Rodriguez-Reyes et al v. Molina-Rodriguez et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER re 6 Motion to Dismiss; and 9 Motion to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS defendant Molina's and defendant Rios' motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 and the ADEA are DISMISSED WITH PRE JUDICE. Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Additionally, all claims against unnamed defendants John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 03/29/2012. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
KAREN RODRIGUEZ-REYES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 11-1504 (FAB)

v.
CARLOS MOLINA-RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before
defendants

the

Court

Carlos

are

the

motions

Molina-Rodriguez

to

dismiss

(“Molina”)

and

filed

Sonia

by

Rios

(“Rios”), (collectively, “defendants”) (Docket Nos. 6 & 9), and the
plaintiffs’ opposition (Docket No. 10).

For the reasons set forth

below, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
I.

Background
A.

Facts as Alleged in the Complaint
Karen Rodriguez-Reyes (“Rodriguez”), Carmen Rivera-Rosado

(“Rivera”), Maria Torres-Plaza (“Torres”), Pilar Vega (“Vega”), and
Liz Fuentes-Rodriguez (“Fuentes”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) are
former employees of the Administration of Juvenile Institutions
(“AIJ”).

1

(Docket No. 1, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 4-8.)

Rodriguez, Rivera,

Elizabeth Gray, a second-year student at the University of
New Hampshire School of Law, assisted in the preparation of this
Opinion and Order.

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

2

Torres, and Fuentes claim to be well-known affiliates of the
Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”).

Id. at ¶¶ 4-6, 8.

Plaintiff

Vega claims to be a well known affiliate of the Puerto Rico
Independence Party (“PIP”).

Id. at p. 2, ¶ 7.

The New Progressive

Party (“NPP”) administration entered office in 2009.
¶ 14.

Id. at p. 4,

The plaintiffs allege that after taking office, the NPP

administration “began to dismiss employees and replace them with
those affiliated with the NPP or maintained those identified with
the party.”

Id.

The plaintiffs state that the defendants were

aware of the plaintiffs’ political affiliations because “they
engaged in a witch-hunt scheme to obtain information as to the
affiliation of each employee.”

Id. at p. 6, ¶ 44.

Specifically,

they claim that the “officers began to talk about politics, to ask
about everybody’s affiliation and even made expressions as to the
fact that there would be NPP’s [sic] very upset if their [the
plaintiffs’] contracts would be renewed.”

Id. at p. 7, ¶ 45.

Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for the AIJ from July 2003
until May 30, 2010.

Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 13, 15.

She had most recently

served as a science teacher at the Villalba institution.
¶ 16.

Id. at

Rodriguez alleges that she never received a negative

evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ.

Id. at ¶ 17.

Rodriguez

claims she was replaced by Jose Colon, a member of the NPP and
friend of the President of the NPP.

Id. at ¶ 19.

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

3

Plaintiff Rivera worked for the AIJ from July 2003 until
May 30, 2010.

Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21.

She most recently served as an

elementary “school” teacher at the Villalba institution.

Id. at

¶ 22. Like plaintiff Rodriguez, Rivera also alleges that she never
received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id.
at ¶ 23.

Rivera claims she was replaced by Marexis Arroyo, who was

younger and a member of the NPP.

Id. at p. 5, ¶ 24.

The complaint

asserts that Rivera was terminated due to her political affiliation
and age. Id. at ¶ 25.
Plaintiff Torres worked for the AIJ from 1998 until
May 30, 2010.

Id. at ¶¶ 26, 29.

She most recently served as a

science teacher at the Ponce institution.

Id. at ¶ 31.

Like

plaintiffs Rodriguez and Rivera, Torres also alleges that she never
received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id.
at ¶ 30.

Torres claims she was replaced by Rousmarie Borrero, a

member of the NPP who joined the AIJ in 2010.

Id. at ¶ 32.

The

complaint states that of the two AIJ employees not retained at the
Ponce location in 2010, neither was a member of NPP.

Id. at ¶ 33.

Plaintiff Vega worked for the AIJ from 2000 until an
unspecified date after 2009.

Id. at p. 6, ¶¶ 34, 36.

recently served as a school director.

Id. at ¶ 34.

She most

Vega alleges

that she always received “excellent monitorings [sic]” during her
tenure with the AIJ.

Id. at ¶ 38.

Vega claims that in 2009 she

was informed that all director positions were to be eliminated and

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

4

that she would be appointed to a regional director position.
at ¶ 36.

Id.

She alleges that, instead, an NPP member was appointed as

regional director.

Id. at ¶ 37.

The complaint asserts that Vega

was terminated due to her political affiliation and age.

Id. at

¶ 39.
Plaintiff Fuentes began working for the AIJ in 2006.
Id. at ¶ 41.

She worked as a physical education teacher at the

Humacao location from 2006 to 2008, and from 2009 to 2010.
¶ 41.

Id. at

Like other plaintiffs, Fuentes alleges that she never

received a negative evaluation during her tenure with the AIJ. Id.
at ¶ 42.

Fuentes claims that she was not offered a position for

the 2011-2012 school year.
B.

Id.

Procedural History
On May 31, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against

defendant Molina, in both his personal and official capacity,
defendant Rios, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2.

(Docket No. 1.)

The

plaintiffs claim that their employment was terminated based upon
their political affiliation.

Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs Rivera

and Vega also allege that they were terminated because of age, in
addition to political affiliation.

Id. at pp. 5, 6, ¶¶ 25, 39.

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations to their freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Id. at p. 7, ¶ 49.

Additionally, plaintiffs allege violations of

the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, article 1802

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

5

of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 51412
(“Article 1802”) and article 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code,
P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 51423 (“Article 1803”).
¶¶ 49, 51.

Id. at pp. 7, 8,

Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages,

injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees.

Id. at pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 50, 53.

On August 12, 2011, defendant Molina filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure

12(b)(6)

(“Rule

12(b)(6)”).

(Docket

No.

6.)

On

October 24, 2011, defendant Rios also filed a motion to dismiss.
(Docket No. 9.)

The defendants argue (1) that the plaintiffs

failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination,
(2) that article 1803 is not applicable to the defendants, and
(3) that the article 1802 and Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Puerto

Rico

jurisdiction.”

claims

have

no

“cognizable

basis

for

federal

(Docket Nos. 6 pp. 12-13 & 9 pp. 12-13.)

On

October 26, 2011, plaintiffs filed an opposition to defendants’

2

Article 1802 provides that, “A person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done.” P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31,
§ 5141.
3

Article 1803 imposes “liability for damages caused by
minor[s], incapacitated person[s], employee[s], agent[s], pupil[s],
or apprentice[s]” and the Commonwealth, arising out of fault or
negligence. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5142.

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
motions to dismiss.4

6

(Docket No. 10.)

Plaintiffs argue that they

have sufficiently provided facts, and not conclusory statements,
which

establish

discrimination.

a
Id.

plausible

prima

facie

case

of

political

The Court will consider each argument in

turn.
II.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) allows the Court to dismiss a complaint when it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

When

considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a Court must accept the
“well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending
[the] plaintiff every reasonable inference in his [or her] favor.”
Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2002).
“[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants
and state a facially plausible legal claim.”

Ocasio–Hernandez v.

Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

When faced with a

motion to dismiss, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed
perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements
of the cause of action.”
S.Ct.

1937,

1950

Id. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

(2009)).

Any

“[n]on-conclusory

factual

allegations in the complaint [, however,] must . . . be treated as
true, even if seemingly incredible.”

4

Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

In their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs request
that the Court “allow plaintiffs time to amend the complaint if it
finds that more facts are required.” (Docket No. 10, p. 3.) The
record does not indicate, however, that the plaintiffs have
requested leave to amend the complaint.

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
at 1951).

7

Where those factual allegations “‘allow[ ] the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.”
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

Id.

Furthermore, a court may not

“attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the
merits; ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if . . . a
recovery is very remote and unlikely’.”

Id. at 13 (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The relevant
inquiry, therefore, “focuses on the reasonableness of the inference
of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from
the facts alleged in the complaint.”
According

to

Rule

12(b)(6),

Id.
a

court

must

base

its

determination solely on the material submitted as part of the
complaint or central to it.

Fudge v. Penthouse Int’l. Ltd., 840

F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988).

Generally, “a court may not

consider documents that are outside of the complaint, or not
expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into
one for summary judgment.”

Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).

“When . . . a

complaint’s factual allegations are expressly linked to - and
admittedly dependent upon - a document (the authenticity of which
is not challenged), [however,] that document effectively merges
into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”

Beddall v. State St. Bank

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

8

& Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal citation
omitted).

This is especially true where the plaintiff has “actual

notice . . . and has relied upon these documents in framing the
complaint.”
The

Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993).

Court

will

first

determine

if

the

plaintiffs

have

established a prima facie case of political discrimination against
the defendants.

Then the Court will evaluate the plaintiffs’

claims brought under Puerto Rico law.
III. Legal Analysis
A.

Section 1983
“Government

officials

are

forbidden

by

the

First

Amendment from taking adverse action against public employees on
the basis of political affiliation, unless political loyalty is an
appropriate requirement of the employment.”
640 F.3d at 13.

Ocasio-Hernandez,

Public employees subjected to such adverse action

may seek to vindicate the violation of their First Amendment right
to political affiliation through a civil action brought pursuant to
section 1983.

See id.

“The freedom to support a particular

political party is ‘integral to the freedom of association and
freedom of political expression that are protected by the First
Amendment.’”

Cortes-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 48 (1st

Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). “To prevail on a claim of
political discrimination, a public employee must at a minimum show
that she engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct and that

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

9

this conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse employment
decision.”

Carrasquillo v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 494 F.3d

1, 4 (1st Cir. 2007).

In order to make that showing and establish

a prima facie case of political discrimination, a plaintiff must
demonstrate:

“(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing

political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the
plaintiff’s affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action
occurred, and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or
motivating factor for the adverse employment action.”

Ocasio-

Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 13 (citing Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630
F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010)).
Once a plaintiff satisfies those elements, the defendant
may attempt to establish the affirmative defense outlined in Mt.
Healthy.
protection

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
of

the

Mt.

Healthy

“A defendant seeking the

defense

bears

the

burden

of

persuasion ‘to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
adverse employment action would have been taken’” regardless of a
plaintiff’s political affiliation.
Marin, 610

F.3d

756,

767

(1st

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-

Cir.

2010)

(internal citation

omitted). “Thus, even if the defendant’s actions were motivated in
part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct, the defendant can still
prevail if he or she can show that the protected conduct was not
the ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse action.”

Id.

(Internal

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
citation omitted).

10

The Court will now determine if the plaintiffs

have sufficiently pled a cause of action against each defendant.
1.

Plaintiffs Fail to Establish a Prima Facie Case of
Political Discrimination Against Defendant Molina
i.

Plaintiffs’ Suit in Personal Capacity
Defendant Molina argues that the plaintiffs

fail to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.
(Docket No. 9.)

The complaint alleges that plaintiffs Rodriguez,

Rivera, Torres, and Fuentes are members of the PDP and plaintiff
Vega is a member of the PIP, while defendant Molina is a member of
the NPP.

(Docket No. 1.)

Furthermore, the complaint establishes

that the plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action because
none were rehired.

Id.

The plaintiffs fail, however, to allege

sufficiently (1) that Molina was aware of the plaintiffs’ political
affiliation and (2) that the plaintiffs’ political affiliation was
a substantial or motivating factor in their termination.

Id.

To support their allegations that defendant
Molina was aware of their political affiliation, the plaintiffs
claim that (1) the defendants “engaged in a witch-hunt scheme to
obtain information” and (2) the administration’s “officers began to
talk about politics, to ask about everybody’s affiliation and even
made expressions as to the fact that there would be NPP’s [sic]
very upset if their contracts would be renewed.”
pp. 6-7, ¶¶ 44, 45.)

(Docket No. 1,

These statements are not “[a]llegations of

discrete factual events” which illustrate Molina’s actions.

See

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

11

Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 14, 16 (“each defendant’s role in the
termination decision must be sufficiently alleged to make him or
her a plausible defendant.”); see also Ramos v. Dept. of Educ. for
the Commonwealth of P.R., No. 11-1653, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957,
at *26 (D.P.R. Feb. 1, 2012) (prima facie case of political
discrimination not established when plaintiffs’ complaint did not
“indicate one single act or even interaction with co-defendant
Lizardi

which

could

be

attributable

to

her

or

discriminatory animus could even be construed.”).

from

which

a

Because the

plaintiffs are unable to establish that defendant Molina was aware
of their political affiliations, they are therefore unable to
establish the fourth element, that their political affiliation was
a “substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment
action.”

See Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel,

658 F.3d 125, 132 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding district court’s
finding that there was not sufficient evidence to “show that the
termination decisions were politically motivated” when plaintiffs
failed to establish that defendant had knowledge of plaintiffs’
political affiliation.). Thus, the Court finds that the complaint,
taken as a whole, fails to sufficiently plead a plausible claim of
political
capacity.

discrimination

by

defendant

Molina

in

his

personal

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)
ii.

12

Plaintiffs’ Suit
Official Capacity

Against

Molina

in

His

The plaintiffs also sue Molina in his official
capacity for injunctive relief.

(Docket No. 1, p. 3, ¶ 9.)

Once

a plaintiff’s constitutional claims are rejected, however, “he [or
she] [is] left without any sound basis for equitable redress.”
Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 1990).

Given that the

Court has determined that the plaintiffs have failed sufficiently
to plead a plausible claim of political discrimination by defendant
Molina in his personal capacity, they have no basis for injunctive
relief against him.

See Soto-Padro v. Public Buildings Authority,

No. 10-2413, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5144, at *20 (1st Cir. March 12,
2012) (“because the judge . . . correctly tossed the politicaldiscrimination and due-process claims . . . , Soto-Padro has no
basis for relief . . . let alone declaratory and injunctive
relief.”).

As a result, defendant Molina’s motion to dismiss the

plaintiffs’ claims against him, both in his individual and official
capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is GRANTED.
2.

Plaintiffs Fail to Establish a Prima Facie Case of
Political Discrimination Against Defendant Rios
Defendant Rios argues that the plaintiffs also fail

to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination against
her.

(Docket No. 9.)

that

defendant

affiliation

Rios

when

it

The complaint presents a plausible claim
was

aware

alleges

of
that

the

plaintiffs’

Rios

“actively

political
acquired

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

13

information of plaintiffs’ political affiliation.”

See Ocasio-

Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 15 (allegation that “defendants asked
several plaintiffs about the ‘circumstances pertaining to how and
why they got
inference

to

that

work

at

defendants

Fortaleza’”
had

supported

knowledge

of

a “reasonable

their

political

beliefs.”); (Docket No. 1, p. 3, ¶ 10.) Furthermore, the complaint
establishes that the plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment
action

because

plaintiffs,
political

none

however,

affiliation

affiliation

was

termination.

a

were

rehired.

(See

fail

to

allege

and

(2)

that

substantial

or

Docket

No.

sufficiently
the

1.)
(1)

plaintiffs’

motivating

factor

The
Rios’s

political
in

their

Id.
In regard to the first element, the plaintiffs

completely fail to allege that Rios had a political affiliation.
See Feliciano v. P.R. State Ins. Fund, No. 11-1012, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124358, at *31 (D.P.R. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Davila[] does not
satisfy the first prong just as she does not even state the
Defendants political affiliation.”). As to the fourth element, the
plaintiffs fail to provide factual allegations that “sustain a
reasonable inference that the plaintiff’s political affiliation was
a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ conduct.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16.

The plaintiffs merely allege

that defendant Rios was responsible for hiring decisions, and that
she

“actively

acquired

information

of

plaintiffs’

political

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

14

affiliation and has taken adverse employment actions . . . .”

See

id. (“[section] 1983 liability cannot rest solely on a defendant’s
position of authority . . . .”); see also Peñalbert-Rosa v.
Fortuño-Burset,

631

F.3d

592,

595

(1st

Cir.

2011)

(“some

allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are
nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross
‘the line between the conclusory and the factual.’”).
Court

finds

that

the

complaint,

taken

as

a

Thus the

whole,

fails

sufficiently to plead a plausible claim of political discrimination
by defendant Rios. Accordingly, defendant Rios’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED.
3.

Plaintiffs Fail to Establish a Prima Facie Case of
Political
Discrimination
Against the
Unnamed
Defendants
The plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case

of political discrimination against the unnamed defendants.
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 13.

See

Other than initially mentioning

John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 and claiming that they “participated in
the discriminatory scheme against plaintiffs,” the complaint is
devoid of factual allegations indicating any action or knowledge
with respect to the political affiliation or discharge of the
plaintiffs.

(See Docket No. 1, p. 3, ¶¶ 11, 12.)

While the First

Circuit Court of Appeals has permitted a “suit against a fictitious
or unnamed party,” given the plaintiffs’ failure to make specific
factual allegations against the unnamed defendants, any claim by

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

15

the plaintiffs against those defendants cannot survive.

See

Alvarez-Estrada v. Alemañy-Noriega, No. 10-1065, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61240, at * 13 (D.P.R. June 8, 2011) (finding that claims
against

defendants

failed

because

plaintiffs

failed

to

make

“factual allegations regarding any action or knowledge on [the
defendants’] part . . . .”); cf. Martinez-Rivera v. Ramos, 498 F.3d
3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim against unknown
defendants when allegations sufficiently pled a violation).
B.

Age Discrimination
Plaintiffs Rivera and Vega additionally allege that the

defendants discriminated against them on the basis of age. (Docket
No. 1.)

The plaintiffs do not proceed further with this argument,

failing to provide even a legal basis for their claims.

Id.

Under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), it is “unlawful
for an employer . . . to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate

against

compensation,

terms,

any

individual

conditions,

or

because of such individual’s age.”

with

respect

privileges

of

to

his

employment,

29 U.S.C. § 623(a).

Under

federal law, an employee has the burden of proving “that he would
not have been fired but for his age.”

Velazquez-Fernandez v. NCE

Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal citations
omitted).

The statute also provides that employees must exhaust

their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) prior to

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

16

pursuing a civil action.

29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1);5 Mercado-Garcia v.

Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 895 (1st Cir. 1992).

Plaintiffs

have presented no evidence in their complaint that they have filed
an administrative claim or given the EEOC notice of the lawsuit,
and as such, their age discrimination claims are DISMISSED.

See

Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 744 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding
district court’s dismissal of ADEA claim appropriate when plaintiff
failed to exhaust administrative remedies).
C.

The Court Declines Jurisdiction on the Supplemental State
Law Claims
Defendants also request that the Court (1) dismiss with

prejudice plaintiffs’ claim under article 1803 for failure to state
a claim and (2) dismiss without prejudice plaintiffs’ claims under
article 1802 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

(Docket Nos. 6 & 9.)

Indeed, the jurisdictional basis to maintain those claims in this
Court has been undone by the dismissal of the federal claims.

See

Rosado v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado, No. 008-2264, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16479, at *28 (D.P.R. Feb. 8, 2012) (“the unfavorable
disposition of a plaintiff’s federal claims at the early stages of
5

29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) provides in pertinent part that
“[n]o civil action may be commenced by an
individual under this section until 60 days
after
a
charge
alleging
unlawful
discrimination has been filed with the
Secretary
[Commission].”
29
U.S.C.
§
626(d)(1).

Civil No. 11-1504 (FAB)

17

a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the
dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims.”)
(quoting Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st
Cir.

1995)).

Accordingly,

defendants

motions

to

dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil
Code and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are
GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).6
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Molina’s

and defendant Rios’ motions to dismiss.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADEA are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to articles 1802 and 1803

of the Civil Code and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Additionally, all

claims against unnamed defendants John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 29, 2012.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides federal district courts the
power to exercise, or decline to exercise, supplemental
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)