Vazquez-Robles v. Commoloco, Inc.

Filing 261

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 251 motion for summary judgment. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Vazquez's Law 44 claim is DISMISSED with prejudice, leaving no remaining claims. Final Judgment shall be entered dismissing this case in its entirety. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 05/15/2017. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MARIBEL VÁZQUEZ ROBLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)
COMMOLOCO, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by
defendant CommoLoCo, Inc. (“CommoLoCo”).

(Docket No. 251.)

For

the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
against

her

Maribel

Vazquez-Robles

erstwhile

employer,

(“Vazquez”)

CommoLoCo,

for

filed

suit

disability

discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with
Disability Act (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and Commonwealth laws.

(Docket No. 1.)

The Court granted summary

judgment in favor of CommoLoCo on all claims except Vazquez’s
failure to provide reasonable accommodation claim pursuant to P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501 (“Law 44").

(Docket Nos. 226 and 246.)

CommoLoCo now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing that Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)
time barred.

2

(Docket No. 251.)

Vazquez opposed the motion,

(Docket No. 255), and CommoLoco replied, (Docket No. 258).
LEGAL STANDARD
A court will grant summary judgment if the moving party shows,
based on materials in the record, “that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and [that the moving party] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“A dispute

is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable
jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 786 (1st Cir. 2011)
(quoting

Rodriguez-Rivera

v.

Federico

Trilla

Carolina, 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).
if

it

has

litigation.”

the

potential

of

determining

Reg’l.

Hosp.

of

“A fact is material
the

outcome

of

the

Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.

2008).
At the summary judgment stage, a court must construe the
entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 2005).

See DePoutot v.

A court must refrain

from making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence.
See McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2014).
also

must

speculation.

disregard
Id.

conclusory

allegations

and

A court

unsupported

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

3
DISCUSSION

CommoLoCo argues (1) that Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is timebarred, (2) that her filling with the Anti-Discrimination Unit
(“ADU”) did not toll the running of the statute of limitations,
and (3) that she cannot establish that her mental illness tolled
the one-year statute of limitations period because she did not
meet the applicable insanity standard.

(Docket No. 251.)

opposition,

Court

Vazquez

claims

that

the

should

In her

not

allow

CommoLoCo’s new motion for summary judgment and argues that her
filing with the ADU tolled the statute of limitations.

(Docket

No. 255.)
I.

Defendant’s New Motion for Summary Judgment
Vazquez claims that the “Court [should] not allow defendant’s

[second] motion for summary judgment” because the Court’s previous
Opinion and Order 1 solved all controversies regarding Law 44.
(Docket No. 255 at p. 3.)

Vazquez also claims that CommoLoco’s

second motion for summary judgment “runs afoul” of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but fails to elaborate on the issue.
It

is

black-letter

law

“that

issues

adverted

to

in

a

perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.”
17 (1st Cir. 1990).

U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 3,

Here, Vazquez fails to develop an argument as

to why the Court should not allow CommoLoCo’s motion.

1

Vazquez’s

Vazquez refers to the Opinion and Order of May 13, 2016.

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

4

claim regarding CommoLoco’s second motion for summary judgment
motion is therefore waived.
The Court concluded in its previous Memorandum and Order 2 that
only Vazquez’s failure to accommodate claim brought pursuant to
Law 44 remained.

(Docket No. 246 at p. 6.)

The Court specifically

stated that defendant could file a motion for summary judgment on
whether Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is time-barred or otherwise timebarred based on an administrative exhaustion requirement.
No. 246 at p. 6.)

(Docket

It is within a district court’s discretion

whether to allow a second motion for summary judgment.

See Zurich

American Ins. Co. v. Watts Regulator Co., 860 F.Supp.2d 81, 94 (D.
Mass. 2012).

Accordingly, the Court ALLOWS CommoLoCo’s second

motion for summary judgment.
II.

Law 44 and the Statute of Limitations
Law 44 is “the Puerto Rico analogue” to the American with

Disability Act (“ADA”) and is structured to harmonize Puerto Rico
law with the ADA.

See Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d

78, 88 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Torres-Alman v. Verizon Wireless,
522 F.Supp.2d 374, 402 (D.P.R. 2007) (Lopez, M. J.).

Law 44

prohibits institutions from “discriminat[ing] against persons with
some type of physical or mental disability.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1
§ 504.

2

Memorandum and Order of September 12, 2016.

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

5

A one-year statute of limitations applies to Law 44 claims.
See Toledo-Colon v. P.R., 812 F.Supp.2d 110, 119 (D.P.R.) (Gelpi,
J.).

State law determines the limitations period, while the date

of accrual is a federal law question.

Id. at 120.

“Under federal

law, the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff ‘knows
or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for [her]
claim.’”

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91,

96-97 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895
F.2d 38, 41 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1990).

One day after the date of

accrual, the one-year statute of limitations begins to run.

See

Gonzalez Garcia v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 214 F.Supp.2d 194, 200
(D.P.R. 2002); see also Benitez-Pons v. Commonwealth of P.R., 136
F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1998).
Filing an administrative charge with the Puerto Rico ADU tolls
the

statute

of

limitations

for

Law

administrative proceeding concludes.

44

claims

until

the

See Torres v. Junto de

Gobierno de Servicio de Emergencia, 91 F.Supp.3d 243, 256 (D.P.R.
2015).

In order for the extrajudicial claim to toll the statute

of limitations, the claim must (1) present an identical cause of
action and (2) request the same relief as the claim later presented
in court.

See Martinez v. Eagle Glob. Logistics (CEVA), Civil

No. 09-2265 (PG), 2011 WL 5025904 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2011); Matos
Ortiz v. Com. of P.R., 130 F.Supp.2d 60, 65 (D.P.R. 2000); Riofrio
Anda v. Ralston Purina, Co., 959 F.2d 1149, 1154 (1st Cir. 1992).

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

6

A somewhat related action arising from the same facts is not
enough; the action plaintiff presented at the ADU must be the same
in the action presented in this case to toll the statute of
limitations.

Martinez at *4; Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de

Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1978).
Here, Vazquez filed a charge against CommoLoCo with the ADU
on

September

1,

2010,

failure to accommodate.

claiming

disability

discrimination

(Docket No. 252-6.)

and

In her charge,

Vazquez requested that defendant CommoLoCo “cease and desist”
discriminating against her.

(Docket No. 252-6 at p. 8.)

On

July 26, 2016, Vazquez filed her complaint alleging disability
discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodation
pursuant to Law 44.

Here, she requested damages “not less than

one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)” for her Law 44 claim. (Docket
No. 1 at p. 21.)

While Vazquez’s ADU charge and Law 44 claim

present the same cause of action and satisfy the first prong, they
do not request the same relief and therefore fail to meet the
second prong.

Therefore, the Court finds that Vazquez’s charge

before the ADU did not toll the statute of limitations.
According

to

the

complaint,

CommoLoCo

denied

request for reasonable accommodation on August 24, 2010.
No. 1 at p. 8.)

Vazquez’s
(Docket

Thus, the one-year statute of limitations began

to run on August 25, 2010, which means that Vazquez had until
August 25, 2011 to file her Law 44 claim.

Vazquez filed her

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)

7

complaint on July 26, 2012, eleven months after the one-year
statute of limitations period.

(Docket No. 1.)

Because Vazquez’s ADU charge did not toll the one-year statute
of limitations, the Court finds that Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is
time-barred.
III. Applicable Insanity Standard
Puerto Rico Law 40 provides that an action may be tolled if
the person entitled to bring the action is insane.
tit. 32, § 254 (“Law 40”).

P.R. Laws Ann.

In order to toll the running of the

statute of limitations, the person must show that she was incapable
of comprehending her legal rights and liabilities or administering
her own affairs.

Torres v. A.F.F., 96 D.P.R. 648, 652 (1968).

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that the person
alleging insanity has the burden of proof.
CommoLoCo

argues

that

Vazquez

Id.

cannot

establish

that

her

mental disability tolled the statute of limitations because she
does not meet the applicable insanity standard pursuant to Law 44.
(Docket No. 251 at pp. 9-11.)
in her opposition.

Vazquez does not address this issue

(Docket No. 255.)

Previously, Vazquez presented evidence that she suffered from
severe back pain, which limited her mobility.
depressive state.

She was also in a

Vazquez presents no evidence, however, proving

that her depressive state was so severe that she was incapable of
comprehending her legal rights or administering her own affairs.

Civil No. 12-1600 (FAB)
Even

though

Vazquez

8
demonstrated

that

she

suffered

from

physical pain and an emotional condition, she did not prove that
she was insane pursuant to Law 40.

Because Vazquez does not meet

the applicable insanity standard pursuant to Law 40, the statute
of limitations was not tolled.

Accordingly, the Court finds that

Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is timed-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court DECLINES to toll
the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, Vazquez’s failure to

accommodate claim brought pursuant to the Law 44 is time-barred.
The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Vazquez’s Law 44 claim is DISMISSED with prejudice, leaving no
remaining claims.

Final Judgment shall be entered dismissing this

case in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 15, 2017.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE