Lopez-Cruz et al v. Puerto Rico Power Authority et al
Filing
120
OPINION AND ORDER denying 111 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 3/17/2015. (MM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
NORBERTO LOPEZ CRUZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PUERTO
RICO
ELECTRIC
AUTHORITY, et al.,
POWER
Civil No. 11-2023 (DRD)
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Introduction
Following the Court’s Order (Docket No. 109) of February 11, 2014
granting Plaintiffs’
Notice
of
Voluntary
Dismissal
With
Prejudice
(Docket No. 106) and the Court’s entry of Judgment (Docket No. 110) of
the
same
date,
Defendants
moved
the
Court
for
attorneys’ fees and costs (Docket No. 111).
Plaintiffs’
suit
was
totally
unfounded
and
the
imposition
of
Defendants argue that
frivolous
and
that
Plaintiffs continued to litigate the case after it clearly became so.
Specifically, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs continued litigating the
case at bar after being appraised on numerous occasions by Defendants
that their remaining claims were meritless.1
On March 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition
to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Docket No. 112) stressing that the
instant complaint was neither frivolous nor unreasonable, as the Court
itself
concluded
when
it
declined
1
to
dismiss
Plaintiffs’
First
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should have seized litigating the instant
matter on March 31, 2013 after the Court dismissed the majority of
Plaintiffs’ causes of action. See Opinion and Order, Docket No. 74.
1
Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process
claims in the Opinion and Order (Docket No. 55) dated July 17, 2012.
On
April
Plaintiffs’
remaining
10,
2014,
opposition
Defendants
(Docket
allegations
that
No.
filed
115)
survived
a
reply
in
accentuating
Defendants’
(Docket Nos. 41 and 44) were frivolous.
response
that
Motions
to
the
to
two
Dismiss
According to Defendants,
Plaintiff Norberto Lopez-Cruz knew on January 24, 2013 that his claims
were
baseless
when
he
continued
prosecuting
his
case
after
being
granted his desired position and being awarded retroactive pay.
II.
As
Defendants’
motion
Costs
combines
the
demand
for
costs
and
attorneys’ fees, the Court must discuss these remedies separately as
the analysis of each request is quite different.
issue a determination on costs first.
The Court shall
The relevant portion of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54 reads as follows:
(d) Costs; Attorney's Fees.
(1) Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees. Unless a federal
statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,
costs--other than attorney's fees--should be allowed to the
prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its
officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the
extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 days'
notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the court
may review the clerk's action.
Analyzing the facts in light of Rule 54(d)(1) requires, first and
foremost,
prevailing
that
the
party.
Court
Here,
determine
as
the
Defendants are the prevailing parties.
2
whether
Court
or
has
not
Defendants
already
We briefly explain.
are
determined,
A district court must grant a plaintiff’s request under Rule
41(a)(2) for voluntary dismissal, if the dismissal being sought is
with prejudice. Wright & Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 2367 (3d ed.); see Smoot v. Fox, 340 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir.
1964)(“We know of no power in a trial judge to require a lawyer to
submit evidence on behalf of a plaintiff, when he considers he has no
cause of action or for any reason wishes to dismiss his action with
prejudice, the client being agreeable.”); Century Manufacturing Co.,
Inc.
v.
Central
Transport
Int'l,
Inc.,
209
F.R.D.
647,
648
(D.Mass.2002) (“Under such circumstances, courts have found that they
are
without
discretion
and
must
grant
the
motion.”);
Puello
v.
Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 76 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 536 (D. Mass. 2010);
Nippy, Inc. v. Pro Rok, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 41 (D.P.R. 1996)(granting
voluntary dismissal over defendant’s objection that attorney’s fees be
awarded); Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169 F.R.D. 11, 18
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Although the purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is “primarily to prevent
dismissal which would result in some clear legal prejudice to the
defendant,” courts must grant plaintiff’s request where, as here, no
clear prejudice exists. Protocomm Corp. v. Novell, Inc., 171 F. Supp.
2d 459, 470 (E.D.Pa 2001).
A dismissal with prejudice constitutes a
complete adjudication of all claims set forth by plaintiffs, meaning
that defendants receive the same outcome they would have received had
the case proceeded to trial. See Nippy, Inc., 932 F. Supp. at 43
(internal citations omitted).
3
As Defendants have triumphed on all of the claims, the Court
understands that Defendants constitute prevailing parties under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
Nevertheless, the Court cannot grant Defendants’
request, as the costs submitted by Defendants pertain solely to the
services
of
Moises
Hernandez,
a
Certified
Court
Interpreter,
who
translated several documents that were used to file the motion for
summary judgment.
As only the costs of oral translations may be
reimbursed, Defendants’ request must be DENIED.
See Taniguchi v. Kan
Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 182 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2012)(holding
that the compensation of interpreters “is limited to the cost of oral
translation and does not include the cost of document translation.”)
III. Attorneys’ Fees
As
Plaintiffs’
Amended
Complaint
(Docket
No.
29)
invokes
42
U.S.C. § 1983, the appropriate vehicle for entertaining a motion for
attorneys’ fees is 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“Section 1988”).
The general “American Rule” is that each side bears its own
litigation costs and that the prevailing party is not entitled to
recover
attorney’s
fees
or
costs.
Alyeska
Pipeline
Serv.
Co.
v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)(“In the United States, the
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable
attorneys’ fee from the loser.”).
However, Congress “has created
exceptions to this ‘American Rule,’ permitting fee-shifting in some
contexts
to
encourage
meritorious
plaintiff and the public interest.”
litigation
that
benefits
the
Boston’s Children First v. City
of Boston, 395 F.3d 10, 14 (citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87,
96 (1989)).
Section 1988, which is one of those exceptions, provides
4
the court with the discretion to allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs
in
federal-civil-rights
U.S.C.
§
1983.
actions,
Id.
The
including
relevant
those
portion
of
actions
the
under
42
aforementioned
statute reads as follows:
(b) Attorney's fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
[section] . . . 1983 . . ., the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs,
except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for
any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action
was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 1988.
“As
we
often
have
recited,
an
award
of
fees
in
favor
of
a
prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights suit is ‘the rule, whereas feeshifting
in
favor
of
a
prevailing
defendant
is
the
exception.’”
Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 235-36 (1st Cir. 2010)
(emphasis
provided)
Rivera-Santos,
defendant
38
may
(citing
F.3d
be
615,
awarded
Casa
Marie
618
(1st
fees
only
Hogar
Cir.
Geriatrico,
1994)).
‘upon
a
“A
finding
Inc.
v.
prevailing
that
the
plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation,
even though not brought in subjective bad faith.’”
Roselló-González
(emphasis added).
v.
Acevedo-Vilá,
483
F.3d
1,
Id. at 236 (citing
6
(1st
Cir.
2007))
In Laboy-Ortiz, the First Circuit described the
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants as one
“difficult to meet, and rightly so.”
Id.
The First Circuit reasoned:
Congress granted parties the prospect of a reasonable
attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to encourage the
5
prosecution of legitimate civil rights claims; to award
fees to prevailing defendants when the history of a case
does not justify it undercuts that goal and chills civil
rights litigation. See Foster v. Mydas Assocs., Inc., 943
F.2d 139, 146 (1st Cir.1991). This chilling effect is
particularly acute in the case of large and financially
onerous fee awards, which threaten to “discourag[e] all but
the airtight cases.” Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d
63, 68 (4th Cir.1983) (citing Christiansburg Garment, 434
U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694).
Laboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 236.
When a court is evaluating whether it
has the discretion to award a defendant attorneys’ fees under Section
1988, the court must assess the plaintiff’s claims at the time the
complaint was filed.
omitted).
Lamboy-Ortiz, 630 F.3d at 237 (internal citation
“The court must keep in mind that ‘[e]ven when the law or
the facts appear questionable or favorable at the outset, a party may
have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.’”
Christiansburg
Garment
Co.
v.
EEOC,
434
U.S.
412,
Id. (quoting
422
(1978)).
Prevailing defendants are eligible for attorneys’ fees only when the
plaintiff’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or
that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980).
Turning to the facts before us, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
claims were not frivolous or that they continued to litigate after
their claims clearly became frivolous.
We briefly explain.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were appraised at the January
25, 2013 Settlement/Initial Scheduling Conference (See Minute Entry,
Docket No. 72) and by a Rule 11 letter that the remaining claims were
unfounded and should, thus, be dismissed.
allegedly
continued
Defendants
to
file
their
a
motion
relentless
for
6
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs
litigation,
summary
judgment.
which
In
forced
order
to
adequately
ascertain
whether
Plaintiffs
relentlessly
continued
litigating its claims, the Court must review the record.
A review of the record shows that Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 77) on May 9, 2013, well before the
discovery cut-off date of September 20, 2013.
Defendants’ motion
contained upwards of ten (10) exhibits that were dated and produced to
the Plaintiffs after the filing of the instant complaint.
opposed
Defendants’
request
on
May
22,
2013
(Docket
Plaintiffs
No.
88)
and
requested that the Court hold Defendants’ motion in abeyance until
discovery has been concluded.
On June 19, 2013, Defendants filed
their reply memoranda (See Docket Nos. 94 and 95).
On October 15,
2013, the Court referred all pending motions to Magistrate Judge Bruce
J.
McGiverin
(Docket
No.
98),
who
entered
his
Recommendation (Docket No. 105) on January 27, 2014.
Report
and
On February 3,
2014, seven days later, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims
against
Defendants.
As
a
result
discovery was never conducted.
of
the
aforementioned
motions,
Hence, the record evinces that after
the January 25, 2013 conference, Plaintiffs did not continue their
relentless litigation, as they merely opposed Defendants motion for
summary
parties
judgment
did
not
on
the
engage
basis
in
that
the
extensive
same
was
discovery
premature.
and
The
Plaintiffs
immediately desisted of their claims once Magistrate Judge McGiverin
recommended that the case at bar be dismissed.
7
Further, the Court
stresses that Plaintiffs’ claims were neither frivolous not dubious
when the instant case was filed.2
Accordingly, Defendants have not placed the Court in a position
to
find
that
Plaintiffs
unreasonableness.
exceptional
acted
with
temerity,
frivolousness,
or
Therefore, the case at bar does not elicit any
circumstances
that
would
warrant
an
imposition
of
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’
request for costs and DENIES Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees.
Defendants have failed to demonstrate any entitlement to the remedies
sought in their motion and the Court’s own independent perusal of the
record has also failed to find any support for the remedies pursued by
Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 17th day of March, 2015.
/S/ DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
U.S. District Judge
2
The Court refers the parties to the Opinion and Order at Docket No. 55 for
an in-depth analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims.
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?