Rodriguez-Reyes et al v. Molina-Rodriguez et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 97 Motion for Summary Judgment. Because plaintiffs failed to comply with Local and Federal Rules 56, the Court finds that they have not met their burden of presenting definite, competent evidence to rebut defendants' m otion. Accordingly, defendants Molina's and Rios' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 05/27/2014. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
KAREN RODRIGUEZ-REYES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 11-1504 (FAB)

v.
CARLOS MOLINA-RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Karen

Rodriguez-Reyes

(“Rodriguez”),

Carmen

Rivera-Rosado

(“Rivera”), Maria Torres-Plaza (“Torres”), Pilar Vega-Rodriguez
(“Vega”),

and

Liz

Katiria

Fuentes-Rodriguez

(“Fuentes”)

(collectively, “plaintiffs”) are former employees1 of the Juvenile
Institutions Administration (“AIJ”).

They claim that defendants

Carlos Molina-Rodriguez (“Molina”) and Sonia Rios-Russi (“Rios”)
(collectively, “defendants”) discriminated against them on the
basis of their political affiliation when the New Progressive Party
(“NPP”) assumed office in Puerto Rico in early 2009.2
allege

that

after

the

NPP

administration

took

Plaintiffs
office,

the

1

Rivera was an elementary school teacher; Fuentes a physical
education teacher; Vega a math teacher and “Principal Director”;
Rodriguez a science teacher; and Torres a custody officer. (Docket
No. 97-1 at pp. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9; Docket No. 105-1 at pp. 1, 2, 3 &
5.)
2

Rodriguez, Rivera, Torres and Fuentes claim to be well-known
affiliates of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), and Vega claims
to be a well-known affiliate of the Puerto Rico Independence Party
(“PIP”). (Docket No. 1 at pp. 2–3.)

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

2

administration in the Department of Corrections “began to dismiss
employees and replace them with those affiliated with the NPP or
maintained those identified with the party.”
4.)

(Docket No. 1 at p.

They thus bring claims for political discrimination pursuant

to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 1, Article
II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and
articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.

Id. at

pp. 7–8.
Pending before the Court are the motion for summary judgment
filed by defendants Molina and Rios (Docket No. 97), and the
plaintiffs’ response (Docket No. 105).

Because plaintiffs have

utterly

Federal

failed

to

comply

with

both

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56(e)’s standards for responding to a
motion for summary judgment, they cannot overcome defendants’
arguments, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment serves to assess the evidence and determine

if there is a genuine need for trial.
895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990).

Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
The Court may enter summary

judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The party moving for summary

judgment has the initial burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact” with definite and competent

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
evidence.

3

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);

Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.
1994).

It must identify “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any’” which support its motion.

Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Once a properly supported
motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party “to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in
[its] favor.”

Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.,

217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
It is well-settled that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence” is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment.
242,

252

(1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
“[A]

party

opposing

summary

judgment[,

therefore,] must ‘present definite, competent evidence to rebut the
motion.’”

Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581 (internal citation

omitted).

In making this assessment, the Court must take the

entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.

Farmers Ins.

Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 779-80 (1st Cir. 2011).
This district’s Local Rule 56(c) requires a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment “to submit with its opposition a
separate, short, and concise statement of material facts” that
admits, denies, or qualifies the facts supporting the motion for

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
summary

judgment.

The

4
opposing

statement

may

also

propose

additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and
supported by a record citation as required by Local Rule 56(e).
Local Rule 56(e) states that:
[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement
of material facts, if supported by record citations as
required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless
properly controverted. An assertion of fact set forth in
a statement of material facts shall be followed by a
citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified
record material supporting the assertion. The court may
disregard any statement of fact not supported by a
specific citation to record material properly considered
on summary judgment. The court shall have no independent
duty to search or consider any part of the record not
specifically referenced in the parties’ separate
statement of facts.
Loc. R. 56(e) (emphasis added).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly . . .
emphasized

the

importance

of

local

rules

similar

to

[this

district’s] Local Rule 56.” Caban Hernandez v. Phillip Morris USA,
Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007).

Rules like Local Rule 56 “are

designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court’s
attention on what is - and what is not - genuinely controverted.’”
Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.
2006)).

Due to the importance of this function to the summary

judgment process, “litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril.”
Id.

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
II.

5

Summary Judgment
A.

Plaintiffs’ Failure to Comply with the Anti-Ferret Rule
In their complaint, plaintiffs claim that defendants

discriminated against them by “engag[ing] in a witch-hunt scheme to
obtain

information

as

(Docket No. 1 at p. 6.)

to

the

affiliation

of

each

employee.”

Specifically, the “officers began to talk

about politics, to ask about everybody’s affiliation and even made
expressions as to the fact that there would be NPP’s [sic] very
upset if their [the plaintiffs’] contracts would be renewed.”
at p. 7.

Id.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ allegations of

political discrimination have no factual basis, and that because no
evidence exists to establish a prima facie case, the Court must
grant summary judgment.

In support of their motion, defendants

attach the full deposition testimony of all five plaintiffs, as
well as those of both defendants, and argue that no piece of
evidence supports plaintiffs’ claims that defendants failed to
renew their contracts on the basis of political affiliation.
(Docket Nos. 97 to 97-8.)
On

May

20,

2014,

plaintiffs

filed

a

response

opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
No. 105.)

in

(Docket

Simply stated, plaintiffs’ motion fails to meet both

Local Rule 56 and Federal Rule 56’s standards for an opposition to
a motion for summary judgment.

The motion is completely devoid of

factual allegations, falling unacceptably short of presenting the

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

6

type of “definite, competent evidence” needed to rebut defendants’
motion.

See Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581.

Instead, plaintiffs

attach 208 pages of depositions — identical testimony already
submitted by defendants in their motion for summary judgment — and
claim: (1) that they “have identified” people at the workplace who
the defendants used in order to discriminate against the plaintiffs
“from afar,” and (2) that they “are prepared to call them as
witnesses as well as other people with personal knowledge of said
agents[’] actions on behalf of defendants.”

Id. at p. 4.

By not

submitting any supporting evidence for those assertions, plaintiffs
impermissibly ask the Court to ferret3 through the record and
scrutinize the depositions for genuine issues of fact which may be
lurking among the pages.

Although under no obligation to do so,

the Court did review the 400+ pages of depositions filed in support
of

the

defendants’

motion

and

finds

no

competent

evidence

demonstrating that defendants utilized third parties to scope out
plaintiffs’ political affiliations.

Due to plaintiffs’ failure to

engage in any type of legal discussion regarding defendants’
insufficiency of the evidence argument, the Court is left “to do
counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh

3

“All too frequently, litigants before the District Court of
Puerto Rico overlook the importance of the anti-ferret rule in the
summary judgment stage . . . [Local Rule 56] prevents the recurrent
problem of ferreting through the record and the specter of district
judges being unfairly sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues.”
Dominguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F. Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R.
Mar. 21, 1997) (Laffitte, J.) (emphasis added).

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
on its bones.”

7

U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

The Court declines to do so, not only because “judges are not
expected

to

be

mind-readers,”

id.

at

17,

but

also

because

perfunctory arguments deserve little attention when a party engages
in lazy lawyering.

See Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 897 F. Supp.

2d 7, 12 (D.P.R. 2013) (Besosa, J.).
B.

Defendants’ Burden
Because

the

anti-ferreting

rule

does

not

shift

the

parties’ respective burdens, a Court may not grant summary judgment
unless the moving party is entitled to it.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3).

In order to prevail, therefore, defendants Molina and Rios must
point

out

an

absence

of

evidence

supporting

political

discrimination. The majority of defendants’ statements of material
facts

do

regarding

not

conclusively

their

alleged

demonstrate

discriminatory

the

lack

animus.

of
Many

evidence
of

the

proffered facts do little more than establish that none of the
plaintiffs had personal interactions with the defendants sufficient
to gain first-hand knowledge of the defendants’ discriminatory
motives, statements, or actions regarding employees’ political
affiliations. (See Docket No. 97-1.) Nonetheless, the Court finds
that defendants meet their initial summary judgment burden.

The

parties admit, and several plaintiffs testified, that all of the
plaintiffs’ contracts at AIJ were transitory, and that many of
their positions ended in May at the end of the school year

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

8

regardless of political affiliation. (Docket No. 97-1 at pp. 1, 3,
6, 8, 9; Docket No. 105-1 at pp. 1, 2, 3, 5).
indicated

above,

the

Court

reviewed

the

Furthermore, as

extensive

deposition

transcripts submitted in support of the parties’ submissions and
finds no admissible evidence of discriminatory animus.
Each plaintiff in his or her deposition claims to have
heard

“through

the

grapevine”

that

plaintiffs’ political affiliations.

defendants

sought

out

(See, e.g., Docket No. 105-2

at pp. 20–21 (deposition of plaintiff Rivera); Docket No. 105-3 at
pp. 16–20 (deposition of plaintiff Fuentes); Docket No. 105-4 at
pp. 20–24 (deposition of plaintiff Vega); Docket No. 105-5 at
pp. 14–19 (deposition of plaintiff Rodriguez); Docket No. 105-6 at
pp. 23–25 (deposition of plaintiff Torres)).

Pursuant to the

nascent joint pretrial report filed on May 14, 2014, plaintiffs
would seek to offer eleven witnesses at trial, many of whom the
plaintiffs’ depositions reveal are people with first-hand knowledge
about defendants’ alleged “witch-hunt” for political affiliation
information.

See id.; (Docket No. 102 at pp. 29–30.)

In their

statement of uncontested material facts, plaintiffs explain that
Sonia Alamo,

Miriam

Monje,

Miguel

Mora,

“available to testify” as to that knowledge.
pp. 2, 4, 5, 6.)

and

Stacy

Milan

are

(Docket No. 105-1 at

Because plaintiffs do not offer so much as an

affidavit or sworn statement from those individuals in support of
their submission, however, they have failed to meet their burden in

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

9

opposition to defendants’ motion.

They have done nothing to put

forth more than a trivial, “scintilla of evidence” or to create
more

than

a

“metaphysical

doubt

as

to

the

material

facts.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986).

The Court cannot draw any reasonable inference

that political discrimination played a role in the non-renewal of
plaintiffs’ employment contracts.

Accordingly, defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.
III. Conclusion
Because plaintiffs failed to comply with Local and Federal
Rules 56, the Court finds that they have not met their burden of
presenting
motion.

definite,

competent

evidence

to

defendants’

Accordingly, defendants Molina’s and Rios’s motion for

summary judgment, (Docket No. 97), is GRANTED.
are

rebut

DISMISSED

WITH

PREJUDICE.

Judgment

Plaintiffs’ claims
shall

be

entered

accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 27, 2014.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE