Vazquez-Robles v. Commoloco, Inc.

Filing 246

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 184 Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof. Vazquez's failure to accommodate claim brought pursuant to the ADA is time-barred. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defenda nt CommoLoCo as to this claim, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Vazquez's sole claim surviving summary judgment is her failure to accommodate claim brought pursuant to Law 44. Defendant may file a motion for summ ary judgment on the issues whether plaintiff's Law 44 claim is time-barred based on Law 44's one-year statute of limitations or otherwise time-barred based on an administrative exhaustion requirement no later than September 30, 2016. Plaintiff may oppose no later than October 17, 2016 and defendant may reply no later than October 24, 2016. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 09/12/2016. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MARIBEL VAZQUEZ-ROBLES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

COMMOLOCO, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Maribel
against

her

Vazquez-Robles
former

(Docket No. 1.)

(“Vazquez”)

employer,

brought

CommoLoCo,

Inc.

this

suit

(“CommoLoCo”).

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of

CommoLoCo on all claims except Vazquez’s failure to provide a
reasonable

accommodation

claims

brought

pursuant

to

the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Puerto Rico Law 44.
(Docket No. 226.)

The Court found that this ADA claim was time-

barred, but that Vazquez raised a factual dispute as to whether
she suffered from a severe mental disability for at least 127
days between August 24, 2010, and October 25, 2011, such that
the Court should equitably toll the limitations period.
To

resolve

this

factual

dispute,

evidentiary hearing on August 19, 2016.
witnesses at the hearing:

the

Court

Id.
held

an

Vazquez presented four

herself; her son, Freddy Ramirez; her

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

2

friend, Evelyn Ortiz-Feliciano; and her sister, Socorro VazquezRobles.

CommoLoCo

submitted

into

evidence

Vazquez’s

records

from the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation (“SIFC”).
After the hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law.

(Docket Nos. 243, 244.)

As explained below, the Court DECLINES to toll the statute
of

limitations

because

Vazquez

did

not

establish

that

she

suffered from a severe mental disability during the relevant
period.
I.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

In December 2009, Vazquez severely injured her back.
reported to the SIFC and was placed on rest.
work

in

February

2010

and

continued

to

She

She returned to

receive

medical

and

therapy treatment for her injury.
On August 27, 2010, Vazquez reported to the SIFC because
she was experiencing intolerable pain.
rest.

The SIFC placed her on

On September 1, 2010, Vazquez filed a charge against

CommoLoCo with the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Unit (“ADU”).
She was able to communicate with the ADU personnel and narrate
the alleged discriminatory incidents.
on September 14, 2010.

Vazquez returned to work

She worked until September 21, 2010,

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

3

when she again reported to the SIFC and was placed on rest for
one year.
On September 28, 2010, Vazquez attended a physical therapy
evaluation and complained of acute back pain.

On September 30,

2010, Vazquez went to the hospital because she was suffering
what she describes as an “emotional crisis.”
and hyperventilating.
Between

October

She was screaming

She remained hospitalized for three days.
2010

and

August

2011,

sister, and friend helped take care of her.
helped bathe her and dress her.
needed

this

assistance

physical conditions.

because

Vazquez’s

son,

For example, they

Vazquez testified that she
of

both

her

emotional

and

They cooked meals for her and drove her

places, although Vazquez occasionally drove herself.

Vazquez

spent most of her time in bed or watching television.

On one

occasion, Vazquez accompanied her son to the supermarket, but
started to cry because of her back pain and needed to return
home.

Vazquez’s friend testified that the only topic Vazquez

talked about during this period was CommoLoCo’s discrimination
against her.
Between
photos

and

account.

October
messages

2010
to

and

family

January
and

2011,

friends

Vazquez
on

her

posted

Facebook

For example, she thanked friends for their birthday

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

4

wishes, commented on the rescue of Chilean miners, and requested
help to repair her broken oven.
Between February and May 2011, Vazquez attended periodic
psychiatric

appointments.

She

complained

of

her

back

pain

during these appointments and expressed that she felt tearful
and worried.
In August 2011, Vazquez decided to dismiss the ADU charge.
She understood the orientation she received from the ADU before
dismissing the charge.

Vazquez testified that by August 2011,

she was feeling “well.”

She returned to work in September 2011.

II.

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

Courts may equitably toll a statute of limitations based on
mental disability “only if the plaintiff show[s] that the mental
disability was so severe that the plaintiff was unable to engage
in rational thought and deliberate decision making sufficient to
pursue [her] claim alone or through counsel.”

Vazquez Rivera v.

Figueroa, 759 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2014) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Melendez Arroyo v. Cutler Hammer de P.R. Co.,
273 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)).
“merely

.

.

.

establish[ing]

depression is not enough.”
“The

‘heavy

burden’

of

a

This is a high bar, and
diagnosis

such

as

severe

Melendez Arroyo, 273 F.3d at 38.

establishing

entitlement

to

equitable

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

5

tolling rests on the plaintiff.”

Vazquez Rivera, 759 F.3d at 50

(quoting Farris v. Shinseki, 660 F.3d 557, 563 (1st Cir. 2011)).
In Hernandez Arce v. Bacardi Corp., for example, the court
found that the plaintiff did not meet this rigorous equitable
tolling threshold because even though the plaintiff “felt no
desire to do anything” and was diagnosed with severe depression
requiring outpatient hospitalization, she was nonetheless “able
to function and comprehend her legal rights and liabilities.”
37 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115-16 (D.P.R. 1999) (Dominguez, J.).
Here, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates
that Vazquez suffered from severe back pain between August 2010
and August 2011.

This injury limited her mobility and therefore

her ability to clean herself, dress herself, cook meals, and
drive.
time

in

She also was in a depressive state, spending most of her
bed

or

watching

television.

No

evidence

suggests,

however, that this depressive state was so severe that she could
not communicate with others, understand her legal rights, or
make rational decisions.

To the contrary, she communicated with

friends, family members, doctors, and ADU personnel throughout
this period.
In sum, although Vazquez demonstrated that suffered from
physical pain and an emotional condition, she did not prove that

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

6

she was unable to engage in rational thought and deliberate
decision making for at least 127 days between August 24, 2010,
and October 25, 2011.

She has therefore not met her burden of

establishing entitlement to equitable tolling.
III.
In

light

conclusions,

of
the

the

CONCLUSION

foregoing

Court

factual

DECLINES

to

findings

toll

the

and

legal

statute

of

limitations because plaintiff Vazquez did not establish that she
suffered from a severe mental disability during the relevant
period.

Accordingly,

Vazquez’s

failure

to

brought pursuant to the ADA is time-barred.

accommodate

claim

The Court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of defendant CommoLoCo as to this
claim, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Vazquez’s

sole

claim

surviving

summary

judgment

is

her

failure to accommodate claim brought pursuant to Law 44.

No

later than September 30, 2016, defendant may file a motion for
summary judgment on the issues whether plaintiff’s Law 44 claim
is time-barred based on Law 44’s one-year statute of limitations
or otherwise time-barred based on an administrative exhaustion
requirement.

Defendant will also brief the Court as to whether

equitable tolling based on mental illness is recognized for Law
44 claims.

See Opinion and Order, docket number 226, pp. 23-24.

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)
Plaintiff

may

oppose

7
no

later

than

October

17,

2016

and

defendant may reply no later than October 24, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 12, 2016.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
United States District Judge