Dominguez et al v. Figueroa-Sancha et al

Filing 101

ORDER granting 62 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 10/30/2015. (VCC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DANNY DOMINGUEZ, ELOINAI FERNANDEZ
AND ANGEL DIAZ,
Civil No. 12-1707 (PG)
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSE FIGUEROA SANCHA, et al.
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Co-Defendants José Figueroa Sancha (“Figueroa Sancha”), Emilio
Díaz

Colón

(“Díaz

Colón)

Colombani”)(collectively,

and
the

Guillermo

Somoza

“defendants”)

Colombani

filed

a

(“Somoza

Motion

for

Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 62). They ask the Court to find
that the complaint fails to state factual grounds regarding their
personal involvement in the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ civil
rights.
For the reasons stated herein, we GRANT the request.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on August 27, 2012. Docket No. 1.
The complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that defendants Figueroa
Sancha, Díaz Colón and Somoza Colombani failed to supervise, train,
discipline

and

control

their

subordinates.

On

February

22,

2013,

several defendants, including Figueroa Sancha, Díaz Colón and Somoza,
filed a Motion to Dismiss. Docket No. 12. They claimed, inter alia,
that

Eleventh

defendants

in

Amendment
their

Immunity

official

barred

capacities.

any

claims

They

also

against
claimed

the
that

plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. On September 30, 2014, the Court entered an Order granting in
part and denying in part the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 40.
On April 28, 2015, the defendants filed the Motion for Judgment
on

the

Pleadings.

Docket

No.

62.

Plaintiffs

filed

an

opposition.

Civil No. 12-1707 (PG)

Page 2

Docket No. 73. Defendants replied. Docket No. 77. A surreply followed.
Docket No. 81.

II.
Legal Standard
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) allows a party, “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, [to] move for
judgment

on

the

pleadings.”

Courts

treat

a

Rule

12(c)

Motion

for

Judgment on the Pleadings “very much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.” Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivera Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.
2008). Moreover, a court may not grant a defendant's Rule 12(c) motion
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.
To properly assess a Motion under Rule 12(c), the trial court
must accept all of the nonmovant's well-pleaded factual averments as
true. Rivera-Gomez v. De Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988).

II.
Discussion
The Complaint’s only allegations against Figueroa-Sancha, DiazColon and Somoza-Colombani is that they were “ultimately responsible
for

the

training,

supervision,

discipline,

control

and

conduct

of

[their] subordinates.” See Docket No. 1 at ¶8, 10 and 12.
The defendants assert that those skeletal allegations are not
enough to survive 12(c) scrutiny. According to defendants, because the
theory

of

respondeat

superior

is

not

applicable

in

§1983

suits,

plaintiffs had to plead that each government official, through his own
individual actions, had violated the Constitution.
Plaintiffs respond that the Court had already addressed the issue
in its Opinion and Order of September 30, 2014 (“O&O”). The O&O stated
that

further

factual

development

was

needed

to

reach

a

qualified

immunity determination as to the government officials and thus, the
Court did not dismiss the claims as to those defendants. See Docket
No. 40 at page 11. Thus, plaintiffs aver that they met their pleading
burden for a §1983 action.

Civil No. 12-1707 (PG)

Page 3

It is a well-established doctrine that a superior officer cannot
be

held

vicariously

liable

under

42

U.S.C.

§1983

on

a

respondeat

superior theory. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576,
581 (1st Cir. 1994). Hence, any claims against co-defendants Figueroa
Sancha, Díaz Colón and Somoza Colombani in their official capacity
cannot stand.
However, a superior officer may be found liable under §1983 in
his/her personal capacity. (“Although a superior officer cannot be
held

vicariously

liable

under

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

on

a

respondeat

superior theory, he may be found liable under section 1983 on the
basis of his own acts or omissions.”) Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo
Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-82 (internal citations omitted).
“One way in which a supervisor's behavior may come within this
rule is by formulating a policy, or engaging in a custom, that leads
to the challenged occurrence.” Id. (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 823–24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436–37, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)).
A supervisor “may be held liable for what he does (or fails to do) if
his behavior demonstrates deliberate indifference to conduct that is
itself

violative

of

a

plaintiff's

constitutional

rights.”

Id.

(citations omitted). Nevertheless, § 1983 liability cannot rest solely
on a defendant's position of authority. Ramirez-Lluveras v. RiveraMerced, 759 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2011)).
“To succeed on a supervisory liability claim, a plaintiff not
only must show deliberate indifference or its equivalent, but also
must

affirmatively

connect

the

supervisor's

conduct

to

the

subordinate's violative act or omission.” Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at
582 (citations omitted). To satisfy the causation requirement, the
plaintiff need not establish that the supervisor participated directly
in

the

conduct,

“a

sufficient

casual

nexus

may

be

found

if

the

supervisor knows of, overtly or tacitly approved of, or purposely
disregarded the conduct.” Id. (citing Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d
630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 902–03 (1st Cir. 1988)).

Civil No. 12-1707 (PG)

Page 4

Moreover, “the plaintiff must show that the official had actual
or

constructive

notice

of

the

constitutional

violation.”

Ramirez-

Lluveras, 759 F.3d at 20 (internal citations omitted).
Taking that framework as a roadmap, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs did not substantiate their claims against co-defendants.
There is no specific allegation as to how the co-defendants had actual
or

constructive

plaintiffs

notice

have

not

of

the

constitutional

established

the

violation.

“strong

causal

Moreover,

connection”

required under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), between the
supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation. See RamirezLluveras, 759 F.3d at 19 (“After Iqbal, as before, we have stressed
the

importance

of

showing

a

strong

causal

connection

between

the

supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.”).
Aside from the allegation that the prosecutor insisted on the
case because there were instructions “coming straight from San Juan,”
nothing else in the Complaint points to an affirmative link between
the behavior of the subordinates and the action or inaction of the
supervisors. And even that allegation does not link those particular
defendants to the civil rights violation that is at the heart of this
case.

Moreover,

widespread

there

abuse

is

no

sufficient

indication
to

alert

of
a

an

“known

supervisor

history
to

of

ongoing

violations.” Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 582.
IV.
Conclusion
In light of the above, the Court GRANTS defendants’ Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. The claims against José Figueroa Sancha,
Emilio Díaz Colón and Guillermo Somoza Colombani are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 30, 2015.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE