Acevedo v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER re 1 SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT filed by Luz Acevedo. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Camille L. Velez-Rive on 2/4/13.(ljt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LUZ ACEVEDO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL NO. 11-2010 (CVR)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Luz Acevedo (hereafter plaintiff “Acevedo”) filed an application for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits with defendant, the Commissioner of Social
Security (hereafter “Commissioner”). Plaintiff Acevedo alleged disability since July 15,
2001 due to back pain and depression. The application was denied initially and on
reconsideration. Plaintiff Acevedo then requested an administrative hearing be held. On
February 12, 2010, the presiding Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”) entertained
same, wherein plaintiff Acevedo waived being present. On April 8, 2010, the ALJ issued a
decision finding plaintiff Acevedo not disabled from amended alleged onset date of January
15, 2004 until December 31, 2006, the date she was last insured for disability benefits. Said
decision was affirmed by the Appeals Council which became the final decision rendered by
the Commissioner. On October 12, 2011, plaintiff Acevedo filed this federal action seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for a period of
disability and ensuing disability benefits. (Docket No. 1).1

1

U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) provides for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner.
“... [t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment without remanding the cause for rehearing”. Section 205(g).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 2

On March 30, 2012, the Court referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge for report
and recommendation. On May 1, 2012 , plaintiff Acevedo’s counsel, Atty. Salvador Medina
De-La-Cruz, filed an “Informative Motion” consenting to the case being referred to a
Magistrate Judge for disposition. (Docket No. 9). Thereafter, the parties filed their
memoranda of law. (Docket Nos. 18 and 21).
Having examined the pleadings, including a review of the administrative record, and
the applicable legal provisions, it is now proper to discuss the disposition of the pending
motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Acevedo filed her application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits with alleged onset date of July 15, 2001 because of exertional and nonexertional conditions. Counsel for plaintiff amended onset date to January 15, 2004.
Plaintiff is a fifty-one year old female, with limited education and past former work
experience as a fish cleaner, which was unskilled and of medium level of exertion.
The application was initially denied and was also denied on reconsideration. After
an administrative hearing was held, wherein plaintiff Acevedo waived being present but
was represented by counsel, the presiding ALJ considered the medical evidence of record
and the testimonies of a medical expert, as well as of a vocational expert, who appeared via
telephone conference. On April 8, 2010, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding that plaintiff
Acevedo was not disabled from onset date, as amended, of January 15, 2004 through the
date she was last insured of December 31, 2006 for she retained the residual functional

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 3

capacity to perform unskilled, medium type of work, and found there were jobs which
existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
Plaintiff Acevedo objects the final decision denying her disability upon considering
the ALJ did not adequately assess the evidence or opinions from treating sources nor
explain the weight given to the same. Plaintiff claims the ALJ relied on the GRID instead
of using a vocational expert when assessing the components of exertional limitations
imposed by her back condition and the additional non-exertional limitations imposed by
Acevedo’s mental condition diagnosed as severe major depression. Plaintiff submits these
factors had an eroding impact on the occupational base and in her capacity to perform work
related activities and were not considered by the vocational expert for no hypothetical
questions were submitted.2 As such, plaintiff avers the ALJ failed to deploy the correct legal
standard in not proposing hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, relying on the
GRID while disregarding the presence of a mental condition and the limitations thereunder.
Additionally, the ALJ did not indicate, according to plaintiff, what weight was given to the
treating sources.
The Commissioner argues the medical evidence and the administrative proceedings
met the substantive evidence test that supports the determination that plaintiff
Acevedo was not considered under disability.

2

In making said argument, plaintiff disregards the fact the ALJ considered the testimonies at the administrative
hearing of a medical expert, Dr. Luis Cánepa, a psychiatrist who reviewed the medical record available, and a vocational
expert, Dr. Marieva Puig, who participated by telephone.

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 4

ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Acevedo was insured for disability purposes up to December 31, 2006 and
did not engage in substantial gainful activity since alleged onset date of disability which was
amended at the administrative hearing for January 15, 2004. The ALJ’s opinion issued on
April 8, 2010, after the case was previously remanded by the Appeals Council, determined
plaintiff Acevedo last met the insured status requirements through the date of alleged onset
date up to December 31, 2006. She did not engage in substantial gainful activity during
said period. During the relevant time, plaintiff Acevedo had low back pain of unknown
etiology and major depression but did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that could be considered severe under the Listing of Impairments as they
appear in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; 20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and
404.1526. (Docket No. 5, Transcript, p. 30).
As to limitations imposed by the mental component, the ALJ found plaintiff Acevedo
had moderate restrictions in activities of daily living and moderate difficulties as to
concentration, persistence and pace, without episodes of decompensation. Upon examining
the medical evidence of record and the testimonies received at the administrative hearing,
the ALJ concluded plaintiff Acevedo retained the residual functional capacity for medium
work, except that she was limited to simple tasks consistent with unskilled type of work.
(Id., p. 31).
Considering plaintiff’s exertional complaints of back pain, the ALJ averred plaintiff
had a history of such pain since 1990 but she continued working until July 15, 2001, when
the factory where she worked was closed. The evidence showed straightening of the lumbar

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 5

lordosis but otherwise the findings were normal. Plaintiff Acevedo received treatment from
Dr. Jorge Méndez-Colón (hereafter “Dr. Méndez-Colón”), a Family Medicine physician, on
a sporadic basis.

The diagnosis was low back pain, cervico-dorsal myositis and

osteoarthritis. Dr. Méndez-Colón noted the presence of major depression. The ALJ took
into consideration the record showed there were only three visits to this physician in the
year 2004 and presented significant gaps in treatment, which was assessed as inconsistent
with a note of having treated the patient bi-monthly. (Id., p. 32).
The record contains a neurological consultative evaluation on April 7, 2004 by Dr.
Samuel Méndez-Figueroa (hereafter “Dr. Méndez-Figueroa). The patient’s symptoms were
assessed as normal and the strength symmetrical in all extremities. Acevedo walked
unassisted, without foot dropping or limping. The diagnosis was of chronic lumbalgia.
On November 29, 2004, neurologist Dr. Alfredo Pérez (hereafter “Dr. Pérez”) made
an evaluation finding normal review of the system as well as cerebral function. Dr. Pérez
noted there was good coordination, without ataxia or dysmetria, and there was also
symmetrical strength, with pinch prick, with handling and carrying normal. There was no
motor atrophy or fasciculation. Tone and gait were adequate. Dr. Pérez’ only diagnosis was
of low back pain. (Id.).
The ALJ further considered medical evidence regarding the mental component of a
depressive condition.

Dr. Ariel Rojas-Davis (hereafter “Dr. Rojas-Davis”) provided

psychiatric treatment to plaintiff Acevedo. The patient reported anxiety, poor sleeping,
diminished attention and concentration and low self-esteem. Dr. Rojas-Davis found her
cooperative, oriented, logical, relevant and with psychomotor retardation. The diagnosis

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 6

was of anxiety disorder and recurrent severe major depression. The patient was provided
with pharmacological assistance which continued, without change in her symptoms or
medications, up to September 8, 2009. Dr. Rojas-Davis reported plaintiff Acevedo’s
depression initiated upon the closing of her work station. Dr. Rojas-Davis referred to
conditions manifested by anhedonia, appetite disturbance with weight change, decreased
energy, mood disturbance, difficulty thinking and concentrating, psychomotor retardation,
memory impairment and sleep disturbance. Dr. Rojas-Davis opined the patient was unable
to meet competitive standards in the mental abilities and aptitudes to do work at all levels
of exertion. (Docket No. 5, Transcript, p. 32). However, the ALJ indicated Dr. Rojas-Davis’
reports dated September 7, 2004, March 7, 2005 and finally one of March 19, 2007 were
in pre-printed forms with filled up boxes and check marks that were inconsistent with the
stability shown by the treating notes submitted by said psychiatrist. Furthermore, in the
same report, Dr. Rojas-Davis indicated the patient, although depressed, was coherent,
relevant and logical in thought, her intellect was proportional to her education, had
preserved recent and remote memory, regular judgment and was fully oriented in the three
spheres. These descriptions were not considered consonant with the marked limitations
in the forms submitted as to all areas of functioning. (Id., p. 33).
The ALJ also considered a consultative psychiatric evaluation performed on
December 8, 2004 by Dr. Armando I. Caro (hereafter “Dr. Caro”). There were complaints
of anxiety, depressed mood, crying spells, irritability, anhedonia, social isolation, auditive
hallucinations, poor sleeping, among others. Dr. Caro’s diagnosis was of severe major

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 7

depression with a GAF of 50-55– that is, moderate symptoms or difficulties in social,
occupational and school functioning.
Dr. Luis E. Cánepa (hereafter “Dr. Cánepa”), a psychiatrist, testified at the
administrative hearing and reviewed the available record. Dr. Cánepa opined plaintiff ’s
condition was a combination of low back pain and an emotional condition.

The

symptomatology resulted in moderate restrictions in activities of daily living, moderate
difficulties in maintaining social functioning, marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence and pace and no episodes of decompensation. Dr. Cánepa relied
on the opinions of the treating sources and found no inconsistencies in the reports and the
remaining evidence, giving full credibility to the reports and finding no need to examine
progress notes.

(Id.).

The ALJ disagreed in part with Dr. Cánepa and took into

consideration the progress notes and supporting documentation for the summarized
opinions and report to determine consistency or absence thereof.
On the basis of the above, the ALJ concluded plaintiff Acevedo’s back pain and
alleged spasms were not in agreement with the treatment followed and she had not been
consistent in seeking or following treatment for her back condition since there were
numerous gaps in office visits, without explanation. The mental condition showed a
condition which remained unaltered, meaning not a significant improvement but at least
consistent stability. (Id., p. 34).
The ALJ also referred to discrepancies and/or inconsistencies in the medical record
for a state agency physician who found at the initial level that Acevedo did not have a severe
impairment and the condition was expected to improve in a year with proper treatment.

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 8

Subsequently, a state agency psychiatrist concluded Acevedo’s mental condition in overall
was of moderate severity. The latter found the patient was able to understand, remember
and carry out simple instructions, sustain attention and concentration and was able to
perform simple tasks. The ALJ gave full credibility to above assessment by Dr. Luis A.
Sánchez (hereafter “Dr. Sánchez”), whose opinion was not available and/or considered by
the medical expert, Dr. Cánepa at the administrative hearing. As to the exertional
condition, the ALJ also gave full weight and credit to Dr. Sánchez, who found plaintiff
Acevedo able to perform work at a medium level of exertion. The evidence of record did not
contradict same. To the contrary, the ALJ indicated he did not afford much weight to Dr.
Rojas-Davis’ reports since these were contradicted by his own notes and by the consultative
evaluation of Dr. Caro.
The ALJ concluded plaintiff Acevedo could perform within the residual functional
capacity for medium level of exertion, limited to performance of simple tasks due to her
mental condition. Considering Acevedo was a younger individual, being 48 years of age at
the time last insured, with high school education and no transferability of skills, within her
residual functional capacity for medium type of unskilled work, the ALJ found Acevedo not
under disability. (Id., pp. 34-35). This administrative determination was affirmed by the
Appeals Council.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court’s review in this type of cases is limited to determine whether the ALJ
deployed the proper legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.
See Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 9

The ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), but are not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law,
or judging matters entrusted to experts. Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999);
Da Rosa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1986); Ortiz
v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991).
To establish entitlement to disability benefits, the burden is on the claimant to prove
disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 146-47, n. 5 (1987). It is well settled law that a claimant is disabled under the Act if
he/she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). A claimant is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity when the claimant is not only unable to do his/her previous work but,
considering age, education, and work experience, cannot engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he/she lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists, or whether he/she would be hired if he/she applied for work. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(a).
In making a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled, all of the evidence
in the record must be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). A five-step sequential
evaluation process must be applied in making a final determination as to whether a
claimant is or not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
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140-42 (1987); Goodermote v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir.
1982). Through step one the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” If he/she is, disability benefits are denied. §§ 404.1520(b).
If not, the decision-maker proceeds to step two, through which it is determined whether the
claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. See §§
404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the disability claim is denied.
If the impairment or combination of impairments is severe, the evaluation proceeds
to the third step, in order to determine whether the impairment or combination of
impairments is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Commissioner
acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. §§ 404.1520(d); 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed
impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is
not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth
step through which the ALJ determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing the work he/she has performed in the past. If the claimant is able to
perform his/her previous work, he/she is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(e).
Once it was determined that the claimant cannot perform her former kind of work,
then the fifth and final step of the process demands a determination on whether claimant
is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of the residual functional
capacity, as well as age, education, and work experience. The claimant would be entitled
to disability benefits only if he/she is not able to perform other work. §§ 404.1520(f).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 11

The ALJ in the instant case followed through the testimony of a vocational expert,
Dr. Marieva Puig, to identify the requirements and demands of plaintiff Acevedo’s former
employment as a fish cleaner. (Docket No. 5, Transcript pp. 597-599). The former job of
fish cleaner was considered non-skilled work which required medium level of exertion, the
use of fine motor manipulation, good judgment and emotional stability to tolerate the
normal level of stress in a regular workplace. (Id., p. 598). As such, the previous relevant
work was still within Acevedo’s assessed residual functional capacity for medium type of
unskilled work. Even if it was considered Acevedo could not perform her former work, with
the use of the GRID as a framework and finding she had no limitation to carry out medium
level of exertion and the mental limitation solely precluded jobs that were unskilled and
with simple task. The ALJ found there were significant number of jobs available in the
national economy without further analysis by a vocational expert who was available by
telephone at the administrative hearing.
The claimant has the burden, under steps one through four, of proving that he/she
cannot return to his/her former employment because of the alleged disability. Santiago v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). In the present case,
plaintiff Acevedo was found to retain the residual functional capacity to perform medium
type of work, unskilled, limited to simple tasks, and was considered able to perform a
significant number of jobs of medium level of exertion which existed in significant numbers

Luz Acevedo v. Commissioner of S.S.
Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 12

in the national economy using the GRID as framework, for her mental impairment did not
significantly erode her capacity to perform said type of work.3
In plaintiff Acevedo’ memorandum of law, she objects to the ALJ’s determinations
as not supported by substantial evidence nor applying the correct legal standards. The
opposition to the administrative decision refers to the ALJ failing to pose hypothetical
questions to the vocational expert to ascertain how the emotional condition and
consequential limitations eroded the occupational base to perform particular jobs. (Docket
No. 18, p. 8). Plaintiff also objected to the ALJ not giving proper weight to the opinion of
treating sources. (Id., pp. 2-4).
The Commissioner’s memorandum of law discusses the medical evidence in the
record. Defendant avers in particular that the ALJ correctly weighed treating sources to
determine Acevedo’s residual functional capacity for unskilled, medium level type of work.
Succinctly, in support of the ALJ’s conclusion, there were laboratory reports and X-rays
showing only straightening of the lordosis but were otherwise negative. Neurological
evaluations found no motor deficits, no atrophy and no spasm, and the extremities showed
full muscle tone symmetrically. (Docket No. 21, pp. 6-7). There was some tenderness at the
back, but no limitation of motion and no neurological abnormalities were displayed. Hand
functions were full, gait was adequate and there was no carpal tunnel or back injury. The
state agency review physicians were also consonant with residual functional assessment for
medium level of exertion. (Id., p. 8).

3

GRID is based on plaintiff’s exertional capacity and can only be applied when plaintiff’s non-exertional
limitations do not significantly impair the ability to perform at given exertional level. Rose v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 13, 19 (1st
Cir. 1994) (citing to Sherwin v. Secretary of HHS, 685 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982)).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 13

Similarly as to the mental condition. The record showed an individual with fair eye
contact, moderate psychomotor retardation, fluent speech, who was coherent and logical,
without flight of ideas or looseness of associations. (Id., p. 9). There were expert medical
opinions of state agency review psychiatrists finding no significant nor moderate limitations
in understanding and memory, with sustained concentration and persistence, social
interaction and adaptation. Opinions of examining consultants can constitute, after all,
substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination.4 Berríos López v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1991) (assessments and reports of
consultative examining physicians provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
determination); Evangelista v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st
Cir. 1987) (ALJ may piece together relevant medical facts from the findings and opinions
of multiple physicians).
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has indicated an ALJ is “not required to
recite every piece of evidence that favored appellant.” See Stein v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 317,
319 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the level of articulation required is not precise). See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) ("We will always give good reason in our notice of determination or
decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion); SSR 96-2p ("the notice of
determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating
source's medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be

4

The ALJ had available the medical expert opinions of Dr. Luis A. Sánchez-Raffucci, Dr. Méndez-Figueroa, Dr.
Pérez-Canabal, Dr. Sánchez-Quiles, Dr. Besquera-García and Dr. Caro.

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 14

sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator
gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.").
Courts give deference to the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical record and notice
that, although an ALJ is not at liberty to ignore medical evidence or substitute his own
views for uncontroverted medical opinion, upon the existence of conflicts in the medical
record from the report and sources, it is not for the Court to resolve same. See Nguyen v.
Chater, 172 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1999); Lizotte v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.2d
127 (1st Cir. 1981) (the resolutions of conflicts in the evidence and the determination of the
ultimate question of disability is for him [the ALJ], not for the doctors or for the courts).
See also Rodríguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.
1981).
The ALJ disregarded the evaluations by treating physicians Dr. Méndez-Colón and
Dr. Rojas-Davis in that the patient should be considered incapable of performing even
sedentary work or lack the mental functional capacity to maintain a full time job but
explained why limited weight was provided to said medical opinions. Many of Dr. MéndezColón’s notes were from dates before alleged onset date, prior to January 15, 2004, or at the
end of the relevant period of December 31, 2006. As to Dr. Rojas-Davis, notes were
inconsistent with his own assessment in that Acevedo had relevant and coherent speech,
was oriented, was cooperative and appeared her chronological age, with logical and
coherent thoughts. (Docket No. 5, Transcript, pp. 397-98, 399-400, 435-35).5

5

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii) ( “[u]nless a treating source's opinion is given controlling weight, the [ALJ]
must explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant”).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 15

To review the final decision of the Commissioner courts must determine if the
evidence of record meets the substantial evidence criteria. Substantial evidence is "more
than a mere scintilla and such, as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion". Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938). The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact are
conclusive, if supported by the above stated substantial evidence.6 The court would set
aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based
on a legal error. See Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001); Rodríguez, 647 F.2d
at 222.
This Magistrate Judge has considered above evidence in support of the ALJ’s
determinations and additionally reviewed the record as a whole to determine whether the
evidence therein presented substantial evidence. From the above discussion, it is concluded
there is substantial evidence for the Commissioner’s decision that found plaintiff Acevedo
not under disability.
Insofar as the hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, there is also
substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ’s finding that Acevedo’s mental
impairment did not significantly restrict her functional capacity except to perform unskilled
work of medium level of exertion and simple tasks. See Tavárez v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 138 Fed.Appx. 327 (1st Cir. 2005) (when claimant’s non-exertional limitations is found
to impose no significant restriction on the range of work a claimant is exertionally able to
perform, reliance on the GRID is appropriate); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
6

Falu v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 703 F. 2d 24 (1st Cir. 1983).

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Opinion and Order
Civil No. 11-2010 (CVR)
Page No. 16

2 §200.00(e)(2) and SS 85-15 providing that when a claimant suffers both exertional and
non-exertional impairments, the GRID may allow a framework for consideration. Cf. Fast
v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (where non-exertional limitation might
substantially reduce the range of work an individual can perform, use of the grids is
inappropriate and the ALJ must consult a vocational expert).7
In view of the above discussed, the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, insofar as that plaintiff’s mental and back
conditions did not preclude performance of medium level of exertion nor was she further
limited by her mental condition except for simple tasks and unskilled work for which there
were significant numbers of jobs available in the national economy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above discussed, this United States Magistrate Judge considers there
is substantial evidence on the record in support of the Commissioner’s decision. As such,
the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Judgment is to be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 4th day of February of 2013.
S/CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE
CAMILLE L. VELEZ RIVE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7

The Court in Fast, 397 F3d. 470, found inappropriate the use of the GRID as a framework for claimant therein
suffered only from non-exertional impairment.