Rosario et al v. Crowley Puerto Rico Services, Inc. et al
Filing
36
ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 9/28/2012. (RJC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BEATRIZ ROSARIO, et. al.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
v.
CROWLEY PUERTO RICO SERVICES,
INC., et. al.,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Before
Plaintiffs’2
admiralty
the
Court
complaint.
and
general
stand
Defendants’1
Plaintiffs’
maritime
law
claim
of
motion
is
the
to
grounded
United
dismiss
on
States
the
of
America, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (formerly 46 U.S.C. §
688), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint;
for the reasons outlined below, it is hereby GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August 6, 2011
alleging violations of the general maritime law of the United
1
Defendants are: Crowley Puerto Rico Services, Inc.; Crowley
Maritime Services, Inc.; Crowley Towing and Transportation
Company, Inc.; Crowley Marine Services, Inc.; Crowley Liner
Services, Inc.; and The West of England Ship Owners Mutual
Insurance Association’s (Luxembourg) (hereinafter “Crowley”).
2
Plaintiffs are: Beatriz Rosario; Víctor M. Escudero-Rosario;
and Enid Beatriz Escudero.
2
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
States, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and the Longshore and
Harbor
Workers’
Amended
Compensation
Complaint
Escudero-Aponte
states
Act,
that
(hereinafter
33
on
U.S.C.
July
“Escudero”),
901-950.
2010,
30,
§§
Mr.
a
seaman
The
Víctor
and/or
stevedore, resident of Puerto Rico, suffered an injury during
the course of his employment aboard Defendants’ vessel, the TMT
Freight Barge Jacksonville. While the vessel was docked in the
territorial and navigable waters of Puerto Rico and Escudero was
working aboard the vessel, he was struck by a container chassis
being driven in reverse by another employee, causing trauma to
his right leg. Escudero died on August 6, 2010 as a result of
his injuries. Escudero’s employer was insured in accordance with
the Puerto Rico Workmen’s Accident Compensation Act (PRWACA) and
Plaintiffs received benefits thereunder. Plaintiffs then brought
suit, alleging that the negligence of Defendants, failure to
provide
safe
working
conditions,
and
the
unseaworthiness
of
their vessels were the proximate cause of decedent’s injuries,
and therefore Plaintiffs’ alleged damages.
Plaintiffs
Workers’
claim
Compensation
that
Act
concurrently
under
state
systems,
long
as
so
under
(LHWCA),
and
amounts
the
Longshore
benefits
federal
paid
may
workers’
for
the
and
be
Harbor
received
compensation
same
injury,
disability, or death are offset against benefits paid under the
aforementioned Act. Similarly, any amount recovered under the
3
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
Jones Act for a seaman’s disability or death is also offset
against
claim
Puerto
LHWCA’s
should
Rico
benefits.
Defendants
dismissed
because
be
Workmen’s
argue
they
Accident
that
are
Plaintiffs’
shielded
Compensation
by
the
Act
(PRWACA)
Procedure
12(b)(6),
employer immunity provision.
STANDARD OF LAW
Pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
courts may dismiss an action for failure “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 (2009). “Facial plausibility” is attained when
plaintiff
pleads
reasonably
infer
factual
that
content
defendant
that
has
allows
incurred
the
in
court
the
to
alleged
misconduct. Id. Thus, to survive a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to “raise a
right to relief above a speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The Federal Rules do not require an exhaustive, detailed
complaint;
principle
enough
however,
of
“heft”
our
to
in
accordance
judicial
system,
satisfy
the
with
the
allegations
requirement
of
underpinning
must
contain
providing
fair
notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it
rests. Id.; see also, Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st
Cir. 2008). Moreover, the First Circuit has held that “dismissal
4
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint
fails
to
set
inferential,
forth
factual
respecting
each
allegations,
material
either
element
direct
or
necessary
to
sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi
v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008).
When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must
distinguish
between
well-pleaded
facts
and
“bald
assertions,
unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the
like,” taking into account the former and safely disregarding
the latter. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). In
adjudicating plaintiffs entitlement to recovery courts assume
the truth of all well-pleaded averments. Nonetheless, statements
that
“merely
offer
legal
conclusions
couched
as
facts,
or
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” will
be rejected. Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the Puerto Rico
Workmen’s Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter PRWACA) holds
the exclusive remedy for covered employees injured during the
course of their employment. As a result, Plaintiffs fail to
state
a
claim
upon
which
this
Court
may
consequently, the complaint shall be dismissed.
grant
relief;
5
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
Pursuant
to
PRWACA,
the
right
to
compensation
of
an
employee who suffers an injury, illness, is disabled or dies as
a
consequence
of
his
or
her
employment
is
limited
to
the
statutory compensation offered by the State Insurance Fund, so
long as the employer is insured under applicable law. Santiago
Hodge v. Parke Davis Co., 1990 JTS 42, 1990 WL 657532 P.R.
Offic.
Trans.
(P.R.
Mar.
21,
1990).
Section
21
of
PRWACA
expressly states that “[w]hen an employer insures his workmen or
employee
in
established
against
accordance
to
the
compensations
obtain
employer,
and
with
this
chapter,
compensation
even
benefits
in
have
shall
those
been
the
be
right
herein
only
remedy
the
cases
granted
where
in
maximum
accordance
thereof….” Tit. 11 P.R. Laws Ann. § 21. (emphasis added).
In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, unlike anywhere
else in the United States, when a seaman [or a
longshoreman], who is a resident of Puerto Rico, is
injured within the territorial waters of Puerto Rico
while working for a company insured under the Puerto
Rico State Insurance Compensation Fund, his exclusive
remedy lies pursuant to the PRWACA. Reeser v. Crowley
Towing & Transp. Co., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 144, 147
(D.P.R. 1996).
Plaintiffs allege that the jurisdiction in this case is
based on the admiralty and general maritime law of the United
States, the Jones Act, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs fail to consider that
not all provisions of the federal constitution are automatically
enforceable within the borders of Puerto Rico, since Puerto Rico
6
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
is an unincorporated territory. See
Guerrido v. Alcoa Steamship
Co., 234 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1956). The rules of admiralty and
maritime law are presently in force in Puerto Rico “to extent
that they are not locally inapplicable either because they are
not designed to apply to Puerto Rican waters or because they
have been rendered inapplicable to such waters by inconsistent
Puerto Rican legislation.” Id., at 355 (1st Cir. 1956). By way
of PRWACA, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has validly enacted
legislation that is inconsistent with the Jones Act, the LHWCA
and the general maritime law of the United States. See Garcia v.
Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1979); Fonseca v. Prann, 282
F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961)
(PRWACA
preempts
seamen’s
actions,
brought
against
their
employers and based on general maritime law, for negligence and
unseaworthiness); Alcoa Steamship Company v. Perez Rodriguez,
376
F.2d
35
(1st
Cir.
1967)
(PRWACA
displaces
LHWCA
and
forecloses in rem suit based on unseaworthiness by longshoreman
against his employer’s vessel as though it were a third party
independently liable); Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Rivera
de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Mojica v. Puerto
Rico Lighterage Company, 492 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding
that PRWACA provides exclusive remedy for a worker injured on a
tug against his employer, the tug owner)).
7
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court have consistently upheld the
right, bequeathed by Congress, of Puerto Rico’s legislature to
enact laws that supplant federal maritime law. As Perez de la
Cruz v. Crowley Towing & Transportation Co., 807 F.2d 1084, 1087
(1st Cir. 1983) notes:
[There is] an unbroken line of cases dating back to
1924 in which [the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit] has held that Congress, in [48
U.S.C.] § 749 and its predecessors gave Puerto Rico
the power to supplant federal maritime law in favor of
the PRWACA for covered accidents involving seamen that
occur in Puerto Rico’s local waters.... In Lusson [the
First Circuit] held that because of the power Congress
delegated to Puerto Rico in § 749, PRWACA displaces
the Jones Act as the exclusive remedy for covered
seaman injured by insured employers in Puerto Rican
waters. Perez de la Cruz, 807 F.2d at 1087 (emphasis
added).
Without
a
doubt,
then,
Plaintiffs’
contention
that
they
may
choose either federal or state law in this instance is clearly
erroneous.
PRWACA
provides
the
sole
rule
of
decision
here.
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to examine whether Crowley
is shielded by PRWACA’s employer immunity doctrine.
There
are
four
factors
that
need
to
be
met
for
PRWACA
employer’s immunity to apply. To wit: (1) it must be determined
that the employer is authorized to do business in Puerto Rico;
(2) the employer must have insured its employees under PRWACA;
(3)
the
accident
must
have
occurred
within
the
territorial
8
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
waters of Puerto Rico; and (4) the injured seaman must have been
a resident of Puerto Rico at the time of the accident. See
Reeser, 937 F. Supp. at 148 (citing Lusson, 704 F.2d at 650;
Perez de la Cruz, 807 F.2d at 1085–1086); see also P.R. Laws
Ann. Tit. 11 § 21.
As
the
undoubtedly
pleadings
applies
to
reveal,
this
PRWACA’s
case.
employer
Plaintiffs
immunity
admitted
that
Escudero’s employer (Crowley Liner Services Puerto Rico, Inc.)
and Escudero’s statutory employer (Crowley Puerto Rico Services)
were both duly authorized to do business in Puerto Rico. (Docket
No. 2, p. 4-5; Docket No. 22, p. 36). They also acknowledged
that
Crowley
Liner
Services
Puerto
Rico,
Inc.
provided
its
employees insurance under PRWACA. (Docket No. 12-1; Docket No.
12-2 at ¶ 11). Furthermore, Plaintiffs admitted that at the time
of
the
incident,
the
Barge
Jacksonville
was
docked
in
the
territorial and navigable waters of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 2,
¶ 17 p.8). Lastly, the complaint alleges that Escudero was a
resident
of
Puerto
Rico.
(Docket
No.
2,
Sec.
2,
p.
3).
Therefore, this case is on all fours with the test outlined in
Reeser, 937 F. Supp. at 148. Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy lies
solely under PRWACA.
For over 80 years, Congress and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit have consistently upheld the line of cases
9
CIVIL NO. 11-1769(JAG)
that grant Puerto Rico the power to supplant federal maritime
law
in
favor
of
PRWACA.
See
Reeser,
937
F.
Supp.
at
149.
“Congress, in enacting Longshoremen's Compensation Act, intended
to
prevent
existing
its
Puerto
new
compensation
Rican
act
compensation
from
act
superseding
with
the
respect
to
longshoremen who were injured in Puerto Rican waters.” Guerrido,
234 F.2d at 356; Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950; Tit. 11 P. R. Laws Ann. §§ 1-42. The
Court is not entirely sure why Plaintiffs chose to ignore the
overwhelming
weight
of
precedent
in
filing
the
present
complaint.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
upon
which
this
court
may
grant
them
relief.
It
is
through
PRWACA, rather than through the federal court, that Plaintiffs
must seek redress. Accordingly, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 28th day of September, 2012.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge
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