Quiles-Santiago et al v. Rodriguez-Diaz et al
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER re 9 Motion to Dismiss. The Court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss the case on Eleventh Amendment grounds but GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs 39; federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and their Commonwealth law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 04/02/2012. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ADALBERTO
al.,
QUILES-SANTIAGO,
et
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARMEN
al.,
G.
CIVIL NO. 11-1269 (FAB)
RODRIGUEZ-DIAZ,
et
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendants Carmen G. Rodriguez-Diaz’s
(“Rodriguez-Diaz”), Cesar E. Caminero-Ramos’ (“Caminero-Ramos”),
Hector
R.
Malave-Rodriguez’s
(“Malave-Rodriguez”),
and
Pedro
Vazquez- Montañez’s (“Vazquez-Montañez”) motion to dismiss the case
on Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity grounds, and for
failure to state a claim.
(Docket No. 9.)
For the reasons set
forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds but GRANTED for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
DISCUSSION
I.
Procedural Background
On
March
16,
(“Quiles-Santiago”)
2011,
and
plaintiffs
Santos
Adalberto
Quiles-Santiago
Calixto-Rodriguez
(“Calixto-
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
2
Rodriguez”) filed a complaint alleging political discrimination
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”).
constitutional
violations
associated
with
They allege three
their
employment:
political discrimination pursuant to the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, deprivation of a property interest
without due process of law pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the denial of equal protection pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment.
(See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 80.)
They are
suing defendants in their individual capacities for damages.
Docket No. 1 at ¶ 81.)
(See
They are also requesting injunctive relief
against defendants to order the “reinstatement of their respective
career positions” and to prohibit the defendants from political
discrimination.
Id.
Calixto-Rodriguez,
partnerships
In addition, plaintiffs Quiles-Santiago,
and
assert
in
their
respective
spouses
the
complaint
that
and
the
conjugal
Court
has
supplemental jurisdiction over their Commonwealth law claims.1
On
August
29,
2011,
defendants
Rodriguez-Diaz,
Malave-
Rodriguez, and Vazquez-Montañez filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”).
1
On
Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to “Sections 1, 4, 6, and 7 of
Article II of the Constitution of Puerto Rico and the Public
Service Personnel laws of Puerto Rico: Law No. 131 of May 13,
1943, P.R. Laws Ann., Tit. 1, Sections 13-19; and Articles 1802
and 1803 of the Civil Code, Sections 5141-5142 of Title 31.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 85.)
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
3
September 19, 2011, all plaintiffs filed a response in opposition
to
defendants’
motion
to
dismiss.2
(Docket
No.
9.)
On
November 18, 2011, defendant Caminero-Ramos filed a motion to join
in defendants’ motion to dismiss.
date,
the
Court
granted
(Docket No. 17.)
defendant
Caminero-Ramos’
On the same
motion
for
joinder.
II.
Factual Background
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege the following facts:
Plaintiffs Quiles-Santiago and Calixto-Rodriguez are employees
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Fire Department (“the Fire
Department”).
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 1.)
They both hold the rank of
“Captain” and are members of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”).
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 1.)
2
Both plaintiffs were appointed to their
Plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss is
twenty-five pages in length. (See Docket No. 13.) Local Rule 7(d)
provides in relevant part that “non-dispositive motions and
memoranda or oppositions to those motions [to dismiss] shall not
exceed fifteen (15) pages in length.” Defendants failed to argue
that plaintiffs violated the local rules in their submission,
however, and thus waive this objection. Therefore, the Court will
consider plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss,
(Docket No. 13), in its entirety.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
4
trust positions3 during the PDP administration.
at ¶¶ 16 and 49.)
(Docket No. 1
Plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez returned to his
career position4 when the NPP administration took over the Fire
Department.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 51.)
Defendant Rodriguez-Diaz is the Chief of the Fire Department.
(Docket
No.
1
at
¶
10.)
Defendant
Vazquez-Montañez
Assistant Chief of Extinguishing at the Fire Department.
is
the
(Docket
No. 1 at ¶ 11.) Defendant Malave-Rodriguez is the Interim Director
of Human Resources of the Fire Department. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12.)
Defendant Cesar Caminero-Ramos is a Commander and the Zone Chief
for the Ponce District of the Fire Department.
¶ 13.)
(Docket No. 1 at
All of the defendants are members of the New Progressive
Party (“NPP”).
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 10-13.)
3
Employees who are in trust positions are “freely subject to
removal from [their] position[s] and, therefore, ha[ve] no claim
for adverse employment or violation of First Amendment rights to
free speech.” Maymi v. P.R. Ports Authority, 515 F.3d 20, 26-27
(1st Cir. 2008). Career employees, which are “government employees
who do not occupy a policy-making position of confidence and
trust,” however, are “protected from adverse employment decisions
based on political affiliation.” Id. at 28. (internal citation
omitted).
4
The complaint only states that plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez
returned to his career position. It fails to plead that plaintiff
Quiles-Santiago returned to a career position. The Court, however,
will read the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
and assume that he is currently in a career position.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
A.
5
Facts Relating to Plaintiff Quiles-Santiago
On January 13, 2010, defendant Caminero-Ramos created a
position called
in
Spanish
the
“Sub-Director”5
for
the
Ponce
Special Operations area and appointed an NPP supporter, Lieutenant
Roberto Irizarry-Rodriguez (“Irizarry-Rodriguez”) to assume this
position.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-29.)
before this date.
Id.
This position did not exist
On the same date, defendant Caminero-Ramos
implemented a work schedule for plaintiff Quiles-Santiago, who was
the Director of the Ponce Special Operations area at the time.
Id.
This action was “unprecedented” for someone of Quiles-Santiago’s
level in the Fire Department.
Id.
On March 17, 2010, defendant Caminero-Ramos started a
series of actions “to persecute, discriminate, marginalize and
remove the duties of Quiles-Santiago because of his political
affiliation to the PDP.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 30.)
Quiles-Santiago
spoke with defendant Vazquez-Montañez about how his conditions were
“substantially inferior to the norm, unreasonable and unnecessary.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 32.)
Defendant Vazquez-Montañez replied “you
should stay calm because you could lose your position.”
Id.
Quiles-Santiago asked him for “one reason that was not political”
and defendant Vazquez-Montañez did not respond.
5
In English the title would be Deputy Director.
Id.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
6
Examples of discriminatory actions taken by defendant
Caminero-Ramos include his requesting the key to the firefighter’s
dormitory, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 31), his ignoring a letter that
Quiles-Santiago sent regarding situations of insubordination by
Lieutenant Irizarry-Rodriguez, (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 33-34), and his
approving a change in schedule without consulting Quiles-Santiago,
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 36).
Defendant Caminero-Ramos, along with
defendant Rodriguez-Diaz, ignored Quiles-Santiago’s request to meet
about
his
letter
concerning
Lieutenant
Irizarry-Rodriguez’s
insubordination. Both defendants Caminero-Ramos and Rodriguez-Diaz
assigned Quiles-Santiago to cover the vacations of other employees
during
the
summer
Furthermore,
the
of
Fire
2010.
(Docket
Department
took
No.
1
away
at
¶¶
40,
42.)
Quiles-Santiago’s
assigned official vehicle; he is the only Director of Special
Operations that does not have an official vehicle assigned to him.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 45.)
On June 25, 2010, Quiles-Santiago was “stripped from his
position and differential,” and Lieutenant Irizarry-Rodriguez was
given the position instead.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 37.)
On July 12,
2010, Quiles-Santiago requested a copy of his transfer letter and
defendant
Malave-Rodriguez,
the
Interim
Director
of
Human
Resources, responded via telephone and said that the document does
not exist.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 43.)
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
B.
7
Facts Relating to Plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez
On June 25, 2010, defendant Rodriguez-Diaz transferred
plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez without allowing him to appeal the
decision.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 53-54.)
Defendant Caminero-Ramos
sent training schedules directly to the secretary and did not send
them to plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez even though protocol required
him to do so.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.)
Defendant Caminero-Ramos
also assigned some of plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez’s tasks to other
people.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.)
Calixto-Rodriguez
was
assigned
In the fall of 2010, plaintiff
to
cover
the
employees workers while they were on vacation.
¶ 62.)
shifts
of
other
(Docket No. 1 at
Furthermore, “all communications that should be generated”
by plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez are now prepared by a different
commander.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 68.)
III. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) allows the Court to dismiss a complaint when it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When
considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a “court must view the
facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom . . .” R.G.
Fin. Corp. v. Vergara–Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).
“[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants
and state a facially plausible legal claim.”
Ocasio–Hernandez v.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
8
Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
When faced with a
motion to dismiss, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed
perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements
of the cause of action.”
S.Ct.
1937,
1950
Id. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
(2009)).
Any
“[n]on-conclusory
factual
allegations [sic] in the complaint [,however,] must . . . be
treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.”
Iqbal, 129
S.Ct.
at 1951).
Where
those
Id.
factual
(citing
allegations
“‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has
facial plausibility.”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
Furthermore, a court may not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s
likelihood of success on the merits; ‘a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if . . . a recovery is very remote and unlikely’.
Id. at 13 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)).
The
relevant
inquiry,
therefore,
“focuses
on
the
reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is
asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.”
Id. at 13.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court will base its determination
solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint or
central to it. Fudge v. Penthouse Int’l. Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015
(1st Cir. 1988).
Generally, “a court may not consider documents
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
9
that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated
therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary
judgment.” Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).
“When . . . a complaint’s
factual allegations are expressly linked to - and admittedly
dependent upon - a document (the authenticity of which is not
challenged), [however,] that document effectively merges into the
pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust
Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
This is especially true where the plaintiff has “actual notice
.
.
.
and
complaint.”
IV.
has
relied
upon
these
documents
in
framing
the
Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).
