Valentin-Perez v. New Progressive Party et al
Filing
29
OPINION AND ORDER granting 25 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 3/13/2012. (RJC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JUAN VALENTÍN-PEREZ,
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 11-2155 (JAG)
NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY, et al,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
On
submit
February
legal
9,
briefs
2012,
the
addressing
Court
the
ordered
question
the
of
parties
whether
to
this
Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint. (Docket No.
22). Both parties timely filed their memoranda. After assessing
the
parties’
respective
positions
on
this
issue,
the
Court
determines that it does not have jurisdiction and accordingly
dismisses this case without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Political parties and citizenry alike are gearing up for
the upcoming general elections in Puerto Rico, to be held in
November of this year. With respect to the public office of
mayor of the municipality of Moca, the incumbent mayor (an NPP
member) has already announced his intention of running for reelection. (Id., ¶ 3.3). If another qualified candidate wishes to
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
2
run for this position, primaries will have to be held in order
to
determine
who
will
carry
the
NPP
banner
in
the
November
general elections. (Id.)
On
October
(“Valentín”
considered
or
as
11,
2011,
plaintiff
“plaintiff”)
filed
one
New
of
the
a
Juan
candidacy
Progressive
Valentín-Perez
request
Party’s
to
be
(“NPP”)
candidates for mayor of Moca. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 3.1). According
to the complaint, Valentín’s petition was eventually rejected by
the NPP’s Candidate Evaluation Committee (the “Committee”). On
October 26, 2011, the General Secretary of the NPP, Omar NegronJudice, notified Valentín of the Committee’s decision. (Docket
No. 1, ¶ 3.5). Valentín timely appealed his disqualification to
the
NPP’s
Directorate,
which
“rubberstamped
the
Evaluation
Committee’s decision with no analysis whatsoever.” (Docket No.
1, ¶ 3.15). Subsequently, Valentín sought review of the NPP’s
decision in the local courts. (Docket No 24, p.4; Docket No. 25,
p.3).1 As far as the Court can gather, the local court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket No 24, p.4;
Docket No. 25, p.3). Valentín appealed this decision and states
in his brief that it will “very likely be reversed.” (Docket No.
1
This is not mentioned in the complaint. However, both parties
later allude to plaintiff’s state court appeal in their briefs.
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
3
24, p.4). As of this moment, the Court understands that the
local appeals court has yet to issue an opinion on this matter.
A month after filing his suit in state court, Valentín
filed
the
violations
instant
under
complaint
the
Civil
alleging
Rights
various
Act,
42
constitutional
U.S.C.
§
1983.
Defendants failed to answer and were found in default. (Docket
Nos. 9, 10). Two days later, defendants moved the Court to set
aside default, arguing that the summonses were defective and did
not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. (Docket No. 11). Plaintiff
timely opposed this motion. However, shortly after these motions
were filed, this Court issued an Opinion and Order in GonzalezCancel v. Partido Nuevo Progresista, Civil No. 11-2149 (JAG),
dismissing that case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Given that the instant complaint presents similar questions of
fact and law as Gonzalez-Cancel, the Court focuses its attention
on whether it has explicit authority to decide this case rather
than ruling upon the pending motion to set aside default. See
Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (en
banc)).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Court
is
tasked
with
determining
if
there
is
jurisdiction over the present complaint. As outlined below, this
analysis depends on whether the complaint states a claim upon
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
4
which relief may be granted. Thus, the Court considers that the
appropriate standard of review is that required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to evaluate a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
12(b)(6).
To
overcome
a
Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
544,
570
(2007);
see
also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
In Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2011), the First Circuit distilled from Twombly and Iqbal a twopronged test designed to measure the sufficiency of a complaint.
First,
the
reviewing
court
must
identify
and
disregard
“statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions
couched as fact, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (internal
punctuation
omitted).
In
this
analysis,
the
remaining
non-
conclusory factual allegations must be taken as true, even if
they are “seemingly incredible,” or that “actual proof of those
facts is improbable.” Id. Finally, the court must assess whether
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
5
the facts taken as a whole “state a plausible, not merely a
conceivable, case for relief.” Id.
ANALYSIS
Under § 1983, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction if
plaintiff’s complaint “limns a set of facts that bespeaks the
violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right.” Bonas v. Town
of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2004). In
spite
of
this,
the
First
Circuit
has
adamantly
warned
that
federal courts should abstain from injecting themselves “into
the midst of every local electoral dispute.” Bonas, 265 F.3d at
74; see also Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978).
Rather, federal intervention is warranted only in those longodds
cases
which
do
not
“embroil
the
federal
courts
in
the
detailed administration” of local elections. Bonas, 265 F.3d at
75-76. This holds true even if the court is vested with subject
matter
jurisdiction
Calderon-Serra,
398
under
F.3d
§
1983.
15-16
(1st
See
Cir.
Rossello-Gonzalez
2004)
(finding
v.
“no
doubt that [plaintiff’s] complaint … presents a colorable claim
under § 1983,” but holding that the district court’s exercise of
jurisdiction was inappropriate because it ran contrary to the
general rule of non-intervention in state electoral disputes).2
2
Concurring with the result, Judge Howard phrased the
jurisdictional inquiry in a slightly different way:
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
6
Thus, in the context of an electoral dispute, a federal court
may only intervene when the complaint presents a colorable claim
under § 1983 and it falls within one of the exceptions to the
general federal policy of non-intervention.
Whether plaintiff has a colorable claim under § 1983
Section 1983 provides a right of action against those who
violate
constitutional
rights.
Inyo
Cnty.,
Cal.
v.
Paiute-
Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 708 (2003). To state a claim
under § 1983, Valentín must plausibly plead (1) that he was
deprived of a constitutional right; (2) that there is a causal
link
between
defendant’s
conduct
and
the
constitutional
violation; and (3) “state action.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo,
590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 action charges the NPP with violations of his
constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution. The essence of defendant’s defense is that
the denial of plaintiff’s candidacy petition did not deprive him
of any cognizable constitutional right.
There is no question, of course, that the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction of a federal civil rights claim
pleaded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The issue is whether the pleaded
federal claim is justiciable. This question is not a matter of
discretion; it is an issue of law. See Bonas v. Town of N.
Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 73–75 (1st Cir.2001). And it is an issue
of law that implicates the court's “jurisdiction” only in the
sense that justiciability is regarded as a jurisdictional
doctrine. See id.
Rossello-Gonzalez, 398 F.3d at 20.
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
7
1. First Amendment
The complaint asserts that the NPP’s allegedly arbitrary
decision
to
deny
the
candidacy
petition
infringed
upon
Valentín’s right to “associate to the party of his choice, and
to
run
for
office
for
said
party,”
pursuant
to
the
First
Amendment. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 3.17). Defendant counters that the
Constitution offers no such protection to a person seeking a
political party’s nomination.
“A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its
membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection
process
that
represents
Elections
(2000)).
its
v.
California
will
in
its
political
view
platform.”
Lopez-Torres,
Democratic
However,
Party
this
produce
552
U.S.
v.
right
nominee
who
New
York
State
196,
202
(2008)
Jones,
does
the
not
530
U.S.
extend
567,
to
best
Bd.
of
(citing
574–575
individual
candidates so as to confer them any associational right to join,
and
have
influence
in,
a
political
party.
Id.
In
fact,
the
Supreme Court has flatly stated that “[n]one of [its] cases
establishes an individual’s constitutional right to have a ‘fair
shot’ at winning the party’s nomination.” Id. at 205. It thus
follows that in denying Valentín’s petition, the NPP could not
have infringed plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because they
are non-existent in this context.
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
8
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff later acknowledges in his brief that “[t]here is
no such thing as a constitutional right to obtain a political
party’s
nomination.”
(Docket
argues
that
states
may
those
nominations.
The
prescriptive
power
to
No.
24,
p.8).
legislate
the
requirements
fact
that
regulate
states
party
Nevertheless,
have
primaries
to
a
is,
he
obtain
limited
as
the
Supreme Court puts it, “too plain for argument.” Lopez-Torres,
552 U.S. at 203.3 Valentín claims that those processes must be
applied in a consistent and fair manner, as required by the
Constitution. (Docket No. 24, p.8). The Court construes this to
mean that the NPP violated plaintiff’s right to procedural due
process
under
petition
for
the
Fourteenth
arbitrary
Amendment
reasons.
On
the
in
denying
basis
of
Valentín’s
the
facts
alleged in the complaint, however, there is little to indicate
that Valentín has suffered a denial of procedural due process.
Plaintiff’s petition was reviewed by the Committee, later by the
Directorate, (Docket No 24, p.4; Docket No. 25, p.3); and is now
pending review before the local courts. (Docket No 24, p.4;
3
“But to say that the State can [impose certain restrictions in
the party-candidate selection process] is a far cry from saying
that the Constitution demands it.” Lopez-Torres, 552 U.S. at
205.
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
9
Docket No. 25, p.3). Thus, as defendant puts it, plaintiff was
afforded all due process in the evaluation of his petition.
The
complaint
Amendment’s
also
Equal
claims
Protection
violations
clause.
of
(Id.,
¶
the
Fourteenth
3.19).
On
this
point, the complaint simply alleges that the arbitrary denial of
Valentín’s candidacy application somehow limits the choices of
Moca voters. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 3.19). As such, “defendants have
created a suspect classification without any compelling interest
behind it.” (Id.). Naturally, this classification would affect
only those Moca voters that support Valentín. Defendant argues,
and the Court agrees, that this subset of voters is not subject
to any disparate treatment, since they may still exercise their
right of suffrage through a write-in vote, or by voting for
Valentín as an independent candidate. Thus, this argument fails
to establish a plausible Equal Protection violation.
In
his
brief
on
jurisdiction,
plaintiff
raises
another
Equal Protection argument couched on a class-of-one theory. This
theory
requires
plaintiff
to
allege
that
he
“has
been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and
that
there
is
no
rational
basis
for
the
difference
in
treatment.” See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)
(per
disparate
curiam).
treatment
The
was
plaintiff
“based
on
must
a
also
malicious
show
or
that
bad
the
faith
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
10
intent to injure.” Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 178 (1st
Cir. 2006). The relevant caselaw places the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff “in class-of-one cases to show such identity of
entities and circumstances to a high degree.” Rectrix Aerodrome
Centers v. Barnstable, 610 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2010). Though
plaintiff attempts to flesh out this argument in his brief, the
complaint itself is devoid of facts showing that Valentín was
treated differently in the qualifications process when compared
with other potential candidates. See Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d
91, 99 (1st Cir. 2004) (“When a motion to dismiss is based on
the complaint …, the facts alleged in the complaint control”).
Finally, the Court considers that this argument is premature
because it presumes that the NPP indeed erred in applying Puerto
Rico electoral law to Valentín’s candidacy request. This matter,
as discussed further below, is one that is best left for state
courts to decide.
Finally, the complaint contends that the NPP’s allegedly
arbitrary decision is conscience-shocking to the point of making
out a substantive due process violation. (Id., ¶ 3.18). The
Court finds otherwise. “In order to establish a substantive due
process claim, the plaintiff must first show a deprivation of a
protected interest in life, liberty, or property. It is not
enough to claim the governmental action shocked the conscience.”
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
Rivera
v.
Rhode
Island,
11
402
F.3d
27,
33–34
(1st
Cir.
2005)
(citations omitted). “A substantive due process claim requires
allegations that the government conduct was, in and of itself,
inherently
impermissible
irrespective
of
the
availability
of
remedial or protective procedures.” Maymí v. Puerto Rico Ports
Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “The
state conduct itself must be so brutal, demeaning, and harmful
that it is shocking to the conscience.” Id.
Fundamentally, plaintiff’s grievance is that the NPP made
the wrong call in assessing his candidacy petition. This is far
removed from the type of brutal and shocking conduct that is the
hallmark of a substantive due process violation. Moreover, as
discussed
below,
substantive
due
process
violations
in
the
context of elections usually arise when the entirety of the
electoral
process
itself
“reaches
the
point
of
patent
and
fundamental unfairness.” Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077. That is not
the case here.
The rule of non-intervention
Though the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983,
the Court also finds that plaintiff’s claims do not fit squarely
within one of the “isthmian exceptions” to the federal policy of
non-intervention.
Bonas,
complaint
us
vested
with
265
F.3d
at
jurisdiction
74.
by
Thus,
even
properly
if
the
stating
a
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
12
claim under § 1983, the Court would still find reason to decline
plaintiff’s invitation to intervene.
Courts have carved out two exceptions to the strong federal
policy
of
non-intervention
exceptions
are
not
the
in
norm.
local
See
electoral
Griffin,
570
matters.
F.2d
at
These
1080
(characterizing as “exceptional” those cases which merit federal
relief); Bonas, 265 F.3d at 75 (“[t]his case is the long-odds
exception to the general rule of non-intervention”); see also
Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept.
1981)(noting that denials of substantive due process in this
context
occur
even
less
frequently
than
violations
of
equal
protection). If a Court finds that neither exception is met, it
must decline to exercise jurisdiction. See Rossello-Gonzalez,
398 F.3d 1.
According
to
the
First
Circuit,
“the
most
developed[]
justification … exists when a discrete group of voters suffers a
denial
of
Reynolds
equal
v.
protection.”
Sims,
377
U.S.
Bonas,
at
265
558).
F.3d
We
at
found
74
(citing
above
that
plaintiff’s complaint failed to make out an Equal Protection
claim. Consequently, plaintiff’s case does not fit within this
exception.
The second exception activates when the “election process
itself reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness,”
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
13
thus depriving citizens of substantive due process. Bonas, 265
F.3d at 74; see also Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.
1978). In Griffin, for example, Rhode Island state officials,
relying on a state supreme court decision, annulled absentee and
shut-in ballots after they had been cast. Bonas, 265 F.3d at 74.
The
First
Circuit
held
that
this
decision
was
fundamentally
unfair, since it “changed the rules at the end of the game” and
excluded a whole section of votes that would have been outcomedeterminative. Id.; see also Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 88889 (3d Cir. 1994)(citing Griffin and decertifying the winner of
a local election in the face of massive absentee ballot fraud).
As this Court noted in Gonzalez-Cancel, these situations justify
the exercise of federal jurisdiction because of the enormity and
broad scope of the underlying constitutional violation.
In this regard, the Court finds little to distinguish the
present complaint from the one in Gonzalez-Cancel. The NPP’s
decision, even if left unchecked, simply does not result in an
extensive
disenfranchisement
of
the
electorate
as
a
whole.
Though Valentín may ultimately be foreclosed from carrying the
NPP banner in the November 2012 elections, his supporters may
still vote for him as a write-in or as an independent candidate.
This is clearly not one of “those few cases in which organic
failures in a state or local election process threaten to work
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
14
patent and fundamental unfairness,” making federal intervention
necessary. Bonas, 265 F.3d at 74. Thus, the Court holds that
plaintiff’s complaint does not establish the type of “broadgauge
unfairness”
that
warrants
the
exercise
of
federal
jurisdiction.
Alternatively, plaintiff posits that the Court’s analysis
under either of the exceptions to the non-intervention rule is
inapplicable
advances
to
that
his
the
situation.
“comity
and
To
that
prudence
effect,
concerns
plaintiff
raised
in
Griffin and Bonas are conspicuously absent in the instant case.”
(Docket No. 24, p.5). Plaintiff also argues that this Court is
not being required to resolve an electoral dispute but rather a
“run-of-the-mill federal civil rights suit,” akin to that of a
public
employee
fired
for
political
reasons.
(Id.,
p.9)
The
Court disagrees on both points.
The complaint contends that the Puerto Rico Electoral Code
establishes the statutory prerequisites for a person to run for
office
for
Consequently,
his
the
political
party.
determination
of
(Docket
whether
No.
a
1,
¶
3.18).
candidate
is
qualified or not is purely a matter of state electoral law. And
“[e]lection law, as it pertains to state and local elections, is
for the most part a preserve that lies within the exclusive
competence of the state courts.”
Bonas, 265 F.3d at 74 (citing
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
15
Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970)). Moreover,
though the complaint asserts that the NPP erred in applying the
correct
legal
standard
to
his
candidacy
request,
such
an
allegation is but a conclusion of law. Thus, it is not entitled
to
a
presumption
of
truth.
See
Ocasio-Hernández
v.
Fortuño
Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). The issue of whether the
NPP
erred
in
denying
plaintiff’s
petition
is,
as
defendant
argues, “a state electoral issue that requires interpretation
and
resolution
by
the
Puerto
Rico
courts.”
(Docket
No.
25,
p.13).
Plaintiff’s comparison of his case with other “run-of-themill” civil rights cases is not persuasive. Furthermore, “local
election
irregularities,
including
even
claims
of
official
misconduct, do not usually rise to the level of constitutional
violations where adequate state corrective procedures exist.”
Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077. For the same reasons, we find that
the federalism concerns that underlie the decisions in Bonas,
Griffin, and other related cases are best served by dismissing
this case and allowing the state electoral machinery to run its
course.
Civil No. 11-2155 (JAG)
16
CONCLUSION
In
light
of
the
above,
the
Court
finds
that
it
lacks
jurisdiction to attend to plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13th day of March, 2012.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge
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