Federal Insurance Co. et al v. Empresas Sabaer, Inc. et al

Filing 213

ORDER re: 210 Stipulation of Dismissal. The stipulation is construed as a joint motion to dismiss, and it is DENIED, though without prejudice to the parties' filing of a motion under FRCP 60(b).Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 4/20/2015.(NBB)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

FED. INS. CO., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIV. NO.: 12-1113(SCC)

EMPRESAS SABAER, INC., ET
AL.,
Defendants.

ORDER
The parties in this contract dispute filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, and in an Memorandum and Order dated
December 17, 2014, I granted Plaintiffs’ motion and denied
Plaintiffs’. Docket No. 196. Accordingly, judgment was entered
in Plaintiffs’ favor on the same date. Docket No. 197. Defendants appealed. See Docket No. 199. On April 13, 2015, the
parties jointly filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. JOINT
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, Fed. Ins. Co. v. Empresas Sabaer, No. 111169 (1st Cir. filed April 13, 2015). On the same date, they

FED. INS. CO. v. EMPRESAS SABAER

Page 2

jointly filed a similar motion before this court. Docket No. 210.1
Pursuant to the parties’ motion, the First Circuit entered
judgment dismissing Defendants’ appeal. Docket Nos. 211, 212.
The parallel motion remains pending before this Court. It
informs the Court that the parties have reached an agreement
“dispos[itive] of all controversies in the above captioned case,
including all claims, counterclaims, final judgment and all
claims for attorney’s fees.” Docket No. 210, at 1. It thus
requests that “all pending claims . . . , counterclaims, claims for
attorneys’ fees, or the award entered on December 17, 2014, be
dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 2. It is difficult to understand
exactly what the parties are requesting with their motion. As
they know, final judgment has been entered, and there are thus
no claims or counterclaims pending. Likewise, no motion for
attorneys’ fees was pending at the time the parties’ motion was
filed. See Docket No. 209 (denying without prejudice Plaintiffs’
motion for attorneys’ fees in light of the then-pending appeal).
This leaves only the December 17, 2014, judgment, but of

1.

The parties submisssion refers to itself as a “Joint Motion for
Dismissal.” Docket No. 210, at 1. However, it was misfiled as a
“Stipulation of Dismissal,” which is how it appears on the docket. In
this Order, I refer to the parties’ filing as a motion, and I treat it as such.

FED. INS. CO. v. EMPRESAS SABAER

Page 3

course a judgment cannot be “dismissed with prejudice.”
A judgment may, however, be vacated, and it is presumably this relief that the parties request. However, they have not
filed the appropriate motion: one for vacatur under Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). I thus DENY the parties’ motion, but I
do so without prejudice to their filing a Rule 60(b) motion. The
parties are warned, however, that I am disinclined towards
vacatur of a final judgment in the absence of a compelling
justification.
If the parties choose to file a Rule 60(b) motion, then, they
should start by addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, which held that
courts of appeals may not, in the absence of “exceptional
circumstances,” vacate a district court judgment on account of
a post-judgment settlement agreement. 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994).
In doing so, the Supreme Court suggested that a district court
should consider a request for vacatur under similar circumstances under the rubric of Rule 60(b). Id. Subsequently, some
courts of held that U.S. Bancorp’s “exceptional circumstances”
test applies to a district court’s review of its own judgments,
while others have disagreed. Compare Marseilles Hydro Power
LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 481 F.3d 1002, 1003 (7th Cir.

FED. INS. CO. v. EMPRESAS SABAER

Page 4

2007) (holding that a district court is not “cabined by the
‘exceptional circumstances’ test”), with Vertex Surgical, Inc. v.
Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (D. Mass.
2009) (applying the “exceptional circumstances” test). Perhaps
more importantly, the Fourth Circuit has held that while Rule
60(b), not U.S. Bancorp’s test, applies to district court review of
vacatur motions, these standards are nearly identical in
practice. Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 117 (4th
Cir. 2000) (“In the circumstances of vacatur due to mootness,
however, we are satisfied that the standards . . . are essentially
the same.”). The bottom line is that if the parties seek vacatur
of this Court’s December 17, 2014, judgment, they must justify
it by reference to considerations apart from mootness and the
fact of settlement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 20th day of April, 2015.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE