Joubert-Vazquez et al v. Alvarez-Rubio et al
Filing
187
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 3/14/2014.(YUC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PEDRO ORTIZ-SANTIAGO,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 11-1087 (SEC)
v.
ZOIME ALVAREZ-RUBIO, ET AL.,
Defendants.
ADELA JOUBERT-VAZQUEZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 11-1194 (SEC)
v.
ZOIME ALVAREZ-RUBIO, ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket # 111),
the plaintiffs’ opposition thereto (Docket # 118), and the parties’ respective replies (Dockets
# 129 and 134). After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, the defendants’ motion is
GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background
Sixty-one employees (collectively, Plaintiffs) of the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund
Corporation (SIFC) who were demoted from career managerial positions, filed this § 1983
action against the SIFC itself; the SIFC’s Administrator, Zoimé Alvarez-Rubio (Alvarez);
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 2
and the SIFC’s Director of Human Resources from January 8, 2009 to February 23, 2012
and employee of the SIFC since 1978, Saúl Rivera-Rivera (Rivera) (collectively,
Defendants), alleging violations under the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause,
and the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as under the Constitution and laws
of Puerto Rico. Dockets # 51 & 111-1, ¶ 4. After considering a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants, in 2011, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims under the Due
Process and Contract Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See Docket # 80.1 Therefore, the
only surviving federal claim is Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim.2
Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate “that they belong to a class that has been unequally treated, and that
[Defendants] intentionally devised and executed a scheme to affect only employees
[affiliated to the Popular Democratic Party].” Docket # 111, p. 2. After reviewing the filings,
the Court states below the relevant uncontested facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
In January 2009, after the Puerto Rico general elections, the New Progressive Party
(NPP) took control of the Commonwealth’s government and the newly elected governor
appointed co-defendant Alvarez as the SIFC’s Administrator. Statement of Uncontested
Facts (SUF), Docket # 111-1, ¶ 2. She started in her position on January 2, 2009. Id. ¶ 2.
During 2009, Alvarez ordered Rivera to review all SIFC’s personnel records and all
personnel transactions carried out between 2001 and 2008, to ensure that all human
resources regulations and procedures were followed during that period. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5 & 240.
1
See Joubert-Vázquez v. Alvarez-Rubio, 820 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.P.R. 2011).
For related cases see: Aponte-Ramos v. Alvarez-Rubio, No. 10-2191; Diaz-Vázquez v. AlvarezRubio, No. 11-1405, 2013 WL 6281455, at *9 (D.P.R. Oct. 22, 2013); Franco-Figueroa v. State
Insurance Fund, No. 11-1025, 2013 WL 4434252 (D.P.R. Aug. 14, 213).
2
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 3
This was part of Alvarez’s organizational administrative work plan and a decision made by
the then governmental administration. Id. ¶¶ 240 & 242. The personnel actions encompassed
within said time-period were audited, and the investigation revealed that 232 appointments
were made through internal-job postings or closed-job announcements. Id. ¶ 246; Audit
Report –Human Resources Actions– of the SIFC, dated October 28, 2009 (Audit Report), p.
2. The Audit Report showed that the appointments were made in violation of the SIFC’s
Personnel Regulation (SIFC’s Regulation) and the merit principle, because the officers in
charge of the recruiting process at that time had to publicly announce the positions. SUF ¶
256.
The Human Resources Department then proceeded to notify all of the affected
employees, including Plaintiffs, of the Administrators’ intent to nullify their appointments.
Id. ¶ 249. Among the annulled transactions, was Rivera’s own appointment to the career
position of Officer of Personnel Affairs II in the Payroll Office. Id. ¶ 250. Plaintiffs received
a letter notifying them of the Administrator’s intent to annul their appointments because
they were all done through a proscribed “internal job posting.” Id. ¶¶ 7-238. The letter
further stated that since they previously held a career position, they had the right to be
reinstated to their previous position, and that they had the right to request an administrative
hearing to contest the decision. Id.
All Plaintiffs requested an administrative hearing, but the Official Examiners
recommended the annulment of Plaintiffs’ appointments. Id.; see also SUF ¶ 239. Alvarez
adopted
the
Official
Examiners’
decisions
and
ordered
the
annulment
of
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 4
Plaintiffs’appointments, as recommended in the Audit Report dated October 28, 2009. Id. ¶
249. This suit followed.
Standard of Review
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the “movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kelley v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 707
F.3d 108, 155 (1st Cir. 2013). At this stage, it is axiomatic that courts “may not weigh the
evidence,” Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.
1994), but must construe the record in the “light most flattering” to the nonmovant. SotoPadro v. Public Bldgs. Authority, 675 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). Courts must similarly resolve
all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Id.
Because the summary judgment inquiry is grounded in the factual evidence
available, one of its principal purposes “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The Court may
therefore consider “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(A).
Inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay evidence considered for the truth of the matter
asserted, is excluded at this stage. Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2011).
Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material
facts in dispute and that judgment is proper as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to “affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 5
authentic dispute.” Kenney v. Floyd, 700 F.3d 604, 608 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable factfinder “could resolve the point in
favor of the non-moving party.” Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A material fact, in turn, is one that may affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law. Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25
(1st Cir. 2008). The nonmovant may not rest on conclusory allegations and improbable
inferences. Shafmaster v. U.S., 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Neither “effusive rhetoric,” Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116
F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) nor “arguments woven from the gossamer strands of
speculation and surmise,” RTR Technologies, Inc. v. Helming, 707 F.3d 84, 93 (1st Cir.
2013), suffice to forestall the entry of summary judgment. So the nonmovant must “point to
competent evidence and specific facts to stave off summary judgment.” Tropigas de P.R.,
Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011). Failure
to shoulder this burden, “allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle.”
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir. 1996).
Applicable Law and Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall
… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § 1. “With reference to a governmental action, this language has been
interpreted to mean that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’” Pagán v.
Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). “Its protections extend to both legislative and executive
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 6
conduct.” Id. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is “‘to secure every person within
the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’”
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923).
Here, Plaintiffs expressly state that their “equal protection claim is one of selective
enforcement.” Docket # 118, p. 2-3. Plaintiffs do not contest whether their appointments
were made in violation of the SIFC’s Regulation and thus were correctly annulled. In fact,
they do not propound their selective enforcement claim in relation to other employees
appointed during the 2001-2008 period. They even admit that all personnel transactions
made at the SIFC in which career managerial employees were appointed through internal
job postings during this period, without exceptions, were declared null as a result of
Alvarez’s decision. SUF ¶ 259. They solely contend that this legal determination “was
selectively applied to them while similarly-situated employees appointed prior to the year
2001 and after the year 2008 were not subjected to the application of said legal principle.”
Docket # 118. Accordingly, the Court’s inquiry turns on whether or not Section 14.1 of the
SIFC’s Regulation and other applicable laws and regulations, were unequally applied to
Plaintiffs in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as compared to other similarly situated
employees appointed before 2001 and after 2008.3 Thus, for purposes of this opinion, the
3
Section 14.1 regulates the promotion policy for SIFC’s employees. Section 14.1 states the
following:
As a general rule, in order to strengthen the merit principle by recruiting the best
qualified individuals, positions shall be filled by means of open competition. Both
employees of the Corporation as well as candidates from outside the Corporation
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 7
Court will assume that Plaintiffs’ appointments were correctly annulled. See GonzálezSegarra v. Corporación del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 2013 T.S.P.R. 34 (certified
translation provided by the parties at Docket # 184) (concluding that the appointments made
via internal job postings were in violation of Section 14.1 and the merit principle).
A selective enforcement claim under the Equal Protection Clause depends on proof
that “(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2)
that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race,
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad
faith intent to injure a person.” Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1995)).
To meet the first prong of the equal protection analysis –whether the person,
compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated– a plaintiff must first
“‘identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly ‘in all relevant
aspects’ were treated differently, instances which have the capacity to demonstrate that
[plaintiffs] were ‘singled … out for unlawful oppression.’’” Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 910
(quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)). The
inquiry whether a plaintiff is “similarly situated” with others is fact intensive and
contextual: the test is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would
think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated. SBT Holdings, LLC v.
Town of Westminster, 547 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v.
may participate, depending on their qualifications. The Administrator may identify
the position classes that, due to their nature, require a certain taype of experience,
and in these cases the competition may be limited to employees and former
employees who have such experience in the Corporation.
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 8
Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage and Finance Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001));
Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at 910. The “relevant aspects” are those factual elements “which
determine whether reasoned analogy supports, or demands, a like result.” Barrington Cove,
246 F.3d at 8. Although the formula is not always susceptible to precise demarcation, the
case law makes clear that the burdens of production and persuasion must be shouldered by
the party asserting the equal protection violation. Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 250
(1st Cir. 2007) (citing Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8). “To carry the burden of proving
substantial similarity, ‘plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between
themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” Id. (quoting Clubside, Inc.
v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2nd Cir. 2006)). Exact correlation is not required, but there
must be sufficient proof on the relevant aspects of the comparison to warrant a reasonable
inference of substantial similarity. Id. (quoting Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2004)).
Employees appointed before 2001
Plaintiffs first identify a group of employees appointed to career positions prior to
2001 without open or closed job announcements. See Plaintiffs’ response to SUF (“RSUF”),
Docket # 118-1, ¶ 258. That is, without any announcements at all. In support of this
contention they submit Luis R. Ramos-Navarro’s statement under penalty of perjury, which
states that between the years 1995-1996, the former SIFC administrator appointed “a large
number of physicians to managerial career positions (now union positions) without any job
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
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announcements whatsoever.” Id.; Docket # 118-6, ¶ 11.4 They also submit four letters dated
between 1995 and 1996, stating that the SIFC’s administrator appointed four individuals to
temporary positions, and six letters dated between 1996 and 1997 informing six employees
–four out of those six are the same individuals who were appointed previously to temporary
positions– about a status change in their employment from temporary to regular.5 Docket #
135-1, p. 1-12. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument.
A careful review of the record shows that none of the individuals appointed prior to
2001 may be considered as similarly situated to Plaintiffs “in all relevant aspects.” And,
even if the court were to find that they were similarly situated, there is no evidence that they
were treated differently. Unlike Plaitiffs, “these employees either experienced a ‘status
change’ in their current position from temporary to permanent or were appointed to shortterm, temporary positions.” Diaz-Vázquez v. Alvarez-Rubio, No. 11-1405, 2013 WL
6281455, at *9 (D.P.R. Oct. 22, 2013). Plaintiffs were appointed to career managerial
positions from other career positions. Moreover, Plaintiffs were appointed through internal
job announcements, and the employees appointed prior to 2001 were appointed “without
any job announcements.” Id. Plaintiffs admit that, before 2003, the mechanism of internal
job postings for recruiting career managerial employees was never used at the SIFC. SUF ¶
257. According to the letters on record, the status change from temporary to regular was “in
4
Luis R. Ramos-Navarro, began working at the SIFC on July 16, 1992. He has held several
positions at the SIFC. At the moment of the filing of this motion for summary judgment, he was the
Chief of the Human Resources Classification and Compensation Division. Docket # 118-6, ¶ 2-4.
5
They also submit change report forms from the SIFC’s Human Resources Office noting status
changes from temporary to permanent positions. Most of the forms, however, pertain to the same
employees that were notified of their temporary appointment or status change by letter. The other
two change reports do not contain sufficient information for this court to consider as additional
evidence. See Docket # 135-1, p. 13-20.
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 10
response to the public policy of offering regular appointments to temporary employees in
entry level positions of fixed duration with permanent duties as applied in the case of
medical personnel and unionized employees.” Docket # 135-1. These appointments were
made between 1995 and 1997, that is, more than five years before Plaintiffs’ appointments.
(The first appointment was in September 2003.) More important, there is no information on
record about the legal and regulatory framework at that time. Cf. Cordi-Allen, 494 F.3d at
252 (stating, in the land-use context, that “in order to show that other parties were similarly
situated to them –[plaintiff] needed to adduce evidence sufficient to establish factual as well
as regulatory similarity”).
Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their burdens of production and persuasion. See
Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 250 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d
at 8). In light of the difference in the circumstances and timing surrounding the
appointments, any tenous common link between Plaintiffs’ appointments and those made
prior to 2001 is insufficient to demonstrate “the extremely high degree of similarity”
necessary to carry plaintiffs’ burden of showing that these individuals are similarly situated
to themselves. Diaz-Vázquez, 2013 WL 6281455, at *9; see also id. (stating that “courts
must be sensitive to the possibility that differential treatment –especially differential
treatment following a time lag– may indicate a change in policy rather than an intent to
discriminate”).
But even if the court were to find Plaintiffs similarly situated “in all relevant
aspects,” there is no evidence that they were treated differently. According to Plaintiffs,
“defendants’ applied their narrow view of the merit principle to plaintiffs’ appointments,
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 11
which featured competition among SIFC’s employees, yet did not apply the same legal rule
to appointments where there was no competition whatsoever.” Docket # 118, p. 6. Plaintiffs
posit that, in Defendants’ view, career status cannot be attained unless an open job
announcement is posted, or some administrative procedures are undertaken prior to the
issuance of closed job announcements, and that “they applied these principles solely to
appointments made during the PDP administrations between 2001-2008.” They further
argue that they need not establish that “defendants’ … approach to the merit principle is
legally incorrect, only that it was selectively applied to them while similarly-situated
employees appointed prior to the year 2001 and after the year 2008 were not subjected to the
application of said legal principle.” Docket # 118, p. 4-5. This argument also fails to
persuade.
Plaintiffs’ appointments were annulled because they were made in violation of
Section 14.1 of the SIFC’s Regulation, which states as follows:
As a general rule, in order to strengthen the merit principle by recruiting the
best qualified individuals, positions shall be filled by means of open
competition. Both employees of the Corporation as well as candidates from
outside the Corporation may participate, depending on their qualifications.
The Administrator may identify the position classes that, due to their nature,
require a certain type of experience, and in these cases the competition may be
limited to employees and former employees who have such experience in the
Corporation.6
6
The Public Service Human Resources Administration Act (Human Resources Act), P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 3, §§ 1461 et seq., excludes from its applicability employees of the SIFC. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
3, § 4161e. Moreover, the Compensation System for Work-Related Accidents Act, P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 11, §§ 1 et seq., which is the SIFC’s organic law, requires the Administrator to administer and
establish the SIFC’s own personnel system. It further provides that “the personnel system to be
established shall be based on the merit principle and shall conform to the rules and regulations
adopted to such effects by the Administrator.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 1b-4(g).
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 12
According to Defendants’ interpretation of Section 14.1 and other applicable provisions,
closed job announcements shall be used only when “the corresponding technical analysis
[is] done stating the grounds and justification of the appointing authority.” Audit Report,
Docket # 111-4, p. 9.
In González-Segarra, 2013 T.S.P.R. 34, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court determined
that, although the Administrator had discretion to authorize closed-job announcements for
an entire “class position” -not for individual positions- said discretion required a prior
analysis stating its grounds and justifications. Id. at 31-32. Since the Administrator had
provided neither a valid justification nor any analysis in limiting competition for plaintiffs’
appointments, and the eligibility requirements for the positions at issue did not require a
particular experience tied to the specific duties that would be carried out, the Supreme Court
determined that they were done in violation of Section 14.1 of the SIFC’s Regulation, and
ran counter to the merit principle. Id.7
Therefore, “Defendants’ view” is rather Defendants’ legal interpretation of, among
others, the SIFC’s Regulation. The SIFC’s Regulation was adopted in January 2000. There
is no information or evidence on record as to the regulations in force prior to this date and
applicable to those appointments made between 1995 and 1997. Because the merit principle
does not operate in a vacuum, Plaintiffs cannot shoulder their summary judgment burden of
showing that Defendants did not apply the same laws and regulations to the appointments
made prior to the adoption of the SIFC’s Regulation. Although at this stage, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, and all reasonable inferences must be
7
Only 20 out of the 232 employees whose appointments were annulled as a result of Alvarez’s audit
were parties to this case.
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 13
drawn in their favor, the nonmovants may not rest on “conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130 (1st
Cir. 2013). Therefore, even if they were indeed similarly situated and Defendants had
included the 1992-2000 period in their audit, there is no basis in the record for the Court to
determine that they were “singled … out for unlawful oppression.” See Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d
at 909-10.
Employees appointed after January 1, 2009
In an additional attempt to identify equivalent incidents and similar protagonists, see
id., Plaintiffs argue that after January 1, 2009, closed-job announcements were used for
union personnel. RSUF ¶ 258. Under penalty of perjury, Ramos-Navarro states that “[w]hile
the SIFC discontinued the use of closed-job announcements for managerial personnel after
the year 2009, it has appointed many career union employees through closed job
announcement [which for union employees are identified as “promotion job
announcements”] during that same period.” Docket # 118-6, ¶ 12. However, as Defendants
correctly point out, according to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), all promotions
for unionized positions are made through closed-job announcements. Docket # 129, p. 7-8.
So it still remains uncontested that, except for union employees, closed job postings have
not been used after January 1, 2009 for recruiting career managerial employees. SUF ¶ 258
and RSUF ¶ 258.
This distinction is crucial. Job postings for SIFC’s union employees are regulated by
the CBA. See Docket # 137-6. The CBA provides that “entry level job postings will be those
where there will be free competition for the entire public, including employees of the
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 14
[SIFC].” Id. at 6. Nevertheless, it makes clear that “[j]ob postings for promotions will be
solely for the employees comprised within the appropriate unit.” Id.
Through collective bargaining, Puerto Rico unionized employees may obtain more
and better benefits than the minimum benefits provided by the applicable laws. See e.g.
J.R.T. v. Vigilantes, 125 P.R. Dec. 581, 592 (1990) (P.R. Offic. Trans.); DACo v. AFSCME,
185 D.P.R. 1, 39 (2012). Excluding promotions from the regular process of open-job
announcements may be considered one of those benefits. Clearly, unionized employees who
were promoted through closed-job announcements in accordance with the CBA may not be
compared with non-unionized employees whose appointments were allegedly made in
violation of the SIFC’s laws and regulations. Once again, Plaintiffs fail to identify a group
similarly situated to them. See Diaz-Vázquez v. Alvarez-Rubio, 2013 WL 6281455, at *9.
Therefore, viewing the facts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of
Plaintiffs, there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude the Court from granting
this motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Supplemental jurisdiction claims
Finally, Defendants argue that, absent any federal claims, this court should refrain
from entertaining Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Docket # 111, p. 23. Plaintiffs have provided
no argument against this contention. Docket # 118, p. 8.
Recently, in Redondo Const. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2011), the
First Circuit recapitulated the well settled rule that “[i]f the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, . . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” Id. (quoting United Mine
Civil No. 11-1087 / 11-1194 (SEC)
Page 15
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, (1966)). It reminded, however, that such general
principle is no “mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases[,]” id. (citation omitted),
punctuating that “[d]istrict court[s] must exercise ‘informed discretion’ when deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.” Id. (quoting Roche v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-57 (1st Cir. 1996)). Such a
determination implicates a weighing of several factors: to wit, comity, judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness. Id. (citations omitted). Having evaluated the foregoing factors,
and because Plaintiffs have failed to oppose Defendants’ request, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims in this case. Comity will be
served by permitting the Commonwealth courts to resolve such issues of local concern.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ remaining federal claim is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice,
and their state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14th of March, 2014.
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