Martell-Rodriguez v. Administracion de Correcion et al

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Juan M Perez-Gimenez on 2/14/2013. (PMA)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

HARRY MARTELL RODRÍGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Case. NO. 12-1726 (PG)

ADMINISTRACIÓN
AL.

DE

CORRECCIÓN,

ET

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Pedro Santos Echevarria’s motion to
dismiss

pursuant

to

FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6)

(Docket

No.

11).

Therein,

Defendant requests that this Court dismiss the claim brought by Plaintiff
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, insofar as the latter failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies prior to filing the above-captioned complaint.
For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s request, and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim.
I.
On May 14, 2012,
“Plaintiff”)

filed

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
plaintiff Harry Martell Rodriguez (hereinafter

Remedy

Department of Correction

Request

FMCP-254-12

before

the

Puerto

Rico

and Rehabilitation’s Administrative Remedies

Division. Therein, Plaintiff sought relief after defendant Pedro Santos
Echevarria (hereinafter “Defendant”) allegedly failed to process some
letters he had sent through the U.S. Postal Office. In his request,
Plaintiff alleges having exhausted all possible administrative remedies.
See Docket No. 2-1.

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

On
failed

May
to

17,

Page 2

2012,

comply

regulation,

with

namely,

Rehabilitation

Plaintiff’s
Rules

the

VII(1)

Puerto

Regulation

request

No.

Rico
8145

and

was

dismissed

XIII(7)1

Department
of

January

because

of

the

of

Correction

23,

it

applicable

2012,

and

titled

“Regulation for Considering Requests for Administrative Remedies Filed by
the Members of the Correctional Population” (hereinafter “Regulation”).
See Docket No. 14-1. Shortly afterwards, on May 29, 2012, Plaintiff
requested

a

reconsideration

and,

on

June

19,

2012,

the

Regional

Coordinator of the Administrative Remedies Division recommended that the
previous determination be confirmed inasmuch as it was proper pursuant to
the applicable Regulation.2 Plaintiff then filed an appeal before the
State Court of Appeals in which he sought judicial review of the agency’s
determination.

The

state

court

dismissed

the

claim

for

lack

of

jurisdiction. See Docket No. 14-3. On September 6th, 2012, Plaintiff
filed the above-captioned complaint before this Court and Defendant filed
a

motion

to

dismiss

pursuant

to

FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6)

arguing

that

Plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions to dismiss brought under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
are subject to the same standard of review. See Negrón-Gaztambide v.
Hernández-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1994). Firstly, when ruling on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court “must
1

Rule VII(1) states that “the member of the correctional population shall be responsible
for filing the requests for remedies in a clear, concise, and honest manner, indicating
the dates and names of the people involved in the incident. Likewise, the member shall
offer all information needed to resolve his or her claim effectively.” See Docket No. 141.
Rule XIII (7)(a) states that “the evaluating official has the authority to dismiss the
following requests: A request that has not complied with the procedures of this
regulation.” See Docket No. 14-1.
2

The Regional Coordinator noted that the claim lacked critical information, namely, the
dates in which the letters at issue were sent. See Docket No. 14-2.

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

Page 3

accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint,
draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor, and
determine whether the complaint,

so read, limns facts sufficient to

justify recovery on any cognizable theory.” Rivera v. Centro Médico de
Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing LaChapelle v.
Berkshire

Life

Ins.

Co.,

142

F.3d

507,

508

(1st

Cir.

1998)).

Additionally, courts “may augment the facts in the complaint by reference
to (i) documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it,
and (ii) matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan,
513 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In

determining

whether

dismissal

of

a

complaint

is

appropriate

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the court must keep in mind that
“[t]he general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief… this short and
plain statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the…
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gargano v. Liberty Intern.
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations
and

quotation

marks

omitted).

Nevertheless,

“even

under

the

liberal

pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court
has… held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a
plausible entitlement to relief.’” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc.,
490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff

pleads

factual

content

that

allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

Page 4

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level… on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and
quotation

marks

omitted).

“Determining

whether

a

complaint

states

a

plausible claim for relief will… be a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a two
pronged

approach.

It

should

begin

by

identifying

and

disregarding

statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched
as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ocasio-Hernández

v.

Fortuño-Burset,

640

F.3d

1,

12

(1st

Cir.

2011)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although a complaint attacked by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6)

“does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations… a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555

(internal

citations

and

quotation

marks

omitted). That is, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions
from

the

complaint

or

naked

assertions

devoid

of

further

factual

enhancement.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009)
(citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1960). “Non-conclusory factual allegations in
the

complaint

must

then

be

treated

as

true,

even

if

seemingly

incredible.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 9 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1951).

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

Page 5

When evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not
“attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if… a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of
the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw
from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at
13.
III. DISCUSSION
Claims

arising

under

the

Prison

Litigation

Reform

Act

of

1995

(“PLRA”) require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing
suit in court. Accordingly, under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]3, or any other
Federal

law,

by

a

prisoner

confined

in

any

jail,

prison,

or

other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§

1997e(a)).

The

Court

also

held

that

“failure

to

exhaust

is

an

affirmative defense under the PLRA,” id. at 216, and as such, “defendant
prison officials must specifically raise the failure to do so as a
defense. If they do not, the defense may well be waived.” Id. In the case
at hand, Defendant has raised such defense, and therefore, has not waived
the same.

3

Section 1983 states that:
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

Page 6

With regards to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, the First Circuit
has held that “[a] prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before a
complaint under § 1983 will be entertained even where the relief sought
cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Johnson v. Thyng, 369
Fed.Appx. 144 at 147 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001)). The Court also noted that “[e]xhaustion
is mandatory,” Johnson, 369 Fed.Appx. at 146 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)), and “has a
decidedly procedural emphasis.” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
“Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve
disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being
haled into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204 (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S at
94-95). In addition, this requirement “has the potential to reduce the
number of inmate suits, and also to improve the quality of suits that are
filed by producing a useful administrative record.” Id.
In order to exhaust the administrative remedies, the prisoner must
comply with the applicable regulation. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88
(holding

that

in

order

to

properly

exhaust

administrative

remedies

prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance
with the applicable procedural rules). These “rules are defined not by
the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Compliance with
prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the
PLRA to properly exhaust.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 228. “The level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will
vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prisons
requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Id.

Civil No. 12-1726 (PG)

Page 7

Under Rule VII(1) of the applicable regulation, the prisoner had
the responsibility of including with his petition, among other things,
“the dates and names of people involved in the incident.” (Docket No. 141). Accordingly, the Court finds that by failing to include the dates of
the

correspondence

grievance

process,

in

question,

and

hence,

he
to

also

failed

adequately

to

comply

exhaust

the

with

the

available

administrative remedies. Consequently, as set forth by the Defendant,
Plaintiff is barred from filing suit before this Court until he properly
exhausts all administrative remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
In

light

of

the

aforementioned,

this

Court

hereby

GRANTS

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 11) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 14, 2013.

S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE