Santiago-Lampon v. Real Legacy Assurance Co. et al

Filing 172

OPINION AND ORDER denying 141 MOTION to Set Aside Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or New Trial. Signed by Judge Jay A. Garcia-Gregory on 2/6/2014.(IL)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

REINALDO SANTIAGO-LAMPON,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 12-1314 (JAG)
v.
REAL LEGACY ASSURANCE, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
GARCÍA-GREGORY, D.J.
Before

the

Court

is

defendant

Puerto

Rico

Highway

and

Transportation Authority’s (“Defendant” or “PRHTA”) motion for
judgment as a matter of law or motion for new trial. (Docket No.
152). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On December 10, 2010 at approximately 05:10 a.m., Plaintiff
Reinaldo Santiago-Lampon (“Plaintiff”) was driving to work on
Highway

Number

5

when

he

noticed

Joshua

Perez’s

(“Perez”)

vehicle on the emergency lane. Perez was replacing two flat
tires. Plaintiff stopped his vehicle behind Perez’s, turned on
the hazard lights and exited his vehicle in order to assist
Perez. Suddenly a truck impacted the rear of Plaintiff’s car
crushing Plaintiff between his vehicle and Perez’s. Plaintiff,

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

2

whose leg had to be amputated, received extensive and permanent
injuries. On May 8, 2012, Plaintiff brought this tort action
under Article 1802 of Puerto Rico’s Civil Code against Shell
Company

ltd.

Puerto

Rico,

Real

Legacy

Assurance,

Co.

“Real

Legacy”, and PRHTA for the damages resulting from the accident.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141.
Shell and Real Legacy eventually settled their claims with
Plaintiff. (Docket No. 122).

As such, only PRHTA proceeded to

trial, which began on July 15, 2013. Six days later, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff for $6,319,696 finding
PRHTA’s negligence, along with that of the truck driver’s, had
been the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.1 Defendant renewed its
motion for judgment as a matter of law on three grounds: (1) the
Court

lacked

subject

matter

jurisdiction

when

judgment

was

entered because there was no diversity between the parties; (2)
Plaintiff’s cause of action is time barred; and (3) the judgment
is not supported by the evidence presented. In the alternative,
Defendant requests new trial. We address each argument below,
and ultimately deny Defendant’s requests.

1

The jury found the truck driver and PRHTA to be equally liable by assigning
fifty percent (50%) responsibility to each party. (Docket No. 137).

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

3

DISCUSSION
I.

No diversity jurisdiction existed at the time the
complaint was filed
Two weeks before trial, defendants Real Legacy and PRHTA

filed a motion to dismiss alleging Plaintiff was not domiciled
in Florida, and diversity jurisdiction was thus not present.
(Docket Nos. 82, 88, 111).

But the Court denied the motion

finding that the Plaintiff was in fact domiciled in Florida
when the complaint was filed, (docket no. 115). Valentin v.
Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 361 (1st Cir. 2001)(“for
federal jurisdictional purposes, diversity of citizenship must
be determined as of the time of suit”) (citing Bank One v.
Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Now PRHTA attacks diversity jurisdiction under a different
theory. Specifically, PRHTA alleges that the State Insurance
Fund (“SIF”), not Plaintiff, had standing to sue because SIF
had yet to issue its final decision on Plaintiff’s accident when the
complaint was filed.2 See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11 §32.3. According

2

While Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on May 8, 2012, the final decision of
the Manager of the State Insurance Fund was issued on September 18, 2012.
3
The Puerto Rico Workman’s Compensation Act (“PRWCA”) states:
the Manager of the State Insurance Fund shall subrogate himself
in the rights of the workman . . . and may institute proceedings
against such third party in the name of the injured workman . . .
within ninety (90) days following the date of the final and
enforceable decision of the case. . . . [T]he injured workman may
[not] institute any action . . . until after the expiration of

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

4

to PRHTA, once SIF filed a motion to intervene, (docket no.
36), diversity was destroyed. PRHTA meshes two arguments into
one – standing and diversity jurisdiction — neither of which
is meritorious.
Defendant’s

position

that

SIF’s

intervention

destroyed

diversity jurisdiction ignores a key fact in this case: SIF’s
motion for leave to intervene was found to be moot by the
Court because SIF filed a motion to dismiss that motion with
prejudice, (docket nos. 89, 130). In other words, SIF was
never a party to this case. See Mutual Produce, Inc. v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Corp, 119 F.R.D. 619, 620 (D.Mass. 1988)(stating
that the intervenors could not be considered parties until
their motions to intervene had been granted)(citing District
of Columbia v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 762 F.2d 129, 132
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(“Intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2  ) ... are
normally

treated

intervention

is

as

if

they

granted.”).

were

original

Accordingly,

parties

diversity

was

once
not

destroyed.
The Court finds that this alone disposes of PRHTA’s rather
convoluted argument. However, intertwined with their primary
argument, Defendant also questions whether this case could

ninety days from the date of the final an enforceable decision of
the case by the Manager of the State Insurance Fund.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11 §32 (emphasis ours).

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

5

continue without SIF and cites different cases that have been
dismissed for prematurity because they were filed before SIF’s
90-day period elapsed. But these cases are inapposite. It is
true that Plaintiff filed this case prematurely, and therefore
SIF had a right to intervene. But the statute cited by PRHTA
vests

SIF

with

the

discretion

to

subrogate

itself

in

the

rights of the employee. And here, the fact remains that SIF
chose to dismiss its subrogation complaint with prejudice,
making

its

intentions

not

to

intervene

clear.4

For

these

reasons, this case shall not be dismissed.
II.

Plaintiff’s cause of action is time barred5

Under Article 1802, “when the negligent acts of more than one
person have adequately caused a harm, each such person is a
joint tortfeasor who is liable in full to the plaintiff for the
harm caused.” Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. v. Pérez & Cia., 142 F.3d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. As this is
a tort case, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to a one-year statute
of limitations.

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5298(2).

4

The Court notes, moreover, that at the pretrial conference, the defendants,
among which was PRHTA, voiced their concern as to SIF’s motion to dismiss
because it was filed as a motion to dismiss without prejudice, (docket no.
85). But the parties conferred with the Court and agreed that they would not
object to SIF’s motion if it were filed as a motion to dismiss with
prejudice, (docket no. 92); shortly thereafter, SIF filed such motion,
(docket no. 89).
5
This is a diversity case, and as such, the substantive Puerto Rico law
controls. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Borges ex rel.
S.M.B.W. V. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010).

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

6

For purposes of this discussion, the relevant facts are as
follows: The accident occurred on December 10, 2010. On August
17, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to PRHTA, which tolled the
statute

of

limitations.

(See

Court’s

Exh.

2).6

The

original

complaint against only Real Legacy was filed on May 8, 2012.
(Docket No. 1. On September 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint, adding PRHTA as a defendant. (Docket No. 32).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim against PRHTA is time
barred

because

even

if

the

statute

of

limitations

was

interrupted by the August 2011 letter, the amended complaint
adding PRHTA was filed more than a year later. Defendant further
argues that the original complaint filed against Real Legacy did
not interrupt the prescription period against PRHTA. Defendant
claims its position is supported by Garcia Perez v. Corporacion
de la Mujer, 174 P.R. Dec. 138 (2008) and Martinez Diaz v.
E.L.A., 132 P.R. Dec. 200 (1992). The Court does not agree.
The issue here is whether in the case of joint tortfeasors the
filing

of

a

prescription

complaint
period

against

against

the

one

tortfeasor

others.

At

interrupts

the

time

of

the
the

filing of the complaint, the controlling case on this issue was

6

Defendant alleges that because the letter was not entered into evidence,
Plaintiff “did not comply with its burden of proof in establishing that the
one (1) year [sic] prescription period was interrupted.” (Docket No. 152, p.
20). This argument is frivolous. The letter did enter into evidence, and was
marked as the Court’s exhibit 2. And more importantly, this legal issue was
never submitted to the jury.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

7

Arroyo v. Hospital la Concepcion, 130 P.R. Dec. 596 (1992),
which answered that question in the affirmative. Arroyo further
held that once a complaint was filed against one tortfeasor, a
plaintiff need only allege well and sufficiently in the amended
complaint that the newly-added tortfeasors were jointly liable
for the damages claimed in the original complaint. See Arroyo,
130

P.R.

Dec.

at

608.

This

rule,

contrary

to

Defendant’s

position, was not modified in Garcia, but in Fraguada Bonilla v.
Hospital Auxilio Mutuo, 186 P.R. Dec. 365 (2012).7
In Fraguada, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established a
distinction
solidarity,

between
the

contractual

latter

of

which

solidarity,

and

applies

jointly

to

imperfect
liable

tortfeasors. The Court then overturned Arroyo and held that a
complaint filed against one tortfeasor did not interrupt the
statute of limitations against the others. Fraguada, 186 P.R.
Dec. at 389. Notwithstanding, Fraguada was issued on August 13,
2012, three months after this case was filed, and the Supreme
Court, in reversing its previous ruling, specifically stated:
“[p]ublic

policy

and

social

order

considerations

prompt

the

prospective application of this new rule.” Fraguada, 186 P.R.

7

In fact, the defendants in Garcia, much like the defendant in this case,
argued that Martinez altered the norm established in Arroyo. The Court
explicitly stated that the defendants were wrong for two reasons: first,
Martinez did not constitute precedent; and second, the facts and issues in
Martinez were distinguishable from the facts in Garcia. Garcia, 174 P.R. Dec.
at 156. For these same reasons, PRHTA’s argument fails.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

8

Dec. at 393 (our translation). For these reasons, the Court
applies

Arroyo

against

Real

limitations

and

finds

legacy

against

that

and

Shell

PRHTA.

Plaintiff’s

original

interrupted

Plaintiff’s

the

claims

complaint

statute

are

not

of
time

barred.
III. Insufficiency of the evidence did not create an issue of
fact for the jury
Defendant has renewed its motion for judgment as a matter
of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.8 According to First Circuit
precedent, “[c]ourts may only grant a judgment contravening a
jury's determination when the evidence points so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that no reasonable
jury

could

have

returned

a

verdict

adverse

to

that

party.”

Monteagudo v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado,
554 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
“A motion for judgment as a matter of law, like a motion for

8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 allows a party during a jury trial to move the Court for
entry of judgment as a matter of law. Such a motion may be granted “[i]f a
party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court
finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). If the
Court denies the motion, then “[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of
judgment ... [t]he movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under
Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). [T]he party renewing a motion for judgment
as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) “is required to have moved for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence.” Taber Partners
I v. Insurance Co. of North America, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 112, 115 (D.P.R. 1996)
(citing Keisling v. SER–Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 758 (1st Cir.
1994)).

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

summary

judgment,

9

questions

whether

a

reasonable

jury

could

reach only one result based upon the evidence.” Taber Partners I
v. Insurance Co. of North America, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 112, 115
(D.P.R.
consider

1996).
the

As

part

of

credibility

this

of

analysis,

witnesses,

courts

resolve

“may

not

conflicts

in

testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Wagenmann v.
Adams, 289 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 565 (1st Cir. 2003).
For these reasons, courts recognize that a party seeking relief
under this rule “faces an uphill battle.” Id.
Defendant

argues

that

there

was

not

sufficient

evidence

presented by Plaintiff to create a triable issue for the jury.
It

contends

that

Plaintiff

was

unable

to

establish

how

the

accident occurred, and that the evidence proves that the PRHTA’s
negligence, assuming there was any, was not the proximate cause
of

the

accident.

After

reviewing

the

record,

the

Court

disagrees.
Plaintiff presented, among other things, the testimony of
engineer Ralph Aronberg, who was admitted by the Court as an
expert in accident reconstruction and roadway safety.9 Aronberg
testified that the required signs were missing and that roadway

9

Defendant did not object to Aronberg being admitted as an expert in these
areas.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

markings

were

10

destroyed.10

In

his

opinion,

there

was

not

sufficient guidance for drivers traveling on that road, which in
turn created a sudden and unexpected situation for the truck
driver in this case.11 Finally, he concluded that due to these
circumstances and the conditions of the road, PRHTA was liable
for the accident. PRHTA, however, emphasizes among other things
the driver’s testimony that he was not looking straight ahead
and that he was familiarized with the road. But we stress that
the Court cannot weigh the evidence; it must limit its analysis
to whether Plaintiff presented evidence that could support its
theory. And the Court finds that he did.
PRHTA

further

argues

that

Plaintiff

did

not

prove

foreseeability since he did not present evidence of previous
accidents where Plaintiff was hit. The argument is unavailing.
First,

there

was

evidence

deterioration

of

impacts

previous

from

the

curb

presented
on

cars.

the

to

exit

Second,

the
ramp

jury

as

possibly

Plaintiff

need

to

the

due

to

not,

as

Defendant alleges, present a previous accident in the exact spot
of Plaintiff’s accident to prove foreseeability. Therefore, and
in

viewing

the

evidence

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

10

Aronberg explained that the analysis was conducted after several site
inspections, and after reviewing the plans and specification of the road, as
well as pictures of the accident.
11
The road where the accident occurred has three lanes immediately prior to
the accident. The right lane is an exit-only lane; vehicles traveling on this
lane must exit the highway or move to the middle lane, since it converts into
an emergency lane. Plaintiff parked his car in the emergency lane, and was
later hit by the truck.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

11

Plaintiff, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to
support the verdict in this case.
IV.

Motion for remittitur

The

jury

awarded

Plaintiff

a

total

of

$6,319,696.00.

The

specific amounts were as follows:
Medical Expenses
Past Lost Salaries12
Future Lost Salaries
Past Physical Pain and Suffering
Future Physical Pain and Suffering
Past Emotional Pain and Suffering
Future Emotional Pain and Suffering

$442,671
$65,000
$812,026
$100,000
$900,000
$1,500,000
$250,000

Defendant moves for remittitur arguing that the damages award
was

grossly

Circuit

has

excessive
held

that

and
“a

disproportionate.
verdict

should

But

stand

the

unless

First
it

is

grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience or so
high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to
stand.” Segal v. Gilbert Color Systems, Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 80-81
(1st Cir. 1984)(internal quotations marks omitted). And we do
not find that such is the case here.
Defendant

makes

two

arguments.

First,

it

avers

that

Jose

Herrero, Plaintiff’s expert witness, admitted to an error in the
calculation of lost salaries, and thus the amount awarded was
excessive.

We note that Defendant’s argument is vague as it

12

“Past lost salaries” means salaries lost from the accident up to the date
of judgment. The same applies for “past physical pain and suffering” and
“past emotional pain and suffering”.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

12

does not explain how the amount should have been calculated or
what the correct amount should have been. Thus, PRHTA fails to
“spell out its argument squarely and distinctly.” Rivera-Gomez
v. De Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 636 (1st Cir. 1988). Furthermore, it
is evident that the jury recognized an error as to the past lost
salaries, since it did not award the amount Plaintiff requested,
$82,277, and instead reduced it to $65,000.
Second,

Defendant

contends

that

the

$5,000,000

award

in

physical and emotional pain and suffering is grossly excessive
and should be a shock to the conscience of the Court. The Court
does not agree. Defendant does little to argue in a meaningful
way — and using the facts of this case — how the amount was
excessive. And it is well-settled that “issues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.” United States v. Zannino, 895
F.

2d

1,

17

testimony

of

(1st

Cir.

Plaintiff,

1990).
Dr.

Moreover,
Carlos

the

Grovas,

jury
an

heard

the

orthopedic

surgeon, Dr. Victor Santiago Noa, a psychiatrist and Dr. Agustin
Garcia, a psychologist, who all elaborated on the extent of
Plaintiff’s

permanent

emotional

and

physical

damages.

This

testimony was, for the most part, uncontested. And in the end,
the jury was instructed that the damages “must be reasonable and
based on reasoned discussion.” (Docket No. 134, p. 27). For

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

13

these reasons, the Court finds that the amount awarded was not
grossly excessive, and does do not warrant a remittitur.

As

such, the motion is denied.
V.

Motion for new trial

The Court grants a motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59 when the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence. Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc., 364 F.3d 368,
375 (1st Cir. 2004). However, the First Circuit has stated that
“the

trial

judge

must

give

due

deference

to

the

jury's

constitutionally sanctioned role as finder of fact.” Raymond v.
Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1521–1522 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus,
the Court may not overturn a jury verdict simply because it
would have decided the case differently. Velázquez v. Figueroa–
Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1993).
PRHTA argues that the evidence presented to the jury shows
that the truck driver’s negligence, not the PRHTA’s, was the
proximate

cause

of

the

accident,

considering

that

the

truck

driver testified to the following: (1) he was not looking at the
road ahead of him; (2) he never saw the warning lights of the
vehicles he later impacted; (3) that he was aware that the right
lane converted into an emergency lane (as he was familiar with
the road). The Court understands that such evidence certainly
carries

weight.

However,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

14

presented sufficient evidence, as detailed above, for the jury
to have reasonably found that the truck driver and PRHTA were
both liable for the accident. We are unconvinced that in finding
PRHTA

negligent,

the

jury

reached

“a

seriously

erroneous

result.” See Borras v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 586 F.2d 881, 887
(1st Cir. 1978).
Defendant also moves for a new trial arguing that the damages
awarded were excessive. When evaluating this type of request,
“the Court should only concern itself with the quality of the
evidence presented at trial, and should not compare the size of
the award to other awards.” Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 213
F.Supp.2d 42, 52 (D.P.R. 2002)(citing Havinga v. Crowley Towing
& Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1488 (1st Cir. 1994). Furthermore,
absent the most unusual case, a Court should not overturn a jury
award that has “substantial basis in the evidence presented.”
Gutiérrez–Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 579–80 (1st Cir.
1989).

After

review,

we

find

that

the

damages

awarded

were

consonant with the evidence presented by Plaintiff. Therefore,
and for the same reasons the Court found that a remittitur was
not warranted, Defendant’s request for a new trial is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Civil No. 12-1314 (JAG)

15

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 6th day of February, 2014.
S/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge