Cruz-Rodriguez et al v. Molina-Rodriguez et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 9/8/2014. (VCC)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

CHRISTOPHER CRUZ RODRIGUEZ,ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Case. NO. 12-1189(PG)

CARLOS MOLINA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This

is

an

action

brought

by

Christopher

Cruz

Rodriguez

(hereinafter the “plaintiff” or “Cruz Rodriguez”), an inmate under the
custody of the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections, alleging, inter
alia, that he was brutally beaten by a correctional officer and denied
adequate medical care to recover from his injuries. He brings this suit
pursuant

to

42

U.S.C.

§1983;

the

First,

Fourth,

Sixth,

Eight

and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, under the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and under several state
law provisions.
On March 19, 2013 defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No.
23) pleading that this Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice
because plaintiffs:(1) failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
filing suit; (2) failed to plead a cause of action as to the claims
predicated on the Fourth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments and (3)
because

several

defendants

were

protected

by

the

qualified

immunity

defense. Id
For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT in part and DENY in part
the Motion to Dismiss.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the instant action on March 16, 2012. See Docket
No. 1. Following some predicaments with the issuance and service of
summons, the defendants finally made their initial appearance on February
15, 2013. See Docket No. 21.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 2

On March 19, 2013 defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss in lieu of
their

answer

to

the

complaint.

See

Docket

No.

23.

On

May

16,

2013

defendants filed a motion to deem as unopposed the motion to dismiss on
account of plaintiffs’ lack of opposition to the motion. See Docket No.
24.

Scarcely

a

month

after,

plaintiffs

finally

filed

their

belated

response, which was ultimately stricken from the record. See Dockets No.
26, 28 and 29. Pursuant to the court’s Order of January 14, 2014 (Docket
No. 29), the motion to dismiss stands unopposed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the
court must keep in mind that “[t]he general rules of pleading require a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief… this short and plain statement need only give the
defendant fair notice of what the… claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48
(1st

Cir.

2009)

(internal

citations

and

quotation

marks

omitted).

Nevertheless, “even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has… held that to survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a plausible entitlement to
relief.’” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st
Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007)).
In

order

to

assess

the

sufficiency

of

a

complaint’s

factual

allegations, the court engages in a two-step inquiry. Manning v. Boston
Medical Center Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ocasio–
Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal
citation omitted)). “First, conclusory allegations that merely parrot the
relevant legal standard are disregarded, as they are not entitled to the
presumption of truth.”

Id. “Second, we accept the remaining factual

allegations as true and decide if, drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs' favor, they are sufficient to show an entitlement to relief.”
Id.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 3

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Dismissal of claims against Carlos Molina and Jesús González

Defendants move to dismiss the claims against co-defendants Carlos
Molina

(“Molina”)

and

Jesús

González

(“González”)

because

the

facts

alleged were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. In
analyzing whether plaintiffs passed the 12(b)(6) hurdle, the Court is
required to “accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint
and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff [ ].”
Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30,
33 (1st Cir. 2001).
We read plaintiffs’ complaint to assert a claim of supervisory
liability

under

Section

1983

against

Molina,

who

was

Secretary

of

Corrections at the time that the events related in the complaint took
place and González, who was Secretary of Corrections when the Complaint
was filed. Section 1983 claims require three elements for liability:
deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the actor and the
deprivation, and state action. Sánchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31
(1st Cir. 2009); see also 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Plaintiffs sued Molina in his personal capacity and González in his
official capacity. See Docket No. 1. The inclusion of these defendants
seems to be premised on the theory that those defendants failed to
adequately supervise the correctional officers implicated in the incident
where

Cruz

Rodríguez

was

supposedly

beaten.

Although

“[g]overnment

officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior,” Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1948, supervisory officials may be liable on the basis of their
own acts or omissions. Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dávila, 135 F.3d 182, 192
(1st Cir. 1998).
In

the

context

of

Section

1983

actions,

supervisory

liability

typically arises in one of two ways: either the supervisor may be a
“primary

violator

or

direct

participant

in

the

rights-violating

incident,” or liability may attach “if a responsible official supervises,
trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the
possibility

that

deficient

performance

of

the

task

eventually

may

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 4

contribute to a civil rights deprivation.” Camilo–Robles v. Zapata, 175
F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999). In either scenario, the plaintiff in a
Section

1983

action

must

show

“an

affirmative

link,

whether

through

direct participation or through conduct that amounts to condonation or
tacit authorization, between the actor and the underlying violation.”
Sánchez, 590 F.3d at 48 (internal citations omitted).
To

be

liable,

then,

Molina

and

González

must

have

personally

participated in the violation of the prisoner's rights or directed others
to

commit

the

violation

or

at

the

very

least,

have

knowledge

and

acquiesced to their subordinates’ violations.
Neither is alleged here. Turning to the complaint, we find that it
does little more than make reference to the defendants’ identities and
does

not

include

even

a

conclusory

allegation

as

to

their

role

or

involvement in the action. The complaint is simply silent as to codefendants

Molina

constitutional

and

González’

violation

and

involvement

therefore,

the

in

the

claims

underlying

against

those

defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B.

Plaintiffs failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim

Next, defendants aver that plaintiffs did not put forth allegations
to state a plausible claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The
secure

Fourth
in

Amendment

their

unreasonable

provides:

persons,

searches

and

“The

houses,
seizures,

right

papers,
shall

not

of

the

and
be

people

to

be

effects,

against

violated,

and

no

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”
The

exigencies

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

apply

to

unreasonable

searches and seizures. “The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one
that

for

much

protections:

of

When

our
the

history

formed

Government

the

obtains

exclusive
information

basis
by

for

its

physically

intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the
original

meaning

of

the

Fourth

Amendment

has

undoubtedly

occurred.”

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013)(citing United States v.
Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950-951 (2012)(internal citations omitted)).
We need not parrot the standard for pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 5

12(b)(6). Even in the most generous reading of the complaint, the Court
fails to identify any allegation that conforms to a Fourth Amendment
violation. In fact, it is unclear whether the Fourth Amendment extends to
pretrial detainees, like Cruz Rodriguez, at all. Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989).
Thus,

plaintiffs’

Fourth

Amendment

claims

are

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.
C.

Plaintiffs failed to state a Sixth Amendment Claim

Defendants

proffer

that

plaintiffs’

Sixth

Amendment

claims

are

equally unavailing. See Docket No. 23 at page 15. “The Sixth Amendment
safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at
all critical stages of the criminal process.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
80–81 (2004).

The Sixth Amendment also encompasses the right to a speedy

trial. Klopfer v. State of N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
The

complaint

states

that

while

Cruz

Rodriguez

was

in

prison

awaiting trial for criminal charges, he “was not given adequate medical
attention for his psychiatric illness” which delayed his trial because he
was not given the medication he needed to “fully function.” See Docket
No. 1, ¶¶ 22-24.
In that sense, we read plaintiffs’ averments as stating a claim for
the right to enjoy a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions. See Docket
No. 1 at ¶¶ 24 and 57. Whether there has been a violation of a defendant's
right to a speedy trial turns on a balancing test that “compels courts to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 530. In Baker, the Supreme Court identified four factors that courts
should consider as part of that inquiry. These include the “[l]ength of
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant.” Id.
Cruz Rodriguez has failed to plead sufficient facts to support his
speedy trial claim under the Sixth Amendment. At no point did he specify
how his trial was delayed and for how long. There are also no allegations
concerning the prejudice that he suffered as a result of the alleged
delay. A passing reference to a delay in the criminal proceedings against
him is simply not enough. Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claims are thus
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
D.

Plaintiffs failed to establish a claim of cruel and unusual

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 6

punishment under the Eight Amendment
According

to

Cruz

Rodriguez,

defendants

violated

his

Eight

Amendment rights by: (1) using excessive force against him; (2) denying
him access to the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; (3) being
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (4) subjecting him to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
The

Eighth

Amendment

provides:

“Excessive

bail

shall

not

be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” The Fourteenth Amendment applies those restrictions imposed
by the Eight Amendment to the States. Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986,
1992 (2014)(citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–240(1972) (per curiam)).
In order for the protections of the Eight Amendment to kick in, the
State must have complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally
associated with criminal prosecutions. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
318, (1986). In other words, the Eighth Amendment does not apply until
“after sentence and conviction.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166
(3rd

Cir.

2005)

(quoting

Graham

v.

Connor,

490

U.S.

devoid

of

386,

392

n.

6

(1989)).
Pretrial

detainees,

however,

are

not

protection.

The

Fourteenth Amendment gives state pretrial detainees rights which are at
“least

as

great

as

the

Eighth

Amendment

protections

available

to

a

convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,
244 (1983). In fact, “[t]he Constitution affords greater protection to a
pretrial detainee compared to a convicted inmate in the sense that ‘[d]ue
process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.’” Walton v.
Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979)).
After reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that the only claims
that would be subject to Eight Amendment scrutiny are those concerning
actions or omissions that took place after Cruz Rodriguez was sentenced
and transferred to the Correctional Complex in Bayamon. See Docket No. 1,
¶ 55. The claims that arise out of events that took place prior to his
conviction are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that particular, Cruz Rodriguez avers that “he has been placed
in a cell with no medical attention for his psychiatric condition, he has

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 7

yet to be interviewed by a social worker, and has not been given the
necessary basic needs like soap and access to laundry.” Id. at ¶ 56.
Defendants
administrative
bringing

the

assertions

aver

that

remedies

as

present

under

the

action
Eight

plaintiffs:
to
and

the

(1)

living

(2)

The

to

to

exhaust

claims

conditions

failed

Amendment.

failed

before

properly

Court

will

plead

their

address

each

separately.
1. Failure to exhaust
The Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995 (hereinafter the “PRLA”),
110 Stat. 1321-73, as amended, 42 USC §1997e(a), states, in relevant part
that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title or any other Federal law, by a prisoner1
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative

remedies

as

are

available

are

exhausted.”

42

U.S.C.

§1997e(a). In that sense, the PRLA's exhaustion requirement applies to
“all

inmate

suits

about

prison

life,

whether

they

involve

general

circumstances, or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The applicable administrative remedies are defined not by the PLRA,
but by the prison grievance process itself. Tomassini v. Correctional
Health Services Corp., No. 09–2059, 2012 WL 1601528, at *1 (D.P.R., May
07, 2012) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). The Puerto
Rico Department of Corrections (PRDOC) has promulgated the Regulation to
Address the Applications for Administrative Remedies Filed by Members of
the Correctional Population, setting forth the grievance procedures for
inmates under their custody. See Regulation No. 8145 of January 19, 2012;
see also Cruz-Berrios v. Oliver-Baez, 792 F.Supp.2d 224, 228-229 (D.P.R.
2011)

for

a

detailed

description

of

the

proceeding

set

forth

in

Regulation No. 8145.
The

prisoner

must

exhaust

administrative

remedies

even

if

the

administrative procedures “would appear to be futile at providing the
kind of remedy sought.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th
Cir. 2002). In fact, even if the plaintiff seeks monetary relief which
1

Prisoner is defined as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who
is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation,
pretrial release, or diversion program.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(h).

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 8

the prison administrative process does not encompass, the inmate is still
not excused from completing the prison administrative process. Lopez-Vigo
v. Puerto Rico, No. 13–1071, 2014 WL 495721, at *3 (D.P.R. February 06,
2014)

(citing

Booth

jurisdictional,

the

v.

Churner,

exhaustion

532

U.S.

731

(2001)).

is

nonetheless

requirement

Although

not

mandatory.

Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 147 (1st Cir. 2002)(citing Curry v.
Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 501 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In the case at hand, it is undisputed that Cruz Rodriguez’s 1983
claim is an action “with respect to prison conditions” under § 1997e(a).
Moreover, as an inmate within the meaning of the statute, plaintiff Cruz
Rodriguez was bound to follow the exhaustion of remedies procedures set
forth in the PRLA before filing the complaint.
Cruz

Rodriguez

makes

several

claims

regarding

lack

of

adequate

medical treatment. See Docket No. 1, ¶ 56. In particular, he avers that
he has not been interviewed by a social worker, “has not been given
necessary basic needs like soap and access to laundry,” and that he has
been “forced to wash his clothes in the toilet with hand soap.” Id.
However, we find no allegation indicating that plaintiffs requested
an administrative investigation pertaining to those living conditions
claims. The First Circuit has held that dismissal is the appropriate
remedy when administrative remedies have not been exhausted. MedinaClaudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31,

36 (1st Cir. 2002). As such,

plaintiffs may not proceed with the aforementioned claims until such time
as they exhaust administrative remedies.2 For that reason, the Eight
Amendment

claims

for

unconstitutional

conditions

of

confinement

are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Failure to plead
The Court need not address whether plaintiffs met the pleading
standard

since

the

claims

are

dismissed

without

prejudice

until

plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
E. Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
Pursuant to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs also failed
to

state

a

claim

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

In

that

sense,

defendants state that “plaintiff failed to establish which process was

2

We decline defendants’ invitation to dismiss the claims with prejudice.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 9

due and in what way did the government failed to comply [sic] it. More
importantly,

plaintiff

failed

to

allege

in

what

way

co-defendants

affected said due process.” See Docket No. 23 at page 12.
Defendants’

limited

view

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

only

contemplates claims for procedural due process and obviates the entire
spectrum

of

substantive

inmates.

Preiser

v.

due

process

Rodriguez,

claims

that

are

U.S.

475,

492

411

available
(1973)

for

[“The

relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise
their confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a private
citizen.

For

state

prisoners,

eating,

sleeping,

dressing,

washing,

working, and playing are all done under the watchful eye of the State,
and so the possibilities for litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment
are boundless.”]
In

reading

the

Complaint

under

the

microscope

of

Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6), the Court can identify several instances in which plaintiffs
raise claims that could be construed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Deliberate Indifference to serious medical needs
When correctional officers are said to be deliberately indifferent
to the serious medical needs of an inmate, their actions constitute a
violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “Developed in the
Eighth Amendment context and used there to address prisoner claims of
inadequate

medical

care…

Estelle

bears

its

uses

in

the

Fourteenth

Amendment context—because, again, detention center officials surely owe
pretrial detainees…at least the same standard of care prison officials
owe convicted inmates.” Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir.
2013). Deliberate indifference might manifest by prison doctors in their
response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
with the treatment once prescribed. Moore v. Ozmint, No. 10–3041, 2012 WL
762460, at *8 (D.S.C. 2012).
Here,

Cruz

Rodriguez

alleges

that

the

defendants

acted

with

deliberate indifference to his health by “placing him in a cell with no
medical attention for his psychiatric condition.” See Docket No. 1, ¶ 55.
The

plaintiff

attention

for

also
his

states

that

psychiatric

he

“was

illness,

not
and

given
was

not

adequate

medical

facilitated

the

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 10

psychotropic medications needed in order to fully function.” See Docket
No. 1, ¶¶ 22-23. After the incident where Cruz Rodriguez was allegedly
beaten, he avers that he asked for and was denied medical attention. See
Docket No. 1, ¶ 44. Finally, he states that after he was convicted and
transferred to another facility, he has continued to suffer the lack of
medical attention. Id. at ¶ 56.
Cruz

Rodriguez

only

mentions

that

he

exhausted

administrative

remedies as to the lack of medical care that he received after the
alleged beating. See Docket No. 1, ¶ 48. As to those circumstances, the
complaint

states

that

Cruz

Rodriguez’s

mother,

plaintiff

María

de

Lourdes Rodriguez Ruiz, filed a criminal complaint at the Ponce Police
Headquarters. See Docket No. 1, ¶ 37. Furthermore, “Cruz Rodriguez was
eventually

taken

to

the

correctional

hospital,

after

his

mother,

Rodriguez Ruiz, complained at the Central Level of the Administration of
Correctional Facilities of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico…regarding the
lack

of

medical

care

given

to

her

son.”

Id.

at

¶ 48.

Thereafter,

Rodriguez Ruiz allegedly went to the Special Investigations Bureau of
the Department of Justice (NIE) (Id. at ¶ 50) and followed through on her
complaint at the Administration of Correction Facilities. Id. at ¶ 51.
We

thus

find

that

plaintiffs

have

satisfied

their

burden

of

pleading exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The
analysis then turns on whether they satisfied the pleading standard as
to deliberate indifference to plaintiff Cruz Rodriguez’s medical needs.
To

establish

deliberate

indifference

in

the

context

of

Eight

Amendment protection, a prison official must both know of and disregard
an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[A] serious medical need is considered one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
order to recover, a plaintiff alleging a violation of this obligation
must show: 1) that the deprivation alleged was “sufficiently serious,”
such that it “result[ed] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities” and 2) that prison officials “[knew] of and

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

disregard[ed]

an

Page 11

excessive

risk

to

inmate

health

and

safety.”

