Ruiz-Albino v. Municipality of Guayanilla et al

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER re 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court GRANTS defendant Municipality's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff Ruiz's federal claims against defendant Municipality of Guayanill a and defendant Mayor Edgardo Arlequin-Velez are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and her Commonwealth law claims against them are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Additionally, all of plaintiff Ruiz's claims against unknown defendants John Doe and Jane Doe are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 02/15/2013. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ROSANA M. RUIZ ALBINO,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

v.
MUNICIPALITY OF GUAYANILLA, et
al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Municipality of Guayanilla’s
(“defendant Municipality”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) (Docket No. 10.)
Having considered the arguments in the motion to dismiss, (Docket
No. 10), and Rosana M. Ruiz-Albino’s (“plaintiff Ruiz”) opposition,
(Docket No. 15), the Court GRANTS defendant Municipality’s motion
to dismiss for the reasons discussed below.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural History
On January 30, 2012, plaintiff Ruiz filed a complaint

seeking damages from defendant Municipality and defendant Edgardo
Arlequin-Velez (“defendant Mayor Arlequin”) in his official and
individual capacities, as well as unidentified defendants “not
presently [sic] known to the plaintiff,” in their official and
individual capacities.

(Docket No. 1.)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
§

1983

(“section

2

1983”),

she

asserted

claims

of

political

discrimination, political harassment, and equal protection and due
process violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. Id. Additionally, plaintiff Ruiz sues
the same defendants for violations of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Id.

Defendant Municipality filed a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on June 19, 2012.
(Docket No. 10.)
2012.

Plaintiff Ruiz filed an opposition on July 20,

(Docket No. 15.)

B.

Factual Background
In her complaint, plaintiff Ruiz alleges the following

non-conclusory facts.

She began her employment with the defendant

Municipality as an Office Clerk at the Municipal Finance Department
in 2002.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)

position became permanent.

Id.

Sometime thereafter, the

From 2004 to 2007, plaintiff Ruiz

participated in political activities that supported defendant Mayor
Arlequin’s reelection campaigns as part of the Popular Democratic
Party (“P.P.D.”).

Id.

Around 2007, plaintiff Ruiz became the

Director of the Citizen’s Services Office, where she supervised
employees and took complaints from citizens, which she referred to
the defendant Mayor.

Id.

She kept her designation as Clerk while

she carried out the additional duties.

Id.

Around October 2009, plaintiff Ruiz’s husband began to
work for a political team supporting another P.P.D certified

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

3

candidate who rivaled defendant Mayor Arlequin in the P.P.D.
Guayanilla mayoral primary race.
performed

computer

work

for

Id.

defendant

Plaintiff Ruiz’s husband
Municipality,

but

his

association with defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rival was well-known
throughout the area.

Id. Plaintiff Ruiz occasionally appeared

along-side her husband at community events that supported the rival
P.P.D. candidate.

Id. at pp. 3-4.

Plaintiff Ruiz was treated as

the rival’s supporter because of her marital relationship and
appearances alongside her husband.

Id. at p. 4.

Plaintiff Ruiz was removed as Director of the Citizen’s
Services Office and was assigned to the Municipal Waste and Recycle
Plant.

Id.

She alleges that she was “belittled” and asked to

perform tasks outside of her official duties as a Municipal Clerk.1
Id.

Thereafter,

plaintiff

Ruiz’s

supervisor

accused

her

of

misusing a USB drive to steal information, to which she had access
at her previous position, about Municipal employees and local
citizens.

Id.

Her

supervisor

accused

her

of

using

this

information for personal gain, and also accused her of undue use of
the municipal computers for personal benefit.

1

Id.

Plaintiff Ruiz did not plead any factual support beyond this
conclusory statement to show how she was belittled or what types of
duties outside of the clerk’s she was asked to complete.
Additionally, she does not plead who belittled her or asked her to
complete these other duties.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
An

4

administrative

hearing

allegations against plaintiff Ruiz.2

was

held

to

address

the

Id.

Prior to the hearing,

defendant Mayor Arlequin made a series of statements to the local
press indicating that one of his employees had been accused of
information theft.

Id. at pp. 4-5.

Defendant Mayor Arlequin did

not name plaintiff Ruiz as the suspect in these statements, but he
provided “[t]he name[s of,] and statements of facts by[,] fellow
municipality workers.”

Id.

Plaintiff Ruiz alleges that the

information provided by the mayor made the “plaintiff’s identity
rather obvious among municipal employees and to the local public.”
Id. at

p. 5. When she heard about the press releases, plaintiff

Ruiz suffered an emotional breakdown, requiring medical treatment.
Id.

After an administrative hearing, plaintiff Ruiz was dismissed

from her position on January 31, 2011.3
II.

Id.

LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint that

fails

to

state

Fed.R.Civ.P.

a

claim

12(b)(6).

upon
When

which

relief

assessing

can

whether

be
a

granted.

plaintiff’s

2

Plaintiff Ruiz did not plead who held the hearing or how it
was carried out.
She did not state what was decided at the
hearing.
3

Plaintiff Ruiz pleads that she was dismissed via a letter,
but does not say who dismissed her, other than to say “defendant”
dismissed her. (Docket No. 1 at p. 5.) The Court surmises that
defendant Mayor Arlequin dismissed her.
She alleges that the
dismissal letter was incorrectly dated January 31, 2010.
Id.
Plaintiff Ruiz also contends that the evidence of theft was not
strong, but she does not say what the outcome of the hearing was.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

5

complaint provides “fair notice to the defendants” and states “a
facially

plausible

legal

two-pronged approach.

claim,”

the

Court

must

utilize

a

See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640

F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2011).

First, the Court can disregard

statements that “offer legal conclusions couched as fact,” because
the plaintiff must do more than “parrot the elements of the cause
of action.”

Id. at 12.

Second, the Court is bound to treat all

“properly pled factual allegations” as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Id.

The Court must base its

determination solely on the material submitted as part of the
complaint and expressly incorporated within it.

See Alt. Energy,

Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.
2001).
The factual material pled must be sufficient “to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level,” and to permit the Court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
has held

The Supreme Court

that a plaintiff’s pleading must cross “the line between

possibility and plausibility.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 577 (2007).

A district court should not attempt to

forecast the likelihood of success even if proving the alleged
facts is “improbable.”

Id. at 556.

A complaint that contains a

plausible basis for relief, therefore, “may proceed even if it

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

6

appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”
(internal citation omitted).
experience

and

plausibility.

common

sense”

Id. at 556

The Court draws “on its judicial
in

evaluating

the

complaint’s

Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st

Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Municipality argues that plaintiff Ruiz fails to
state a claim for political discrimination, political harassment,
an equal protection violation, or a due process violation pursuant
to the First or Fourteenth Amendments necessary for section 1983
liability.

(Docket No. 10 at pp. 2-8.) It also contends that any

claim related to political harassment is barred by the expiration
of the statute of limitations and that plaintiff Ruiz fails to
establish municipal liability.

(Docket No. 10 at pp. 6-7, 10.)

The Court addresses those arguments in turn.
A.

Plaintiff Ruiz’s Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 allows “a private right of action for

violations of federally protected rights.”
Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007).

Marrero-Gutierrez v.

The Supreme Court has held

that section 1983 does not confer substantive rights, “but provides
a

venue

for

vindicating

federal

rights

elsewhere

conferred.”

Marrero-Saez v. Municipality of Aibonito, 668 F.Supp.2d 327, 332
(D.P.R. 2009) (citing Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94
(1989)).

In order to state a claim pursuant to section 1983, a

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

7

plaintiff must plausibly plead (1) that he or she was deprived of
a constitutional right; (2) that a “causal connection exists
between [defendants’ conduct] and the [constitutional deprivation];
and (3) that the challenged conduct was attributable to a person
acting under color of state law.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590
F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
1.

Municipal Liability
Municipalities are “persons” for the purpose of a

section 1983 claim, and, therefore, are subject to claims pursuant
to the statute.

See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,

690 (1978).

Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for

actions

its

of

employees,

however,

pursuant

to

a

theory

of

respondeat superior. Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st
Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

In order for a plaintiff

to allege a claim of municipal liability, he or she must show “a
municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs. of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403

(1997)

(internal

citation

established in two ways:

omitted).

Liability

can

be

(1) when a municipal custom or policy

causes a constitution violation, or (2) when a person with final
decision

making

authority

constitutional right.
Cir. 2002).

took

the

action

that

violated

the

See Kelly v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

8

The Court finds that plaintiff Ruiz fails to allege
facts showing that the municipality enforced a policy or custom
that led to her dismissal.

First, plaintiff Ruiz fails to plead

that a policy or custom even existed.

(See Docket No. 1.)

The

Court surmises it would be a custom or policy to dismiss people who
supported one of defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rivals.

Other than

conclusory statements that plaintiff Ruiz was “belittled” and
dismissed because of her support for the rival, she does not
provide any support demonstrating a municipal policy or custom.
See id.

Evidence of a plaintiff’s own employment history is not

enough to support a claim of a municipal custom or policy.

See

Murray v. City of Boston, 104 F.3d 348, 348 (1st Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment against a plaintiff who attempted to
establish a municipal policy or custom with only his employment
history and the fact that other unrelated claims had been filed
against the city).
Second, the Court finds that plaintiff Ruiz fails to
plead a municipal policy or custom through the actions of a person
with final decision making authority. In Puerto Rico, the mayor is
considered a person with final decision making authority for the
municipality.

See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, ch. 97 § 1061 et seq.

(2004). Accordingly, plaintiff Ruiz may bring a section 1983 claim
against

defendant

Municipally

of

Guayanilla

by

establishing

municipal liability if she sufficiently pleads facts demonstrating

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
that

defendant

Mayor

9
Arlequin,

or

another

person

with

final

decision making authority, violated her constitutional rights.
“[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single
decision

by

municipal

circumstances.”

policymakers

under

appropriate

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480

(1986); see also Kelley, 255 F.3d at 9.

For the reasons discussed

below, the Court finds that plaintiff Ruiz fails to establish that
the only identified person in her complaint, defendant Mayor
Arlequin, violated her constitutional rights on even a single
occasion.

Accordingly, all of plaintiff Ruiz’s claims against

defendant Municipality are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.4
2.

Political
Amendment
The

Constitution5

Discrimination

First

embodies

the

Amendment
right

to

Pursuant

to

the

to

the

United

be

free

from

First
States

political

discrimination. Barry v. Moran, 661 F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 2011).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the right to be
free from political discrimination prohibits government officials
from “taking adverse action against public employees on the basis

4

The Court later finds that because the complaint lacks
sufficient facts upon which to establish a claim against defendant
Mayor Arlequin, it also DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE, sua sponte,
plaintiff Ruiz’s claims against defendant Mayor Arlequin.
5

The First Amendment states, in relevant part, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or
the right of the people to peaceably assemble.” U.S. Const. amend.
I.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
of

political

10

affiliation,

unless

political

appropriate requirement of the employment.”

loyalty

is

an

Ocasio-Hernandez,

640 F.3d at 13 (internal citations omitted). A prima facie case of
political discrimination based on the First Amendment consists of
four elements: “(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing
political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the
plaintiff’s affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action
occurred, and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or
motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” Lamboy-Ortiz
v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010).
“each

defendant’s

role

in

the

termination

Additionally,

decision

must

be

sufficiently alleged to make him or her a plausible defendant.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16 (emphasis in original).
The Court finds that plaintiff Ruiz fails to meet an
important

element

required

to

state

a

claim

of

political

discrimination against defendant Mayor Arlequin, and, therefore,
defendant Municipality.
she

and

defendant

Although she plausibly establishes that

Mayor

Arlequin

have

opposing

political

affiliations, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and
that defendant Mayor Arlequin knew whether she was politically
affiliated with defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rival in the mayoral
primary election, she has failed to show the affiliation with the
mayor’s political rival, her husband, was a motivating factor for
the alleged adverse employment action taken against her.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
a.

11

Opposing Political Affiliations
Plaintiff Ruiz’s complaint adequately alleges

that she and defendant Mayor Arlequin had opposing political
affiliations.

She

contends

that

she

occasionally

appeared

alongside her husband at campaign events supporting a candidate
that rivaled defendant Mayor Arlequin in the P.P.D. mayoral primary
election.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)

Plaintiff Ruiz states that she

was “treated as another of” the supporters of defendant Mayor
Arlequin’s rival.

Id.

Although the two candidates are members of

the same political party, they were rivals in the mayoral primary
election, and their respective supporters, therefore, are treated
as

having

opposing

political

affiliation

political discrimination cases.

for

the

purpose

of

See Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermos

Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2000) (establishing that
supporting

rival

candidates

within

the

same

political

party

satisfies the opposing political affiliation element). Although
plaintiff Ruiz does not directly state in her complaint that she
supported defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rival, a reasonable inference
can be drawn that she did support him.
facts

exist

to

demonstrate

the

first

Accordingly, sufficient
element

of

political

discrimination, opposing political affiliations.
b.

Defendant
Mayor
Arlequin’s
Knowledge
Plaintiff Ruiz’s Political Affiliation

of

Defendant Municipality argues that plaintiff
Ruiz fails to plead sufficient facts establishing the second

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
element

of

political

12
discrimination

that

the

defendants

had

knowledge of her political affiliation. It contents that plaintiff
Ruiz did not sufficiently plead that she was, in fact, a supporter
of the defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rival,6 and further alleges that
plaintiff

Ruiz

fails

to

plead

sufficient

facts

showing

that

defendant Mayor Arlequin or any other specific person in the
municipality was aware of her political affiliation.
No. 10 at p. 5.)

(Docket

The Court agrees that plaintiff Ruiz fails to

establish that defendants knew of her political affiliation.
According

to

the

First

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals, a plaintiff must plead “discrete factual events” to show
that defendants

were

Ocasio-Hernandez,
include:

640

aware
F.3d

of
at

his

or her

14-15.

political beliefs.

Sufficient

allegations

(1) that a plaintiff was asked by defendants about the

circumstances relating to how the plaintiff obtained his or her
job; (2) that the clerical staff directly asked about a plaintiff’s
political affiliations; and (3) that employees knew about and
frequently discussed the political affiliation of their co-workers.
Id. at 15.

The Court also should take into account “the cumulative

effect of the factual allegations” when evaluating whether it is
plausible

that

affiliation.

6

a

defendant

knew

of

a

plaintiff’s

political

Id. at 14.

As the Court explains above, a reasonable inference can be
made that plaintiff Ruiz was affiliated with defendant Mayor
Arlequin’s rival because she attended events supporting him.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

13

In this case, plaintiff Ruiz did not state a
single factual allegation that any defendant was aware of her
political affiliation.

She merely states that “she was treated as

another of ‘Toñito’s’ supporters, the only opposing candidate
certified by the P.P.D. for political primaries within said party.”
(Docket No. 1 at p. 4.)
that way.

Id.

She does not, however, say who treated her

Plaintiff Ruiz also states that her husband’s

support for defendant Mayor Arlequin’s rival “became publicly known
throughout Guayanilla, and within the Municipal dependencies.”
(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)

Asserting that her husband’s affiliation

was well-known, however, is not sufficient to establish that her
own political affiliation was known.

See Jimenez-Gonzalez v.

Alvarez-Rubio, 683 F.Supp.2d 177, 184 (D.P.R. 2010) (finding that
the court could not infer the defendants knew of the plaintiff’s
political affiliation when the facts pled showed the defendants
witnessed

plaintiff’s husband

supporting a rival).

participate

in

political

events

Taking into account the cumulative effect of

the facts pled, the Court finds that an inference may be drawn that
defendant Mayor Arlequin was aware of plaintiff Ruiz’s political
affiliation because she at times appeared along-side her husband at
his political events.
c.

The second element is satisfied.

Adverse Employment Action
Plaintiff Ruiz’s complaint satisfies the third

element of political discrimination, an adverse employment action.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

14

An adverse employment action occurs “if those actions, objectively
evaluated, would place substantial pressure on even one of thick
skin to conform to the prevailing political view.”

Rodriguez-

Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Generally, discharging or demoting an employee
constitutes an adverse employment action.

Id.

Plaintiff Ruiz

alleges that she was dismissed from her position with defendant
Municipality on January 31, 2011.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 5.)

This

non-conclusory factual allegation is sufficient to plead the third
element of a political discrimination claim pursuant to the First
Amendment.
d.

Political Affiliation as a Substantial Factor
for Plaintiff Ruiz’s Discharge
Defendant Municipality contends that plaintiff

Ruiz fails to plead adequately that her political affiliation was
a substantial factor for her discharge, which is the fourth element
of a political discrimination claim.
The Court agrees.

(Docket No. 10 at pp. 5-6.)

To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff Ruiz

must plead facts sufficient to support “a reasonable inference that
[her] political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor
in the defendants’ conduct.”

Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16.

“[C]ircumstantial evidence alone may support a finding of political
discrimination.”

Lamboy-Ortiz v. Oritz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 240

(1st Cir. 2010). Mere conclusory statements that a plaintiff faced
an adverse employment action because of his or her political

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
affiliation,

however,

15
are

insufficient

for

discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss.

a

political
See Ocasio-

Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12.
Plaintiff Ruiz does not meet the fourth element
of a political discrimination claim because she fails to plead
facts plausibly showing that there was a political motivation
behind her dismissal.

The complaint states that she was “accused

of using and maintaining, for her own personal use and gain,
private

information

records.”

maintained

within

(Docket No. 1 at p. 4.)

to her immediate supervisor.

Id.

the

Mayor’s

Official

She attributes the accusations
Plaintiff Ruiz alleges that

“[a]ll allegations initiated by defendant against [her] are totally
disconnected from the evidence available to and collected by the
Municipality and to the findings of their investigation,” but she
does not even say she was innocent.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 5.)

She

goes on to say that “[d]efendant nonetheless, dismissed plaintiff
from her employment,” but she does not indicate the reason for her
dismissal.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 5.)

At the motion to dismiss

stage, circumstantial evidence of a highly politically charged
atmosphere, coupled with a change in political power has been found
sufficient to allege political motivation for dismissal.
Diaz v. Aponte,1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 1993).

Acevedo-

Plaintiff Ruiz fails

to plead any factual support, however, showing that there was
political motivation behind her dismissal.

Instead, the facts she

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

16

alleges show that she was accused of theft, and someone within the
defendant

Municipality

carried

out

a

hearing

regarding

allegations and that after the hearing, she was terminated.

the

Based

on those facts, alleged by plaintiff Ruiz herself, the Court does
not

find

circumstantial

evidence

available

in

the

complaint

justifying a plausible inference that she was dismissed due to her
political affiliation.
Because plaintiff Ruiz fails to plausibly plead
sufficient facts supporting the important fourth element of a prima
facie case of political discrimination, her First Amendment claim
against defendant Municipality is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3.

Political
Amendment

Harassment

Pursuant

to

the

First

The First Amendment also embodies the right to be
free from political harassment. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 937
(1st Cir. 2008).

“Actions of informal harassment, as opposed to

formal employment actions like transfers or demotions, can be the
basis for first amendment claims if the motive was political
discrimination,”

but

this

is

only

true

if

the

actions

are

“‘sufficiently severe to cause reasonably hardy individuals to
compromise their political beliefs and associations in favor of the
prevailing party.’”

Martinez-Velez v. Rey-Hernandez, 506 F.3d 32,

42 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Agosto-de Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque,
889 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc)).

A plaintiff’s

political harassment claim can only prevail against a supervisor

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
if:

“(1)

17

the

behavior

of

his

subordinates

constitutional

violation

and

(2)

the

results

supervisor’s

in

action

a
or

inaction was affirmatively linked to the behavior in the sense that
it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation
or acquiescence or gross negligence . . . amounting to deliberate
indifference.”

Welch, 542 F.3d at 937.
Defendant

Municipality

argues

that

even

if

the

political harassment claim had been well-pled, it is barred by the
statute of limitations.

(Docket No. 10 at p. 9) The Court agrees.

Because section 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations,
courts have applied a state’s statute of limitations for personalinjury tort actions.

Febus-Rodriguez v. Questell-Alvarado, 660

F.Supp.2d 157, 176 (D.P.R. 2009).

In Puerto Rico, personal-injury

tort actions have a one year statute of limitations.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2)).

Id. (citing

Plaintiff Ruiz alleges that

she was harassed prior to her dismissal on January 31, 2011.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 5.)

Plaintiff Ruiz filed her complaint one-

year later, on January 30, 2012.

Id.

Plaintiff Ruiz did not

provide dates for any of the alleged harassment.

See id.

Any

political harassment that happened prior to January 30, 2011,
therefore, is barred by the statute of limitations because the
alleged harassment

occurred

complaint’s filing date.

more

than

one year

prior

to

the

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)
4.

18

Fourteenth AmendmentEqual Protection Claim
Defendant Municipality next argues that plaintiff

Ruiz’s

claim

pursuant

to

the

Fourteenth

Protection Clause7 must be dismissed.

Amendments’

Equal

It contends that she cannot

properly assert a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection political
discrimination

claim

discrimination claim.
Court of

Appeals

alongside

a

First

Amendment

(Docket No. 10 at p. 3.)

has held

that

“[a]n

political

The First Circuit

equal

protection

claim

alleging political discrimination merely restates a First Amendment
political discrimination claim and, as [the First Circuit has] said
repeatedly, should [be] considered under the First Amendment.”
Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandoro, 597 F.3d 423, 430 n.8 (1st Cir.
2010).

Plaintiff Ruiz alleges that she was treated differently

because of her perceived political affiliation, and her equal
protection claim rests on the same facts as her First Amendment
political discrimination claim.
proper

method

pursuant

to

(Docket No. 1 at p. 6.)

which

to

bring

her

The

political

discrimination case is, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
indicated, only pursuant to the First Amendment.

7

Accordingly,

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that similarly situated persons shall be treated
similarly. It contains an “Equal Protection Clause,” providing, in
relevant part, that “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

19

plaintiff Ruiz’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

For a procedural due process claim to survive the motion to dismiss
stage,

a

plaintiff

must

plausibly

plead

that

he

or

she

was

“[1] deprived of a property interest, [2] by defendants acting
under color of state law, and [3] without the availability of a
constitutionally adequate process.”

Maymi v. Puerto Rico Ports

Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
The Due Process Clause guarantees public employees
a property interest in their continued employment only if “existing
rules or understandings” that “stem from an independent source such
as state law” create a reasonable expectation that their employment
will continue.

Davila-Aleman v. Feliciano-Melecio, 992 F. Supp.

91, 96 (D.P.R. 1997) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)).

Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, public

employees that are categorized as “career” employees enjoy a
property interest in their employment.

See Laws of P.R. Ann.

tit 3, § 1465 (“Career employees . . . are entitled to remain in
the service pursuant to the provisions of § 1462e of this title.”);
§ 1462e(4) (“The appointing authority may only . . . remove any

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

20

career employee for just cause, after having given written notice
of the bringing of charges and . . . his/her right to request a
hearing before action is taken.”); Colon-Santiago v. Rosario, 438
F.3d 101, 108 (1st Cir. 2006); Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque,
829 F.2d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that Puerto Rico law
clearly

gives

employment).

career

employees

a

property

interest

in

their

Plaintiff Ruiz states that she “obtained a permanent

position and official designation” as an Office Clerk with the
Municipality of Guayanilla.

(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)

Because she

alleges that her job was permanent, a reasonable inference can be
made that her position constituted a career position pursuant to
Puerto Rico law.
In order to allege a cause of action for a due
process violation sufficiently, plaintiff Ruiz must show that an
official acting under the color of law removed her from her career
position without due process.

The minimum process due to a career

employee prior to termination is “oral or written notice of the
charges against him [or her], an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his [or her] side of the
story.”

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.

This entails “some kind of

a hearing and an opportunity to respond to the allegations against
the employee.”

Lopez-Quiñonez v. P.R. Nat’l. Guard, 488 F.Supp.2d

112, 119 (D.P.R. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In addition, the opportunity to be heard must take place “at a

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

21

meaningful time” and “in a meaningful manner.” See Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 547; Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5-6
(1st Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff
impartial

Ruiz

administrative

accused of theft.

acknowledges

hearing

was

that

convened”

(Docket No. 1 at p. 4.)

an

“alleged

after

she

was

She contends that she

was publicly identified as someone being investigated for theft
before the hearing was held, so she was denied due process.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 6.)
evidence
(Docket

and
No.

investigate
1

at

p.

Defendant Municipality did collect
the

5.)

charges
The

against

publicity

plaintiff
surrounding

Ruiz.
the

administrative hearing did not prevent an investigation from being
carried out, and no reasonable inference can be made from the facts
alleged that plaintiff Ruiz was unable to speak on her behalf at
the hearing.

Plaintiff Ruiz received the process she was due when

she received notice of the charges against her and was given a
hearing

and

opportunity

to

be

heard

prior

to

dismissal.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff Ruiz’s
Fourteenth

Amendment

due

process

claim

against

defendant

Municipality.
6.

Plaintiff Ruiz’s Claims Against Defendant Mayor
Arlequin
Plaintiff Ruiz also brings claims against defendant

Mayor Arlequin in both his official and personal capacities.
Docket No. 1 at p. 2.)

(See

Defendant Municipality, however, is the

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

22

only party who filed a motion to dismiss.

(See Docket No. 10.)

Notwithstanding, the Court sua sponte finds that plaintiff Ruiz’s
claims

against

defendant

Mayor

Arlequin

in

his

official

and

individual capacities must fail for the same reasons as those
brought against defendant Municipality.

As discussed earlier, one

way for liability to be imputed to defendant Municipality is for
plaintiff Ruiz to plausibly plead defendant Mayor Arlequin or
another actor with final-decision making authority violated her
constitutional rights.

Welch, 542 at 941; Kelley, 288 F.3d at 9.

For the reasons discussed previously, plaintiff Ruiz fails to
sufficiently plead a section 1983 claim against Mayor Arlequin.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff Ruiz’s
section

1983

action

against

defendant

Mayor

Arlequin

in

his

official and individual capacities.
7.

Plaintiff Ruiz’s Claims Against Unknown Defendants
John Doe and Jane Doe
Plaintiff Ruiz has also alleged claims against John

Doe and Jane Doe defendants, who were not known to her when she
filed the claim.

Service on defendants must be completed within

120 days after the complaint is filed, and unidentified defendants
must be named and served by that time.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).

More than a year has passed since plaintiff Ruiz filed her claim on
January 30, 2012. (Docket No. 1.) Her claims against unidentified
defendants, therefore, are waived for lack of service of process.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all of plaintiff

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

23

Ruiz’s claims against unidentified defendants John Doe and Jane
Doe.
B.

Plaintiff Ruiz’s Supplemental State Law Claims
Because the Court dismisses plaintiff Ruiz’s section 1983

action as to all defendants, no federal claim remains upon which to
ground jurisdiction over her Commonwealth law claims.

Federal

courts have jurisdiction over state claims when they are “so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. The Court has dismissed all claims over which it exercised
original jurisdiction, and it declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction

over

plaintiff

Ruiz’s

Commonwealth

claims.

Accordingly, plaintiff Ruiz’s Commonwealth law claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court GRANTS defendant

Municipality’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff Ruiz’s federal claims against defendant Municipality of
Guayanilla and defendant Mayor Edgardo Arlequin-Velez are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, and her Commonwealth law claims against them are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Additionally, all of plaintiff Ruiz’s
claims against

unknown

defendants

John

Doe

and

DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

entirety.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

This

case

is

Jane

DISMISSED

Doe

are

in

its

Civil No. 12-1060 (FAB)

24

IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 15, 2013.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE