Vazquez-Marin v. Diaz et al

Filing 24

ORDER denying 14 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 12/9/2013. (VCC)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JOSE VAZQUEZ-MARIN
Plaintiff,
v.
EMILIO
PACHECO;
BURSET

Civil Case. NO. 12-1177 (PG)

DIAZ-COLON;
PRPD; AND LUIS

REYNALDO
FORTUNO-

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket
No. 14). Therein, defendants request this Court dismiss the claim brought
by plaintiff, insofar as the latter failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies prior to filing the above-captioned complaint. For the reasons
set forth below, this Court DENIES the defendants’ request.
I.
On

March

13,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2012,

Jose

Vazquez-Marin

(“plaintiff”)

filed

the

above-captioned complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In short, the
plaintiff avers that he was assaulted by another inmate on two separate
occasions,

namely,

on

April

1st

and

April

21st,

2011.

Thereafter,

plaintiff was interviewed by Puerto Rico Police Officer Reinaldo Pacheco,
and filed two administrative complaints with the Correctional Facility.1
However, the plaintiff claims that no criminal case was filed allegedly
due to the nature of his conviction. See Docket No. 3. Consequently, the
plaintiff

brought

suit

against

Emilio

Diaz-Colon,

Reynaldo

Pacheco,

Puerto Rico Police Department, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Luis
Fortuno-Burset (“the defendants”).
The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 14).
Therein, they assert that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the
administrative remedies prior to filing suit before this Court. This,
because the plaintiff failed to file reconsideration to the decision
issued by the Correctional Facility

and subsequently

failed to seek

judicial review in the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals as well as the

1

See Docket No. 17-1..

Civil No. 12-1177 (PG)

Page 2

Supreme Court as required by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.2
Consequently,

the

defendants

move

this

Court

to

dismiss

the

above-

captioned complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.
12(b)(1). See Docket No. 14.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions to dismiss brought under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
are subject to the same standard of review. See Negrón-Gaztambide v.
Hernández-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1994). Firstly, when ruling on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court “must
accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint,
draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, and
determine whether the complaint,

so read, limns facts sufficient to

justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Médico de
Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing LaChapelle v.
Berkshire

Life

Ins.

Co.,

142

F.3d

507,

508

(1st

Cir.

1998)).

Additionally, courts “may augment the facts in the complaint by reference
to (i) documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it,
and (ii) matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan,
513 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In

determining

whether

dismissal

of

a

complaint

is

appropriate

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the court must keep in mind that
“[t]he general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief… this short and
plain statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the…
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern.
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations
and

quotation

marks

omitted).

Nevertheless,

“even

under

the

liberal

pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court
has… held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a
plausible entitlement to relief.’” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc.,
490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff

pleads

factual

content

that

allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
2

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 3 § 2172.

Civil No. 12-1177 (PG)

Page 3

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level… on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and
quotation

marks

omitted).

“Determining

whether

a

complaint

states

a

plausible claim for relief will… be a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a two
pronged

approach.

It

should

begin

by

identifying

and

disregarding

statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched
as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ocasio-Hernández

v.

Fortuño-Burset,

640

F.3d

1,

12

(1st

Cir.

2011)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although a complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6)

“does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations… a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555

(internal

citations

and

quotation

marks

omitted). That is, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions
from

the

complaint

or

naked

assertions

devoid

of

further

factual

enhancement.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009)
(citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1960). “Non-conclusory factual allegations in
the

complaint

must

then

be

treated

as

true,

even

if

seemingly

incredible.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 9 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1951).
When evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not
“attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if… a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of
the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw
from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at
13.

Civil No. 12-1177 (PG)

Page 4
III. DISCUSSION

Claims

arising

under

the

Prison

Litigation

Reform

Act

of

1995

(“PLRA”) require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing
suit in court. Accordingly, under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]3, or any other
Federal

law,

by

a

prisoner

confined

in

any

jail,

prison,

or

other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§

1997e(a)).

The

Court

also

held

that

“failure

to

exhaust

is

an

affirmative defense under the PLRA,” Id. at 216, and as such, “defendant
prison officials must specifically raise the failure to do so as a
defense. If they do not, the defense may well be waived.” Id. In the case
at hand, the defendants have raised such defense, and therefore, have not
waived the same.
With regards to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, the First Circuit
has held that “[a] prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before a
complaint under § 1983 will be entertained even where the relief sought
cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Johnson v. Thyng, 369
Fed.Appx. 144 at 147 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001)). The Court also noted that “[e]xhaustion
is mandatory,” Johnson, 369 Fed.Appx. at 146 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)), and “has a
decidedly procedural emphasis.” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
“Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve
disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being
haled into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204 (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S at
94-95). In addition, this requirement “has the potential to reduce the
number of inmate suits, and also to improve the quality of suits that are
filed by producing a useful administrative record.” Id.
3

Section 1983 states that:
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Civil No. 12-1177 (PG)

Page 5

In order to exhaust the administrative remedies, the prisoner must
comply with the applicable regulation. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88
(holding

that

in

order

to

properly

exhaust

administrative

remedies

prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance
with the applicable procedural rules). These “rules are defined not by
the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Compliance with
prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the
PLRA to properly exhaust.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 228. “The level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will
vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prisons
requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Id.
In their motion to dismiss the defendants assert that the plaintiff
failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
PLRA. This, because he failed to file an appeal before the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals and subsequently file a certiorari before the Puerto
Rico

Supreme

Court

prior

to

filing

the

above-captioned

complaint.

Moreover, the defendants aver that the plaintiff is now barred from doing
so, insomuch as he failed to file reconsideration to the decision issued
by

the

Correctional

Facility

within

the

period

prescribed

by

the

applicable regulation. The Court disagrees.
The Court notes that said directives are meant to be followed when
a petitioner seeks judicial review

before state court. However, the

above-captioned complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
issue

of

whether

Congress

intended

to

include

appeals

to

the

state

judicial system within the administrative remedies which a prisoner must
exhaust before bringing an action described in § 1997e(a) was addressed
by the Third Circuit in Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d 257 (1998). In said
case, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the
Department of Correction, because he had failed to challenge the agency’s
decision in the Superior Court of New Jersey, and thus, had failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies. In reversing the District Court’s
decision, the Third Circuit found that “the prisoner must exhaust his
administrative remedies… but need not exhaust state judicial remedies
before bringing an action governed” by § 1983. Id. at 259.

Civil No. 12-1177 (PG)

Page 6

Accordingly, the Court finds that the petitioner was only required
to properly exhaust the internal administrative remedies prior to filing
suit. Judicial review before state courts does not constitute internal
remedies. Extending that requirement to include judicial review before
state courts, as the defendants suggest, is an onerous hurdle that defies
Congressional intent behind the PLRA. The Court’s reading of the statute
leaves no doubt that it was not Congress’s intention that plaintiff file
an appeal before the state court of appeals, or certiorari before a
state’s Supreme Court prior to filing suit before a federal court under a
federal statute. See Jenkins. Consequently, having the plaintiff filed
two separate claims with the Ponce Correctional Complex, Administrative
Remedies

Division,

this

Court

finds

that

he

properly

exhausted

administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, this Court hereby DENIES the defendants’
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 14).
SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 9, 2013.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE