Ocasio-Vazquez et al v. Rubero-Aponte et al
Filing
44
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 36 MOTION for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 37 MOTION for Joinder; finding as moot 39 MOTION to Strike. Signed by Judge Jay A Garcia-Gregory on 8/27/2013.(RJC)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
OCASIO-VÁZQUEZ, et al,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 12-1137(JAG)
v.
RUBERO-APONTE, et al,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
GARCÍA-GREGORY, D.J.
Pending
before
the
Court
is
Dr.
Rubén
Rubero-Aponte’s
(“Defendant” or “Dr. Rubero-Aponte”) Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (Docket No. 36). For the reasons
outlined below, the motion is hereby DENIED.
FACTS
On November 20th, 2007, plaintiffs Paulita Vázquez-Torres,
Carmen Vázquez-Torres, and Ralphie Ocasio-Vázquez (“Plaintiffs”)
filed
a
complaint
for
medical
malpractice
and
vicarious
liability (the “First Complaint”) against Defendant and Quality
Health Service of Puerto Rico, Inc. d/b/a Hospital San Cristóbal
(the “Hospital”), Dr. Gil Kelly Torres-Lugo (“Dr. Torres-Lugo”),
Dr. Karla M. Borrero-Cuello (“Dr. Borrero-Cuello”), SIMED, and
Admiral Insurance Company (“Admiral”). (Docket Nos. 29-3, 29-4).
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
2
Subsequently, in August, 2010, Plaintiffs entered into a
Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release (the “Settlement
Agreement” or “Settlement”) with the Hospital and its insurer,
Admiral, and Dr. Torres-Lugo and his insurer, SIMED. (Docket No.
29-6 at 1). Pursuant to its terms, the Settlement released the
Hospital, Dr. Torres-Lugo, Admiral, and SIMED “from any and all
past, present and future claims, demands, obligations, actions
or causes of action as a result of the facts alleged in the
[First] [C]omplaint and/or any of its amendments.” Id. at 2. In
exchange for the release, Plaintiffs received the total sum of
$120,000.00. Id. at 1-2. Under paragraph 7 of the Settlement
Agreement, however, Plaintiffs “reserve[d] the right to continue
their action against all defendants . . . not included in th[e]
[] Settlement [].” Id.
On February 28th, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint
for medical malpractice (the “Instant Complaint”) against Dr.
Rubero-Aponte, Dr. Borrero-Cuello, and SIMED. (Docket No. 29-7
at 1-2). The Instant Complaint is based on the same factual
allegations as the First Complaint. See id.1
1
Dr. Borrero-Cuello filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
October 1st, 2012. (Docket No. 29). Nevertheless, on April 29th,
2013, she and Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Partial Voluntary
Dismissal as to Co-Defendants Dr. Karla Michelle Borrero Cuello
and Her Insurance Carrier SIMED, whereby Plaintiffs moved to
voluntarily dismiss with prejudice the complaint as to Dr.
Borrero-Cuello and SIMED. (Docket No. 38 at 1). By the same
-2-
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
3
On April 15th, 2013, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment, now pending before the Court. (Docket No. 36). In his
motion, Dr. Rubero-Aponte argues that the Settlement Agreement
not only released the Hospital, Dr. Torres-Lugo, Admiral, and
SIMED,
actions
but
also
resulting
released
from
him
the
from
facts
all
claims
alleged
in
and
causes
the
First
of
and
Instant Complaints. (Docket No. 36 at 2). Defendant specifically
argues that, because he was an employee of the Hospital at the
time the Settlement was signed, the benefits that accrued to the
Hospital under the Settlement must also accrue to him. Id. Other
than the uncontested fact that the Hospital employed Dr. RuberoAponte at the relevant time period, there is no evidence in the
record that clarifies the nature of the relationship between the
two parties. Therefore, summary judgment is not proper as a
matter of law.
DISCUSSION
A. The Settlement Agreement
The Puerto Rico Civil Code provides that the terms of a
settlement agreement will be interpreted restrictively. US Fire
Ins. v. A.E.E., 174 D.P.R. 846, 854 (P.R. 2008) (citing P.R.
Laws
Ann.
tit.
31,
§
4826).
Because
token, Dr. Borrero-Cuello moved to
counterclaim, also with prejudice. Id.
-3-
of
their
voluntarily
restrictive
dismiss
her
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
4
interpretation, settlement terms must be clearly and precisely
drafted. Id. Specifically in the context of a tort action with
multiple
defendants,
where
the
plaintiff
enters
into
a
settlement agreement with one of them, the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico has stated that ascertaining what the parties agreed
to
is
of
vital
importance
to
establish
the
effect
of
the
settlement agreement with regard to the remaining defendants.
Id. at 855 (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 4826); see also
Sagardía De Jesús v. Hosp. Aux. Mutuo, 177 D.P.R. 484, 499 (P.R.
2009).
Here, the terms of the Settlement are clear and precise.
Paragraph 4 expressly states that Plaintiffs, pursuant to the
Settlement
Agreement,
“release[d]
and
forever
discharge[d]
defendants [the] Hospital [], its insurer Admiral [], Dr. []
Torres-Lugo and his insurer, SIMED . . . .” (Docket No. 29-6 at
2). There is no mention of Defendant’s name anywhere in the
Settlement.
See
id.
On
the
contrary,
under
paragraph
7,
Plaintiffs “specifically reserve[d] the right to continue their
action against all defendants which are not included” in the
Settlement
Agreement.
Id.
at
2.
Nevertheless,
the
crux
of
Defendant’s argument is that the Settlement Agreement released
him from all claims resulting from the facts alleged in the
First
and
Instant
Complaints
by
-4-
virtue
of
his
employment
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
5
relationship with the Hospital. (Docket No. 36 at 2). Therefore,
to determine the effect of the Settlement on the claims against
Dr. Rubero-Aponte, it is necessary to delve into the vicarious
liability doctrine as found in Puerto Rico law.
B. The
Employment
Relationship
between
Defendant
and
the
Hospital
Under
Puerto
Rico
law,
a
hospital
can
be
liable
for
a
doctor’s malpractice in four distinct situations. See Fonseca v.
Hosp. HIMA, 184 D.P.R. 281, 288-90 (P.R. 2012) (citing P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 31, § 5142). First, a hospital is vicariously liable
for the negligent acts of its employees. Id. (citing Márquez
Vega
v.
Martínez
Rosado,
116
D.P.R.
397,
403
(P.R.
1985)).
Hospitals are likewise liable for the negligent acts of doctors
who, although not employees, are part of the hospital staff and
are available for consults. Id. (citing Márquez Vega, 116 D.P.R.
at 407). Third, a hospital is jointly liable with an exclusive
franchise contracted to provide special medical services in that
hospital. Id. (citing Sagardía De Jesús, 177 D.P.R. at 515-16).
Finally, where a hospital grants a doctor the privilege to use
the hospital’s facilities for his or her private patients, the
hospital can be held liable for the doctor’s negligent acts if
the hospital was careless or imprudent in selecting and granting
the
doctor
such
privilege,
in
-5-
monitoring
the
doctor’s
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
6
performance, and so on. Id. (citing Márquez Vega, 116 D.P.R. at
409-10).
Defendant
states
that
the
Settlement
Agreement
not
only
expressly released the Hospital, Dr. Torres-Lugo, Admiral, and
SIMED, but also had the effect of releasing him of liability
given that he was an employee of the Hospital at the time it was
signed. (Docket No. 36 at 2). Although it is uncontested that
Dr.
Rubero-Aponte
evidence
in
the
was
the
record
Hospital’s
clarifying
employee,
exactly
there
what
is
no
type
of
employment relationship existed between the parties. A finding
as to the nature of their employment relationship is necessary
to determine whether the Hospital can be held liable for the
acts
of
liability.
Dr.
In
Rubero-Aponte
turn,
only
under
if
the
the
doctrine
Hospital
of
is
vicarious
liable
for
Defendant’s acts can the Settlement Agreement have discharged
the claims against him. Because the record is undeveloped on
this issue, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
above,
Defendant’s
Motion
Summary Judgment, (Docket No. 36), is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 27th day of August, 2013.
-6-
for
CIVIL NO. 12-1137 (JAG)
7
S/ Jay A. García-Gregory
JAY A. GARCÍA-GREGORY
United States District Judge
-7-
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