Arroyo-Morales v. Administracion de Correccion Del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R. et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 54 Motion for Summary Judgment: GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims pursuant to section 1983 and the RLUIPA are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 09/15/2016. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ORLANDO ARROYO-MORALES,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL NO.

12-1715 (FAB)

ADMINISTRACION DE CORRECCION, et
al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants
Rafael

Alexander

Rodriguez-Madera

Mendez-Serrano

(“Rodriguez-Madera”)

(“Mendez-Serrano”)

asserting

that

and
the

plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies properly
prior to filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”).

(Docket No. 54.)

Having

considered the content of that motion and plaintiff’s opposition,
(Docket No. 64), the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the events in question, plaintiff was an inmate
at the Bayamon 501 Correctional Facility.
p. 1.)

Following the death of his daughter, he made a vow never to

cut his hair again.
Id.

(Docket No. 60-1 at

Id.

Later, in 2009, he converted to Islam.

Although a certain skin condition prevented him from growing

facial hair in accordance with the traditional “religious vow of

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

2

the beard,” plaintiff’s Muslim chaplain allowed him to grow his
hair out instead. Id. at p. 1-2.

This vow created problems during

plaintiff’s incarceration at the Bayamon 501 facility, however,
when various prison officials demanded, pursuant to the prison
rules, that he submit to a haircut.

Id. at p. 2.

After several

encounters with the prison staff, plaintiff unwillingly allowed
them to cut his hair in March and July of 2012.
these incidents,
#B-646-12,

with

plaintiff
the

filed

an

Administrative

Id.

Following

administrative

grievance,

Remedies

Division

at

the

Department of Corrections on August 24, 2012, which asserted
violations
religion.

of
Id.

plaintiff’s

constitutional

right

to

freedom

of

On September 20, 2012, the Administrative Remedies

Division sent plaintiff an answer to his grievance, which stated
that it had no notice of his complaint and advised him to contact
the Regional Director with any further inquiries.

Id. at p. 3.

Plaintiff received this answer, but did not file a request for
reconsideration or otherwise appeal the evaluator’s decision.
at p. 4.

Id.

Nor did he request judicial review of the decision before

the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals.

Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiff did, however, file a complaint with this Court on
August 30, 2012 alleging violations of both his First Amendment
religious rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), and
the

Religious

Land

Use

and

Institutionalized

Persons

Act

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)
(“RLUIPA”).1

3

The essential issue before the Court is whether that

act of bringing federal suit was legally permissible at the time it
was taken.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A fact is “material” if it has the potential

to “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Id.

A dispute is “genuine” when it “could be resolved in favor of
either party.”

Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d

6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden
of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.”
party
1

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
must

demonstrate

this

through

definite

and

The

competent

On May 23, 2013, defendants Administración de Corrección del
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (“Administracion de
Correccion”),
Attorney
General
Guillermo
Somoza,
and
Rodríguez-Madera filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(Docket
No. 19.)
On September 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Marcos Lopez
issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the
motion be granted in part and denied in part. (Docket No. 25.) No
parties objected to the R&R, and it was adopted by the Court on
February 19, 2014. (Docket No. 44.) After the Court’s acceptance
of the R&R, the following claims remained:
(1) claims for
injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983 and RLUIPA against
Rodriguez-Madera in his official capacity; and (2) claims for
damages pursuant to section 1983 against Rodriguez-Madera in his
individual capacity.
All claims against the Administracion de
Correccion and Attorney General Guillermo Somoza were dismissed.

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)
evidence.

4

See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576,

581 (1st Cir. 1994). It must identify “portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any’” which support its motion.
Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

Once a properly supported motion

has been presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party “to
demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its]
favor.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d
46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
If the non-moving party establishes uncertainty as to the
“true state of any material fact, the movant’s efforts should be
deemed unavailing.”

See Lopez & Medina Corp, v. Marsh USA, Inc.,

694 F. Supp. 2d. 119, 123 (D.P.R. 2010) (citing Suarez v. Pueblo
Int’l., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).

It is well-settled that

“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is insufficient
to

defeat

a

properly

supported

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
opposing

summary

evidence

to

for

summary

judgment.

It is therefore necessary that “a party

judgment

rebut

motion

the

must

‘present

motion.’”

definite,

competent

Maldonado-Denis

v.

Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal
citation omitted). Otherwise, if the non-moving party’s case rests
merely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable references, and
unsupported

speculation,”

summary

judgment

is

appropriate

Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayagüez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st
Cir. 2006).

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

5
DISCUSSION

The sole argument advanced by defendants in their motion for
summary judgment is that plaintiff’s action before this Court
should be precluded by his failure to exhaust the administrative
remedies

provided

Corrections

(“PR

to

him

by

DOC”).

the

Puerto

(Docket

No.

Rico
54

Department

at

p.

2,

of

11.)

Specifically, defendants point to plaintiff’s failure to request
reconsideration of the evaluator’s response to his grievance, and
to seek judicial review of that answer before the Puerto Rico Court
of Appeals.

Id. at p. 11.

The failure to pursue these steps prior

to filing a federal lawsuit, defendants argue, violated the PLRA
and should therefore prove fatal to plaintiff’s current action.
Plaintiff

admits

that

he

did

not

properly

exhaust

administrative remedies before filing with this Court.
No. 64 at p. 5.)
exceptions,

his

(Docket

He points, however, to several discretionary

pursuant

to

Puerto

Rico

law,

to

the

exhaustion

requirement and argues that his case falls within the boundaries of
that safe harbor.
below, the

Court

Id. at pp. 5-6.
finds that

For the reasons discussed

plaintiff failed

to

exhaust

his

administrative remedies in violation of the PLRA and that the cited
exceptions should not be invoked here to waive that failure.
I.

The PLRA and Administrative Remedy Requirements
The PLRA states that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . .
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

6

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Thus, pursuant to the PLRA,

exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is “mandatory”
and “a prerequisite to suit.”
(2002).

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524

This means that a plaintiff must exhaust all available

remedies prior to commencing an action in federal court, even if
the available remedies are not “plain, speedy, and effective” or do
“not meet federal standards.”

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Given the mandatory nature of the exhaustion requirement, proof of
a

plaintiff’s

failure

to

exhaust

warrants

dismissal

of

a

plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211
(2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under
the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”);
Johnson

v.

Thyng,

369

Fed.

Appx.

144,

149

(1st

Cir.

2010);

Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs, however, need not plead exhaustion in the complaint.
Rather, the exhaustion requirement functions as an affirmative
defense, thus placing the burden of showing non-exhaustion on the
defendants.

See Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.

2002) (holding that “exhaustion of PLRA remedies is an affirmative
defense”); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (affirming the First
Circuit Court of Appeals and other circuits’ conclusion that
exhaustion is an affirmative defense).
To exhaust administrative remedies properly, a prisoner must
complete the grievance procedures specified by the prison system in

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)
which he is held.

7

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.

“[I]t is the

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries
of proper exhaustion.” Id. Accordingly, to determine the relevant
boundaries of exhaustion in this case, the Court must look to the
particulars of the PR DOC’s internal grievance process.
II.

The PR DOC’s Grievance Process
The

procedure

correctional
established

by

population
by

the

PR

which
can
DOC

a

member

seek
in

its

of

the

administrative
Regulation

to

Puerto

Rico

remedies

was

Address

the

Applications for Administrative Remedies Filed by Members of the
Correctional Population. That procedure basically consists of five
tiers of review, as follows:2

(1) review of the prisoner’s

petition by an evaluator, (2) an appeal, following the evaluator’s
response, to the regional coordinator, (3) a motion to have the
regional coordinator reconsider his decision, (4) an appeal to the
program director if the prisoner is unsatisfied with the regional
coordinator’s resolution, and (5) a request for judicial review
before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals.

Each of these steps must

be pursued in turn for a prisoner to exhaust his administrative
remedies fully, as required by the PLRA.

See Cruz–Berrios v.

Oliver–Baez, 792 F.Supp.2d 224, 228–229 (D.P.R. 2011) (Besosa, J.)

2

Because plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, the Court need not describe the PR DOC’s
grievance process at length. For a more detailed explanation of
the applicable procedures, see Cruz–Berrios v. Oliver–Baez, 792
F.Supp.2d 224, 228–229 (D.P.R. 2011) (Besosa, J.).

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

8

(“Pursuing administrative remedies by taking some, but not all, of
the steps available does not constitute exhaustion for the purpose
of determining whether a party has exhausted all administrative
remedies.”) (citing Johnson v. Thyng, 369 Fed. Appx. at 148.)
Here, plaintiff Arroyo-Morales admits that he failed to take
all steps included in the PR DOC’s grievance process before filing
his complaint with this Court.

(Docket No. 64 at p. 5.)

This

concession is substantiated by evidence in the record showing that
he neither requested review of the evaluator’s response by the
regional coordinator, nor sought judicial review by the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals.

See Docket No. 60-1 at pp. 3-5.

Rather, he

pursued only the preliminary tiers of administrative review, and
chose not to avail himself of the additional procedures provided to
him as part of the correctional facility’s internal grievance
process.
satisfied

Based on this uncontroverted evidence, the Court is
that

plaintiff

did

not

exhaust

all

available

administrative remedies offered by the PR DOC, a mandatory prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court.

Plaintiff argues,

however, that his failure to exhaust should be excused by certain
discretionary exceptions available pursuant to the Puerto Rico
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, Law No. 170 (“Law 170”), P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 2173.
issue.

The Court now turns to this waiver

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

9

III. Discretionary Waiver of Exhaustion Pursuant to Law 170
Section 2173 of Puerto Rico’s Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act authorizes courts to waive exhaustion requirements in certain
circumstances.

The statute provides, in pertinent part, that:

The court may exempt a petitioner from having to
exhaust any or all of the administrative remedies
provided in case such remedy is inadequate or that
requiring its exhaustion would cause irreparable harm to
the petitioner and in the balance of interests it is not
justified to exhaust such remedies, or when a substantive
violation of constitutional rights is alleged, or when it
is useless to exhaust the administrative remedies due to
an excessive delay in the procedures . . . .”
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 2173.

Plaintiff requests that the Court

apply these discretionary exceptions to excuse his exhaustion
failure

and

allow

his

federal

lawsuit

proceed. (Docket No. 64 at pp. 5-6.)

against

defendants

to

As discussed above, however,

the PLRA speaks in unambiguous terms, providing that “[n]o action
shall be brought” absent exhaustion of available administrative
remedies.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a).

The Supreme Court of the United

States has recently reaffirmed its interpretation of this statutory
text to mean that there are essentially “no limits on an inmate’s
obligation to exhaust” and that “a court may not excuse a failure
to exhaust, even to take [special] circumstances into account.”
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2016); see
also

Woodford

v.

Ngo,

548

U.S.

81,

90

(2006)

(finding

that

administrative law requires “proper exhaustion” of administrative
remedies, “which means using all steps that the agency holds out,
and doing so properly.”) (internal quotations omitted.)

In other

Civil No. 12-1715 (FAB)

10

words, the Supreme Court has made clear that the PLRA establishes
a

mandatory

exhaustion

discretion.”

regime,

thereby

“foreclosing

Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1857.

judicial

Consequently, “every

attempt to deviate . . . from [the PLRA’s] textual mandate” has
been rejected.

Id.

Mindful of the Supreme Court’s observation

that “wide-ranging discretion ‘is now a thing of the past’” with
respect to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Court DECLINES
the opportunity to waive plaintiff’s exhaustion failure through
application of Law 170’s discretionary exceptions.

Id. at 1858

(quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 732 (2001)). Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendants
demonstrate

that

have

successfully

plaintiff

did

carried
not

their

exhaust

all

burden

to

available

administrative remedies before commencing this federal action, as
required by the PLRA.

Accordingly, their motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 54) is hereby GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to section 1983 and the RLUIPA are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 15, 2016.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE