Alvarado-Jimenez et al v. Arcos Dorados de Puerto Rico Inc. et al

Filing 93

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 84 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Defendants. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 1/30/2013.(mrj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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MELISSA ALVARADO TORRES, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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Civil No. 11-1214 (JAF)

ARCOS DORADOS DE P.R. INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER

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Before the court is a motion by Defendants seeking costs and attorneys’ fees as

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prevailing parties in a case brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; the Americans

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with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the Age Discrimination in

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Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket

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No. 84.) Each of these statutes provides that a prevailing party may recover attorneys’ fees

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and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1988.

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attorney’s fees by prevailing plaintiffs, the statutes empower courts to grant fee requests by

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whichever party prevails.” Tang v. State of R.I. Dept. of Elderly, 163 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.

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1988).

(Docket No. 84.)

“Although courts are most often faced with motions for

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I.

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Background

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In this case, Plaintiffs filed a complaint on February 25, 2011, alleging a number of

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federal and Puerto Rico law claims. (Docket No. 1.) On May 4, 2011, Defendants filed a

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motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 11.) Plaintiffs requested two extensions of the time allowed

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to oppose the motion to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 21; 25.) On June 8, 2011, Plaintiffs then

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filed a “motion to withdraw voluntarily without prejudice certain of the claims,” including

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their claims under the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq.; Title VII; and their

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individual liability claims against two codefendants under the ADA and ADEA. (Docket

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No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiffs also filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss as to their

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remaining claims. (Docket No. 30.) Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw

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claims without prejudice. (Docket No. 32.) Defendants argued that these claims Plaintiffs

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sought to withdraw were baseless and should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)

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We initially granted Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their claims voluntarily without

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prejudice.

(Docket No. 66.)

Defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration,

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reincorporating their arguments that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

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(Docket No. 69.) Persuaded by Defendants’ arguments, we granted Defendants’ motion and

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converted our final judgment to a dismissal with prejudice. (Docket Nos. 71; 72.) Plaintiffs

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filed a motion for reconsideration, which we denied. (Docket Nos. 74; 76.) Plaintiffs then

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appealed our decision. (Docket No. 77.) The Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal

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as untimely. (Docket No. 82.)

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II.

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Analysis

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Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees for the time they spent

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responding to Plaintiffs’ frivolous claims. (Docket No. 84.) Specifically, Defendants argue

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that Plaintiffs’ § 1983, Title VII, and their individual liability claims under the ADA and

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ADEA were “unreasonable, frivolous, groundless, and should have never been brought by

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Plaintiffs in the first place. (Docket No. 84 at 2.) Defendants do not ask to be reimbursed

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for the time they spent responding to Plaintiffs’ non-frivolous claims. See Fox v. Vice, 131

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S.Ct. 2205 (2011) (holding that prevailing parties may only recover fees for time spent

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responding to frivolous claims). Defendants do not ask to be reimbursed for Plaintiffs’

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remaining claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Puerto Rico employment laws, ADA, and

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ADEA claims against the employer, or under the federal and Puerto Rico constitutions.

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(Docket Nos. 1; 84.) For the reasons explained below, we deny Defendants’ motion.

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“While decisions to grant defendants fees are and should be, rare, ‘a district court

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may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant ... upon a finding that

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the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not

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brought in subjective bad faith.’” Tang v. State of R.I. Dept. of Elderly, 163 F.3d 7, 13 (1st

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Cir. 1988) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). While

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we think that some of Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous, these frivolous claims made up a

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very small portion of the case. Under the Supreme Court’s rule in Fox, defendants can be

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reimbursed “only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous

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claim.” 131 S.Ct. at 2215.

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We agree that Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII and § 1983 were frivolous. Title VII

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“makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

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discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

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privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

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origin.’” Morales-Cruz v. University of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)

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(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). Plaintiffs did not even allege which of these protected

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classes was grounding their claim.

The complaint mentions age and disability

Civil No. 11-1214 (JAF)

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discrimination, but nothing about any of the classes protected under Title VII. (Docket

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No. 1.) Moreover, it is well established that there is no individual liability under Title VII.

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Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d at 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that “there is no

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individual employee liability under Title VII.”). We agree with Defendants that it was

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frivolous for Plaintiffs to file their Title VII claim despite these obvious shortcomings.

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Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was frivolous. Again, we agree.

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“To make out a viable section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show both that the conduct

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complained of transpired under color of state law and that a deprivation of federally secured

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rights ensued.” Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Redondo-

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Borges v. U.S. Dep’t of HUD, 421 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)). We have seen no plausible

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suggestion that these Defendants’ conduct satisfied the “under color of state law”

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requirement. Therefore, we find Plaintiffs’ claim under 1983 was frivolous.

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Defendants’ arguments under the ADA and ADEA are less compelling. Defendants

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have cited only to district court cases for the proposition that there is no individual liability

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under either of these statutes. (Docket No. 84 at 4.) These cases persuasively reason why

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there is no individual liability under the ADA or ADEA. See Mercado v. Cooperativa de

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Seguros de Vida de Puerto Rico, 726 F.Supp.2d 96, 101 (D.P.R. 2010) (finding no

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individual liability under ADEA); Reyes-Ortiz v. McConnell Valdes, 714 F.Supp.2d 234,

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238 (D.P.R. 2010) (finding no individual liability under ADEA or ADA). Still, to our

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knowledge, this is still an “open question in the First Circuit.” Reyes-Ortiz, 714 F.Supp.2d

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at 238. We think that until the Court of Appeals provides an authoritative construction of

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the statute, it is premature to say that all arguments for individual liability under the statutes

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are frivolous.

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We must then decide whether to award fees for Defendants’ work responding to

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Plaintiffs’ frivolous claims. Under Fox, when a defendant prevails in a suit involving both

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frivolous and non-frivolous claims, he may be reimbursed “only the portion of his fees that

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he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim.” 131 S.Ct. at 2215. As the Supreme

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Court acknowledged, this can present difficult separability issues. Id. Some of the time

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attorneys spend defending against frivolous claims will also serve to defend against non-

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frivolous claims.

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timesheets that describe the time they spent performing various tasks, but it is nearly

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impossible to tell how much of this time was devoted exclusively to Plaintiffs’ frivolous

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claims under Title VII and § 1983. (See Docket No. 84-4.) To take one example, Plaintiffs

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ask to be reimbursed for time spent preparing their opposition to Plaintiffs’ “motion to

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withdraw without prejudice.” (Docket No. 84-4 at 2.) But the vast majority of the time they

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spent preparing this opposition would have addressed not only Plaintiffs’ frivolous Title VII

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and 1983 claims, but also their ADA, ADEA, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act claims, which

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Defendants do not argue were frivolous. (See Docket No. 32.)

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Id.

That appears to be the case here.

Defendants have submitted

The determination of fees “should not result in a second major litigation.” Fox, 131

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S.Ct. at 2216 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

We must

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remember that the “essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to achieve rough justice,

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not achieve auditing perfection.” Id. Therefore, we make a rough estimate of what portion

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of these fees Defendants would not have paid but for the frivolous litigation. Id. Here, we

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think the percentage is very small. The vast majority of the work in this case was to respond

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to Plaintiffs’ non-frivolous claims of age and disability discrimination. We can find no

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entry on the timesheet that describes work that was necessary only because of Plaintiffs’

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frivolous claims. We also think that it would have taken very little time for Defendants to

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respond to Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII and 1983. A brief search on a legal database

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and a couple pages of text would have been sufficient to respond to these groundless claims.

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See Efron v. Mora Development Corp., 675 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding fee award

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not justified where only minimal work was required to respond to frivolous claims).

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Therefore, we hereby DENY Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 30th day of January, 2013.

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s/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
United States District Judge