADA claim.
See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33, pages 7-10. See also Ramos-Echevarría v.
Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 187 (1st Cir.2011):
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In assessing whether someone is disabled under the ADA, we must
consider the impairment’s effect on the particular individual. Katz v.
City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.1996). The limitation caused
by the impairment must be permanent or long-term. Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii), (iii) (1991). Evidence of a medical
diagnosis of impairment, standing alone, is insufficient to prove a
disability. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 198. What
is required is evidence showing that the impairment limits this
particular plaintiff to a substantial extent. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp.,
294 F.3d 231, 238 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc., 534 U.S. at 196-200) (internal quotations marks omitted).
In the instant case, the Court finds that the record is devoid of any supporting documents
regarding plaintiff’s thyroid condition. The record is plagued with plaintiff’s bare, general
conclusory allegations, which indeed are in itself contradictory with plaintiff’s own statements given
in her deposition.
Question:

How many tests did you have prior to the surgery?

Answer:

Only the biopsy.

Question:

What activities are you precluded from performing due to this medical
condition that your mentioned that Dr. Giraldes identified?

Answer:

None.

Question:

How did this condition affect your ability to work?

Answer:

In no way.

Question:

Is there something that you used [to do] that you cannot perform now?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Are there any limitations imposed on you by this condition that you undergo
surgery for?

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Answer:

No.

Question:

Was this a temporary or permanent condition?

Answer:

Permanent.

...
Question:

Did you consult any other doctor, besides Dr. Giraldes, for this condition?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Did you request leave under SINOT at San Juan Capestrano?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Were you dismissed from work at San Juan Capestrano?

Answer:

No.

Question:

At the time that you handed your resignation to San Juan Capestrano, were
you authorized to work from your doctor?

Answer:

Yes.

See Docket No. 11-2, pages 17-18.
Question:

Did you ever request a reasonable accommodation at San Juan Capestrano
due to this condition that you’re claiming [possibility of muteness for a
period of three months after the thyroid surgery, and end up hoarse]?

Answer:

No, but they indicated to me that I was going to be rotated.”

Id. at page 19.
Question:

Were you ever perceived or treated as disabled by someone at San Juan
Capestrano?

Answer:

No.
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Question:

Before undergoing surgery, did you ever report to San Juan Capestrano on
medical leave?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

Were you subject to any disciplinary action, or a comment because you went
on sick leave?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Did you ever report to Workmen’s Compensation?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

Were you reinstated in your job after you were released from Workmen’s
Compensation?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

Were you subjected to any remarks, or comments, or disciplinary action
because you reported yourself to Workmen’s Compensation?

Answer:

No.

Id. at page 20.
Plaintiff also admitted never hearing comments regarding her disability, or that someone
perceived or treated her as disabled. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33, page 5.
The Court notes that there are no medical certificates or diagnosis on the record regarding
plaintiff’s thyroid condition. Hence, the Court finds that the plaintiff failed to show that indeed she
had a disability either by direct evidence or by indirect evidence using the prima facie case test as
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Plaintiff Santiago alleges that she was discriminated against due to her age. See Report and
Recommendation, Docket No. 33, pages 5-6. However, the Court finds that according to plaintiff’s
deposition, she did not feel discriminated against due to her age.
Likewise, the Court agrees with the legal analysis made by the Magistrate Judge as to
the ADA, and incorporates the same herein:
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employers from taking
adverse employment actions against employees who are forty years of age or
older because of the employee’s age. Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp.,
507 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir.2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a)). To
prevail on her ADEA claim, Plaintiff must prove that she suffered an adverse
employment action that was motivated by her age, and that she suffered an
injury as a result. Mélendez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., Inc.,
273 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001). Here, Plaintiff was over forty years old and
was replaced, in at least some of her responsibilities, by a person younger
than her.
In this case, the central question is whether Plaintiff’s demotion was
motivated by age discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that her age triggered her
demotion; the hospital argues that Plaintiff’s demotion was precipitated by
errors she made on the job. At the summary judgment state, the relevant
question is whether Plaintiff “has pointed to enough admissible evidence to
create a factual issue for trial on the issue of motivation—that is, to permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that the decision to demote her was taken or
prompted by someone based on age-based stereotyping or hostility.” Id.; see
also Dávila v. Corporación de P.R. para la Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 16
(1st Cir.2007) (“At summary judgment, this question reduces to whether or
not the plaintiff has adduced minimally sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that he was fired because of his age.”).
Plaintiff has adduced no evidence supporting discrimination apart from the
mere facts of her age and that of her supposed replacement. She admits that
she heard no comments directed at her age and that other, older employees
worked around her. More relevantly, her resignation letter from her position
takes some responsibility for the errors in judgment that the hospital says led
to her demotion. Simply put, we do not think there is enough here to permit
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Plaintiff suffered age discrimination.
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See Dávila, 498 F.3d at 17 (“For a quondam employee to withstand summary
judgment in an age discrimination case, there must be some significantly
probative evidence from which the factfinder can infer that the employer
discharged the employee because of his age.”). Accordingly, we must
recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to
her ADEA claim.
Plaintiff further alleges that she was discriminated against due to her age. See Report and
Recommendation, Docket No. 33, pages 5-6. However, the Court finds that according to plaintiff’s
deposition, she did not feel discriminated against due to her age.
Question:

Did someone at Capestrano ever made a comment to you that you were old?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Did you ever contact him [the director of human resources] to report any
conduct or any situation regarding these comments?

Answer:

No.

Question:

Did you ever try to reach Mr. Rivera [the director of human resources], and
he refused to listen to you?

Answer:

No.

See Docket No. 11-2, page 8.
In the instant case, there is not one single allegation of age discrimination supported by
plaintiff’s own admissions. The record clearly shows otherwise, to wit: (a) plaintiff was hired when
she was 45 years old; (b) plaintiff is a registered nurse with post-graduate studies, and is currently
studying a doctoral degree; (c) plaintiff was unable to establish that her demotion was age related,
hence, she failed to meet the “but for” test, required by the Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (requiring that the termination must be “the motivating factor”

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instead of “a motivating factor”). In sum, the Court finds that summary judgment is warranted on
plaintiff’s ADEA claim.
Constructive Discharge
Plaintiff claims constructive discharge due to her demotion. “Constructive discharge
typically ‘refers to harassment so severe and oppressive that staying on the job while seeking redress
– the rule save in exceptional circumstances – is intolerable.’” Gerald v. University of Puerto Rico,
707 F.3d 7, 25 (1st Cir.2013), citing Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe, Inc., 354 f.3d 34,
45 (1st Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “A successful constructive discharge
claim requires ‘working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled
to resign.’” Id., citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004).
In the instant case, the record clearly shows otherwise. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that
she presented her resignation under pressure, even though she was not asked by the administration
to resign. See Docket No. 11-2, page 15. Moreover, plaintiff admitted that she did not return to
work after the surgery, notwithstanding that she had a job at the hospital, and her doctor allowed her
to return to work and perform as usual. See Docket No. 11-2, pages 16-18. Hence, plaintiff could
not have suffered “severe and oppressive” working conditions while she was away on sick leave.
Gerald v. University of Puerto Rico, 707 F.3d at 25. Lastly, plaintiff admitted that she was not
dismissed from work at San Juan Capestrano.

Id. Contrariwise, plaintiff sent a resignation

apologetic letter admitting that she had in fact provided “unauthorized employees” [the per diem
nurse, who was also an employee of the Government of Puerto Rico] to receive flu vaccinations.
See Letter of Resignation, Docket No. 14-4. Plaintiff further admitted that she forgot to make the
proper entry on the “shift report.” Id. The record reflects that the defendant was a “general
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supervisory nurse” with a license to act as a registered nurse, occasionally acting as the registered
nurse in charge of the hospital. See Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33, page 2.
Considering that plaintiff was never terminated but only demoted, and never returned to work
after surgery, notwithstanding she was capable and authorized by her physician to work, the Court
refuses to act as a super overseeing personnel office. The Court remains mindful that its role is not
to “second-guess[ing] the business decisions of an employer, nor to impose [its] subjective
judgments of which person would best fulfill the responsibilities of a certain job.” Petitti v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 909 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.1990). “Courts may not sit as super personnel
departments, assessing the merits – or even the rationality – of employer’s nondiscriminatory
business decisions.” Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991).
Question:

Were you dismissed from work at San Juan Capestrano?

Answer:

No.

Question:

At the time you handed your resignation to San Juan Capestrano, were you
authorized to work from your [personal] doctor?

Answer:

Yes.

See Docket No. 11-2, page 18.
Hence, the Court finds that plaintiff was not constructively discharged, rather that she
resigned knowingly and voluntarily without any “sever and oppressive” conditions present.
Gerald v. University of Puerto Rico, 707 F.3d at 25. The record also shows that another supervisor
resigned from Capestrano, however, plaintiff could not provide the name of said supervisor and the
circumstances that triggered the supervisor’s alleged resignation. See Docket No. 11-2, page 21.
The Court finds that this bare allegation is irrelevant, as it fails to prove any type of discrimination
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conduct from the defendant, or how this resignation is related, if any, to plaintiff’s resignation.
Plaintiff’s claim for constructive discharge is denied, as she failed to show that her working
conditions were “so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.”
Gerald v. University of Puerto Rico, 707 F.3d at 25. Hence, summary judgment is warranted as to
the claim of constructive discharge.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there is no plain error in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Docket No. 33.

Hence, the Report and

Recommendation is hereby adopted in toto, as supplemented herein. All federal causes of action are
dismissed with prejudice and all causes of action under state law are dismissed without prejudice.
Judgment is to be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 11th day of April, 2013.
s/Daniel R. Domínguez
DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
United States District Judge

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