Santos-Rodrguez et al v. Viera et al

Filing 198

OPINION AND ORDER granting 155 motion for summary judgment. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez on 3/13/2015. (MT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BERNADINO SANTOS RODRÍGUEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL NO. 11-1602 (MEL)

RAUL VIERA TORRES, et al.
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 14, 2012 Bernardino Santos Rodríguez (“Santos”), minor G.S.G, minor F.S.G.,

Gregory Santos, and Milagro López (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed second amended complaint
pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (“Article 1802”), claiming both diversity and
maritime jurisdiction and alleging a cause of action for negligence against Raúl Viera-Torres
(“Viera”) and Marcelo Colón López (“Colón”), as well as Cooperativa de Seguros Múltiples de
Puerto Rico (“Cooperativa”), as insurer of Viera and Colón, and for products liability against
defendant SeaStar Solutions, formerly known as Teleflex Canada, Ltd. (“SeaStar” or
“defendant”). ECF No. 82. Co-plaintiffs minor G.S.G, minor F.S.G., Gregory Santos, and
Milagro López are all family relatives of Santos (the “Santos Family Members”). ECF Nos. 156,
¶ 2; 162, ¶ 2. On August 16, 2012 plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss all claims against
Viera, Colón, and Cooperativa, and on September 25, 2012 the court entered partial judgment
dismissing all claims against them with prejudice. ECF Nos. 85, 88. Pending before the court is a
motion for summary judgment filed by SeaStar, plaintiffs’ response in opposition, SeaStar’s

reply, and plaintiffs’ surreply. ECF Nos. 155, 161, 166, 172. For the following reasons, the
motion for summary judgment is granted.
II.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL UNCONTESTED FACTS
On or about June 25, 2010, Santos, along with Colón, Wilfredo O. Sandoz (“Sandoz”)

and Martha M. Mercado (“Mercado”), spent the day at Bahía Jobos, Guayama, Puerto Rico in a
vessel that was the property of Viera and was captained and controlled by Colón. ECF Nos. 156,
¶ 3; 162, ¶ 3. None of the plaintiffs were the owner or operator of the vessel on June 25, 2010.
ECF No. 162, at 6, ¶ 7. The only individuals aboard the vessel on June 25, 2010 were Santos,
Colón, Sandoz, and Mercado. ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 8; 162, ¶ 8. The vessel had a Teleflex hydraulic
steering system, model number HC5380, with a rod-end attachment manufactured by SeaStar in
2002 (the “Teleflex”). ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 4; 162, ¶ 4. The rod end of the Teleflex broke during the
course of the voyage on June 25, 2010 and an accident occurred from which Santos sustained
extensive injuries, resulting in paraplegia. ECF Nos. 156, ¶¶ 5-7; 162, ¶¶ 5-7.
The 2000 Revision M of the SeaStar / Teleflex Installation Instructions and Owner’s
Manual (the “Instruction Manual”) was in effect at the time of manufacturing of the Teleflex.
ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 13; 162, ¶ 13. The Instruction Manual contains warnings regarding corrosion of
the “hydraulic hose steering,” but it does not contain a specific warning regarding corrosion of
the rod end of the Teleflex system or about “end of life” maintenance. ECF No. 162, ¶¶ 5-6.
When Viera acquired the vessel second-hand, he did not request any maintenance log or
maintenance documentation from the previous owner. ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 17; 162, ¶ 17. Viera did
not read the warnings and / or stickers affixed to the Teleflex nor did he review the Instruction
Manual. Id. Viera did not perform maintenance to the vessel himself or keep a maintenance log;
the maintenance to the vessel was provided by third-party mechanics that Viera would retain or

2

hire. ECF Nos. 156, ¶¶ 17-18; 156, ¶¶ 17-18. Viera has no knowledge as to what type of
maintenance or services were provided to the vessel by these mechanics. Id. During the course of
the seven to eight years that Viera had the vessel, none of the mechanics that provided
maintenance to the vessel brought to his attention that the rod end of the Teleflex needed to be
replaced. ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 19; 162, ¶ 19.
Plaintiffs confirmed on March 31, 2013 that the Teleflex had been stolen and is nowhere
to be found. ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 25; 162, ¶ 25. Plaintiffs’ liability expert, Farhad Booeshaghi
(“Dr. Booeshaghi”), did not physically inspect the Teleflex that was installed on the vessel on
June 25, 2010 for preparation of his expert report. ECF Nos. 156, ¶ 26; 162, ¶ 26. Instead,
Dr. Booeshaghi physically inspected an exemplar Teleflex product for preparation of his expert
report. Id. The date of manufacture of the exemplar inspected was 1998 whereas the original
Teleflex was manufactured in 2002. ECF No. 156, ¶ 27; 162, ¶ 27.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment “is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay

the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ.
Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is granted when the record
shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “‘A dispute is genuine if the evidence about
the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving
party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.’”
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v.
Federico Trilla Reg’l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).

3

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the
movant presents a properly focused motion “averring ‘an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case[,]’ [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of
at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d
112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug., Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)).
For issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot
merely “rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific
facts” in the record “that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995). The plaintiff need not, however, “rely on
uncontradicted evidence . . . . So long as the plaintiff’s evidence is both cognizable and
sufficiently strong to support a verdict in her favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine
which version of the facts is most compelling.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d
6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court “must view the entire record in
the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115 (citations omitted). There is “no
room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence
such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of
probability and likelihood . . . .” Greenburg v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st
Cir. 1987). The court may, however, safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

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IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Choice of Law
Federal maritime jurisdiction applies “in the territorial waters of Puerto Rico, which are

navigable waters of the United States . . . .” Ortiz v. Zambrana, 809 F.Supp.2d 1, 6-7 (D.P.R.
2011). Indeed, “the First Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that boating accidents are
maritime torts within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . .” NietoVincenty v. Valledor, 22 F.Supp.3d 153, 159 (D.P.R. 2014) (citing Medina v. Pérez, 733 F.2d
170, 171 (1st Cir. 1984)); see also Acadia Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 116 F.3d 599, n.2 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“Since ‘pleasure boats constitute an important part of maritime commerce,’ admiralty
jurisdiction extends to pleasure craft.” (citing Sirius Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Collins, 16 F.3d 34, 37
(2d Cir. 1994)).
Although the parties appear to agree that the underlying claim is a maritime tort that
renders admiralty jurisdiction applicable in this case, there is a dispute regarding which
substantive law applies. Defendant asserts that the incident that gave rise to the case at bar “falls
within the scope of a maritime tort” and, therefore, federal admiralty law applies to this case.
ECF No. 155, at 8. The second amended complaint avers that the court has diversity jurisdiction
to hear this action, and “[i]n the alternative, this case is governed by federal maritime law . . . .”
ECF No. 82, ¶ 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332-33; Victory Carries, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 204
(1971)). In response to summary judgment plaintiffs contend that since it is their “job . . . to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court,” and they have invoked admiralty jurisdiction as an
alternative to diversity jurisdiction in this case, Puerto Rico law controls. ECF No. 161.
However, where jurisdiction is available both on diversity and maritime grounds, “[p]laintiff’s
choice of diversity jurisdiction rather than admiralty jurisdiction . . . does not determine the

5

substantive law that governs the case.” Butler v. Am. Trawler Co., 707 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Me.)
aff'd, 887 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Austín v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 8 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1982) cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983)); see also Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864
F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he mere fact that the plaintiff invoked diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction does not preclude the application of maritime law.”); Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd.,
996 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Where a tort falls within admiralty jurisdiction, the general
maritime law applies, even if the plaintiff’s complaint pleaded diversity of citizenship as the sole
basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Wallstrom v. Kawaski Heavy Indutsries, Ltd., 4
F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993)).
It is well-accepted that where the basis of the underlying claim is a maritime tort,
substantive federal admiralty law applies. Butler, 707 F. Supp. At 31-32 (“In Carey, it was
determined that admiralty law applies where substantive provisions of admiralty and common
law conflict.” (citing Carey, 864 F.2d 201; Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953))); see also Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81
(D.P.R. 2005) aff'd, 449 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2006) (“If admiralty jurisdiction is available,
substantive admiralty law will apply even if plaintiffs alleged diversity jurisdiction in the
complaint.” (citing Hawn, 346 U.S. at 410-11)); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 (1995) (“It is true that with admiralty jurisdiction comes the
application of substantive admiralty law.” (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986) (internal quotations omitted))); Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark,
N.J. v. Gulf Puerto Rico Lines, Inc., 349 F.Supp. 952, 960 (D.P.R. 1972) (“The fact that in
maritime cases the court is to apply federal Maritime Law is a recognized principle of law.”).
Thus, given that the court has admiralty jurisdiction, substantive federal admiralty law governs

6

the controversies in this case.1 However, “[w]here maritime law is silent, state law supplements
the maritime law.” Guarascio v. Drake Associates Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (supplementing admiralty law with New York law where gaps existed (citing Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996))); see also Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341 (courts in admiralty cases may reach beyond
maritime precedents and apply state law “absent a clear conflict with federal law”); see also
Floyd v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 844 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“[S]tate law may not
be applied where it would conflict with a [federal] maritime law.”).
B. Products Liability
i. Manufacturing Defect
In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege claims against SeaStar for defective
manufacture, defective design, and failure to warn, all of which SeaStar moves to dismiss in its
motion for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 82; 155. In response, plaintiffs argue against
dismissal of their negligent design and failure to warn claims; however, with regard to the
manufacturing defect claim they state: “Although SeaStar may argue that it moved to dismiss
any manufacturing defect claim that may be present in this case out of an abundance of care,
wittingly or not, SeaStar incites the Court into believing that Plaintiffs are pursuing a
1

Although plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority in support of their contention that they may choose between
diversity and admiralty jurisdiction with regard to which substantive law applies, their position is in fact consistent
with Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1996). In Fedorczyk, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that because plaintiff is “the master of her complaint” she can avoid the application of general
maritime law if an alternative basis for jurisdiction over the claim, such as diversity jurisdiction, exists. Id. at 73.
This holding, however, stands in direct conflict with the position of the First Circuit Court of Appeals articulated in
Carey, in which the plaintiffs had invoked diversity jurisdiction and wished to apply a state law contributory
negligence rule. 864 F.2d 201. Because the case involved a maritime tort and the state law contributory negligence
rule conflicted with the comparative negligence provision under substantive admiralty law, the First Circuit held that
“the court should have applied the maritime rule” and disregarded the conflicting state provision. Id. at 207; see also
Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F.Supp. 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he Third Circuit regarded the plaintiff as
‘the master of her complaint,’ and allowed her to avoid general maritime law, even though admiralty jurisdiction
apparently exists . . . . I think it is a doubtful proposition that parties, who cannot by their agreement vest a federal
district court with subject matter jurisdiction that does not exist, can agree to divest the court of jurisdiction that
unquestionably exists. If that is the Third Circuit’s view, I am not bound by it.”) (quoting Fedorczyk, 83 F.3d at 73).

7

manufacturing defect claim against it.” ECF No. 161, at 5-6. Plaintiffs continue to state that their
“products liability theory is based on design defects and failure to warn, not manufacturing
defects,” and assert that “[i]t is clear that any manufacturing defect claim initially made was
subsequently abandoned with the submittal of the Joint Initial Scheduling Memorandum in
March of 2014.” Id. at 6. Moreover, in their surreply plaintiffs state that they have “no
manufacturing defect claim before the [c]ourt” and in the proposed pretrial order plaintiffs
indicate their manufacturing defect claim has been deemed waived. ECF No. 175, at 73. Because
plaintiffs have made clear that they have abandoned their manufacturing defect claim, to the
extent that it is alleged in the second amended complaint it is dismissed with prejudice.
ii. Design Defect
Products liability claims are “part of the general maritime law.” East River, 476 U.S. at
865. The substantive law in products liability cases arising under admiralty jurisdiction “is
informed by the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts.” Oswalt v. Resolute Industries,
Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Restatement (Third) of Torts). As explained in
Dehring v. Keystone Shipping Co., “[f]ederal admiralty law, like the Restatement of Torts, has
gradually moved from the ephemeral consumer expectations test to the more concrete risk-utility
test of the Restatement (Third).” No. 10-cv-13959, 2013 WL 3879619, at *3 (July 26, 2013 E.D.
Mich.) (finding the plaintiff was incorrect that federal admiralty law only applies the products
liability rules articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Regan v. Starcraft Marine LLC,
Civil Action No. 06-1257, 2010 WL 996424, at *3 (March 27, 2010 E.D. La.) (“The applicable
substantive law of products liability in admiralty is found in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.”);
Warford v. Industrial Power Systems, Inc., Civ. No. 06-cv-463-JL, 2008 WL 4642638, at *13
(D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2008) (applying Restatement (Third) of Torts to design defect claim in

8

admiralty case); see also 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and the General Maritime Law,
§ 5-7 (5th Ed. 2014) (noting that Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies in
admiralty cases, but that courts hearing products liability cases in admiralty have begun to
supplement it with the Restatement (Third) of Torts).
Section 402A of the Statement (Second) of Torts states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a product
is defectively designed “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or predecessor in the commercial chain or distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod.
Liab. § 2(b) (1998). Factors that are relevant to the consideration of whether the omission of a
reasonable alternative design renders a product not reasonably safe include: the magnitude and
probability of foreseeable risks of harm; instructions and warnings accompanying the product;
the nature and strength of consumer expectations about the product; and the relative advantages
and disadvantages of the product as designed and as it could have alternatively been designed.
Id. at § 2 cmt. f. In order to create a genuine issue of fact, “[s]ufficient evidence must be
presented so that reasonable persons could conclude that a reasonable alternative could have
been practically adopted.” Id.

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Defendant asserts that plaintiffs’ design defect claim should be dismissed, noting that
Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report “does not identify the existence of any design defect in the
Teleflex.” ECF No. 155, at 15. Indeed, a review of Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinion and conclusions
reveals that he does not identify any aspect of the design of the Teleflex system as the cause of
the incident. See ECF No. 162-4. Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Booeshaghi testified during his
deposition that the material used for the rod end, Stainless Steel 303, was prone to corrosion and
that Stainless Steel 316 has superior resistance to corrosion in a marine environment. ECF No.
161, at 9. The portions of Dr. Booeshaghi’s deposition to which plaintiffs refers state:
You can see that even the literature is very clear about that. That
303, because, because, in order to make it more machinable they
add a component of sulfur to it, which is different than 304. In fact,
if you look at most of the literature, they tell you 303 is not good
[in a] marine environment. You should not use 303. But, again,
this is a design choice. In fact, one of my students may have this as
his design choice. But you got to work with what you decide. And,
and that decision of using the 303 stainless steel. You’ve got to
make sure that you work with that design. For example, the most
popular one is 316, because 316 is a higher concentration of
chromeo which gives you a better protective surface of corrosion.
Anyway . . . .
The 316, in fact, is a better quality product for marine
environment. And by that virtue, definitely, washing it down, you
know, the established literature or, or technical facts about the
product, about its foreseeable use, creating a knowledge base for
the people who come after, which, which are the inspectors, the
mechanics, the owner, in order to have some understanding of the
procurements of the selection of that material to the environment at
which the, the product is design [sic] to perform.
ECF Nos. 162-1, at 115:11-23; 162-2, at 62:15-25.
Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report, however, does not mention that the Teleflex was
composed of Stainless Steel 303 or 316, let alone that Stainless Steel 303, or any other
component of the Teleflex design, is not well-suited to a marine environment or that Stainless

10

Steel 316 is a better choice for marine applications.2 Dr. Booeshaghi was asked during his
deposition: “So, so, your opinions in this case, just to be clear, your opinions in this case, the
ones that you are going to testify about at trial, are the opinions and conclusions stated in your
report of September 15, 2014?” ECF No. 156-6, at 83:2-5. He responded: “That’s correct.” Id. at
83:6. He also clarified that as of the date of his deposition the report dated September 15, 2014
was the only report he has rendered in this case and that it is his final report in this case, as well.
Id. at 84:14-20.
Even more significant than Dr. Booeshaghi’s own assertion that his expert report contains
the opinions about which he plans to testify at trial is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require that an expert report “contain: (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will
express and the basis and reasons for them; [and] (ii) the facts or data considering by the witness
in forming them . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). “The purpose of the expert disclosure
rule is ‘to provide opposing parties reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective crossexamination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses.’” Rembrant Visiion
Technologiez, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 725 F.3d 1377, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (citing Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Generally . . . Rule
26(a)(2) does not allow parties to cure deficient expert reports by supplementing them with later
deposition testimony,’ or the function of expert reports would be ‘completely undermined.’”
MMG Ins. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 293 F.R.D. 58, 61 (D.N.H. 2013) (finding

2

Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report does use the word “design” on two occasions. First, he indicates that he reviewed
the “Teleflex design drawings” for purposes of rendering his expert report. ECF No. 162-4, at 1. He also states that
“[a]s part of standard hierarchy in engineering design and manufacturing, the product manufacturer is required to
warn against all foreseeable hazards . . . .” Id. at 5. The first use of the word design is not an opinion or conclusion
of any kind, but merely a reference to materials he reviewed in reaching his opinions and conclusions. While the
second reference to the word design is contained within the opinion section of Dr. Booeshaghi’s report, viewed in
context this portion of his report does not relate to an opinion regarding how the Teleflex was designed or should
have been designed, but establishes his opinion regarding the standard of care as to what warnings are necessary
with regard to any product.

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supplemental deposition testimony insufficient to cure expert report’s failure to disclose one of
the bases of expert’s opinion as to cause of a fire (citing Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d
635, 642 (7th Cir. 2008))); see also Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d, 358 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The
purpose of the expert disclosure rules is to facilitate a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practical extent.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus,
based on the expert disclosure rule, courts routinely confine expert witnesses to testifying about
the opinions that are contained within their original expert report or a timely-filed amendment or
supplement. See, e.g., Carbo v. Chet Morrison Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. 12-3007, 2013 WL
5774948, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2013) (“[T]hough Carbo has not indicated that he intends to
supplement or amend Pazos' report, the Court notes, out of an abundance of caution, that such
amendments are not permitted at this late stage of litigation. Therefore, Carbo is confined to his
current expert report . . . .”); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 731 F.Supp.2d 184, 188
(D.N.H. 2010) (granting judgment as a matter of law in part because expert’s “opinion was
expressed for the first time at his deposition, not in his expert report, and thus was not properly
disclosed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)”); Galaxy Ventures, LLC v. Rosenblum, No. CIV
03-1236 JH/LFG, 2005 WL 5988690, at *7 (D.N.M. July 21, 2005) (“Dr. McDonald's testimony
at trial will be confined to the information and opinions expressed in his original expert report,
dated July 21, 2004.”); Medtronic Inc. v. Guidant Corp., No. CIV. 03-848-SLR, 2004 WL
5501181, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2004) (granting motion in limine to confine expert witness
testimony to opinions expressed in expert report).
When a party “fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a),” a party is “not
permitted to use that . . . information . . . at a trial unless the failure was substantially justified or
is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The tardy designation of expert evidence “impacts not

12

only the discovery deadline but also the court’s and the parties’ planning for summary judgment
motions. Consequences such as this undermine a showing of harmlessness.” Goldenson v.
Steffens, No. 2:10-CV-440-JAW, 2012 WL 2603143, at *6 (D. Me. July 5, 2012) (citing PoulisMinott, 388 F.3d at 358); see also Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1413 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“The reason for requiring that an expert report be provided before the deposition is
taken is so that the opposing party can use the report to examine the expert at deposition.”).
Although defendant clearly points out that Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report does not
mention the type of steel used in the Teleflex, in their response and opposition to summary
judgment and surreply plaintiffs do not offer any explanation or excuse as to why the opinions of
Dr. Booeshaghi upon which they rely as evidence for their design defect claim were not included
in his expert report. The deposition transcripts in question indicate that Dr. Booeshaghi’s
deposition was taken on November 25, 2014 and December 2, 2014, over two months after
plaintiffs’ expert report on liability was due and over a month after the date upon which
defendant’s expert report was due, that is October 15, 2014.3 See ECF No. 129, at 2. A review of
the docket reveals that plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend or supplement
Dr. Booeshaghi’s September 15, 2014 expert report in this case.4 As of today, any request to do
so would be highly untimely, in view that all deadlines for discovery and to file dispositive

3

The deadline to conduct depositions of expert witnesses on liability was November 7, 2014. See ECF No. 129, at 2.
On October 29, 2014 the parties requested an extension of this deadline until December 31, 2014, in order to be able
to conduct depositions on November 25, 2014 and December 23, 2014. ECF No. 153. The court denied the
extension request, no motion for reconsideration or renewed request to move the deadline in question was filed, and
the deadline was not otherwise extended. ECF No. 154.
4
On January 20, 2015, plaintiffs did move to substitute their medical damages expert in this case, psychiatrist
Dr. Néstor Cardona Cancio (“Dr. Cardona”). ECF No. 181. The request was denied because, among other reasons,
at the time of the ruling trial was scheduled to commence on February 23, 2015 and plaintiffs failed to bring the
matter motivating their request to the court’s attention in a timely manner. See ECF No. 194. On February 9, 2015,
at the Pretrial and Settlement Conference, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court for the first time that Santos would
not be available to attend the trial beginning on February 23, 2015 due to medical reasons. See ECF No. 195, at 2-3.
Taking into account this information and defendant’s objection to having Santos testify at trial via videoconference,
the court reluctantly moved the trial date. Id. Plaintiffs did not move the court to reconsider the denial of their
motion to substitute Dr. Cardona in light of the additional time before trial.

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motions have since expired. Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinions regarding the relative benefits and
drawbacks of using Stainless Steel 303 and 316 constitute a new theory of liability from that
which is contained in his expert report.5 Even if plaintiffs were now to request leave for
Dr. Booeshaghi to supplement his export report at this late stage in the litigation, permitting him
to testify about this matter at trial would not only require granting leave for him to supplement
his expert report after SeaStar has incurred in the expense of filing the pending motion for
summary judgment, but would likely also require the reopening of discovery to provide
additional leave for defendant’s expert to submit an amended or supplemental rebuttal report and
the need for additional depositions to be taken, and potentially a renewed opportunity for SeaStar
to file a dispositive motion regarding plaintiffs’ design defect claim. Because Dr. Booeshaghi’s
expert report is silent with regard to the use of Stainless Steel 303 and plaintiffs have not moved
for leave to allow him to amend or supplement it, he may not testify regarding his opinion about
its use in the Teleflex design at trial. Plaintiffs have made no argument that its exclusion from his
expert report is substantially justified, and such an argument would nevertheless be undermined

5

At the Pretrial and Settlement Conference convened on February 9, 2015, counsel for the parties mentioned that
Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report was accompanied a PowerPoint presentation of approximately 60 pages, which was
produced to defendant the same day as the expert report. See ECF No. 195, at 2. Plaintiffs have submitted a 69-page
slide presentation as an exhibit to their response in opposition to summary judgment. See ECF No. 162-3. It is
somewhat unclear, however, whether this is the PowerPoint presentation to which the parties referred at the Pretrial
and Settlement conference, as it has been submitted in the summary judgment record separately from
Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report and plaintiffs have not suggested that it should be considered as an exhibit to the
report. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the slide presentation is properly considered an exhibit to the expert
report, the page to which plaintiffs have cited in support of their design defect claim does not contain an opinion
regarding the type of steel used in the rod end of the Teleflex. ECF Nos. 162, at 6 ¶ 4; ECF No. 162-3, at 43. The
only evidence that plaintiffs have brought to the court’s attention regarding Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinion about the
merits and drawbacks of Stainless Steel 303 and 316 is contained within his deposition testimony, the contents of
which are not admissible at trial for the reasons stated in this opinion. ECF Nos. 162, at 6 ¶ 3-4; 162-1, at 115:11-23;
162-2, at 62:15-25. Several slides to which plaintiffs have not cited, however, do refer to the type of steel used in the
Teleflex. One such slide, which is entitled “Teleflex Product Update Notice,” states: “The cylinder fittings are made
of corrosion resistant stainless steel . . . .” ECF No. 162-3, at 52. The other is labeled “Manufacturer Drawings” and
contains a “notes” section that indicates that the “housing” and “ball” are composed of “303 Stainless Steel.” Id. at
58. These slides, however, do not contain a comparison of Stainless Steel 303 and 316, nor do they mention
Dr. Booeshaghi’s theory referred to in his deposition that Stainless Steel 303 is not suitable for a marine
environment. At most, they indicate that the Teleflex is composed of Stainless Steel 303, which cannot support a
design defect claim in isolation.

14

by Dr. Booeshaghi’s own statement that his report contains his opinions about which he will
testify at trial. Furthermore, given the advanced stage of this litigation, the admission at trial of
Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinion pertaining to the alleged design defect, which was absent from his
expert report, would certainly not be harmless. In view that Dr. Booeshaghi’s September 15,
2014 expert report does not contain any statement from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that the Teleflex was defectively designed, that his statements regarding Stainless Steel 303 and
316 are not included in his report and thus are inadmissible at trial, and that plaintiffs have not
brought any additional evidence to the court’s attention to support their design defect claim, it is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.6
iii. Inadequate Instructions or Warnings
As noted with regard to plaintiffs’ design defect claim, “[c]auses of action based on the
doctrine of products liability . . . are governed by the general maritime law.” Pietrafesa v. Board
of Governors for Higher Educ., 846 F.Supp. 1066, 1071 (D.R.I. 1994); see also East River, 476
U.S. at 865 (recognizing products liability as part of general maritime law). Although courts
have begun to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability cases in admiralty, in
their memoranda the parties have applied the four-prong test from non-admiralty, Puerto Rico
jurisprudence to the facts surrounding plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim. See ECF Nos. 155, at 16;
161, at 12. Regardless of which standard is applied, however, plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim
fails for the same reason: plaintiffs have not brought sufficient evidence of proximate causation

6

Nothing in this opinion should be construed as an expression that the addition of Dr. Booeshaghi’s deposition
testimony regarding Stainless Steel 303 and 316 to his expert report would create a triable issue of fact regarding
whether the Teleflex was defectively designed. Indeed, he emphasizes that the use of Stainless Steel 303 is a design
choice that one of his students may have made. However, because Dr. Booeshaghi does not mention the type of steel
used in the Teleflex design in his expert report, rendering his testimony on the matter inadmissible at trial, it is not
necessary to determine whether such testimony would allow plaintiffs’ design defect claim to survive summary
judgment.

15

to the court’s attention in the summary judgment record to create a trial-worthy dispute regarding
their failure to warn claim.
As with design defect claims, in the failure to warn context admiralty law “has gradually
moved from the ephemeral consumer expectations test to the more concrete risk-utility test of the
Restatement (Third).” Dehring, 2013 WL 3879619, at *3; see also Guarascio v. Drake
Associates Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) to failure to warn claim in suit within admiralty jurisdiction);
Oswalt, 642 F.3d at 860-61 (finding that Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, rather
than the Restatement (Second) of Torts, should be applied in products liability admiralty cases,
including those based on a failure to warn theory). Under the Restatement (Third), “[o]ne
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §§ 1, 15. A product “is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.” Id. § 2(c). “Under
prevailing rules concerning allocation of burdens of proof, plaintiff must prove that adequate
instructions or warnings were not provided.” Id. § 2, cmt. i. The reasonableness of including a
particular warning “rest[s] on a risk-utility assessment,” taking into account both the benefits and
drawbacks of including additional warnings. Id. § 2, cmt. n; see also § 2 cmt. i. While the
Restatement (Third) rejects strict adherence to traditional tort categories such as negligence and
strict liability, the reasonableness inquiry is intended to “achieve the same general objectives as

16

does liability predicated on negligence.” Id. § 2 cmt. a; see also § 2 cmt. n. In order for a plaintiff
to prevail, he or she must show that the defect in the warnings proximately caused the injuries in
question. Id. §§ 1, 15; see also Stark v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 371,
375 (6th Cir. 2001).
Under Puerto Rico law a “plaintiff alleging failure to warn must prove (1) the
manufacturer knew, or should have known of the risk inherent in the product; (2) there were no
warnings or instructions, or those provided were inadequate; (3) the absence of warnings made
the product inherently dangerous; and (4) the absence of adequate warnings or instructions was
the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Cruz Vargas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 348 F.3d
271, 276 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Aponte Rivera v. Sears Roebuck, 144 D.P.R. 830 (1998)).7
Puerto Rico products liability law “generally embraces the principles of strict products liability
prescribed in the of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A” and “has consistently relied upon
California Supreme Court precedent when confronting issues raised by the doctrine of strict
products liability.” Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int’l of Puerto Rico, 156 F.3d 49, 54, 55 (1st Cir.
1998). Under Puerto Rico’s strict liability, consumer-expectations based regime, “[t]he
manufacturer’s liability will depend on whether the deficiencies in the warnings or instructions
render the product unreasonably dangerous, that is, more dangerous than would be expected by
the ordinary consumer.” Aponte, 144 D.P.R. at 841; ECF No. 163-1, at 6. The chief distinction
between a strict liability and negligence in the products liability realm lies in what is necessary to
show that a product is defective: “Negligence rests on a showing of fault leading to product
defect. Strict liability rests merely on a showing of product defect.” Restatement (Third) of Torts
§ 2, cmt. n. In other words, “strict liability[] mak[es] the seller subject to liability to the user or
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
7

The docket contains an official translation of Aponte. See ECF No. 163-1.

17

product.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), cmt. a; see also 1 Owen & Davis on
Prod. Liab. § 5:1 (4th ed.) (“Liability under § 402A is ‘strict’ because it is based not on the
manufacturer’s fault in producing a defective product, but on the frustration of consumer
expectations of safety when a latent defect in a product cases physical harm.”).
Notwithstanding these doctrinal distinctions, the practical differences between an
application of the legal standard in a strict liability, consumer expectations regime and a riskutility regime with regard to design defect and failure to warn claims can often be difficult to
discern:
Strict liability can be applied coherently in manufacturing defect
cases because a product’s defectiveness can be determined without
resort to negligence-oriented cost-benefit balancing. But in both
defective design and failure-to-warn cases, cost-benefit balancing
is inevitably required to determine product defectiveness. Because
cost-benefit balancing is also at the heart of negligence, it is no
easy matter in design and warning cases to discover a difference
between strict liability and negligence.
Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-72 (1990); see also George Blum, et al., 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products
Liability § 1022 (2015) (“[D]espite theoretical differences between strict liability and negligence,
there need not be a rigid distinction between the theories in warning cases . . . .”); and 1 Owen &
Davis on Prod. Liab. § 9:2 (4th ed.) (“Most jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that there is
no material distinction between a claim in negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to
warn.”). The distinctions are further obscured when “proof of knowledge [is] a necessary
element of strict liability failure to warn”—as is true under Puerto Rico law—because “the strict
liability action begins to look much like its negligence counterpart.” Michael A. Pittenger,
Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1509, 1514 (1992).

18

It is unnecessary in this case to parse out what material differences, if any, exist between
to a failure to warn claim under admiralty and Puerto Rico law, because Puerto Rico’s strict
liability regime does not obviate the requirement from admiralty law that plaintiffs must prove
that the allegedly defective warnings caused the injuries in question in order to succeed on their
failure to warn claim. Puerto Rico’s strict liability failure to warn standard has been derived from
California products liability law, which also clearly requires a causal nexus between the
defective warnings in question and the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc.,
117 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638 (Cal. App. 1981) (“Causation is a necessary element in strict liability
just as it is in negligence liability. Thus the general rules of proximate causation apply.”); Groll
v. Shell Oil Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 444, 478 (Cal. App. 1983) (noting that a product may be
“deemed defective within the general strict liability rule” if it lacks adequate warnings, but that
the plaintiff in a products liability suit has “the burden of proving that the product was defective
and that the defect was a proximate cause of his injuries.” (emphasis added)). The inclusion of a
proximate cause element in a strict liability regime, however, is not unique to Puerto Rico and
California law: “[P]rinciples of proximate cause routinely apply in the negligence and strict
liability contexts.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 711, n.* (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also, e.g, Mumley v. Lenco Industries, Inc.,
173 F.3d 845, at 2 (2d Cir. 1999); Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir.
1991) (“A manufacturer is liable in tort on a theory of strict liability when it places a product on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, and it has a defect that
causes injuries.” (emphasis in original) (citing Montero Saldaña v. American Motors Corp., 107
D.P.R. 452, 508 (1978)); Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 492 (3d
Cir. 1985) (“Proximate causation is a necessary element in proving a tort case under theories of

19

strict liability or negligence.” (citation omitted)); Horak v. Pullman, Inc., 764 F.2d 1092, 1095
(5th Cir. 1985) (“Whether applying the law of strict liability or negligence, Texas law requires
that the defect or the negligent actions must be a producing or proximate cause of the accident.”).
Plaintiffs acknowledge that proximate cause is an element of a failure to warn claim, but
argue that under Puerto Rico law “[t]he absence of adequate warnings provided the element of
causation necessary to support this claim.” ECF No. 161, at 14. However, a review of the case
that plaintiffs cite in support of their assertion, Rivera et al. v. Superior Packaging, Inc., 1992
P.R.-Eng. 754,830, 132 D.P.R. 115 (1992), reveals that it does not stand for such a proposition.
To the contrary, Rivera states that a plaintiff in a products liability case “must first establish the
existence of the product’s defect, and second, that said defect was the legal cause of the damage
or injuries suffered.” 1992 P.R.-Eng. 754,830, 132 D.P.R. at 126 (emphasis in original); see also
Pérez v. Hyundai Motor Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72-73 (D.P.R. 2006) (“In Puerto Rico, in order
to meet its onus under strict liability principles plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
product was defective and that said defect was the cause of the injury.” (emphasis added) (citing
Aponte, 144 D.P.R. at 839-40; Rivera, 1992 P.R.-Eng. 754, 830, 132 D.P.R. at 128)).
Furthermore, to the extent, if at all, that Rivera is ambiguous as to whether proximate cause is a
separate element from inadequate warnings in a failure to warn claim under Puerto Rico law,
Aponte—which was decided approximately 6 years later—eliminated that ambiguity. 144 D.P.R.
at 841-42; ECF No. 163-1, at 6. Holding that the absence of adequate warnings provides
sufficient proof of causation would render the fourth, proximate cause element of a failure to
warn claim under Puerto Rico jurisprudence superfluous, as the second element of such a claim
is that there were no warnings or instructions or those provided were inadequate.

20

In a maritime personal injury case, “[a] proximate cause is one that plays a substantial
role in bringing about plaintiff’s injury.” Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime
Personal Injuries § 8:9 (2014). Puerto Rico jurisprudence employs a similar definition, that
“[p]roximate cause requires that the damages complained of be either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission at issue.” See, e.g., Pérez v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 57, 73 (D.P.R. 2006). In the failure to warn context, “[i]nadequate
warnings cannot serve as a proximate cause of injuries where adequate warnings about have
resulted in the same injuries.” Barry A. Lindahl, 3 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation
§ 27:43 (2d ed.); 1 Owen & Davis on Prod. Liab. § 9:30 (4th ed.) (“The primary issues in
causation revolve around whether a different, adequate, warning would have altered the
plaintiff's, or other users, behavior and prevented the injury.”).
Conceding plaintiffs’ point that “Santos was an invitee and not the owner or operator of
the vessel when the accident occurred” and that “[h]e had no duty to read the Instructions
Manual prior to boarding the vessel,” there nevertheless must be some evidence tending to
suggest that had better warnings been provided then the incident in question and the injuries
Santos sustained would have been avoided. ECF No. 172, at 7; Cf. Rodríguez-Ortega v. Philip
Morris, Inc., Civ. No. 03-1529 (CCC), 2005 WL 2977795, at *1, 8 (D.P.R. Nov. 7, 2005)
(granting summary judgment as to failure to warn claim under Puerto Rico law based on
plaintiffs’ failure to proffer evidence that the alleged failure to warn was the proximate cause of
damage to plaintiffs). Not only has no evidence been brought to the court’s attention with
specific citations to the record that Santos read the Instruction Manual, plaintiffs have not
rebutted the evidence that Viera, the owner of the boat, did not read the warnings in the
Instruction Manual and it is uncontested for summary judgment purposes. This fact would not

21

necessarily be fatal if plaintiffs had other evidence from which a rational jury could find that the
lack of warnings contributed to the incident. See, e.g., Johnson v. Medtronic, Inc., 365 S.W.3d
226, 234-35 (Mo. App. 2012) (finding plaintiffs satisfied their burden of producing sufficient
evidence on the element of proximate causation where the maintenance inspector of an allegedly
defective airplane testified that he was familiar with the contents of the maintenance manual
because it had read it on prior occasions); Sorto-Romero v. Delta Int’l Machinery Corp., No. 05CV-5172 (SJF)(AKT), 2007 WL 2816191, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (noting that “in
light of Plaintiff's inability to read the warnings, Plaintiff may be able to prove causation
whereby a third party may have conveyed the warning to him,” where sufficient evidence to
support such a finding was present). For example, plaintiffs might nevertheless have been able to
prove proximate cause had the third-party mechanics on whom Viera relied to perform
maintenance to the vessel possessed or read a copy of the Instruction Manual, basing the
maintenance services they offered on its contents or communicating the warnings within it to
Viera, or had the previous owner of the vessel read the manual and communicated the relevant
contents to Viera upon selling the vessel to him, among other possibilities. However, no such
evidence has been adduced.
Indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, no evidence has been brought
the court’s attention from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the omission of
additional warnings caused Santos’s damages. Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report provides sufficient
evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the warnings in the Instruction
Manual were lacking certain information regarding the risks of corrosion of the rod end of the
Teleflex, as well as the preventive maintenance measures to be taken. See ECF No. 162-4, at 4-5.
There is a gap in the record, however, regarding how the inclusion of the additional language

22

would have prevented the incident in which Santos sustained his injuries, as the owner of the
boat did not read the Instruction Manual that Dr. Booeshaghi opines is inadequate and no
evidence has been cited to the effect that the vessel’s mechanics or any of its occupants on June
25, 2010 had read said manual. Without some evidence to bridge this gap, a rational finding that
the alleged product defect—the lack of additional warnings and instructions in Instruction
Manual—caused the boating incident on June 25, 2010 cannot be made without speculation.
Thus, plaintiffs cannot defeat summary judgment of their failure to warn claim based on the
proximate cause element.
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found in Aponte that the failure to
read the warnings given by a manufacturer does not preclude a plaintiff from recovering on a
claim that the warnings were inadequate. See ECF Nos. 161, at 14. In the relevant portion of
Aponte, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stated:
It is advisable to point out that the fact that plaintiff did not read
the instructions has no bearing on the solution of this case. When
the duty to adequately inform is breached, the fact that the plaintiff
did not read the warnings or instructions does not bar a claim for
damages.
144 D.P.R. at 846-47; ECF No. 163-1, at 9-10. In making this assertion, the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico relied on Rhodes v. Interstate Battery System of America, 722 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir.
1984) and East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C. App. 1990). 144 D.P.R. at 870
n.15; ECF No. 163-1, at 10 n.15. Far from expressing that whether or not the warnings were read
is irrelevant to a claim that the warnings were inadequate for failing to contain additional
information, both Rhodes and East Penn explain that whether an individual read the warnings
rendered is not necessarily fatal to a failure to warn claim, depending on the plaintiff’s theory of
liability.

23

In Rhodes, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between two types of
failure to warn theories: “(1) failure to take adequate measures to communicate the warning to
the ultimate user, [and] (2) failure to provide a warning that, if communicated, was adequate to
apprise the user of the product’s potential risks.” 722 F.2d at 1519. It cited to numerous cases in
which courts had held that “any insufficiency in the adequacy of the warning label of a product
cannot be the proximate cause of the injury” when the plaintiff fails to read a warning label. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the proposition expounded in those cases did “not
necessarily preclude recovery” in that particular case. Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the
plaintiff in Rhodes did not “maintain that the warning itself, if communicated, was inadequate to
apprise him of the danger. He claim[ed] his failure to read the label resulted from the defendants’
negligence in communicating the warning, i.e., that other, more effective ways of
communicating the battery’s dangers were available and should have been employed.” Id. In
short, the “contents” of the warnings were not at issue because the plaintiff’s failure to warn
argument was that the manufacturer should have communicated the warning to him “in a more
effective manner.” Id. at 1520. In East Penn, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized the distinction drawn in Rhodes, stating that “[w]hen the failure to warn is based on
the steps taken to communicate the warning, the fact that the plaintiff never read the warning is
evidence that the label was inadequate, and should not bar recovery.”8 578 A.2d at 1124 (citing
Rhodes, 722 F.2d at 1519 (emphasis added)).

8

The D.C. Court of Appeals also noted in East Penn that in that jurisdiction, a rebuttable presumption exists that the
user of a product would have read the warnings given and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the jury may
presume that the defendant’s product was the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. Id. However, when the
defendant does present contrary evidence, the plaintiff “may not recover absent proof that the inadequacy of the
warning was at least a substantial factor contributing to his injury.” Id. at 25. In East Penn, the defendant rebutted
the presumption by presenting evidence that the user of the product did not read the warnings which he claimed
were inadequate. The D.C. Court of Appeals explained, however, that even though the plaintiff admitted that he did
not read the warning label and his claim related to the content of the warning, there was nevertheless sufficient
evidence for a jury to find that the failure to warn proximately caused the plaintiff’s work-related injury, because it

24

In Aponte, the plaintiff’s central failure to warn theory was based in an argument that the
manufacturer had not taken adequate measures or steps to communicate warnings; he alleged
“that the warnings of the danger and instructions . . . were written in English and, therefore, were
ineffective or nonexistent and constituted a defect of the product.” 144 D.P.R. at 836; ECF No.
163-1, at 2-3. Thus, the essence of his failure to warn claim was that the manufacturer failed to
communicate the warnings to him, as someone who was not fluent in the English language, in an
effective manner. In response, the defendant “contended that plaintiff did not read the
instructions or warnings printed on the battery, or the information they gave him when he bought
it, and that he did not take any steps to have the instructions translated or explained and,
therefore, his ignorance could solely be attributed to his own conduct.” Id. In the course of the
opinion, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico asserted that:
An analysis must . . . be made of . . . the likelihood that a particular
warning will adequately alert the users or consumers to the risks of
using the product, whether correctly or incorrectly. The content of
the warning must be comprehensible to the average consumer.
Consequently, the warnings and instructions supplied by the
manufacturer must transcend language barriers.
Id. at 842; ECF No. 163-1, at 7. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in Aponte affirmed the
holding of Superior Court, Ponce Part, which found that the defendant was liable for failure to
warn, ultimately finding that the warnings were inadequate “even for an English speaker,” since
they lacked specificity as to a particular risk, and “that plaintiff could not be aware of the risk
involved in his conduct, because the warnings advising on the possibility of an explosion were
written in English.” Id. at 837; ECF No. 163-1, at 3-4, 11.
In light of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s reliance on East Penn and Rhodes, which
held that the failure to read warnings does not preclude recovery when the theory is based on the
was undisputed that one or more of his co-workers did read the warning label and the jury could have reasonably
inferred that they would have communicated the warning to him, impacting his behavior. Id. at 1124-25.

25

steps to communicate a warning, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s proclamation that “[w]hen the
duty to adequately inform is breached, the fact that the plaintiff did not read the warnings or
instructions does not bar a claim for damages” is best understood as meaning that the fact that
warnings were not read does not always bar a claim for damages in a failure to warn claim based
on the steps taken to communicate the warnings to the user or buyer. Aponte, 144 D.P.R. at 84647; ECF No. 163-1, at 9-10. Aponte explicitly requires a plaintiff pursuing a failure to warn
claim to prove proximate causation. Id. at 841-42; ECF No. 163-1, at 6. Likewise, California
products liability jurisprudence, on which Puerto Rico’s products liability law has consistently
relied, uniformly requires the same showing. See, e.g., Garman, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 638; Groll,
148 Cal. App. 3d 444, 478. Interpreting Aponte to mean that whether an end user has read
allegedly inadequate warnings is always irrelevant in a failure to warn claim would conflict with
the fundamental principle—recognized not only in the Restatement (Third) but in Aponte
itself—that a product defect is actionable only when it proximately causes a person’s injuries.
Based on the evidence that plaintiffs have brought to the court’s attention in the summary
judgment record, plaintiff’s failure to warn theory falls in the category of a claim of inadequate
content, not inadequate steps or measures to convey the warnings or instructions. The opinion
rendered in Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert report states:
1. It appears that the loss of steering control, which resulted in the
subject accident and injuries to Mr. Bernardino Santos, was
due to corrosion of the rod end of the boat’s hydraulic steering
cylinder.
2. The subject failed hydraulic steering cylinder was a SeaStar
model number HC5380 outboard splashwell mount cylinder
with a rod end attachment manufactured by Teleflex.
3. The photographs of the rod end, along with the testimony of
Mr. José Terrasa Nolla, depict and confirm that corrosion was
the main cause for failure of the subject hydraulic steering
cylinder rod end.

26

4. The subject Teleflex hydraulic steering cylinder was
manufactured in 2002.
5. As a part of standard hierarchy in engineering design and
manufacturing, the product manufacturer is required to warn
against all foreseeable hazards such as the hazards associated
with the subject hydraulic steering cylinder rod end’s
interchangeability, corrosiveness, preventive maintenance, and
the risks associated with its failure.
6. The 2000 Revision M of the SeaStar/Teleflex Installation
Instructions And Owner’s Manual was in effect at the time of
manufacturing of the subject hydraulic steering cylinder.
7. The 2000 Revision M of the SeaStar/Teleflex Installation
Instructions And Owner’s Manual does not contain specific
references, warnings, and/or requirements related to the
hydraulic steering cylinder rod end and its interchangeability,
corrosiveness, preventive maintenance, and the risk of hazards
associated with its failure.
ECF No. 162-4, at 4-5. Essentially, Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinion is that the standard of care requires
additional language about all foreseeable hazards that was not included in the Instruction
Manual. That is, the Instruction Manual should have contained additional content about the rod
end’s interchangeability, corrosiveness, preventive maintenance, and the risks associated with its
failure. A reading of Dr. Booeshaghi’s opinion does not support a claim that the Teleflex was
defective because defendant failure to take adequate measures, such as including instructions in a
different place or in a different language, to communicate the warnings. Aside from
Dr. Booeshaghi’s expert opinion, plaintiffs have not brought any additional evidence to the
court’s attention to support their claim that the Teleflex was defective due to inadequate
warnings or instructions. Thus, even assuming that Puerto Rico law governed the failure to warn
cause of action, the language on which plaintiffs rely from Aponte does not resolve the matter of
proximate causation in this case.
Under maritime law “[t]he plaintiff must . . . bring forward some evidence of actual
cause” between the product defect and the injuries in question in order to succeed on a products

27

liability claim. Stark, 21 Fed. Appx. At 376. Stated differently, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving proximate causation. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the parties are correct in
their implicit assumption that Puerto Rico law applies to the failure to warn claim in this case,
plaintiff also has the burden of proving proximate causation between the product defect and the
injuries in question under Puerto Rico law. Given that the summary judgment record establishes
that Viera did not read any of the warnings SeaStar provided, and given that no evidence of an
alternative causal link has been identified such that the jury could rationally infer the requisite
proximate causation, regardless of whether maritime or Puerto Rico law is applied SeaStar’s
motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Defendant contends that under federal maritime law, the Santos Family Members cannot
recover for negligent inflection of emotional distress because they were not present at the time
the incident occurred. ECF No. 155, at 8-9. In light of the conclusions reached regarding
plaintiffs’ manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn claims, whether the Santos
Family Members can recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress is moot, as
all of their claims have been dismissed on other grounds. Assuming for argument’s sake that one
or more of their products liability claims survived summary judgment, however, they would not
be permitted to recover for emotional damages for the reasons that follow.
Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to consider whether federal
maritime law precludes a state law cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(see Fairest-Knight v. Marine World Distributors, Inc., 652 F.3d 94, n.7 (1st Cir. 2011)), the
consensus among courts that have addressed this matter is that negligent infliction of emotional
distress is a cognizable claim under admiralty, and thus general admiralty law governs liability,

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precluding state law to the extent that it conflicts with admiralty rules. See Nieto-Vincenty v.
Valledor, 22 F.Supp.3d 153, 159 (D.P.R. 2014); Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208,
231 (5th Cir. 2013); Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2012);
Carrier v. Jordaan, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1348 (S.D. Ga. 2010); Stepski v. M/V NORASIA
ALYA, No. 7:06-cv-01694, 2010 WL 6501649, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010); Zorrilla-Balseiro
v. Marina Puerto Chico, Inc., Civ. No. 08-1183 (CCC), 2009 WL 866867, at *2 (Mar. 30, 2009);
Fernández v. Aliff, Civ. No. 06-1301 (DRD), 2008 WL 2026010, at *2 (May 8, 2008); Tassinari
v. Key West Water Tours, L.C., 480 F.Supp.2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Isham v. Padi Worldwide
Corp., CV. Nos. 06-00382 DAE-BMK, 06-00386 DAE-BMK, 2007 WL 2460776, at *17 (D.
Haw. Aug. 13, 2007); Kunkel v. Motor Sport, Inc., 349 F.Supp.2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2004);
Complaint of Clearsky Shipping Corp., 1998 WL 560347, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 1998); Chan
v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
Despite the consensus among courts hearing admiralty cases that negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims are governed by substantive admiralty law, it is somewhat less clear
whether the “physical injury or impact,” the “zone of danger” test, or the “bystander proximity”
theory applies to such claims:
Under the ‘physical injury or impact’ test, a plaintiff may recover
damages only if she experiences physical contact or injury in
addition to the emotional distress. Under the ‘zone of danger’
standard, a plaintiff need not experience physical injury or impact
to recover damages so long as the plaintiff witnesses the
endangerment of another and is also placed at risk of physical
injury due to the defendant’s negligence. Under the ‘bystander
proximity’ theory, a plaintiff may recover for emotional damages if
he or she: (1) is physically close to the scene of the accident; (2)
directly witnesses the incident; and (3) is a close relative of the
victim.

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Peemoller Sultan v. Pleasure Craft Contender 25’, 139 F.Supp.2d 230, 235-6 (D.P.R. 2001)
(internal citations omitted). In Chan, one of the first cases to consider the issue, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to decide whether general maritime law should adopt the “physical
injury or impact” rule, the “zone of danger” test, or the “bystander proximity” theory. 39 F.3d at
1410. Subsequent to Chan, however, many courts sitting in admiralty have chosen to apply the
“zone of danger” test to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, “which allows recovery
if a plaintiff is ‘placed in immediate risk of physical harm by [defendant’s negligent] conduct.’” 9
Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1337-38 (citing Stacy v. Rederiet Otto Danielsen, A.S., 609 F.3d 1033,
1035 (9th Cir. 2010)); Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 403, 406
(S.D.Fla.1995)); see also Nieto-Vincenty, 22 F.Supp.3d at 159; Peemoller Sultan v. Pleasure
Craft Contender 25’, 139 F.Supp.2d 230, 235-6 (D.P.R. 2001). Others have continued to avoid
the question of which of these three tests applies, because regardless it is clear that under
maritime law “a plaintiff may not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
for injury sustained by another unless he or she was near the scene of the accident.” Peemoller
Sultan, 139 F.Supp.2d at 235-6 (citing Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.
1994); Yballa v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1428, 1435 (D.Haw. 1995); Williams v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.Fla. 1995)); see e.g., Barker, 713 F.3d at
231; Stepski, 2010 WL 6501649, at *7; Zorrilla-Balseiro, 2009 WL 866867, at *2; Fernández,
2008 WL 2026010, at *2.

9

The “zone of danger” test has prevailed among these courts based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994), which applied the “zone of danger” test to tort claims
brought under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act. See, e.g., Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1337-38 (“[F]ederal maritime
law has adopted Gottshall’s application of the ‘zone of danger’ test . . . .); Nieto-Vincenty, 22 F.Supp.3d 153
(applying zone of danger test as articulated in Gottshall to admiralty claim and noting that “[o]ther federal courts
have followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottshall and applied the ‘zone of danger’ test.”).

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It is uncontested for summary judgment purposes that the only individuals aboard the
vessel on the date of the incident were Santos, Colón, Sándoz, and Mercado, and that the incident
occurred during the course of the voyage that day. Defendant also proposes as an uncontested
fact that “[t]he [Santos] Family Members were neither aboard the vessel on June 25, 2010, nor
were they present to witness the accident and / or incident that took place on June 25, 2010.”
ECF No. 156, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). However, as plaintiffs point out defendant does not support
the latter portion of this assertion with a citation, in violation of Local Rule 56(b), which requires
that each fact in a proposed statement of material facts be followed by a citation to the specific
page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion. Because of SeaStar’s
failure to cite to evidence that the Santos Family Members were not present to witness the events
in question, plaintiffs request that the court allow their negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 161, at 4. Disregarding
this unsupported proposed fact, it is still clear from the uncontested facts that none of the Santos
Family Members were aboard the vessel when the incident occurred, but it nevertheless remains
possible, among other things, that one or more of them witnessed the incident from the shore or
from another vessel or that their safety was somehow jeopardized by the incident although they
were not aboard the vessel.
At the summary judgment stage “[t]he movant must put the ball in play, averring ‘an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’ The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to establish” the existence of a genuine and material issue of fact. Garside v. Osco
Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 315; Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248). Defendant clearly and explicitly moves for summary judgment as to the Santos Family
Members’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, arguing that they were not close

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enough to the scene to witness the incident on June 25, 2010 in which Santos sustained injuries.
ECF No. 155, at 8-9. In response, plaintiffs have not argued that the Santos Family Members
were in fact near to the scene of the incident on June 25, 2010, but only request that the claim
survive summary judgment because defendant has not provided evidence to support the proposed
fact that the Santos Family Members were not present to witness the accident, as required by
Local Rule 56. ECF Nos. 161, at 3-4; 172, at 1-2. Not only have plaintiffs not cited to any
evidence to suggest that one or more of the Santos Family Members saw the incident and / or
were present at or near the scene, a review of the second amended complaint reveals that
plaintiffs do not allege that the Santos Family Members were in close proximity to the scene of
the incident, such that they were in risk of physical harm, as required under the “zone of danger”
test, that they sustained a physical impact or injury, as is necessary to recover under the “physical
impact or injury” rule, or even that they witnessed the events at issue, which could entitle them
to relief under the more lenient “bystander proximity rule”. See ECF No. 82. For issues where
the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely “rely on the
absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts” in the record “that
demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy, 56 F.3d at 315. Regardless of
which test is applied, the applicable proximity factor is an element of a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim that plaintiffs must prove at trial in order to prevail on that cause of
action under maritime law.10 See Nieto-Vincenty, 22 F.Supp.3d at 160 (granting summary
judgment were plaintiffs did “not even allege—much less put forth evidence” that the plaintiff
was placed in immediate risk of physical harm); and Carrier, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (dismissing
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based on physical impact theory where the

10

Although all reasonable inferences are made in the nonmovant’s favor, for summary judgment purposes the court
may disregard unsupported speculation.

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plaintiffs did not allege in the complaint that they sustained a physical impact or injury). Because
plaintiffs’ local cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is precluded as it
conflicts with the maritime standard barring recovery for emotional distress unless an individual
is near the scene of an accident, and they have not presented evidence that the Santos Family
Members were in fact near the scene of the incident and / or saw it unfold and have not so much
as alleged or argued as such, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Santos Family
Members’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims is granted and such claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
D. Spoliation
Defendant’s final argument is that sanctions are warranted due to plaintiffs’ “inability to
protect or maintain its sole and indispensable evidence,” namely, the Teleflex. ECF No. 155, at
22-24. SeaStar asserts that there are a “number of issues” relevant to its defense that “can only be
resolved through the physical inspection of the missing product itself.” Id. at 22.
Acknowledging that SeaStar and its experts have been unable to inspect the Teleflex, defendant
has not shown that sanctions for spoliation are justified in this case. The summary judgment
record establishes that Viera, not Santos or any of the other plaintiffs, was the owner of the boat
in question. Defendant does not allege, and no evidence has been brought to the court’s attention,
that plaintiffs were in control of the boat or the Teleflex after the incident occurred, such that
they did not adequately safeguard the evidence. Furthermore, aside from the uncontested fact
that the Teleflex was “stolen” and is “nowhere to be found,” no evidence has been brought to the
court’s attention regarding the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the Teleflex such
that a finding could be made that one or more of the plaintiffs are responsible. As defendant
points out, it is unnecessary for the court to find that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in order to

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impose sanctions for spoliation, but plaintiffs do at least need to have been responsible for its
absence. See Sacramona v. Bridgestone / Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that the district court is permitted to consider sanctions if evidence “is mishandled
through carelessness” even absent bad faith).
As a sanction for the unavailability of the Teleflex, SeaStar requests that the court
dismiss the claims against it with prejudice or “grant such other . . . relief as the [c]ourt may
deem appropriate.” ECF No. 155, at 25. To the extent that defendant requests dismissal, the
request is moot in light of the dismissal of plaintiffs’ manufacturing defect, design defect, and
failure to warn claims for the reasons stated within this opinion. Addressing defendant’s
spoliation argument on the merits, however, given the lack of evidence, or even allegations, as to
how any specific actions or omissions on the part of plaintiffs contributed to the disappearance of
the Teleflex, SeaStar’s request for sanctions against plaintiffs is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, SeaStar’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All
claims against SeaStar are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13th day of March, 2015.
s/Marcos E. López
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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