Legal Analysis
In
their
motion
to
dismiss,
defendants
argue
(1)
that
plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to section 1983 because they fail to state a prima facie
case of political discrimination pursuant to the First Amendment;
(2) that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment;
(3) that plaintiffs fail to state a claim pursuant to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment; (4) that plaintiffs fail to
state a claim pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; (5) that in the alternative, defendants are entitled to
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
qualified
immunity;
10
and
(6)
that
plaintiffs’
jurisdiction claims should be dismissed.
supplemental
(See Docket No. 9.)
The
Court will first address defendants’ Eleventh Amendment argument.
Then
the
Court
will
discuss
defendants’
arguments
regarding
plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim and the corresponding constitutional
claims.
Finally, the Court will address defendants’ arguments
regarding qualified immunity and supplemental jurisdiction.
A.
The Eleventh Amendment
Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims against them
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.6
Plaintiffs respond that
while the Eleventh Amendment bars suits “against a State that
require
disbursements
from
the
State’s
purse,”
the
Eleventh
Amendment does not bar section 1983 actions against state officials
sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.
(Docket No. 13 at p. 4.)
The Eleventh Amendment, they argue, also
does not bar actions against state officials sued in their personal
capacity for damages.
Id.
The Court agrees with the plaintiffs
and finds defendants’ arguments unpersuasive.
It is well-settled
law that section 1983 suits against state officials in their
6
The Eleventh Amendment to the United State Constitution provides
that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S.
Const. amend. XI.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
11
personal and official capacities, as is this case, may proceed as
long as plaintiffs do not seek a reward from the payment of state
funds.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
bar this section 1983 action.
The Eleventh Amendment does not
Therefore, because defendants were
not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court
DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss the case on these grounds.
B.
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Action
Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983, allows
“a private right of action for violations of federally protected
rights.”
2007).
Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 does not
confer substantive rights, “but provides a venue for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred.”
Marrero-Saez v. Municipality
of Aibonito, 668 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Graham
v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)).
In order to state a
claim pursuant to section 1983, plaintiffs must plausibly plead
(1) that they were deprived of a constitutional right; (2) that a
“causal connection exists between [defendants’ conduct] and the
[constitutional deprivation]; and (3) that the challenged conduct
was attributable to a person acting under color of state law.”
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
1.
Political Discrimination Under the First Amendment
The
Constitution
12
Amendment7
First
embodies
the
right
to
be
to
the
free
United
from
States
political
discrimination. Barry v. Moran, 661 F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 2011).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the right to be
free from political discrimination prohibits government officials
from “taking adverse action against public employees on the basis
of
political
affiliation,
unless
political
appropriate requirement of the employment.”
loyalty
is
an
Ocasio-Hernandez v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
A prima facie case of political discrimination based on
the First Amendment consists of four elements:
plaintiff
and defendant
have
opposing
“(1) that the
political affiliations,
(2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff’s affiliation,
(3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for
the adverse employment action.”
Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz Velez, 630
F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010).
Moreover, each defendant’s role
must be sufficiently alleged to make him or her a plausible
defendant.
7
Ocasio-Hernandez,
at
16.
The
Court
finds
that
The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or
the right of the people to peaceably assemble.” U.S. Const. amend.
I.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
13
plaintiffs have failed to state a prima facie case of political
discrimination because they have not adequately pled facts to show
that defendants themselves had knowledge of their [the plaintiffs’]
political
affiliation
or
that
political
affiliation
was
a
substantial or motivating factor for the alleged adverse employment
actions.
a.
Opposing Political Affiliations
The complaint contains straightforward factual
allegations with respect to element one. The plaintiffs state that
they are active supporters of the PDP and that defendants are
members of the NPP.
(See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 10-13, 17, 20.)
When
the Court takes these factual allegations as true, the plaintiffs
have pleaded adequate factual material to support a reasonable
inference
that
the
plaintiffs
and
defendants
have
opposing
political affiliations.
b.
Defendants’
Affiliation
Knowledge
of
Plaintiffs’
Defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to
plead facts to show adequately that the defendants had knowledge of
the plaintiffs’ political affiliation.
Defendants argue that the
complaint is insufficient because plaintiffs merely allege that
defendants knew about plaintiffs’ PDP affiliation.
at p. 9.)
(Docket No. 9
The complaint, defendants argue, “does not contain any
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
14
other allegations [sic] regarding the defendants’ knowledge of
plaintiffs’ political affiliation.”
defendants.
defendants’
Id.
The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs aver only the following with regard to
knowledge
of
their
political
affiliation:
that
plaintiffs were appointed positions during PDP administrations,
that plaintiffs were active supporters of the PDP, and that these
facts are “well known within the Fire Department, and specifically
the defendants.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17, 50-51.)
Plaintiffs
state no other facts regarding how defendants Rodriguez-Diaz,
Caminero-Ramos, and Malave-Rodriguez themselves had knowledge of
their political affiliation.
According to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, a plaintiff must plead “discrete factual events” to
show that defendants were aware of plaintiffs’ political beliefs.
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14-15.
The Ocasio-Hernandez Court
stated that it was sufficient for those plaintiffs to allege
(1) that they were asked by defendants about the circumstances
relating to how they obtained their jobs at the Governor’s mansion;
(2) that the clerical staff directly asked about the plaintiffs’
political affiliations; and (3) that employees knew about and
frequently
workers.
allege
discussed
Id. at 15.
any
defendants’
such
the
political
affiliations
of
their
co-
The plaintiffs in this case, however, do not
“discrete
knowledge
of
the
factual
events”
plaintiffs’
regarding
political
these
leanings.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
15
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14-15.
these
defendants
questioned
Plaintiffs never aver that
plaintiffs
about
their
political
affiliations or that the political affiliation of employees was
shared
or
discussed.
Acevedo-Concepcion
v.
Irizarry-Mendez,
No. 09-2133 (JAG), 2011 WL 6934791, at *3 (D. Puerto Rico, Dec. 29,
2011) (citing Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595
(1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In any case,
we are not required to ‘conjure up unpled allegations’ to support
Plaintiffs’ deficient complaint.’”
Acevedo-Concepcion, 2011 WL
6934791, at *3 (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514
(1st
Cir.
1988)).
Therefore,
even
taking
into
account
the
“cumulative effect of the factual allegations,” plaintiffs fail to
plead plausibly that defendants Rodriguez-Diaz, Caminero-Ramos, and
Malave-Rodriguez had knowledge of their political affiliation.
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 15.
With
plaintiff
Quiles-Santiago
regard
does
to
the
state
remaining
that
he
told
defendant,
defendant
Vazquez-Montañez about how his working conditions were allegedly
“inferior to the norm, unreasonable and unnecessary and that it was
causing him personal family problems.”
(See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 32.)
Defendant Vazquez-Montañez allegedly told him to “stay calm because
[he] could lose [his] position.”
Id.
Quiles-Santiago allegedly
requested that defendant Vazquez-Montañez “give him just one reason
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
16
that was not political” and Vazquez-Montañez allegedly “had no
response.” Id. It is unclear whether this sole alleged discussion
is
sufficient
to
prove
that
defendant
Vazquez-Montañez
had
knowledge of plaintiff Quiles-Santiago’s political affiliation.
Plaintiff Quiles-Santiago does not plead when and where this
exchange occurred.
Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, however,
that degree of specificity is not required.
F.3d at 14-15.
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640
The complaint must provide defendants with only
enough detail such that defendants have “fair notice of what . . .
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Id. at 15
(internal citations omitted). The Court need only be able to “draw
the reasonable
inference”
that
defendant
Vazquez-Montañez
had
knowledge of plaintiff Quiles-Santiago’s political affiliation.
Reading this fact in a “light most favorable to the nonmovant and
draw[ing] all reasonable inferences therefrom,” the Court finds
that plaintiff plausibly pleads sufficient facts to show that
defendant
Santiago’s
Vazquez-Montañez had
political
knowledge of
affiliation.8
R.G.
plaintiff
Fin.
Quiles-
Corp.
v.
Vergara–Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).
8
The Court still finds, however, that plaintiffs fail to allege
facts sufficient plausibly to plead elements three and four of a
First Amendment political discrimination claim with respect to
defendant Vazquez-Montañez.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
c.
17
Adverse Employment Action
Defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to
plead adequately sufficient detail that they have suffered an
adverse employment action.
(Docket No. 9 at p. 8.)
For a First
Amendment claim filed pursuant to section 1983, a plaintiff “need
not suffer an ‘adverse employment action’ as that term ordinarily
is used in the employment discrimination context.”
Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 29 (1st Cir. 2011).
Barton v.
This term was first used
in the Title VII context to describe the statutory requirement that
a plaintiff must show:
an alteration in the material terms or
conditions of his or her employment.
Id. (citing Bergeron v.
Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2009)).
No similar requirement
exists for a First Amendment claim filed pursuant to section 1983.
Id.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has said that an adverse
employment action inquiry in the First Amendment context “‘focuses
on
whether
an
employer’s
acts,
viewed
objectively,
substantial pressure on the employee’s political views.’”
place
Barton,
632 F.3d at 29 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).
The
Barton Court said that “more generally, [the inquiry focuses] on
whether the defendants’ acts would have a chilling effect on the
employee’s exercise of First Amendment rights.”
Id.
Therefore,
the “standard for showing an adverse employment action is lower in
the First
Amendment
retaliation
context
than
it
is
in other
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
18
contexts (such as Title VII).”
Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362
F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2004).
For
First
Amendment
purposes,
an
adverse
employment action occurs “if those actions, objectively evaluated,
would place substantial pressure on even one of thick skin to
conform to the prevailing political view.”
Rodriguez-Garcia v.
Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
Generally, discharging or demoting an employee, denying
promotions and transfers, and failing to recall a public employee
after layoffs constitute adverse employment actions.
Id.
A
“substantial alteration in an employee’s job responsibilities” may
also constitute an adverse employment action.
at 8 (internal citation omitted).
Bergeron, 560 F.3d
A denial of “special benefits
and assignments” that normally come with a job may also suffice.
Id.
A court may also find an adverse employment action when the
plaintiff
is
confronted
with
“a
work
situation
unreasonably
inferior to the norm for the position.” Rodriguez-Garcia, 610 F.3d
at
766
(internal
citations
and
punctuation
omitted).
Even
“informal harassment, as opposed to formal employment actions . . .
can be the basis for the [F]irst [A]mendment claims if the motive
was
political
discrimination;
but
this
is
so
only
if
the
discriminatory acts are ‘sufficiently severe to cause reasonably
hardy
individuals
to
compromise
their
political
beliefs
and
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
19
associations in favor of the prevailing party.’”
Welch v. Ciampa,
542 F.3d 927, 937 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Carrasquillo-Gonzalez v. Sagardia-de
Jesus, 723 F.Supp.2d 428, 435 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting Agosto-de
Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1809, 1219 (1st Cir. 1989)
(discussing how courts consider “additional factors such as ‘lost
access to telephone and photocopier, poorer office accoutrements,
worse hours’” when determining whether an adverse action occurred).
1.
Defendants Rodriguez-Diaz and Commander
Caminero-Ramos
Both
plaintiffs
Quiles-Santiago
and
Calixto-Rodriguez have alleged sufficient facts to plead plausibly
that they have been subjected to adverse employment actions by
defendants Rodriguez-Diaz and Caminero-Ramos.
Plaintiff Quiles-
Santiago and Calixto-Rodriguez plausibly described that as a result
of defendant Rodriguez-Diaz and Caminero-Ramos’ actions, (1) they
were treated differently from others who held the same rank; and
(2)
they
had
their
job
duties
changed
and/or
curtailed.
Additionally, plaintiff Quiles-Santiago plausibly pleads that he
was (3) denied benefits that come with the normal course of the
job.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
20
First,
both
plaintiffs
allege
that
defendant Rodriguez-Diaz “reassigned” them to “cover vacations9 of
individuals at great distances from their homes, despite there
being individuals of the same rank to cover such absences in
staff.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 21, 61-62.)
Specifically, plaintiff
Quiles-Santiago describes two incidents during the summer of 2010
where he was sent to cover the vacations of officers in a different
district and contends that such coverage generally comes from
within the same district.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 41-43.)
Plaintiff
Calixto-Rodriguez alleges that defendant Rodriguez-Diaz suddenly
transferred him on June 25, 2010 without “any right of appeal.”
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 53-54.)
Furthermore, plaintiff Calixto-
Rodriguez also alleges that he was sent to the Caguas area to cover
another officer’s vacations during the fall of 2010. (Docket No. 1
at ¶ 62.)
Second, both plaintiffs also contend that
their supervisory duties have been “curtailed, circumvented and/or
eliminated all together.”
Quiles-Santiago
alleges
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 21.)
that
on
April
20,
2010,
Plaintiff
he
consulted about a change in schedule, “as was required.”
No. 1 at ¶ 36.)
9
was
not
(Docket
On that same date, Quiles-Santiago contends that
Plaintiffs sometimes characterize these
transfers. (See Docket 1 at ¶¶ 43, 72.)
reassignments
as
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
21
he was not “notified of decisions” and that on June 25, 2010, he
was “officially stripped from his position and differential, both
of which was given to a lower ranking official.”10
at ¶¶ 37-38.)
(Docket No. 1
Defendant Caminero-Ramos also allegedly imposed a
work schedule on plaintiff Quiles-Santiago, an action which QuilesSantiago describes as “unprecedented” for someone at his level in
the Fire Department.
Calixto-Rodriguez
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 28.)
also
alleges
that
Similarly, plaintiff
defendant
Caminero-Ramos
stripped him of his duties by delegating a lower ranking officer to
attend
meetings,
“coordinate
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.)
services
or
give
conferences.”
Furthermore, plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez
contends that his supervisory duties, such as communications that
10
Plaintiff Quiles-Santiago fails to state, however, exactly which
defendant engaged in these actions. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 37-38.)
The Court will read the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff and draw the reasonable inference that plaintiff makes
these claims about defendant Caminero-Ramos because he mentioned in
a previous paragraph that “[o]n March 17, 2010[,] Cmdr. CamineroRamos started a series of actions to persecute, discriminate,
marginalize and remove the duties of Quiles-Santiago . . .” (Docket
No. 1 at ¶ 30.)
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
22
should have been prepared by one in his position, was reassigned to
a different officer.11
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 68.)
Third,
plaintiff
Quiles-Santiago
also
avers that he has been denied benefits that occur in the normal
course of their job.
He alleges that the Fire Department12 took
away his assigned vehicle while other similarly situated officers
have assigned vehicles.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 45-46.)
The
Court
treats
these
non-conclusory
factual allegations as true and finds that plaintiffs QuilesSantiago and Calixto-Rodriguez allege sufficient facts to plead
plausibly that adverse employment actions occurred as a result of
defendants Rodriguez-Diaz’s and Caminero-Rivero’s actions.
11
Plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez also fails to state who stripped him
of those duties. Again, the Court will read the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw the reasonable
inference that plaintiff makes these claims about defendant
Caminero-Ramos because plaintiff Calixto-Rodgriuez previously
discussed the removal of duties in relation to defendant CamineroRamos. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60.)
12
It is unclear from the complaint who approved this action. The
complaint fails to state exactly who took his vehicle away. (See
Docket No. 1 at ¶ 45.) Again, the Court will read the complaint in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw the reasonable
inference that plaintiff makes these claims about either defendant
Rodriguez-Diaz or defendant Caminero-Ramos because plaintiff
previously discussed the removal of duties in relation to these
defendants. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 34-35.)
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
2.
23
Defendants Vazquez-Montañez and MalaveRodriguez
With regard to defendants Vazquez-Montañez
and Malave-Rodriguez, however, plaintiff Quiles-Santiago13 fails to
allege sufficient facts to plead plausibly that these defendants
subjected
him
adverse
employment
actions.
Plaintiff
Quiles-
Santiago alleges only that defendant Vazquez-Montañez told him to
“stay calm because [he] could lose [his] position” when plaintiff
confronted Vazquez-Montañez about how “his conditions was [sic]
substantially inferior to the norm, unreasonable and unnecessary
and that it was causing him personal and family problems.” (Docket
No. 1 at ¶ 32.) Quiles-Santiago allegedly requested that defendant
Vazquez-Montañez “give him just one reason that was not political”
and Vazquez-Montañez allegedly “had no response.”
isolated
incident,
objectively
evaluated,
would
Id.
not
This
“place
substantial pressure on even one of thick skin to conform to the
prevailing political view.”
Cir.
2010).
Nor
could
Rodriguez-Garcia, 610 F.3d at 66 (1st
this
interaction
be
described
as
a
“sufficiently severe” harassment. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d at 937
(1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see Rosario-Urdaz v.
Velazco, 433 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing how a
13
Plaintiff Calixto-Rodriguez does not mention either defendant
Vazquez-Montañez or Malave-Rodriguez in his factual allegations.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
24
“substantial campaign of harassment . . . can form the basis of a
§ 1983 claim”) (emphasis added); Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725
(1st Cir.
1996)
(describing
how
the
employer
must
“(1)
take
something of consequence from the employee . . . or (2) withhold
from the employee an accoutrement of the employment relationship”
in order for an employee to establish an adverse employment action)
(emphasis added).
The same analysis applies to defendant
Malave-Rodriguez’s alleged actions.
Plaintiff Quiles-Santiago
avers that on July 12, 2010, defendant Malave-Rodriguez ignored his
request for a copy of his transfer letter.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 32.)
In the same paragraph, however, he admits that defendant MalaveRodriguez called Quiles-Santiago to say that the “document doesn’t
exist.”
Id.
Therefore, defendant Malave-Rodriguez did not ignore
plaintiff’s request and even if he did, such an action does not
qualify
as
an
adverse
employment
action.
Defendant
Malave-
Rodriguez did not take something of consequence from plaintiff nor
did he deprive plaintiff of any “accoutrement of the employment
relationship.”
Blackie, 75 F.3d at 725 (1st Cir. 1996).
Therefore, even if the Court treats these
non-conclusory
factual allegations
as
true,
plaintiff
Quiles-
Santiago fails to allege sufficient facts to plead plausibly that
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
25
adverse employment actions occurred as a result of defendant
Vazquez-Montañez’s actions.
d.
Political Affiliation as a Substantial Factor
for Adverse Employment Action
Defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to
plead adequately that the plaintiffs’ political affiliation “was a
substantial factor for such adverse employment action.”
(Docket
No. 9 at p. 8.)
Even if
The Court agrees with the defendants.
plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to plead plausibly the existence
of the first three required elements to establish a First Amendment
political discrimination claim, which the Court finds that they
fail to do, plaintiffs have stated virtually no facts to indicate
that their political affiliation was a substantial factor for the
alleged adverse employment actions.
In addition to the previous three elements,
plaintiffs
must
also
plead
facts
sufficient
to
support
“a
reasonable inference that plaintiffs’ political affiliation was a
substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ conduct.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16.
Plaintiffs must plead facts
specifying the role of each defendant in the adverse employment
action.
Id.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that
while plaintiffs are not required to bring forward “smoking gun”
evidence, Welch, 542 F.3d at 940 (internal citations omitted),
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
26
plaintiffs must do more than “[m]erely juxtapose a ‘protected
characteristic - someone else’s politics - with the fact that the
plaintiff was treated unfairly.’” Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464
F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
For
example, an adverse employment action that takes place shortly
after
a
change
in
political
administration
“unquestionably
contributes at the motion to dismiss stage to the reasonable
inference that the employment decision was politically motivated.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 604 F.3d at 18 (internal citation omitted).
politically
charged
work
atmosphere
may
also
suggest
A
that
plaintiff’s political affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendants’ conduct.
Id. at 17.
Mere conclusory
statements that plaintiffs faced an adverse employment action
because of the plaintiffs’ political affiliation, however, are
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
In
regard
to
See id. at 12.
discriminatory
animus,
the
complaint contains only “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.”
omitted).
For
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal punctuation
example,
the
plaintiffs
aver
that
they
were
“illegally transferred and discriminated against by the defendants,
simply because they are members of the Popular Democratic Party”
but allege no facts to support this contention.
¶ 1.)
(Docket No. 1 at
In fact, nearly all of the plaintiffs’ allegations that
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
their
political
defendants’
27
affiliation
actions
are
was
the
threadbare
motivating
assertions
factor
and
behind
boilerplate
statements added to plaintiffs’ description of alleged adverse
employment actions.
62, 63, 68, 70.)
rejected
a
(See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 30, 35, 45, 47, 48,
While the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
heightened
pleading
standard,
see
Educadores
Puertorriqueños en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.
2004), plaintiffs may not make threadbare statements.
Plaintiffs
“may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and tacking on the
self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a
discriminatory animus.” Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903
F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing the no-bald-assertions
standard).
This is exactly what plaintiffs do in their complaint.
Plaintiffs’ set of facts do not allow for a
plausible
inference
of
political
discrimination.
In
Ocasio-
Hernandez, the leading First Circuit Court of Appeals case that is
on point, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants (1) had a list of
PDP workers who were to be fired, (2) made disparaging remarks
about
the
previous
PDP
administration,
(3)
inquired
about
plaintiffs’ political affiliation, and (4) terminated and replaced
plaintiffs in less than ten weeks after the change in political
administration.
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 18.
The Ocasio-
Hernandez Court found that this was sufficient to allow for a
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
28
plausible inference of political discrimination.
In contrast, the
plaintiffs in this case have not pled anywhere in their complaint
that the work environment was politically charged.
No. 1.)
(See Docket
In addition, the plaintiffs’ first alleged “illegal”
transfers occurred in January 2010,14
administration came to office.
No. 13 at ¶ 1.)
one year after the NPP
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 28; Docket
These facts and all of the conclusory statements
made by plaintiffs do not allow the Court to draw a plausible
inference that any of defendants’ actions occurred because of
political discrimination.
While it is conceivable that these
actions are due to political discrimination, the Supreme Court
“requires that the claims be plausible, not merely possible.”
Acevedo-Concepcion, 2011 WL 6934791, at *4 (citing Ashcroft v.
14
Plaintiff Quiles-Santiago also alleges that he was sent to cover
one Commander’s vacation in August 2009. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 25.)
First Amendment claims for political discrimination that are
brought pursuant to section 1983, however, have a one-year statute
of limitations.
“Because it has no internal statute of
limitations, section 1983 claims ‘borrow[] the appropriate state
law governing limitations unless contrary to federal law.’”
Marrero-Guitierrez, 491 F.3d at 1 (citing Poy v. Boutselis, 352
F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 2003)).
In Puerto Rico, section 1983
claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. MoralesTañon v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority, 524 F.3d 15, 18 (1st
Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs filed this complaint on March 16, 2011,
which is past the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the
Court will not consider this incident in its analysis. Even if the
Court were to consider the incident, however, it occurred eight
months after the NPP administration took office and thus, did not
take place shortly after a change in political administration.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
Iqbal,
129
S.Ct.
at
29
1951
(internal
punctuation
omitted)).
Therefore, the plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to plead
plausibly that their political affiliation was a substantial or
motivating
factor
for
defendants’
alleged
adverse
employment
actions.
Because plaintiffs Quiles-Santiago and CalixtoRodriguez fail to allege sufficient facts to plead plausibly
elements
two
and
four
of
a
prima
facie
case
of
political
discrimination, their First Amendment political discrimination
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Fifth Amendment
Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to state a due
process claim under the Fifth Amendment.
15.)
The
Fifth
Amendment
to
(Docket No. 9 at p. 14-
the United
States
Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held
consistently that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to causes of
action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and private persons.
See, e.g., Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st
Cir. 2007).
The plaintiffs do not bring suit against the federal
government or any federal actors; rather they bring this suit
against defendants in their individual and official capacities as
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
30
employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Fire Department.
Therefore, the Court agrees with the defendants.
Plaintiffs
Quiles-Santiago’s and Calixto-Rodriguez’s Fifth Amendment claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3.
The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states,
in relevant part, “nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law (the “Due Process
Clause”); nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws (the “Equal Protection Clause”).”
amend. XIV.
U.S. Const.
The Court will address arguments regarding both
clauses in turn.
a.
Equal Protection Clause
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claim under
the Equal Protection Clause must be dismissed because plaintiffs
may not “assert parallel claims under the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause for the same [alleged] discriminatory
conduct.”
(Docket No. 9 at p. 20.)
Plaintiffs do not make any
arguments regarding the Equal Protection Clause in their opposition
to defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The
Equal
(See Docket No. 13.)
Protection
Clause
requires
that
similarly situated individuals to be treated in a similar manner.
See Marrero-Gutierrez, 491 F.3d at 9–10 (citing City of Cleburne v.
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
31
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
“An equal protection
claim alleging political discrimination [,however,] merely restates
a First Amendment political discrimination claim and . . . [should
be] considered under the First Amendment.”
Uphoff Figueroa v.
Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 426, 430 n. 8 (1st Cir. 2010); Pagan v.
Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 36 (1st Cir. 2006).
The plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim
is based on the exact same set of facts in their First Amendment
political
discrimination
discriminated
against
claim:
them
(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 79-80).
that
because
of
defendants
their
PDP
allegedly
membership.
Therefore, because plaintiffs’ claim
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause merely reiterates their
First Amendment discrimination claim, their Equal Protection Clause
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
b.
Due Process Clause
Defendants also assert that plaintiffs’ due
process claims should be dismissed.
types
of
due
process
procedural due process.
specify
which
type
of
rights:
Plaintiffs may assert two
substantive
Maymi, 515 F.3d at 29.
due
process
claim
due
process
and
Plaintiffs fail to
they
are
pursuing.
Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the Court will analyze
plaintiffs’
claims
under
both
substantive
and
procedural
due
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
process.
32
The Court finds that plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
claims fail under either type of due process argument.
i.
Substantive Due Process
Similar to political discrimination claims
brought under the Equal Protection Clause, the First Circuit Court
of
Appeals
has
held
that
substantive
due
process
“is
an
inappropriate avenue of relief” when the conduct at issue is
covered by the First Amendment.
First
Amendment,
individuals
the
against
discrimination
“allegations
not
or
of
Pagan, 448 F.3d at 33.
Fourteenth
Amendment,
state-sponsored
retaliation.”
political
Id.
acts
at
discrimination
“It is the
that
of
political
34-35.
and
guards
Thus,
retaliation
when
are
covered by the First Amendment, those allegations cannot serve as
a
basis
for
a
substantive
due
process
claim.”
Id.
at
34.
Therefore, plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
ii.
Procedural Due Process
A
state
may
not
discharge
a
public
employee who possesses a property interest in continued employment
without due process of law.
101, 108 (1st Cir. 2006).
Colon-Santiago v. Rosario, 438 F.3d
To state a claim under a procedural due
process theory, plaintiffs must plausibly plead that they were
“[1] deprived of a property interest, [2] by defendants acting
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
33
under color of state law, and [3] without the availability of a
constitutionally adequate process.”
Maymi, 515 F.3d at 20 (1st
Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
With regard to the first element, property
interests are not derived from the Constitution of the United
States; rather, “they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law . . .”
(1st Cir. 2006).
Colon-Santiago, 438 F.3d at 108
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has turned
consistently to Puerto Rico law for guidance on property interests.
Id., see also Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir.
2003). Puerto Rico law grants career employees a property interest
in their continued employment and therefore, their job.
Colon-
Santiago, 438 F.3d at 108; see also Ruiz-Casillas v. CamachoMorales, 415 F.3d 127, 134.
Public employees do not have a
property interest, however, in the duties and functions that they
perform for
(holding
their
that
the
employer.
plaintiff
Ruiz-Casillas,
did
not
have
a
415 F.3d
claim
at
134
under
the
Fourteenth Amendment because he only had his duties downgraded but
he
was
not
fired).
Plaintiffs
Quiles-Santiago
and
Calixto-
Rodriguez were not terminated from their positions. Instead, their
alleged “continued reassignments” are the basis of their due
process claim.
(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 76.)
Because plaintiffs have
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
34
failed to plead plausibly that they have been deprived of a
property
interest,
Therefore,
their
plaintiffs’
procedural
due
process
due
process
claims
are
claim
fails.
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE.
c.
Qualified Immunity
“The
threshold
inquiry
[when
determining
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity] is whether
the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional
violation.”
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
Because
the plaintiffs have failed to plead plausibly a constitutional
violation
by the
defendants, the
Court need not
qualified immunity defense asserted by defendants.
address
the
Ruiz-Casillas,
415 F.3d at 134 (internal citations omitted).
V.
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental State Law Claims
Because the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ section 1983 action,
no federal claims remain on which to ground jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’
declines
to
claims
pursuant
exercise
its
Commonwealth law claims.
to
Commonwealth
supplemental
law.
jurisdiction
The
Court
over
the
Plaintiffs’s supplemental Commonwealth
law claims are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJDUICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Civil No. 11-1269 (FAB)
VI.
35
Conclusion
For the reasons expressed, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion
to dismiss the case on Eleventh Amendment grounds but GRANTS
defendants’ motion to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure
to state a claim.
Plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and
their Commonwealth law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 2, 2012.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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