See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837 (internal quotations omitted).
Analyzing the facts of the case against this legal backdrop, we
find that Cruz Rodriguez has satisfied the burden. The deprivation that
plaintiffs allege, namely, that Cruz Rodriguez was not provided with
medical

care

after

the

alleged

beating

is

“sufficiently

serious.”

Moreover, the Court cannot see how the co-defendants who were officials
at the correctional facility were not aware of the alleged beating. The
fact that plaintiff Rodriguez Ruiz made a formal complaint also meditates
against a determination of lack of knowledge. Finally, taking as true
plaintiffs’ allegations, if defendants did not provide medical attention
to

Cruz

Rodriguez

after

the

alleged

assault,

their

actions

would

constitute an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety. Having
alleged all the necessary factors required to establishing a cause of
action for deliberate indifference to medical needs, it is evident that
plaintiffs’ claims should not be dismissed.
2. Excessive Use of Force
The use of unnecessary or gratuitous force against a prisoner is
cognizable in a prisoner civil rights suit for damages. Bruce v. Wade,
537 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1976) (a violation of § 1983 is clearly
stated by the unjustified beating of an inmate at the hands of prison
officials).
A prisoner alleging excessive force must objectively show that a
defendant “inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering.” Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298 (1991) (holding that an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive
force requires an objective deprivation of a basic human need and that
prison officials subjectively acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind). The subjective component encompasses “such factors as the need for
the application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted.”
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (internal citations omitted). The objective
element generally requires more than a de minimis use of force. Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992). “A claim of excessive force under the
Fourteenth Amendment is analyzed as if it were an excessive-force claim
under the Eighth Amendment.” Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 12

(11th Cir. 2009)(citing Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
2005)).
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, we find that they satisfied the pleading standard as to the
claims of excessive use of force. According to plaintiffs, co-defendant
Acosta Zambrana “hit the plaintiff with his fists in the face and broke
plaintiff’s nose.” Docket No. 1, ¶ 30. The complaint further states that
Cruz Rodriguez “picked up his hands in order to cover his face and the
co-defendant then banged the plaintiff against an adjacent locker area
and threw several punches at the plaintiff’s ribs and chest areas.” Id.
The

plaintiffs

thus

averred

that

Cruz

Rodriguez

suffered

a

physical

injury and in fact describe the physical force used against him.
In addition, by plaintiffs’ averments, Rodriguez Ruiz (“Rodriguez
Ruiz”), mother of Cruz Rodriguez, filed a criminal complaint at the Ponce
Police Headquarters detailing the incident where her son was arguably
assaulted at the hands of a corrections officer. See Docket No. 1 at ¶37.
Afterwards, “she went to Las Cucharas Correctional Complex and met [sic]
and officer there who was assigned to investigate all incidents that
occurred

[at

the

complex].”

Id.

at

¶38.

Then,

the

police

officer

interviewed Cruz Rodriguez. Id. at ¶41. Eventually, Ms. Rodriguez Ruiz
“followed through on her complaint at the Administration of Correctional
Facilities, and found out that the incident had been labeled as an
accident.” Id. at ¶48.
Hence, the plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that they exhausted
administrative remedies as to the incident pertaining to the alleged
assault. Furthermore, defendants’ request to dismiss with prejudice the
excessive use of force claims is DENIED.
F. Qualified Immunity
Defendants likewise move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against codefendants Carlos Molina, David Aguila and Maria Lugardo because they
were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims.
The

Court

has

already

ruled

that

plaintiffs

did

not

plead

sufficient facts to state a cause of action against Carlos Molina. Thus,
the Court will only discuss the qualified immunity doctrine as to codefendants Aguila and Lugardo.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 13

In § 1983 actions, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects
state officials from personal liability from paying an award of damages
to

a

plaintiff

for

on-the-job

conduct,

so

long

as

the

conduct

is

objectively reasonable and does not violate clearly-established federal
rights.

Harlow

omitted).

A

v.

Fitzgerald,

qualified

457

immunity

U.S.

analysis

800,

818

consists

of

(1982)
two

(citations
prongs:

(1)

whether the facts as alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a
constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established
given the state of the law at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). The qualified immunity inquiry is “a pure question of
law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U .S. 510, 514 (1994).
As to the first prong, the court considers whether, “[t]aken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... the facts
alleged show the [defendants'] conduct violated a constitutional right.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. As to the second prong, whether the law was
clearly established, such inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. If
the public official can demonstrate he did not know, nor should he have
known

the

relevant

legal

standard,

then

qualified

immunity

applies.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
In

determining

whether

allegations

state

a

plausible

claim

for

relief, the Supreme Court has suggested that we “begin by identifying
pleadings

that,

because

they

are

no

more

than

conclusions,

are

not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The
complaint alleges that Lugardo was the Superintendent of Section 676 of
Las Cucharas Prison on the date of the beating and thereafter.

Aguila

was the second in command at Section 676 at the time that the alleged
beating took place.
Plaintiffs

sue

defendants

Lugardo

and

Aguila

on

theories

of

unconstitutional conditions of confinement and excessive use of force. As
to the unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims, the Court has
already established that they must be subject to prior administrative
review. Hence, the Court will not dwell on the merits of the qualified
immunity
exhausted.

assertions

at

this

point

until

such

remedies

have

been

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 14

As to the claims for excessive use of force, the complaint only
signals Acosta as the perpetrator. The allegations against Lugardo and
Aguila would thus be limited to a claim of supervisory liability under
Section 1983 and a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate
indifference to Cruz Rodriguez’s health and safety.
According to the complaint, co-defendants Lugardo and Aguila were
allegedly “aware of the situation and beating.” See Docket No. 1 at ¶39.
It is further detailed that, in the process of inquiring about her son’s
injuries, plaintiff Rodriguez Ruiz spoke to Aguila, who indicated that
Acosta “had been going through a rough time” and Cruz Rodriguez “just
rubbed him the wrong way.” See Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 45-46.
Similarly, Lugardo “refused to handle the situation and shrugged
plaintiff Rodriguez Ruiz’ demands and inquiries and assigned the matter
to codefendant Aguila.” Id. at ¶47.
By those averments, we find that plaintiffs have sufficiently plead
that

Lugardo

and

authorization,

as

Aguila’s
is

conduct

required

to

amounts
establish

to
a

condonation
claim

of

or

tacit

supervisory

liability under section 1983. Thus, the first prong of the qualified
immunity inquiry test has been met.
As to the second prong, we conclude that plaintiff Cruz Rodriguez’
right to be free from excessive use of force at the hands of a prison
official is clearly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. No reasonable
officer could have thought that it was permissible to use the amount of
force that Acosta allegedly used on Cruz Rodriguez. It follows, then,
that no reasonable official carrying out supervision duties could claim
to be unaware that such conduct is proscribed by the constitution. It is
well settled that a “deliberately indifferent police supervisor may be
held

liable

for

the

constitutional

violations

of

his

subordinates.”

Camilo–Robles, 175 F.3d at 7 (citing Diaz v. Martinez, 112 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir.

1997)).

Based

on

the

above

determinations,

it

is

clear

that

plaintiffs have put forth sufficient facts to overcome the qualified
immunity defense.
The analysis now turns to whether co-defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity as to the deliberate indifference to medical needs
claims. Plaintiffs aver that co-defendants “took about an hour to deliver
the inmate-plaintiff to the Institution’s medical facility. However, he

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 15

was not given any medical care, or medicines, but rather was told to
clean himself up.” See Docket No. 1, ¶ 32. Cruz Rodriguez also says that
he was not seen by any doctor at the 676 section’s medical facilities.
Id.
If, as the complaint states, Cruz Rodriguez suffered a broken nose
and received punches in the face, ribs and chest, (Id. at ¶ 30), it must
have been obvious that he had to receive medical attention. If codefendants

failed

to

do

so,

it

would

amount

to

a

violation

of

his

constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. We
find that co-defendants Aguila and Lugardo cannot make the case for
qualified immunity because Cruz Rodriguez’s right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged misconduct.
Therefore, defendants’ request for dismissal of the claims against
Lugardo and Aguila on account of qualified immunity is DENIED.
G. Plaintiffs’ claims under Article 1802 of the Civil Code should be
dismissed
Finally, defendants claim that since no federal claims withstand
12(b)(6) scrutiny, the court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims. However, since this Court
did not dismiss all the claims, there is a basis for federal and thus
supplemental jurisdiction. Thus, defendants’ position regarding dismissal
of plaintiffs’ 1802 claims is inapposite.

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of aforementioned, this Court hereby GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23).
SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th of September, 2014.

S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE