Pagan-Ocasio v. RAAD Broadcasting Corporation, Inc.

Filing 64

OPINION and ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 motion for summary judgment. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on June 24, 2013. (McGiverin, Bruce)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
GLERISBET PAGAN OCASIO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 11-1538 (BJM)

RAAD BROADCASTING CORP.,
Defendant
OPINION AND ORDER
Between June 5, 2008 and August 5, 2009, plaintiff Glerisbet Pagán Ocasio
(“Pagán”) worked as a radio host for RAAD Broadcasting Corp. (“RAAD”). During this
period, Pagán claims she was the victim of sexual harassment, which created a hostile
work environment for her. She sued RAAD for doing nothing about the situation. She
alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well
as discrimination and tortious conduct under Puerto Rico law. Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 40-41, 47.
RAAD now moves for summary judgment. Docket No. 43. Pagán opposed
(Docket No. 54) and RAAD replied (Docket No. 60). The motion for summary judgment
is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The factual record is summarized here using the Local Rule 56 statements of
uncontested facts, considering Docket No. 45 (“Def. St.”), Docket No. 60 (“Reply”),
Docket No. 55 at 1-7 (“Pl. St.”), and Docket No. 55 at 7-11 (“Pl. Additional Facts”).1

1

Local Rule 56 requires parties at summary judgment to supply brief, numbered
statements of facts, supported by citations to admissible evidence. It “relieve[s] the district court
of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely
in dispute,” CMI Capital Market Inv. v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008), and
prevents litigants from “shift[ing] the burden of organizing the evidence presented in a given case
to the district court.” Mariani-Colón v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.
2007). The rule “permits the district court to treat the moving party‟s statement of facts as
uncontested” when not properly opposed, and litigants ignore it “at their peril.” Id.

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The Contract
On May 23, 2008, Pagán signed a Professional Services Contract with RAAD to
be a co-hostess of a late afternoon radio show produced by La X that would air Monday
through Friday from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. Docket No. 11-1 at 1 (“Contract”). The contract
stated that Pagán was an independent contractor. Id. at 6. She would receive an annual
salary of $35,000, to be paid biweekly. Id. at 2. She was given fifteen days of annual
leave and fourteen days of sick leave, as required by the Puerto Rico Department of
Labor and Human Resources. Id. at 2. Pagán agreed to work exclusively for RAAD on
FM radio, but she was allowed to pursue other opportunities on AM radio or TV, as a
spokesperson or actress, or making commercial endorsements. Def. St. 45 ¶ 53; Pl. St. 55
¶ 53. RAAD did not provide her with health insurance, life insurance, or retirement
benefits, nor did it pay for her unemployment benefits. Def. St. ¶¶ 55-56; Pl. St. ¶¶ 55-56.
In addition to acting as a co-hostess, Pagán agreed to participate in advertising
and marketing campaigns inherent to her work at no additional cost. Contract at 5-6. She
also agreed to act as Master of Ceremonies in at least two activities produced by the radio
station, for which she would receive $400 each. Id. at 5. Fees for any additional activities
that Pagán wanted or was asked to participate in would be negotiated separately. Def. St.
¶ 45; Pl. St. ¶ 45. She agreed to maintain her good image and the good image of RAAD.
Contract at 4.
For its part, RAAD agreed to “sell the services of talent fees for live mentions and
integrations performed by [Pagán] for the amount of $30 per live mention.” Id. at 3.
Pagán was responsible for billing and collecting the fees. Id. The rate could be adjusted
by mutual agreement in accordance with market conditions. Id. Pagán would also receive
a 20% commission for any direct sales she made to third parties, all of which had to be
approved by the Sales Manager at RAAD. Id. at 7.
Under the contract, Pagán was eligible for certain bonuses, including a signing
bonus and a $1,000 bonus annually for working exclusively for RAAD on FM radio. Id.

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at 3, 7. Any other bonuses would be tied to the rating of the show. Id. at 5. Pagán agreed
to pay taxes and social security directly; RAAD did not need to withhold any taxes for
her beyond the deductions required for independent contractors. Id. at 6.
Termination of the contract could occur in a few ways. RAAD could terminate the
contract and fine Pagán $20,000 if she violated the exclusivity agreement for FM radio.
Id. at 4. The parties could terminate the contract after giving three months‟ notice in
writing if both parties agreed that the radio program “did not work.” Id. at 6-7. The
parties also agreed that Pagán would be in default if the program did not rank within the
top five radio programs for its time slot, unless the fallen ranking was not attributable to
Pagán. Id. at 4-5. The contract, which was to last 36 months, went into effect on June 5,
2008. Id. at 4.
The Work
For the duration of the contract, Pagán co-hosted the radio show with Ronaldo
Campos (“Campos”) and Juan Adames (“Adames”). Citing Pagán‟s deposition, RAAD
states that Campos and Adames were also independent contractors. Def. St. ¶ 15. Pagán
however testified that she believed that they were, but not that she knew definitively. Pl.
St. ¶ 15. See also Docket No. 48-6 at 53 (“Pl. Deposition”). Campos was the main
producer of the radio show. Def. St. ¶ 21; Pl. St. ¶ 21. He evaluated potential additional
producers for the show, created the initial outline for each show, and controlled what
went on air during the program as operator of the master console. Def. St. ¶¶ 28, 30, 32;
Pl. St. ¶¶ 28, 30, 32. Pagán, Campos, and Adames used their own computers for the show.
Def. St. ¶¶ 18-20; Pl. St. ¶¶18-20. Pagán used her personal email and cell phone to
communicate with the other hosts, and her own TV and magazines to prepare for the
show. Def. St. ¶¶ 35-36; Pl. St. ¶¶ 35-36.
The skills needed for the show were skills that Pagán had before signing the
contract. Def. St. ¶ 34; Pl. St. ¶ 34. They included topic elaboration, improvisation, gift of
words, gift of communication, how to get to the public, public recognition, the ability to

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develop a mix between comedy and fun, and skills developed through acting. Def. St. ¶
34; Pl. St. ¶ 34. However, Pagán had no prior experience as a radio show host. Pl.
Additional Facts ¶ 14.2
Pagán often prepared for the show in advance at her home. Def. St. ¶ 37; Pl. St. ¶
37. Pagán prepared for the show by staying current with the news. Pl. Deposition at 88.
Pagán had free time during the day, but she stated that preparing for the show generally
required her to be watchful of the news all of the time. Def. St. ¶ 38; Pl. St. ¶ 38. No one
controlled where or when she did work to prepare for the program. Pl. Deposition at 9091.
Pagán, Adames, Campos and the other producers (Hector Bravo, Miguel Morales,
and José Calderón) controlled the contents of the radio program. Def. St. ¶ 29; Pl. St. ¶
29. RAAD‟s vice president states that the producers were independent contractors. Def.
St. ¶ 31. RAAD had no access to the conversations and information exchanged between
Pagán, Adames, and Campos during the radio program. Def. St. ¶ 33; Pl. St. ¶ 33. Pagán
states that they would normally meet at the radio station at 1 p.m. for a pre-show meeting.
Pl. Additional Facts ¶ 15. 3 At the meeting, the producers would inform Pagán of the
topics of conversation for the day and tell her how they wanted her to hold the
conversations to attract the right audience. Pl. Additional Facts ¶ 15; Reply ¶ 3.15. Pagán
states that they also told her how to dress. Pl. Additional Facts ¶ 17. RAAD‟s vice
president says that this was only in response to complaints about her inappropriate attire.
Reply ¶3.17. After the show, Pagán states that the producers would meet until 8 p.m. to
discuss the next show. Pl. St. ¶ 16. RAAD‟s vice president says that whether this
happened or not, it was not required by RAAD. Reply ¶ 3.16
2

RAAD cites a prior job on her resume as evidence of prior experience. Reply ¶ 3.14.
However, the resume is not translated into English and therefore is not admissible evidence.
Local Rule 5(g).
3
RAAD states that it did not require these meetings, but does not point to any evidence
of this. See Reply ¶ 3.15.

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While she was working for RAAD, Pagán pursued other opportunities. She
developed her own line of jeans and hosted a television program. Deposition at 102. She
also participated in nine presentations for RAAD and was paid $450 per presentation.
Def. St. ¶49; Pl. St. ¶ 49.
While she worked for RAAD, Pagán used the 480.6B Informative Return tax
form issued by the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury. Def. St. ¶ 57; Pl. St. ¶ 57. This
form is used to report income derived from professional services. Def. St. ¶ 57; Pl. St. ¶
57. RAAD gave her this form. Pl. Deposition at 79. In 2008 and 2009, Pagán filed
Individual Income Tax Returns that show that all of her income was earned as a selfemployed person. Def. St. ¶ 6, 8; Pl. St. ¶ 6, 8.
Cancellation
RAAD sent a letter to Pagán, Adames, and Campos on August 6, 2009 cancelling
their contracts. Def. St. ¶ 41; Pl. St. ¶ 41. Afterwards, Pagán entered an unwritten
agreement to continue as one of the two radio announcers for one month while RAAD
looked into other alternatives for the show. Def. St. ¶ 42; Pl. St. ¶ 42.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material only if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986), and “[a] „genuine‟ issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party.”
Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The court does not
weigh facts, but instead ascertains whether the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 751 (1st
Cir. 1995).
The movant must first “inform[] the district court of the basis for its motion,” and
identify the record materials “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

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issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); R. 56(c)(1).
If this threshold is met, the opponent “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to avoid summary judgment. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party
may not prevail with mere “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation” for any element of the claim. Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Still, the court draws inferences and evaluates
facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Leary, 58 F.3d at 751, and the
court must not “superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how
reasonable those ideas may be) upon the facts of the record.” Greenburg v. P.R. Maritime
Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
RAAD asserts that it was not Pagán‟s employer within the meaning of Title VII.
RAAD additionally argues that Pagán‟s Article 1802 claim should be dismissed because
it arises out of the same facts as her Law 100 claim. Lastly, RAAD requests that the court
decline supplemental jurisdiction over Pagán‟s pendent claims under Puerto Rico law.
I.

Title VII’s Definition of Employer
RAAD asserts that Pagán is an independent contractor, as stated in the contract,

and that therefore RAAD is not an employer under Title VII. Docket No. 44 at 10.
However, the agreed-upon label in an employment contract is not conclusive. Rivera v.
Hospital Metropolitano Dr. Susoni, Inc., Civil No. 10-1075 (JAG/BJM), 2012 WL
3777003 at *6 (D.P.R. Feb. 27, 2012). Common law agency principles determine whether
an individual is an employee or an independent contractor under Title VII. Alberty-Velez
v. Corporación de Puerto Rico Para La Difusión Pública, 361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
This test requires the court to consider:
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished . . . ; the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools;

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the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 7 (quoting Dkyes v. DePuy, 140 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998)). All of the factors must be
weighed, and no one factor is decisive. Id. The most important factor is usually the extent
to which the hiring party controls the manner and means of production. Id. (citing
Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)). At
summary judgment, a movant cannot prevail unless “the factors point so favorably in one
direction that a fact finder could not reasonably reach the opposite conclusion.” Id.
In this case, various factors favor classifying Pagán as an employee. For instance,
RAAD paid Pagán an annual salary on a regular bi-weekly basis. In Alberty-Velez, the
court held that an actress was an independent contractor in part because she was paid in
lump sums per episode. Id. at 8. In contrast, in Russel v. BSN Medical, Inc., the court held
that the regular, monthly payment of a salary was indicative of employee status. 721 F.
Supp. 2d 465, 473 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (citing Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C, N.A., 259
F.3d 309, 315 (4th Cir. 2001)). RAAD attempts to argue that it paid Pagán a lump sum for
every ten episodes. Docket No. 44 at 20. However, it cites no evidence of this, and the
contract refers to her payment as a yearly salary to be received biweekly. Contract at 2.
In addition, though Pagán did not receive health, retirement, or unemployment
benefits, she received annual and medical leave. In Rodriguez-Vega v. Policlinica la
Familia de Toa Alta, Inc., the court held that doctors‟ eligibility for ten vacation days
weighed in favor of finding them employees. Civil Nos. 11-2235 (FAB), 11-2236 (FAB),

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2013 WL 1798017 at *11 (D.P.R. Apr. 29, 2013). Cf. Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc.,
613 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that plaintiff did not receive vacation or sick
days, indicating she was not an employee). Citing Tagare v. Nynex Network Sys. Co.,
RAAD argues that this leave is merely part of the compensation package that Pagán
negotiated. Motion at 21. 994 F. Supp. 149, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). However, in Tagare,
the vacation time the plaintiff received was not part of the regular benefits given to
employees, and therefore was considered part of what Tagare negotiated for as an
independent contractor. Tagare, 994 F. Supp. at 156. But there is no evidence in the
record here that the leave Pagán received was different from that given to other RAAD
employees, nor that she negotiated for that leave. A jury could weigh this factor in favor
of employee status.
RAAD further argues that it did not control the location of the work since Pagán
was able to prepare for the show wherever she wanted. Pagán argues that, on the contrary,
RAAD did control the location of the work by requiring her to come to RAAD‟s facilities
to air the program. Control of the location of work must be viewed in the context of the
industry at issue. Alberty-Velez, 361 F.3d at 9. In Alberty-Velez, the television company
could only produce the show by controlling the location of filming, and therefore the
court held that this type of control was irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at 10. The relevant
issue of control was whether the actress could decline to film future episodes. Id. at 9-10.
Likewise, RAAD could only air the show by controlling the location of recording, and
therefore this type of control is irrelevant. However, Pagán could not decline to
participate in the radio show at her discretion, since her contract engaged her for three
years. Cf. Id. at 4 (actress signed single-episode contracts). Furthermore, the length of this

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commitment is “neither brief nor insubstantial” and could be found to favor classifying
her as an employee. Daggit v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local
304A, 245 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that UFCW stewards normally
served for three years, indicating employee status).
RAAD also argues that the job of a radio broadcaster is a skilled position such
that Pagán must be deemed an independent contractor. Skilled positions are those that
require “relatively specialized skills,” such as architects, graphic artists, computer
programmers, photographers, and treasurers. Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 118. Skilled
positions often require extensive study and prior experience. See Weary v. Cochran, 377
F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2004); Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992). Indeed,
in Alberty-Velez, the court found that an actress held a skilled position precisely because
of her extensive training and prior experience. Alberty-Velez, 361 F.3d at 7 (plaintiff had a
master‟s degree in public communications and journalism, was trained in dance, singing,
and modeling, taught drama at the University of Puerto Rico, and acted in several
productions prior to her employment in question). In Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, a
radio broadcaster and disc jockey was considered an independent contractor. Civil No.
95-1078, 1995 WL 491291 (E.D.P.A. Aug. 16, 1995). This was in part because “[h]er onair radio personality [gave] her an unusual, perhaps unique, skill that would be difficult to
acquire on the open market.” Id. But this was only one factor out of many in the court‟s
analysis. Besides her radio personality, the broadcaster only came to the station once a
week during the hours of her show for under two years, she provided her own
phonograph records, she was paid on commission rather than a regular salary, she
received no benefits, and she was not required to take on additional duties such as public

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appearances or extra time slots. Id. at 8. These factors combined weighed in favor of
independent contractor status. Id.
Here, a jury could find that Pagán‟s position only required improvisation, the
ability to reach the public, and the ability to mix comedy and fun. There is no evidence
that these skills required extensive training or education to develop. Moreover, there is no
evidence that Pagán had any prior experience in the industry, which permits the
conclusion that her position did not require specialized skill. See Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at
118 (explaining that the fact that defendants did not ask plaintiff about her work
experience underscored the point that her position did not require specialized skill). Even
granting that she had some prior experience in the radio industry, but see note 2, supra, a
jury need not conclude she was so highly trained that RAAD hired her as an independent
contractor rather than an employee.
The most important factor in the analysis – whether RAAD was in control of the
manner and means of production – is inconclusive in the summary judgment analysis.
The producers were in control of the contents of the show. Def. St. ¶ 29; Pl. St. P 29.
Campos, the main producer, wrote the outline for each day and controlled who spoke on
air via the master console. Def. St. 21, 30, 32; Pl. St. 21, 30, 32. And RAAD had no direct
access to the conversations and information exchanged between the producers during and
after the show. Def. St. ¶ 33; Pl. St. ¶ 33. RAAD argues that because Campos and the
other producers were independent contractors, it therefore had no control over the manner
and means of production. However, the agreed-upon label of an employment contract is
not conclusive in determining the nature of an employment relationship. Rivera, 2012
WL 37770003 at *6. The fact that RAAD nominally hired Campos, Adames, and the

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other producers as independent contractors therefore says little about what type of control
it had over the production of the show.
RAAD also argues that it did not control the hours Pagán spent preparing for the
show, and therefore it did not control the manner and means of production. All agree that
RAAD did not control how long Pagán spent preparing for the show at home. But Pagán
had to be at the radio station every day at 1 p.m. for a pre-show meeting with the other
producers. RAAD claims that the producers required this, and since the producers were
independent contractors, it had no control over the hours she spent preparing for the
show. Reply ¶ 3.15. Even granting that RAAD did not directly require the meetings, and
that the producers did (but see note 3, supra) the fact that the producers nominally were
independent contractors says little about the control RAAD had over how they prepared
for the show as explained above.
Moreover, Pagán argues that the exclusivity agreement for FM radio weighs in
favor of considering her an employee. Docket No. 54 at 5. Exclusivity can be a sign of
control favoring employee status. Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 867 F. Supp. 2d
344, 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); Russell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 473. See also Davis v. Hartland
Homes, Inc., Civil No. 4:06CV3012, 2006 WL 2805255 (D. Neb. Sept. 28, 2006) (citing
Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir. 2003)). In Salamon,
the doctor had privileges at other hospitals, but claimed that she rarely if ever used those
privileges. Id. The court held that this raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
purported employer‟s control over her work. Id. Likewise, in Russell, a sales
representative for a company that sold medical products would have been fired if she sold
other product lines. Russell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 473. This weighed in favor of employee

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12

status. Id. Here, Pagán was able to pursue other opportunities on AM radio or television,
which she did, but she also signed an exclusivity agreement for FM radio and breaking
that agreement would terminate her contract. This shows at least some control by RAAD
and a reasonable jury could find that her relationship with RAAD was “in-house” rather
than “free-lance.” See Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491.
Some factors favor classifying Pagán as an independent contractor. For instance,
RAAD could not assign her additional projects beyond those stipulated in the contract,
and for each additional project that she took on, RAAD paid Pagán an additional fee.
Furthermore, both Pagán and RAAD classified her income as professional services
rendered. This tax treatment “suggests independent contractor status.” Alberty-Velez, 361
F.3d at 8.
Pagán also provided the instrumentalities and tools for the show. Pagán used her
own magazines, newspapers, and television to stay current on topics relating to women
and celebrities, and she used her own computer during the show to talk with Campos and
Adames. Pagán argues that RAAD provided the instrumentalities and tools for the show
by providing the microphones and equipment to air the show. However, only the
equipment used by Pagán for her particular functions is relevant to the analysis. AlbertyVelez, 361 F.3d at 8. Here, Pagán‟s function was to talk with Campos and Adames about
various topics, not to record and air the show. To perform these functions, she needed to
stay current with the news and converse with the other hosts. To do that, she used her
own TV, magazines, newspapers, and computer. Because there is no evidence that RAAD
provided any of the relevant equipment, a jury could not weigh this factor in favor of
employee status.

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The remaining factors include whether Pagán could hire assistants, whether
RAAD‟s regular business is radio broadcasting, and whether RAAD is currently in
business. The parties do not develop arguments for any of these factors. Though RAAD
claims Pagán could hire assistants, it points to no evidence in the record. See Docket No.
44 at 21. Pagán likewise does not point to any evidence that she could not hire assistants.
See Docket No. 54 ¶ 33. RAAD misreads the regular business factor and discusses
Pagán‟s line of business, see Docket No. 44 at 21, while Pagán states that radio
broadcasting is RAAD‟s regular business, but does not cite any evidence. Docket No. 54
¶ 34. Lastly, Pagán states that RAAD is in business without citing evidence, see id., and
RAAD does not discuss the matter. See Docket No. 54. The lack of developed arguments
for these factors does not affect the outcome of the case as Pagán has already showed that
a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding her employment status.
Looking at the record as a whole, the common law agency factors point in both
directions. They do not point so favorably towards independent contractor status such
that a fact finder could not reasonably find that Pagán was an employee. This is
especially so considering that the most important factor – the control RAAD had over the
means and manner of production – remains at issue. See Rodriguez-Vega, 2013 WL
1798017 at *12. RAAD‟s request is therefore denied.
If the court found that she was an independent contractor, Pagán argues in the
alternative that she became a regular employee after her contract was cancelled in 2009.
Docket No. 54 ¶ 37. Because summary judgment on her employment status during the
contract is denied, I need not discuss this argument.

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II.

14

Article 1802
RAAD also seeks to dismiss the Article 1802 claim, correctly arguing that Pagán

is barred from simultaneously pursuing an identical Law 100 claim. “To the extent that a
specific labor law covers the conduct for which a plaintiff seeks damages, he is barred
from using that same conduct to also bring a claim under Article 1802.” Rosario v.
Valdes, Civil No. 07-1508CCC, 2008 WL 509204 at *2 (D.P.R. Feb. 21, 2008). Pagán has
not shown how her Article 1802 and Law 100 claims differ. RAAD‟s motion for
summary judgment on this count is therefore granted.
III.

Supplemental Jurisdiction
RAAD‟s only discussion of the claims under Puerto Rico law asks the court to

decline supplemental jurisdiction. But when a district court has original jurisdiction over
a civil claim, supplemental jurisdiction extends to all other claims so related that they are
a part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Since the Title VII claim
conferring original jurisdiction remains viable and RAAD has not argued that Pagán‟s
other claims are outside supplemental jurisdiction, there are no grounds on which to
dismiss the claims under Puerto Rico law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See also Cabrera de
la Mata v. Puerto Rico Highway and Transp. Auth., Civil No. 10-1759 (BJM), 2012 WL
1110123 at *8 (D.P.R. Mar. 30, 2012). RAAD is not entitled to judgment on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. The claim under Article 1802 of the Civil Code is
DISMISSED. Summary judgment on Pagán‟s other claims is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 24th day of June, 2013.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge