Rivera-Narvaez v. United States Postal Service et al

Filing 44

OPINION & ORDER denying 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on 8/7/2013. (jm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
EDGAR RIVERA NARVAEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 11-2167 (BJM)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
In an amended complaint, Edgar Rivera Narvaez sued the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for $4,000 in damages to his car and house, and for his
emotional distress, all resulting from a collision between a U.S. Postal Service vehicle
and several vehicles, including Rivera’s parked car, a Volkswagen Jetta. (Docket No. 22).
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. (Docket No. 20). Before the
court is the government’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 27 and Docket
No. 27-1, or “Def. Mem.”). Rivera opposed. (Docket No. 30, or “Pl. Mem.”). For the
reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material only if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986), and “[a] ‘genuine’ issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party.”
Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The court does not
weigh facts, but instead ascertains whether the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 751 (1st
Cir. 1995).

Rivera Narvaez v. United States, Civil No. 11-2167 (BJM)

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The movant must first “inform[] the district court of the basis for its motion,” and
identify the record materials “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); R. 56(c)(1).
If this threshold is met, the opponent “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to avoid summary judgment. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party
may not prevail with mere “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and
unsupported speculation” for any element of the claim. Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Still, the court draws inferences and evaluates
facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Leary, 58 F.3d at 751, and the
court must not “superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how
reasonable those ideas may be) upon the facts of the record.” Greenburg v. P.R. Maritime
Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987).
BACKGROUND
The factual record is summarized here using the parties’ Local Rule 56 statements
of uncontested facts.1 The government’s statement (Docket No. 27-2, or “Def. St.,”),
Rivera’s opposition (Docket No. 31, p. 1-4, or “Pl. Opp.”), and Rivera’s additional
statement (Docket No. 31, p. 4-5, or “Pl. St.”) have been considered. The government
did not oppose Rivera’s additional statement of fact; to the extent it is supported by
record evidence, it is deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56(e).

1

Local Rule 56 requires parties at summary judgment to supply brief, numbered
statements of facts, supported by citations to admissible evidence. It “relieve[s] the district court
of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely
in dispute,” CMI Capital Market Inv. v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008), and
prevents litigants from “shift[ing] the burden of organizing the evidence presented in a given case
to the district court.” Mariani-Colón v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.
2007). The rule “permits the district court to treat the moving party’s statement of facts as
uncontested” when not properly opposed, and litigants ignore it “at their peril.” Id.

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Rivera is a former officer of the Puerto Rico Police Department, but is now an
employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Pl. St., ¶ 1. Sometime in early 2010, Rivera
complained to his local letter carrier, Angel Ramos, that he should drive slower around
the neighborhood. Pl. St., ¶ 4. At around 3:50 p.m. on September 7, 2010, Ramos was
driving his mail route. Def. St., ¶ 1. At an intersection, a collision occurred involving
Ramos’s mail truck and a car driven by a man named Hector J. Vargas. Def. St., ¶ 2; Pl.
St., ¶ 2. Rivera never saw the initial impact, though he heard it. Def. St., ¶ 4. Rivera
heard the sound of wheels spinning, and rushed outside to see what was happening. Pl.
St., ¶ 2.
The parties offer conflicting versions of how this collision occurred. Drawing on
his past experience as a police officer, Rivera believes that Vargas’s car was coming to a
stop, and that Ramos hit him. He bases this view on the apparent damage to each car and
their positioning after the accident. Pl. Opp., ¶ 2. The responding officer, on the other
hand, wrote in an accident report that Vargas failed to stop at the intersection. 2 Def. St.,
¶ 2. The officer’s report was written after interviewing eyewitnesses; however, Rivera
disagrees with its conclusion. Def. St., ¶ 9; Pl. Opp., ¶ 9.
In any event, Ramos was not wearing a seatbelt. Def. St., ¶ 8. Ramos lost control
and hit two parked cars, including Rivera’s Jetta. Def. St., ¶ 3. The mail truck had
jumped the curb by this time. Pl. St., ¶ 2. Rivera saw Ramos in the mail truck with the
door open and with his hands on the wheel, though he was barely hanging on. Def. St.,
¶ 5; Pl. Opp., ¶¶ 3, 5. Ramos hit the Jetta, which in turn hit Rivera’s house and damaged
it. Def. St., ¶ 6; Pl. St., ¶ 2.

Ramos was ejected upon impact, but immediately got up

and walked over to park the mail truck. Def. St., ¶ 6.

2

Although the report itself has not been translated into English and must be disregarded,
see Local Rule 5(g), the government relies without objection on Rivera’s English-language
deposition transcript, during which he reads from the report. See, e.g., Docket No. 27-5.

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According to the police report, Vargas was given Miranda warnings and subjected
to a “Breathalyzer” test indicating a .102% blood alcohol content. Def. St., ¶ 7. He was
charged with misdemeanor negligence in Commonwealth court, but no probable cause
was found. Pl. St., ¶ 3. Charges of driving under the influence were not dismissed. Pl.
St., ¶ 3. Ramos was not cited by the Puerto Rico Police. Def. St., ¶ 8. On February 7,
2011, Rivera filed an administrative claim for $4,000. Def. St., ¶ 10.
DISCUSSION
The government argues that Rivera cannot establish negligence on this record. To
resolve questions of liability, the FTCA applies the law of the place of injury.
Wojciechowicz v. United States, 582 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2009).

In Puerto Rico,

negligence cases are governed by Article 1802 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code. 31 L.P.R.A.
§ 5141. Under Puerto Rico law, the elements of negligence are (1) injury, (2) breach of
duty, and (3) proximate causation. Vásquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d
43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007).

Proximate cause depends on (a) actual cause and (b)

foreseeability. Id. at 49 n.6.
The government challenges Rivera’s theory of causation on three grounds. First,
the government contends that Ramos only lost control as a result of a drunk driver
crashing into him, such that Rivera must prove the failure-to-buckle was an “intervening
cause” of the accident. Def. Mem. at 4. However, the government fails to explain how
this alters the analysis; whether Ramos’s failure-to-buckle was an intervening cause with
respect to the other driver’s responsibility poses the same ultimate question as whether
Ramos’s failure to buckle caused the accident at all. See also Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga,
828 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Nuñez Méndez v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93
P.R.R. 168, 178 (1966)) (describing doctrine of intervening cause under Puerto Rico law).
Next, the government argues that there is no evidence of actual cause—e.g., how
wearing a seatbelt would have prevented Ramos from losing control of the mail truck.
Id. But Rivera testified that Ramos’s shoulders were leaning out of the car’s open door

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immediately before hitting his car. Docket No. 31-1 at 7–8. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, this version of events permits an inference that Ramos
was not fully in control of the vehicle, given that drivers in control do not often let their
shoulders just hang out of doors while careening towards a parked car.
Finally, the government asserts that Rivera cannot prove foreseeability because
the chain of events here—from failing to buckle up, to having an accident, to losing
control, to hitting Rivera’s parked car and damaging Rivera’s home—was too attenuated.
Def. Mem. at 4–5. But “[t]he rule of foreseeability does not require that the precise risk
or exact result that occurred should have been foreseen; rather, the essential factor is that
a person should have foreseen consequences of the general kind that occurred.” MalaveFelix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Gines v. P.R. Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth., 86 P.R.R. 490, 495 (1962)).

Here, a fact-finder could reasonably

conclude that the general consequences were foreseeable at each step in the chain. As a
matter of common sense, the combination of driving with one’s door open and without a
seatbelt creates a foreseeable risk of losing control after an accident. Losing control of a
moving vehicle, in turn, can rationally be foreseen to cause damage to others’ property.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th day of August, 2013.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge