Cruz-Rodriguez et al v. Molina-Rodriguez et al

Filing 75

ORDER denying 53 motion for summary judgment. Status Conference set for 4/18/2017 02:00 PM in PG's Chambers before Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 03/28/2017. (NNR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CRISTOPHER CRUZ-RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 12-1189 (PG)
v.
CARLOS MOLINA-RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Before the court is defendants Maria Lugardo-Cintron (“Lugardo”), David
Aguila-Rodriguez

(“Aguila”),

and

Hector

Acosta-Zambrana’s

(“Acosta”)

(collectively, “defendants”) motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs
Christopher
(“Rodriguez”)

Cruz-Rodriguez
and

Natalia

(“Cruz”),

Maria

Cruz-Rodriguez’s

de

Lourdes

(“N.

Rodriguez-Ruiz

Cruz”)(collectively,

“plaintiffs”) opposition thereto. See Docket Nos. 53 and 61. For the reasons
specified below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2012, plaintiffs filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Docket No. 1. They allege that Acosta, a custodial officer in
Puerto Rico’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, assaulted CruzRodriguez on March 16, 2011 while he was serving a prison sentence. Plaintiffs
also claim that Cruz-Rodriguez was denied medical attention after the alleged
incident. On August 7, 2015, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
See Docket No. 53.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Through summary judgment, courts “pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings
and assay the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually
required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.
1992). The Supreme Court encourages employing summary judgment in federal
courts- it “[avoids] full blown trials in unwinnable cases, … [conserves]
parties’ time and money, and [permits] the court to husband scarce judicial
resources.” McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 314 (1st Cir.
1995). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
A court may grant summary judgment only when the pleadings and the
evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 2

56(a). See also Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 2000). A
factual dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party,
and “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. See CaleroCerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The court
must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Anderson Plumbing Productions
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
functions of a jury, not of a judge. See id.
In short, when there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, and
when a court would be required to make credibility determinations, weigh the
evidence, or draw legitimate inferences from the facts in order to adjudicate
a controversy, summary judgment will not be granted. While no legitimate
inferences can be drawn, the court will construe all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. See Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 158
F. Supp. 2d 167, 171 (D.P.R. 2001). Still, the nonmoving party is required to
demonstrate “through submissions of evidentiary quality that a trial worthy
issue persists.” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 108 (1st Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Issues of Material Fact
Cruz-Rodriguez was scheduled to go to court on March 16, 2011. See Docket
No. 51-3, Defendant’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“SUMF”) at ¶
38.

At

the

time,

Cruz-Rodriguez

was

serving

a

prison

sentence

at

the

Institution Adults Ponce 1000 in Ponce, Puerto Rico (“Las Cucharas”). Id. at
¶¶ 6-7. He was waiting his turn at the administration’s admission area, from
where inmates are dispatched to appear in court. Id. at ¶ 40. Defendants
concede that the incident took place in a separate room, but proffer no
explanation as to how they reached that room. Plaintiffs claim that Acosta
approached Cruz-Rodriguez in the admissions area, informed him that he was
going to search him, and took him to room “C,” where they were alone. Id. at
¶¶ 47, 53. Plaintiffs also assert that the door remained open. Id. at ¶ 53.
At this point in the narration, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ versions of the
facts diverge drastically.
According to defendants, after searching the inmate, Acosta told CruzRodriguez to put his clothes back on. Id. at ¶ 101. Cruz-Rodriguez then turned,
lost his balance, and fell, hitting his face against a cabinet. Id. Cruz-

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 3

Rodriguez was bleeding through the nose. Id. at ¶ 102. Correctional officials
immediately took him to the Emergency Room to receive medical attention. Id.
at ¶ 102-104. Medical records reveal that Cruz-Rodriguez suffered a nose
fracture consistent with a fall, and makes no reference to any injuries
elsewhere on his body, such as the chest or torso. Id. at ¶ 106.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that once inside the room Acosta told
Cruz-Rodriguez “[v]amos a ver si el gas pela”1 and then punched him. See Docket
No. 62, Plaintiff’s Statement in Opposition to Defendants’ SUMF (“OSUMF”) at
¶¶ 101(a), 101(b)2. Cruz-Rodriguez fell back and tried to cover himself, but
Acosta continued to punch him “like a punching bag,” striking him over ten
times in the nose, face, ribs and head. Id. at ¶¶ 101(c), 101(e), 101(f),
101(g). Cruz-Rodriguez claims to have no idea why Acosta beat him. Id. at ¶
101(d). After the beating, Cruz-Rodriguez was taken to a housing unit and
despite his pleas, did not receive medical attention until a later date (“the
next day or maybe two days later”). Id. at ¶¶ 102 (e), 102(f). Co-plaintiff
Rodriguez (Cruz-Rodriguez’s mother) claims that, the day after the incident,
Cruz-Rodriguez was still wearing the same bloodied overalls. Id. at ¶¶ 102(i),
102(j). Medical records show that Cruz-Rodriguez had a fractured nose as well
as contusions to his back. Id. at ¶¶ 102(n), 102(o). Per Lt. Wilson Rivera of
the DOC, the injuries sustained to Cruz-Rodriguez’s face and back are not
consistent with the version of events proffered by defendants. Id. at ¶¶
101(i), 110.
The two versions of events, as submitted to the court by each party, are
in stark contrast with each other. Granting summary judgment when, as now,
material facts at the very core of a legal dispute are so hotly contested,
would run afoul of the courts discretion in employing the dispositive tool.
Indeed, courts may grant summary judgment only when the pleadings and the
evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). See also Sands, 212 F.3d at 660. There is no doubt that the factual

1 Literally, this phrase translates to “let’s see if the gas peels.” However, it is a
Puerto Rican idiom similar to “let’s see what happens when push comes to shove,” which can be
used as a taunt.
2 Plaintiffs are required to respond to the movants’ SUMF with reference to each of their
numbered paragraphs. See Local Rule 56(c) (L. Cv. R. 56(c)). The plaintiffs’ opposing statement
does not comply with summary judgment rules.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 4

dispute at hand is “genuine”- it could be resolved in favor of either party.
See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 19.
Elements of both versions of events are purportedly backed by evidentiary
support in the record. For the court to tilt the scales in favor of either
party,

it

would

have

to

weigh

the

evidence

and

make

determinations

of

credibility. This the court cannot do- such functions reside in the sole
province of the jury. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135. Furthermore, there is no
doubt that the disputed facts are “material”- they potentially affect the
outcome of the case. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 19. In fact, the resolution
of the case before the court hinges on which versions of the disputed facts
prevail. Thus, after reviewing the record, the court finds that there are
genuine disputes as to material facts that make granting summary judgment
inappropriate.3 To boot, the nonmoving party (plaintiffs), has met the burden
of

demonstrating

“through

submissions

of

evidentiary

quality

that

a

trialworthy issue persists.” Iverson, 452 F.3d at 108. As such, summary
judgment will not be granted.
B. Timeliness
Next, the court turns to the issue of timeliness defendants raise in
their motion for summary judgment. Defendants claim that plaintiffs’ civil
action is time barred, per the one-year statute of limitations afforded to
tort

claims

under

the

applicable

Puerto

Rico

statute.

However,

their

contention is plainly misguided.
Although § 1983 provides a federal cause of action, state tort law
determines the statute of limitations period that is to be applied. See Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). As such, the court borrows Article 1868 of
the Puerto Rico Civil Code (statute of limitations period of one year) to
determine whether plaintiffs’ action is time barred. See Centro Medico del
Turabo v. Feliciano del Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 31
P.R. Laws Ann. § 5298(2). Thus, pursuant to Puerto Rico law, the period for
filing a § 1983 claim is 365 days, or 366 days when the February of a leap
year falls within that period. See Yeinsip v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 725
F. Supp. 113, 115 (D.P.R. 1989).
Unlike the limitations period, the accrual date of a § 1983 claim is a
matter of federal law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. It “ordinarily starts when

3 The court notes that the material facts in dispute summarized above are by no means
exhaustive. Genuine disputes as to other material facts abound in the record.

Civil No. 12-1189 (PG)

Page 5

the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action
is based.” Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1997).
Here, there is no doubt that the accrual date of plaintiffs’ claim is March
16, 2011, the date when the incident at “Las Cucharas” took place. However,
“the day in which a tort cause of action arises, or the accrual date, counts
in the sense that it provides the starting point for the computation of the
prescriptive term; it is not, however, counted within that term.” Salamanca
v.

Am.

Airlines,

Inc.,

920

F.

Supp.

24,

26

(D.P.R.

1996).

Thus,

the

prescriptive period in the instant case must be computed from March 17, 2011.
Because 2012 was a leap year, and February falls within our computation,
plaintiffs had 366 days starting on March 17, 2011 to file their § 1983 claim.
The 366th day was March 17, 2012. Plaintiffs filed their suit on March 16,
2012. As such, plaintiffs’ claims were timely brought.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
DENIED. Genuine disputes of material facts foreclose the use of the dispositive
tool, and the court finds plaintiffs brought their civil action in a timely
manner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 28, 2017.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE